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ABSTRACT 
ABSTRACT 
The thesis investigates how a justice framework is relevant to analysis of the role of 
international law in relation to climate change-compelled human displacement. In 
particular, through the application of a justice framework, questions of responsibility 
will be explored. It will be argued that such a lens provides unique insights 
concerning conceptualisations of the role international law may play, or should play, 
in relation to the phenomenon. Specific justice theories selected are corrective and 
distributive justice, which will be explored in a substantial theoretical chapter 
fanning the analytical backbone of the thesis. The theories then inform the more 
contextualised analysis about the role of international law in relation to climate 
change and human displacement. Corrective justice permits analysis of whether 
climate change-compelled displacement, including the livelihood impacts that may 
precede it, could be conceived as damage or harm which is compensable under 
international law, either through fault-centred regimes or no-fault regimes (i.e. 
insurance). Distributive justice permits analysis of whether climate change-
compelled displacement could potentially be framed as an undeserved and 
disproportionate burden which stipulates international action to rebalance it, through 
distributing either costs or burdens. The thesis hopes to contribute to the growing 
scholarship concerning international law, climate change and human displacement 
by investigating the bounds of the law where the phenomenon is viewed as one of 
responsibility and of justice. 
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CHAPTER ONE THESIS INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTERl 
Thesis Introduction 
Justice? - You get justice in the next world. In this one you have the law. 
(William Gaddis, 1994)1 
1. Climate Change, Displacement, International Law and Justice 
The possibility that anthropogenic (man-made) climate change and its effects could 
impact, compel or induce human displacement has been the subject of much 
reporting and debate for some time. Prevalent have been images of 'drowning 
islands' creating 'castaways' in dramatic fashion,2 joined, at times, by concerns that 
millions of 'climate (change) refugees' would result from the effects of climate 
c_hange. 3 Academic scholarship concerning human displacement which may arise 
-
from environmental change generally, and the impacts of climate change in 
particular, has turned to urging caution against the often overly simplistic and 
sensationalist depictions entailed in such portrayals.4 Rather, scholarship has turned 
to infusing debates about the possibility of such human movement with greater 
nuance. Maj or contributions have been made towards uncovering the many possible 
expressions of n1ovement ( or even a lack thereof) arising from ( or in relation to) 
climate change in1pacts, its complex and often inter-acting causes and possible ways 
1 William Gaddis, A Frolic of His Own (Scribner, 1994) 13. 
2 See, eg, Ben Doherty, 'Clilnate Change Castaways Consider Move to Australia', Sydney Morning 
Herald (online), 7 January 2012 <http: //www.smh.com.au/environment/cliinate-change/cliinate-
change-castaways-consider-move-to-australia-20120106-1 pobf.hhnl>. Further examples are cited 
throughout the thesis. 
3 See, eg, John Vidal, ' Global Warning Could Create 150 Million "Climate Refugees ' by 2050', The 
Guardian (online), 3 November 2009 <http ://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/03/global-
warming-climate-refugees>. Scholars, too, have stipulated the possibility of mass displacement in the 
clilnate change context, which will be critically explored in greater detail in the next chapter. 
4 See, eg, Carol Farbotko, 'Wishful Sinking: Disappearing Islands, Clilnate Refugees and 
Cosmopolitan Experilnentation' (2010) 51 Asia Pacific Viewpoint 47; more also in ch 2 of this thesis. 
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to address it. 5 The discipline of international law has been important in this effort. It 
has contributed in significant ways to moving the discourse concerning the 
phenomenon away from its overly sensationalist and simplistic origins, bound to the 
idea of the so-called 'climate refugee', to a more nuanced perspective. 6 Great strides 
have been made in taking the discipline beyond its early discovery that international 
refugee law will have a negligible part to play, at best, where human movement is 
compelled by, or linked to, anthropogenic climate change' s effects. Instead, the 
discipline has explored the relevance of a host of other international law branches 
and sub-branches and has uncovered an array of potential obligations held by states 
( and other actors) in relation to such movement. 7 
This thesis seeks to infuse the relationship between climate change, human 
n1ovement and international law with a further dimension - justice. The fact that 
anthropogenic climate change in general raises a host of justice issues is now widely 
acknowledged. 8 People movement arising from ( or in relation to) climate change 
impacts is also recognised to raise justice or equity concerns,9 in particular, where it 
is not desired and involuntary, 1noven1ent perhaps best described as displacement, a 
term which will be employed widely throughout the thesis. 10 Similarly, geo-spatial 
inequities in the distribution of both displacees and migrants ( often considered those 
moving 1nore voluntarily) in the climate change context have been conceded, with 
5 For an overview of a lot of the most important scholarship, see International Organization for 
Migration, 'People on the Move in a Changing Climate: A Bibliography' (2012). And consult ch 2 of 
this thesis and the bibliography. 
6 See, in particular, Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2012). A fuller representation of the relevant scholarship is provided in ch 3 
of this thesis. 
7 These findings are presented in ch 3 of this thesis. 
8 See, eg, S Gardiner, S Caney, D Jamieson and H Shue, Climate Ethics: Essential Readings (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2010). 
9 See, eg, Laura Westra, Environmental Justice and the Rights of Ecological Refugees (Earthscan, 
2009). 
1
° Ch 2 will justify the usage of the term 'displacement' in this thesis and further clarify definitional 
issues. 
2 
CHAPTER ONE THESIS INTRODUCTION 
many poorer, developing states and their citizens expected to be burdened more 
considerably. 11 Yet the concept of justice rarely features in an explicit form in the 
legal scholarship concerning climate change and people movement. This thesis 
argues that this is a serious limitation. 12 
The thesis contends that the concept of justice enables legal considerations, 
especially those pertaining to international law, to be imbued with a question 
significantly underexplored in the scholarship. 13 As has been noted, international law 
scholarship concerning people movement in the climate change context has been 
motivated by a desire to explore the relevance of a host of the law's branches and 
sub-branches for their relevance in responding to such movement. Some important 
potential obligations have thus been discovered. 14 However, obligations here are 
conceptualised as those that arise out of the positive law, which means scholarship 
has largely been bound by the purposes or opportunities inherent in the law itself. 
What a justice-centred analysis, importantly, adds to this is e-onsideration of what 
obligations may exist instead in relation to the question of responsibility - for harm, 
for damage, or for disproportionate burdens, for example. Is it possible that the 
relevance and applicability of international law are different if the analysis is bound 
to questions of justice, and therefore of responsibility? The task of this thesis is to 
explore this in some detail. 
11 Distributional issues have, eg, been considered in Foresight, 'Migration and Global Environmental 
Change: Final Report (Government Science Office, UK, 2011); more also in ch 7 of this thesis. 
12 Jean-Fran9ois Dw·ieux notes that a focus on (climate) justice in scholarship concerning climate 
change, human movement and international law is an under-explored gap; see Jean-Frarn;ois Durieux, 
'Book Review: Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law '(2013) 25 International 
Journal of Refugee Lavv 187, 189. 
13 Although subject to more detailed discussion in ch 4, it may be useful to state from the outset how 
law 1nay differ from justice. According to the Law Dictionary, law is 'any system of regulations to 
govern the conduct of the people of a community, society or nation, in response to the need for 
regularity, consistency and justice-based upon collective human experience', whereas justice refers to 
'fairness' , '1noral rightness ' or 'a scheme or system of law in which every person receives his/her/its 
due from the system, including all rights both natural and legal. ' In other words the two are separate 
but linked; see Law Dictionary (2014) <http: //dictionary.law.com/>. 
14 Ch 3 of this thesis outlines these in greater detail. 
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2. Why Justice? What Justice? 
This thesis focuses on the concepts of climate change and displacement; doing so, it 
emphasises the idea that people movement arising from the effects of anthropogenic 
climate change may be involuntary, not desired, imposed, a burden. 15 The thesis will 
analyse how responsibilities may arise and may be invoked in relation to this. Of 
course, it is possible to consider the question of responsibility in this context in 
different ways. The thesis has selected a specific framework to approach this. It 
contends that justice theory provides a particularly appropriate analytical background 
by which to approach the question. Justice, at its heart, is essentially conce1ned with 
one thing: how, in human interactions and relations, each party is rendered its due. 
The flip side of this concern is, of course, what ought to happen where one party has 
not been rendered this; what responsibilities this engenders amongst the parties, 
especially the one which has failed to render what is due. It is easy to see how an 
analysis bound only by this question is difficult to reign in, or how such an analysis 
might become perhaps utopian. Therefore this thesis is bound by two further 
limitations: First, the thesis utilises only two particular justice constructs - corrective 
and distributive justice. Aristotle, to whose theory of justice the two are essential, 
contended that all justice disputes concerning human interactions ultimately fit either 
of these constructs. Chapter Four will outline this and provide further justification for 
why these two have been selected. For now, it should suffice to say that corrective 
justice permits analysis of whether clin1ate change-compelled displacement, or the 
livelihood and other impacts that precede it and the consequences that follow it, 
could be conceived as damage, loss or harm that is compensable. Two versions of 
15 Ch 2 of this thesis provides ftniher explanations and justification for this focus and will highlight 
complexities conce1ning the usage of the tenn 'climate change (and) displacement'. 
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corrective justice are considered: one 'pure' and fault- or perpetrator-centred, the 
other 'rough' and less focused on fault and the identification of perpetrators. 
Distributive justice, on the other hand, permits analysis of whether climate change-
compelled or related displacement could potentially be framed as an undeserved and 
disproportionate burden requiring collective rebalance. The thesis will argue that this 
is indeed possible. Two models are then considered: one essentially focused on 
rebalancing through cost-sharing, the other through burden-sharing. Secondly, the 
. analysis in chapters to follow is further bound by justice considerations as they arise 
in relation to international law. In other words, guided by corrective and distributive 
justice, the analysis will centre on how international law may be relevant to 
displacement in the climate change context if viewed from the perspective of the two 
selected justice paradigms. 
3. Argument and Structure 
The thesis will proceed with the following overall argumentative structure: it 
contends that human displacement in the climate change context is a complex 
phenomenon, which raises intricate questions concerning responsibilities and 
obligations, and for the application and relevance of international law and of justice 
theory, especially where the two are to be applied in concert. Nevertheless, although 
the phenomenon may be complex, multi-causal and multi-dimensional, a 
contributing factor to its occurrence is, undoubtedly, anthropogenic (man-made) 
climate change, or rather its effects (which is why the notion of displacement, in the 
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first place, is the focus of this thesis above others16). This means that interesting 
questions of responsibility are raised, which have not often been explored in the 
existing international law scholarship concerning the phenomenon, a gap which this 
thesis will seek to fill through the application of justice theory, in particular, the 
application of corrective justice and distributive justice concepts. 
Chapter Two is scene-setting and provides the non-legal background to the 
thesis. It does so by analysing simultaneously the discourse which has emerged 
surrounding climate change and people movement and the evidence concerning both 
the anthropogenic nature of climate change and the impact of its effects upon human 
displacement. It will argue that the former ( the discourse) was long damaging to 
conceptualisations of people movement in the climate change context, with 
potentially detrimental consequences for persons and communities likely to be 
affected, and, arguably, with consequences for the extent to which a justice-inspired 
framework appears relevant. In exploring the evidence, the--chapter will briefly 
present the no-longer controversial argument that current climate change is 
anthropogenic in nature but also highlight that the effects of climate change alone 
will not compel displacement ( or even inevitably compel it). Rather, the chapter will 
show that, where movement occurs, it may well be the result of a number of 
interacting factors of which the effects of climate change may only be one. The 
implications that this may have for a justice-inspired analysis of the phenomenon 
will be highlighted but the chapter will conclude that the relationship between 
anthropogenic climate change and the possibility of displacement is nevertheless not 
insignificant, which does raise important questions about responsibility best explored 
16 See ch 2 of this thesis. 
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through application of a justice-inspired analytical framework, including in relation 
to international law. 
Chapter Three is contextual and it will present the treatment of climate change 
and human displacement in the international law scholarship. The discipline has 
undoubtedly played its part in raising awareness about the phenomenon and has 
made great strides in exploring and uncovering the relevance of many of 
international law's areas of speciality to addressing displacement in the climate 
change context. However, the chapter will also draw attention to a limitation which is 
notable in the disciplinary treatment - that it has focused largely on the positive 
law's inherent opportunities and purposes, and less so upon other important 
principles, which include justice. This has further meant that the discipline is focused 
on how the law may be relevant in responding to displacement in the climate change 
context, how to deal with its consequences. Some obligations arising from the 
positive law have thus been uncovered. However, this thesis will seek to explore the 
questions of obligations from a different angle, notably that of responsibility. 
Chapter Four is also contextual and presents the theoretical framework to be 
employed in later chapters. It has already been noted that the analytical framework or 
lens this thesis will utilise is justice theory, through which questions of responsibility 
between interacting parties are commonly explored. In particular, the chapter will 
seek to justify why the specific angles of corrective and distributive justice have been 
selected. Substantial sections of the chapter will explore the nature and scope of each 
and will also seek to evaluate the extent to which questions of 'justice' usually 
feature in international law scholarship. 
Chapter Five will be the first of two chapters which will take one particular 
justice angle - namely corrective justice - and apply it to questions of responsibility 
7 
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under international law in relation to climate change and human displacement. The 
chapter will explore whether a 'pure' corrective claim could be established under 
international law, one where casualties (the bearers of loss or harm), a specific 
perpetrator ( or several) and actually correctable harm, damage or loss are all 
established. The chapter will conclude that this may be very difficult, not least 
because of how corrective justice is incorporated or reflected in international law, 
and because of the complexities highlighted in Chapter Two. 
Chapter Six will continue with corrective justice, but in a less 'pure' form. The 
chapter builds on its predecessor in acknowledging that identifying a specific 
perpetrator ( or even several) in particular in the anthropogenic climate change 
context is complex and difficult but that this cannot mean that those affected 
detrimentally by its effects have no opportunity to seek redress. It will rely on the 
logic which has informed the establishment of no-fault compensatory mechanisms -
especially those akin to insurance - in exploring alternative, 'rougher' mechanisms 
of compensation and correction. Detailed attention will also be paid to existing 
support for such mechanisms under international law and for their specific relevance 
to climate change and human displacement. 
Chapter Seven will move the analysis forward to the realm of distributive justice 
and away fron1 conceptualisations of displacement as compensable harm or damage. 
Rather, the chapter will construct the climate change and displacement phenomenon 
as one of unequal distribution, arguing that it may be geo-politically distr.ibuted in 
disproportional ways but also that it presents a burden which is disproportionate 
given that some_ have unjustly benefited from processes which have contributed to its 
occurrence. The chapter will argue that such distributional issues require rectification 
as a matter of distributive justice. The chapter will also explore the extent to which 
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international law incorporates distributive justice notions and how it may be achieved 
under international law in relation to climate change and human displacement. The 
investigation will focus, in pa1iicular, on international environmental law and the 
emerging international adaptation (finance) architecture, and thus the possibility of 
distributive justice through cost distribution for those facing displacement or wishing 
to prevent it. 
Chapter Eight will also rely on distributive justice concepts to analyse whether 
the concept of burden-sharing known to international law and relations, especially in 
the displacement context, provides an additional means by which to approach 
distributional issues (those facing states who must shelter or assist displacees) in the 
climate change and displacement context. The chapter will explore the concept's 
normative foundations, in particular in relation to justice, and show how these are 
complex, therefore 1naking this a difficult concept to apply in relation to the 
phenomenon explored in this thesis. The chapter will nevertheless explore inter-state 
motivations for sharing, experience with burden-sharing in the displacement context, 
reflections of the notion of sharing ( and the related concepts of cooperation and 
solidarity) in international law, as well as burden-sharing proposals already put 
forward in relation to climate change and human displacement, all in an effort to 
delimit the boundaries of its relevance for the purposes of this thesis. 
The Conclusion presented in Chapter Nine, naturally, will collate the maJor 
. themes and outcomes which have emerged in the preceding chapters. Key insights 
gained through the application of a justice framework will be identified and situated 
in the context also of possible limitations of a justice approach. The Conclusion will, 
finally, highlight gaps that the thesis was unable to address and recommend possible 
worthwhile avenues for further study. 
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CHAPTER2 
Climate Change and Displacement: Utility and Complexity 
[L}et 's be honest: I 'd come in search of imminent catastrophe. 
(Mark Levine, 2002)1 
[A} shadow that is no less om,inous because it is formless and obscure. 
2 (Rachel Carson, 1962) 
1. Introduction 
In debates about the environment and human mobility, climate change and its effects 
are increasingly playing a prominent role. Climate change impacts upon the 
environment, natural resources and human livelihoods seemingly provide a 
persuasive case to argue that environmental factors could compel people to move -
possibly on a very large scale.3 Sometimes highlighted in the literature to support 
-
this point is the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which noted in 
its first Assessment Report that: 
[t]he gravest effects of cli1nate change 1nay be those on human 1nigration, as 1nillions 
are displaced by shoreline erosion, coastal flooding and severe drought. Many areas to 
which they flee are likely to have insufficient health and other support services to 
acco1nn1odate the new arrivals. Epidemics 1nay sweep through refugee camps and 
settlements, spilling into surrounding co1n1nunities.4 
Nun1erous studies, both prior to this statement but particularly since, have sought to 
clarify the relationship between the environment and various types of human 
1 Mark Levine, 'Tuvalu Toodle-oo' , Outside (online), 1 December 2002 <http://www.outsideonline. 
com/ adventw·e-travel/australia-pacific/Tuvalu-Toodle-oo.html>. 
~ Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Houghton Mifflin, first published 1962, 1992 ed) 238. 
.) Environmental factors indeed play a role in large-scale human displacement: note, for example, the 
three million dust bowl 'refugees' of 1930s America. For historic accounts of people movement 
concerning the Pacific Islands (including in relation to environmental stressors), now thought to be 
paiiicularly threatened by climate change, see Michael D Lieber, Exiles and Migrants in Oceania 
(The University of Hawaii Press, 1977). 
4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change: The IPCC 1990 and 1992 
Assessments (1992), 103 , para 5.0.10 <http: //www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/far/IPCC_l990_and_1992_ 
Assessments/English/ipcc-90-92-assessments-fullre port.pd£> . 
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mobility, particularly so in the context of climate change. 5 The current chapter will 
engage with the research and analytical outputs thus generated. Doing so, the chapter 
has two goals: First, it seeks to analyse how the relationship has been characterised, 
represented and problematized. In doing so, the chapter will show an intense, often 
politically-motivated polarisation of the 'issue' 6 and the consequences of this schism 
and its constitutive positions. Secondly, the chapter will seek to analyse what the 
relationship is, what is actually known about whether, how and what environmental 
change drives people movement and whether anthropogenic climate change may 
contribute to such movement. The intention is to highlight how both the 
representational and empirical perspectives impact on a justice-inspired analysis of 
the role of international law in relation to climate change-induced displacement. 
2. Quantifying Movement: The Numbers Game 
The concept of displacement resulting from climate change came to prominence 
within debates about the wider concept of environmental migration and 
displacement. Interest in both has been fed particularly through the evocation of 
5 The literature is now quite substantial. See, eg, Koko Warner, Charles Ehrhart, Alex de Sherbinin, 
Susana Adamo and Tricia Chai-Onn, 'In Search of Shelter: Mapping the Effects of Climate Change 
on Hmnan Migration and Displacement' (CARE, 2009); Foresight, 'Migration and Global 
Environmental Change: Final Report (Govermnent Science Office,. UK, 2011); Koko Warner, Tamer 
Afifi, Kevin Henry, Tonya Rawe, Christopher Smith and Alex de Sherbinin, 'Where the Rain Falls: 
Cli1nate Change, Food and Livelihood Secm·ity, and Migration' (CARE, 2012); Frank Laczko and 
Christine Aghazarm (eds), Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence 
(Inten1ational Organization for 1'1igration, 2009). Also, International Organization for Migration, 
'People on the Move in a Changing Climate: A Bibliography' (2012). For a more historical take on 
conceptualisations of the enviromnent in migration studies see Etienne Piguet, 'From "Prilnitive 
Migration" to ' Clilnate Refugees": The Curious Fate of the Natural Enviromnent in Migration 
Studies' (2013) 103 Annals of the Association of American Geographers 148. 
6 Noted and described widely in the literature; eg, by James Mon-issey, 'Environmental Change and 
Forced Migration: A State of the Art Review' (Background Paper, Refugee Studies Centre, Oxford 
University, 2009) and Olivia Dun and Franc;ois Gemem1e, 'Defining Environmental Migration: Why 
it Matters · so Much, Why it is Controversial and Some Practical Processes Which May Help Move it 
Forward' (2008) 6 RE,VUE Asylon(s) 1. 
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vivid imagery - provided by the media, academic and various advocacy communities 
alike - of mass flows of so-called 'environmental refugees', for example. An 
exhibition at the Museum of London in 2010 - Postcards from the Future -
envisioned a climate change-affected capital city with colossal refugee camps 
surrounding Buckingham Palace and rice paddies at Parliament Square.7 Although 
the imagery thus created helps to keep interest in anthropogenic climate change and 
its possible effects acute, questions about the legitimacy and utility of such 
representations also kept the academic discourse on climate change migration and 
displacement trapped in prevailing disagreement about the representational or 
conceptual tools frequently resorted to, which, for a time, relegated more interesting 
and important questions, including concerning responsibility (the question at the 
heart of this thesis) or the actual linkages between climate change and people 
movement,8 subject of the analysis in Section Four of this chapter. 
Disagreement about portrayals of people movement in the- environmental and 
climate change context is variously described to be existing between 'maximalists' 
and 'n1inimalists' ,9 'alarmists' and 'sceptics' 10, 'proponents' and 'critics' .11 It arose 
notably in relation to depictions of such movement as mass migration or 
displacement. 12 Astri Suhrke noted the schism in 1991, when she stated that 
[ w ]hile the literature on environmental change and population movement is quite 
li111ited, two different and opposing perspectives can be discerned. One - which I call 
7 See George Marshall, 'Fantasy Images of Climate Migration Will Fuel Existing Prejudices', The 
Guardian ( online ), 27 October 2010 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2010/ 
oct/2 7 /london-futures-climate-change-exhibition>. 
8 See, eg, Jaines Morrissey, 'Rethinking the "Debate on Environmental Refugees": From 
"Maximalists and Minilnalists" to "Proponents and Critics"' (2012) 19 Journal of Political Ecology 
36. 
9 Astri Suhrke, Pressure Points: Environmental Degradation, Migration and Conflict (American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1991) 4; also in Astri Suhrke, 'Environmental Degradation and 
Population Flows' (1994) 47 Journal of International Affairs 473. 
10 Dun and Gemenne, above n 6. 
11 Morrissey, above n 8. 
12 See on this also Franc;ois Gemenne, 'Why the Numbers Don't Add Up: A Review of Estimates and 
Predictions of People Displaced by Environmental Changes ' (2011) 21 S Global Environmental 
Change 41. · 
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the minimalist view - sees enviromnental change as a contextual variable that can 
contribute to migration, but warns that we lack sufficient knowledge about the process 
to draw firm conclusions. The other perspective sets out a maximalist view, arguing 
that enviromnental degradation has already displaced millions of people, and more 
d. 1 . h 13 1sp acement 1s on t e way. 
The aforementioned IPCC Assessment Report, warning, as it did, that 'millions' 
would be displaced within some future timeframe, is illustrative of the maximalist 
position. Increasingly specific and deterministic estimates followed it: 
• The best-known, and most often-cited, estimates on climate change 
displacement specifically have been provided by Oxford University-affiliated 
academic Norman Myers, who has generated flow estimations frequently. 14 
Forecasting to 2050, he has stipulated that '[w]hen global warming takes 
hold, there could be as many as 200 million people [ displaced] by disruptions 
of monsoon systems and other rainfall regimes, by droughts of unprecedented 
severity and duration, and by sea-level rise and coastal flooding.' 15 
• Further back, the 1994 Almeria Statement postulated that severe 
desertification might eventually lead to 13 5 million displacees. 16 
• Robert Nicholls of the Flood Hazard Research Centre at Middlesex 
University suggested in 2004 that by 2080 up to 200 million people would be 
displaced by the effects of climate change. 17 
• In 2005, the United Nations University's Institute for Environment and 
Human Security (UNU-EHS) warned of 50 million 'environmental refugees ' 
as early 2010, 18 largely a result of climate change. 
13 Suhrke, Pressure Points, above n 9, 4. 
14 In an oft-cited article from 1993, Myers ' earliest estimate included 150 million displaced persons as 
a result of global warming; see Norman Myers, 'Enviromnental Refugees in a Globally Warmed 
World' (1993) 43 Bioscience 752, 757. 
15 Norn1an Myers, 'Environmental Refugees: An Emergent Security Issue' (Paper Presented at the 
13 th Economic Forum, Prague, 23-27 May 2005) 1. He is cited as believing that the figure 'will be 
closer to 250 million, in a 2007 Christian Aid report; see Rachel Baird, Katy Migiro, Dominic Nutt, 
Anjali Kwatra, Sarah Wilson, Judith Melby, Andrew Pendleton, Malcolm Rodgers and John Davison, 
Human Tide: The Real Migration Crisis (Christian Aid, 2007) 48. 
16 Almeria Statement on Desertification and Migration (Statement following the International 
Symposimn on Desertification and Migrations, Almeria, 8-11 February 1994) 1. 
17 Robe1i J Nicholls, ' Coastal Flooding and Wetland Loss in the 21 st Century: Changes under the 
SRES Climate and Socioeconomic Scenarios ' (2004) 14 Global Environmental Change 69, 72. 
18 Institute of Enviromnent and Human Security, United Nations University, 'As Ranks of 
"Environmental Refugees" Swell Worldwide, Calls Grow for Better Definition, Recognition, 
Support' (Statement to Mark the UN Day for Disaster Reduction, 11 October 2005) 1. Although the 
link to climate change remains disputed, making this figure somewhat more plausible were the 12 
million people affected by severe flooding in Pakistan in August of 2010 alone; see Office of the 
United Nations High Cmnmissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Millions of Flood Victims Require 
Assistance Today (2010) <http://www.unhcr.org/emergency/pakistanfloods/ global_landing. hhnl>. 
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• The 2006 Stern Review, initiated by the United Kingdom Government, and a 
Friends of the Earth report from 2007 both predicted 200 million displaced 
by climate change by 2050. 19 
Particularly in the years leading up to the much-anticipated 2009 United Nations 
Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, ever more staggering predictions of 
mass displacement emerged, a process perhaps best described as the 'numbers 
game' .20 Most astounding of all, a Christian Aid report in 2007 suggested that almost 
one billion people could be permanently displaced by environment-related factors by 
1nid-century, including 250 million by climate-induced slow-onset events such as 
droughts, floods and famines, as well as a further 50 million by rapid-onset natural 
disasters.21 
Although those suggesting such figures have, at times, themselves admitted that 
they are based on little more than 'heroic extrapolation' ,22 admitting to 
methodological challenges and flaws, it is easy to see the logic behind the 'numbers 
game' . Using numerical information to frame phenomena of potentially global 
importance is common. Sally Engle Merry notes this, and in describing a 'turn to 
indicators' in the global human rights arena, for example, holds that '[n]umbers have 
become the bedrock of systematic knowledge because they seem free of 
interpretation, as neutral and descriptive. ' 23 Packaging the really rather complex 
climate change and people movement phenomenon into easily digestible numbers 
19 Nicholas Stem, The Economics of Climate Change: Stern Review (Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 56; Friends of the Earth Australia, A Citizen's Guide to Climate Refugees (2007) 1 0; henceforth 
also 'Stem Review' . 
20 A term coined by Oli Brown, 'The Nun1bers Game ' (2008) 31 Forced Migration Review 8. It has 
been noted that the 'numbers gaine' is, at least in part, 'played' by silnply regurgitating estimates; see 
Foresight, above n 5, 28. 
2 1 Rachel Baird et al, above n 15, Sf. 
22 See Norman Myers, cited in Brown, above n 20, 8. Gaim Kibreab notes that numbers are no more 
than 'educated guesses'; see Gaim Kibreab 'Climate Change and Human Migration: A Tenuous 
Relationship' (2009) 20 Fordham Environmental Law Review 357, 400. The IPCC has also come 
around to the idea that the 'numbers game' is about little more than guessing; see Intergovernmental 
Panel on Clilnate Change, Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 365. 
23 Sally Engle Merry, 'Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and Global Governance ' 
(2011) 52 Current Anthropology 83 , 89. 
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therefore seemed to imbue the issue with objectivity and neutrality, a useful way also 
to satisfy an appetite, in the media, advocacy and some policy and academic circles, 
for accessibility and visibility. 24 
Critics have been quick to point out at least two major, inter-connected 
detrimental consequences of the 'numbers game', questioning particularly its 
neutrality or objectivity: First, they note that the 'numbers game' rapidly 
securitised25 the climate change and displacement discourse ( and the environmental 
migration and displacement discourse within which it sits). Thomas Homer-Dixon, 
for example, warned around the time of the afore-mentioned IPCC Assessment 
Report that 'waves of environmental' refugees [ would] spill across borders with 
destabilizing effects on the recipient's domestic order and on international 
stability' .26 The military establishment in so1ne Western countries eventually took 
note. A grim, climate-affected future of wars, conflict, instability and mass migration 
was portrayed in a 2003 United States (US) Department of Defence report.27 Taking 
this one step further, a later report by retired US military brass sought to argue that 
'climate change will provide the conditions that will extend the war on terror' and 
that ' [ m ]ore pove1iy, more forced migrations, higher une1nployment[;] those 
conditions are ripe for extremists and terrorists' .28 Exaggeration and embellishment 
are acknowledged to be an integral and strategic part of such constructions: 
Rather than predicting how cli1nate change will happen, our intent is to drainatize the 
impact climate change could have on society ... [O]ur aiin is to further the strategic 
24 See also Ge1nenne, above n 12, 45. 
25 Securitisation is a term com1nonly used within realist and constructivist approaches to international 
relations and refers to the process by which a public issue is constructed as a security concern or 
threat. The concept is credited tu Ole Waever and Ban-y Buznan; see, eg, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever 
and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework/or Analysis (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998). 
26 Thomas F Homer Dixon, ' On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute conflict' 
p991) l6International Security 76. 
7 Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall, 'An Abrupt Clilnate Change Scenario and its Implications for 
United States National Security' (Report, Global Business Network, 2003). 
28 Admiral T Joseph Lopez, quoted in CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate 
Change (2007), 17 <http: /securityandclilnate.cna.org/report>. 
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conversation rather than to accurately forecast what is likely to happen with a high 
d f . 29 egree o certainty. 
On the other hand, how uncertain the 'numbers game' really is was evidenced by 
UNEP's (United Nations Environment Programme) removal of its prediction of 50 
million displaced by climate change by 2010 from one of its websites, when this 
scenario had not occurred by the end of that year. 30 The UN found itself accused of 
dishonesty in the blogosphere and other media31 and climate change sceptics were 
delighted that doubt had been sown in a climate change-related matter. 32 More 
importantly, however, significant criticism has come from those who are concerned 
that securitisation and crisis-talk opens the possibility that victims are turned into 
perpetrators and that, at worst, the use of force comes to be seen as a legitimate 
d. 1 33 response to 1sp acement. 
A second avenue of criticism has come from those concerned about the thinly-
veiled political motivations or aspirations underpinning the 'numbers game'. Richard 
Black, for example, has asked 'in whose interest it is that environment degradation 
should be seen as a possible cause of mass displacement?' 34 He notes that the notion 
has its origins with environn1entalists more eager to raise attention about issues of 
29 Schwaiiz and Randall, above n 27, 7 [italics added by thesis author]. 
30 The website now states the following: 'GRJD-Arendal offered a 1nap for everybody to download 
and further use on Environmentally Induced Migration ("Fifty million climate refugees by 201 0") at 
this web address. This graphic was originally produced for the Environmental Atlas of the newspaper 
Le Monde diplomatique . We have decided to withdraw the product and accompanying text. It follows 
some 1nedia reports suggesting the findings presented were those ofUNEP and the UN which they are 
not. We hope this clarifies the situation.' See UNEP/GRJD-Arendal, Environmentally Induced 
Migration Map - Clarification (2011) <http://www.grida.no/generaV4700.aspx>. It may be worth 
noting, however, that in 2010, over 42 million people were displaced by natural disasters (this 
includes those displaced by geophysical events), a significant rise from the ca. 1 7 1nillion just the year 
before; see Foresight, above n 5, 9. 
31 See, eg, Axel Bojanowski, 'UN Embarrassed by Forecast on Climate Refugees', Der Spiegel 
( online ), 18 April 2011 <http://www.spiegel.de/intemational/world/O, 1518,757713,00.html> . 
.)
2 See, eg Fred Pearce, 'Search for the Clilnate Refugees ' (2011) 2810 New Scientist 6. For the 
climate change denial cainpaign, see more generally James Hoggan, Climate Cover-Up: The Crusade 
to Deny Global Warming (Greystone Books, 2009); see also Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced 
l:figration and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) 29, who cites this example. 
.).) See, eg, Betsy Hartman, 'Rethinking Climate Refugees and Climate Conflict: Rhetoric, Reality and 
the Politics of Policy Discourse' (2010) 22 Journal of International Development 233; Lonaine 
Elliott, 'Clilnate Migration and Climate Migrants: What Threats, Whose Security?' in Jane McAdam 
(ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2010) 175. 
.)
4 Richard Black, Refugees, Environment and Development (Addison Wesley Longman, 1998) 1. 
16 
CHAPTER TWO NON-LEGAL BACKGROUND 
environmental degradation and the ill-effects of climate change than other matters. 35 
The consequence, however, would be a tum against migrants, particularly refugees, 
who already suffered from significant public ill will directed against them in the 
post-Cold War era.36 As the London-based Information Centre about Asylum and 
Refugees has highlighted, for example: 'The aquatic imagery of floods and tidal 
waves [ often evoked] is reminiscent of bygone headlines in sections of the United 
Kingdom's press warning of floods of asylum seekers or a tidal wave of Poles. ' 37 
Such in1agery is then easily used to justify policies that deter migrant and asylum 
seeker arrivals.38 Bhupinder Chimni, though not writing from a climate change 
perspective, provides a compelling reason why: he a1iiculates a concept he calls the 
'myth of difference', a post-Cold War tendency, largely emanating from the Global 
No1ih, which emphasises that the world's persecuted and oppressed are increasingly 
1noving 'for no good reason', whilst 'abusing hospitality' and, importantly in the 
context of this section, in ' numbers too large' .39 The myth is then relied upon to 
justify the imposition of restrictive entry practices concerning displaced persons and 
other 1nigrants, pa1iicularly by Western gove1nments (a 'policy of containment'). 
The fact that the 1nyth is factually wrong in light of historical migration flows seems 
irrelevant.40 Ultimately, in the environmental displacement context, the 'numbers 
gaine' has raised concern about whether it is worthwhile, and just, to dramatize an 
35 Ibid. 
36 See, eg, Morrissey, above n 8, 42f. 
37 Information Centre About Asylum and Refugees, Climate Change Refugees? (15 May 2007) 
<wvlw.icar.org.uk/?lid=8733>. Such imagery is prevalent also in other countries; see, eg, Catriona 
Ross, 'Prolonged Symptoms of Cultural Anxiety: The Persistence of Narratives of Asian Invasion 
within l'v1ulticultural Australia' (2006) 5 Journal of the Association for the Study of Australian 
Literature 86. 
38 See, eg, Gaim Kibreab, 'Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique of 
the CmTent Debate ' (1997) 21(1) Disasters 20. 
_,
9 B S Chimni, 'The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from the South' (1998) 11 Journal of 
Refugee Studies 350, 357 and 355ff more generally. 
40 Ib'd ") ~g 1 ' .J) . 
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issue in order to bring about action ( environmental) but thereby to sacrifice another 
cause (asylum and immigration advocacy).41 That this should be dubious is clear. 
3. Naming and Conceptualising Movement: The Labelling Game 
The 'numbers game' has not been the only conceptualisation that has caused 
disagreement and uncertainty. A 'labelling game' has been equally contentious. 
Particularly antagonistic have been positions which have crystallised concerning the 
so-called 'environmental refugee' or 'climate (change) refugee'. The concept rose to 
prominence following a 1985 United Nations Environment Programme paper by 
Essam El-Hinnawi,42 who defined the 'environmental refugee' and is generally 
credited with bringing the concept to the attention of research, policy and activist 
communities. 43 It did not take long for the term to be conceptually tied also to the 
possibility of displacement originating in climate change and its effects.44 Neo-
Malthusian in nature, those advancing the 'environmental refugee' concept 
( 1naxi1nalists again) usually suggest that such persons are the unfortunate but 
. inevitable victims of envirorunental crises, including those arising in connection with 
climate change. 45 
Disagreement soon emerged46 - concerning once again the politics underpinning 
the construct, as well as the methodological and conceptual underpinnings of its 
41 Mark Dowie asks silnilar questions on a larger scale; in Mark Dowie, Conservation Refugees: The 
Hundred-Year Conflict Between Global Conservation and Native Peoples (MIT Press, 2009) . 
42 Essam El-Hinnawi, 'Enviromnental Refugees' (United Nations Environment Programme, 1985). 
4~ . 
., See Morrissey, above n 6, 4. 
44 Jodi L Jacobson, 'Environmental Refugees: A Yardstick of Habitability' (World Watch Institute, 
1988). 
45 See, eg, Morrissey, above n 6, eg, 4 and throughout. 
46 See, in particular, Stephen Castles; 'Environmental Change and Forced Migration: Making Sense of 
the Debate ' (New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No 70, Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, 2002); Richard Black, 'Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality' 
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constitutive parts. The political schism follows closely that of the 'numbers game'. 
On the one hand, again, are environmentalists willing to use the image of the hapless 
refugee, arriving en masse, to push for environmental action.47 The 'environmental 
refugee' is here used as both outcome and source of a problem, the logic being that 
only if environmental problems (such as climate change) are 'fixed' would there not 
be a 'refugee problem' with all its alleged attendant security and instability 
iinplications.48 On the other hand, there are those who warn that such 
conceptualisations will only further harm asylum or immigration causes. One side 
seeks to portray displacement as intrinsically 'bad', thereby stimulating action to 
prevent it, the other seeks to portray this argument itself as 'bad' .49 Both end up 
more concerned with the protection of their respective interests rather than with 
those who may be affected by environmental change. 50 
Those concerned about the 'refugee' component of the labe1 have further 
pointed out that a refugee is, legally speaking, someone displ_aced across borders by 
persecution in relation to at least one of five specified grounds. Environmental 
factors contributing to movement would likely not meet the persecution requirement 
(in relation to at least one of the stipulated grounds) and such movement would also 
be much more likely to be internal. 51 Eventually, conceptualisations of 
environmentally-induced movement arose in relation to a profusion of alternative 
designations, proposed by jurists, activists, academics and international organisations 
(New Issues in Refugee Research Working Paper No 34, Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 2001); Kibreab, above n 38. 
47 See, eg, Carol Farbotko, 'Wishful Sinking: Disappearing Islands, Climate Refugees and 
Cosmopolitan Experimentation' (2010) 51 Asia Pacific Viewpoint 4 7. 
48 See Morrissey, above n 8, 41. 
49 See, eg, Stephen Castles, 'Afterword: What Now? Climate Induced Displacement After 
Copenhagen' in McAdam, above n 33, 239, 242. 
50 Morrissey, above n 8. 
51 See, amongst many others, Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2012) ch 2. Ch 3 of this thesis will dissect this further. 
19 
CHAPTER TWO NON-LEGAL BACKGROUND 
alike. 52 The 'environmental refugee' or 'climate (change) refugee' was there by soon 
joined by the 'environmental migrant', 'climate exile' and the 'eco migrant'. The 
'migrant' label, in particular, has many proponents. For example, the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) has argued that those compelled to move in 
response to climatic and other environmental changes are 'environmental migrants', 
or 
persons or groups of persons who, for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in 
the environment that adversely affect their lives or living conditions, are obliged to 
have to leave their habitual home, or choose to do so, either temporarily or 
pennanently, and who 1nove either within their territory or abroad. 53 
This does manage to incorporate a variety of important factors: time, space, choice 
and multiple drivers. However, it leaves other matters ill-addressed. As Anthony 
Oliver-Smith has pointed out, such conceptualisations usually tend 'to suggest that 
nature is at fault, when in fact humans are d_eeply implicated in the environmental 
changes that make life impossible in certain circumstances. ' 54 They suggest that 
there is no 'persecutor', no human 'victimiser', with the environment the entity 
responsible for dislocation - and therefore no one in particular for preventing, 
resolving or responding to it. In its own way, this depoliticises the issue to the same 
degree that the aforementioned schism over-politicised it. 
Also not explicitly noting human contributions to environmental push factors 
has been another line of conceptualisation - one which seeks to categorise those 
moving in relation to environmental factors (including those anticipated to arise with 
climate change) along various continuums. Suhrke, 55 for example, has stipulated that 
- ? 
~: See Dun and Gemenne, above n 6. 
).) International Organization for Migration, Migration, Climate Change and the Environment: 
J) efinitional Issues <http: //www.iom.int/jahia/Jahia/definitional-issues>. 
)
4 Anthony Oliver-Smith, cited in Stefan Lovgren, Climate Change Creating Millions of "Eco 
Refugees", UN Warns, National Geographic News (online), 18 November 2005 
<http ://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2005/11/11180511 l8disaster refugee.html>. He refers to 
!he ' environmental refugee ' construct, but what he says is equally true about the 'migrant' construct. 
) 5 Astri Suhrke, 'Environmental Degradation and Population Flows', above n 9. 
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' refugees' are not 'generated' by temporary or circular movement in relation to 
short-term environmental change. Specifically, those making a rational, voluntary or 
pre-emptive choice are 'migrants' and only those compelled to flee sudden and 
drastic environmental change that is permanent could, conceivably, be classed as 
'refugees' and thereby deserving of protection. Similarly, Graeme Hugo,56 also 
writing about the role of environmental change in migration, emphasises choice and 
has maintained that the 'refugee' designation must be contingent upon a lack of 
choice and an element of force. Along a 'continuum of choice', he distinguishes 
between voluntary and involuntary movement and therefore between 'migrants' and 
'refugees'. Diane Bates57 later picked up on this idea of a continuum, which for her 
is tripartite, however: Environmental refugees' move involuntarily as a result of 
pronounced environmental change. 'Environmental migrants' are seemingly required 
(but not forced in the absolute sense) to move by environmental change. Finally, 
simply 'migrants' are those moving allegedly purely voluntarily (no environmental 
change compels movement). More recent studies include even more categories along 
the continuum from voluntary to forced; others envision conceptualisation in relation 
to other criteria altogether. 58 
The simplicity of some earlier conceptualisations is avoided here. However, if 
one is to assume that only 'refugees' are eligible for protection or assistance, then 
such obligations may largely arise in relation only to those who face extreme, rapid-
onset events (forcing allegedly involuntary movement). What may be ignored is that 
56 Graeme Hugo, 'Environmental Concerns and International Migration' (Centre for Migration 
Studies of New York, 1996). 
57 Diane C Bates, 'Envirornnental Refugees: Classifying Human Migrations Caused by Environmental 
Change' (2002) 23 Population and Environment 465. 
58 See, eg, Cord Jakobeit and Chris Methmann, 'Klimafltichtlinge' [Climate Refugees] (Greenpeace, 
2007) 11 , who include five steps on the voluntary-involuntary continuum. Others conceptualise 
differently; for example, distinguishing between slow- and rapid onset-events and their displacement 
consequences; see, eg, Koko Warner, 'Climate Change and Migration: Assessing Institutional and 
Governance Needs Related to Environmental Change and Hmnan Migration' (Gennan Marshall Fund 
of the United States, 2010). 
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those subject to slow-onset change (who may look to be moving 'voluntarily') may 
also have needs that will have to be met, in particular because they may ultimately 
not be able to return due to the permanent degradation of former living spaces. 59 
Koko Warner has argued that whereby institutional and legal frameworks for 
displacement related to rapid-onset events are at least partially adequate, with some 
mechanisms for humanitarian and post-disaster assistance long in place, this is not so 
n1uch the case for migration induced by slow-onset change. 60 Additionally, although 
working with continuums, most conceptualisations just introduced work with the 
assumption that it is somehow possible to distinguish a voluntary from an 
involuntary decision to move, which n1ay frequently not be the case. Ultimately, the 
distinction between voluntary and involuntary movement set up is underpinned by 
normative or factual considerations which may not always correspond to complex 
causes, interactions, motivations or needs which exist on the ground. 
Furthermore, the continuums all work with the refugee- notion. Although 
refugees are indeed persons who are forced to flee (they do not move voluntarily), 
legally they are recognised as such only in relation to flight for carefully delineated 
reasons. 61 For this reason, foremost, the refugee notion is avoided in this thesis. 
Rather, the notion of climate change ( and) displacement is employed. This 
acknowledges a) that the thesis concerns not any environmental change but that 
impacted by anthropogenic climate change; b) that because of the now widely-
59 Note that return following a pronounced natural disaster is, alternatively, often possible; see Asmita 
Naik, Elca Stigter and Frank Laczko, 'Migration, Development and Natural Disasters: Insights from 
the Indian Ocean Tsunami ' (International Organization for Migration, 2007). 
6
° Koko Warner argues: 'Few regions of the world cunently appear equipped to manage human 
mobility related to slow-onset environmental degradation - some of which may be caused by climate 
change. The [ ... ] gaps related to this subset of environmentally induced migration come in part 
because of policy silos, because of the gradual nature of change itself and because of the challenges of 
sustaining traditional livelihoods or creating alternative livelihoods. ' See Warner, above n 58, 5f; see 
also the following thesis chapter. 
61 Ch 3 of this thesis will deal in greater detail with this and other legal issues. 
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accepted anthropogenic nature of current climate change, 62 it is not simply 'nature' 
which impacts upon movement but 'nature' as altered through human activity; and c) 
that the refugee label is indefensible in light of legal and other constraints and that 
the migrant label is indefensible in light of factors that may compel movement. 
Ultimately, it is only a construct such as 'climate change displacement' which allows 
for an investigation of questions of responsibility so integral to the justice-based 
enquiry to follow in later chapters, as 'displacement' indicates force ( even if it is 
only indirect), or movement not desired (a burden or a harm), and 'climate change' 
the anthropogenic contribution to that force. 63 
Returning to the popular 'environmental refugee' or 'climate (change) refugee' 
construct briefly, it faced its perhaps most significant challenge from critics 
concerned about the 'environmental' component of the construct, who doubted that it 
was possible to isolate particular or singular ( environmental) causes of displacement 
or 1nigration, especially in areas where many factors interact with the environment, 
for example, poverty and under-development. 64 Such critics therefore grounded their 
challenge methodologically, arguing that the relationship between environmental 
change or degradation and people movement is less mono-causal than maximalists 
usually insinuated. 65 Suhrke, for example, argued that environmental degradation is 
62 The following section of this chapter will deal in greater detail with the anthropogenic (man-made) 
nature of cmTent cli1nate change. 
63 Two further qualifications are necessary. As this thesis will soon argue, the effects of anthropogenic 
cli1nate change do not impact on people movement in isolation of other factors - social, cultural, 
economic, etc. Therefore, 'climate change-related displacement' may be more appropriate, indicating 
the possibility of interaction with other factors. For brevity's sake, however, the 'clilnate change 
displacement' or 'clilnate change and displacement' notion will frequently be used for the cited 
reasons, but interactional dimensions highlighted as necessary. Secondly, although the thesis concerns 
climate change 'displacement' other tenns may, at times, be resorted to (and already have been); for 
example, migration, movement, mobility. These are used silnply in a sense that they are meta-labels 
that have the potential to cover a wide variety of different human 'movements ' , including 
displacement. So displacement, for example, creates forced migrants, displacement leads to 
movement, etc. Other terms incorporated in the thesis may include resettlement or relocation, as these 
1nay precede or follow displacement and are therefore intimately connected to it. 
64 S ee, eg, Black, above n 46. 
65 S ee, eg, Dun and Ge1nenne, above n 6. 
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at best only ever a 'proximate cause of population displacement' .66 For some, the 
idea that it is possible to isolate environmental factor from others in driving 
migration and displacement was so problematic that the whole idea of 
environmentally-motivated people movement was deemed nearly preposterous.67 
However, maximalists have never entirely denied complexity, or proposed 
mono-causality.68 As James Morrissey points out, Norman Myers, for example, often 
considered the maximalist flag bearer, acknowledged socio-economic circumstance 
when arguing in 1992 that poorer countries, in particular, may find that 'costs of 
[adaptation] measures are likely to prove too high for many' - conceding that human 
adaptability may be the issue in relation to displacement and not simply climatic 
impacts.69 Given that there may, therefore, be at least some fundamental agreement, 
Morrissey argues that it is now time to 'bury the hatchet' in relation to debates about 
environmental change and human mobility (numbers, labels, conceptualisations, etc.) 
and to allow a more important and contextualised focus on how,-in interaction with 
other factors , environmental aspects impact on people movement, a possibility not 
entirely denied by even the most ardent critics. 70 The following section will seek to 
do just that: rely on the growing evidence base to tease out how certain 
environmental stresses or impacts, especially those linked to climatic change, may 
compel, at least in contributory fashion, people 1novement. Because the analysis in 
chapters to follow of course also depends on the existence of a link between climatic 
change and human activity (in particular, the human emission of greenhouse gases), 
this link will also be established. 
66 Suhrke, 'Pressure Points', above n 9, 5; Black 1nakes the same point, above n 46 . 
67 Morrissey, above n 8, 38; he cites, Steve Lonergan, 'The Role of Environmental Degradation in 
Population Displacement ' (1998) 4 Environmental Change and Security Proj ect Report 5 as an 
example. 
68 Morrissey, above n 8, 39f. 
69 Myers, above n 14, 753 ; in Morrissey, above n 8, 40. 
70 See Morrissey, above n 8, esp 45f. 
I 
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4. Qualifying Movement: What Do We Actually Know? 
Analysis in chapters to follow will essentially revolve around two causal chains: 
First, that certain human activities cause climate change, a notion now quite widely 
accepted and supported, and with it its associated consequences. Secondly, that some 
of the effects of anthropogenic climate change impact upon humans in such a way 
that they compel ( or contribute to) displacement, a notion, as will be shown, not so 
straightforward, mono-causal or mono-directional. 
The Anthropogenic Nature of Climate Change and Its Effects 
The human contributions to the phenomenon described as anthropogenic climate 
change are now widely accepted and this thesis will therefore not devote 
considerable attention to providing evidence of this link. Simply put, although 
greenhouse gases naturally occur in the earth's atmosphere ( or end up there through 
processes that do not involve human intervention), and are indeed necessary to make 
our planet suitable for human habitation, the likelihood that their relatively recent 
measurable increase in the atmosphere is the result of relatively recent increases in 
hu1nan-induced greenhouse gas emissions (foremost carbon dioxide), particularly 
through the combustion of fossil fuels, is greater than 90 percent.71 Whilst the 
'natural range ' for atmospheric -greenhouse gas concentrations is thought to be 
between 172 to 300 parts per million (ppm), concentration levels have increased by 
71 Commonwealth Scientific and Research Organisation (Australia), Human Activities are Changing 
the Climate <http: //www. csiro. au/ en/Outcomes/Climate/U nderstanding/Humans-Changing-Clilnate/ 
Atmospheric-greenhouse-gas-exceeds-pre-industrial-levels.aspx>. Note also a study by a teain from 
the University of Queensland, which, having surveyed the abstracts of nearly 12,000 academic journal 
articles, found that the scientific consensus that anthropogenic global wanning is 1nan-made is 97 
percent; see John Cook, Dana Nuccitelli, Sarah A Green, Mark Richardson, Barbel Winkler, Rob 
Painting, Robe1i Way, Peter Jacobs and Andrew Skuce, 'Quantifying the Consensus on 
Anthropogenic Global Warming in the Scientific Literature ' (2013) 8 Environmental Research Letters 
1. 
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almost 40 percent in the last 250 years and are now around the 400ppm,72 a level 
'greatly exceeding' that to have occurred through 'natural processes' alone. 73 The 
result has been an increase in global average temperatures, which are known to have 
risen, for example, by 0.35 degrees Celsius between 1910 and the 1940s but, more 
markedly, by 0.55 degrees Celsius from the 1970s and the compilation of the IPCC's 
latest ( at time of writing) Assessment Report. 74 The IPCC leaves little doubt that 
'[m]ost of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th 
century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations. ' 75 Such changes to global average temperatures have also led to 
measurable changes to other indicators, including precipitation amount, intensity, 
frequency and type; 76 the occurrence and severity of extreme weather events, such as 
heat waves, droughts, floods and hurricanes; 77 and sea levels, known to be rising. 78 
Continuing human-induced emissions of greenhouse gases is expected to further 
alter or vary how these and other phenomena occur. 79 
That said, the challenge for this thesis, and more generally, is not to support the 
notion that human greenhouse gas emissions contribute to global warming and all its 
potential (ill)-effects but to determine also whether a specific event ( especially one 
with displacement consequences) may be attributable to climate change. Evidence 
supports the notion that single climatic or weather events are the result of multiple 
72 Commonwealth Scientific and Research Organisation, above n 71. 
73 European Environment Agency, How Do Human Activities Contribute to Climate Change and How 
Do They Compare with Natural Influences? <http: //www.eea.europa.eu/themes/climate/faq/how-do-
human-acti vities-contribute-to-climate-change-and-how-do-they-co1npare-with-natural-influences>. 
74 Intergovermnental Panel on Climate Change, Frequently Asked Questions: From the Report 
Accepted by Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007), 103 <http: // 
www .ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg 1/ar4-wg 1-faqs.pdt>. 
75 Intergovermnental Panel on Clilnate Change, 'Smnmary for Policy Makers' in Contributions of 
Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change: The Physical Science Basis (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 10 [italics by thesis author]. 
76 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 74, 105f. 
77 Ibid, 107f. 
78 Ibid, 111 f. 
79 Ibid, 122. 
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factors working in confluence. 80 However, the IPCC maintains that existing climate 
models permit a determination at least of the likelihood of a specific event having 
been influenced by human-induced emissions. 81 It contends that ' [t]he value of such 
a probability-based approach - 'Does human influence change the likelihood of an 
event?' - is that it can be used to estimate the influence of external factors, such as 
increases in greenhouse gases, on the frequency of specific types of events'. 82 This 
provides at least so,ne certainty to support the notion that 'human influences will 
cause an increase in many types of extreme events'. 83 It will pe1mit at least the 
dete1mination that a ce1iain event would likely not have happened without climate 
change, and therefore the consequences which arise from that event. 
The Links Betvveen Cliniate Change and Displacenient 
In addition to establishing the link betvireen the anthropogenic nature of cun·ent 
clii11ate change, and human-induced e1nissions and ce1tain climate-related events, the 
chapter needs to establish another link - whether and how such events cause, 
co1npel, or at least contribute to , displacement. A gro,i\ring body of evidence has 
h d · h 84 d . .. b d h f hi h . soug t to . 10 Just t at an• 1t 1s eyon t , ,e scope or purpose o , t i 11 s t 1es1s to present 
it all. \1/hat is certain are t\vo things: First, that the effects of climate change ,vill 
interact with other factors (non-climatic, non-environmental, pre-existing 
enviromnental, etc . .), and it is this interaction which will impact displacement. 
Secondly, climate change impacts \i\rhich may influence displacement \i\rill be both 
slow-onset in nature, leading to the disruption or destruction of spaces and 
livelihoods over time, as \i\rell as rapid-onset, leading to swift and drastic 
80 Ibid, 119. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 See above n 5. 
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environmental change and reaction to it. Beyond this, there is now an array of 
research which seeks to establish linkages between climate change impacts and 
people movement, including displacement: this includes research concerning 
different potential climate change-induced drivers of migration or displacement - for 
example, rising sea levels, drought and desertification, natural disaster85 - and 
different geographical or topographical regions which may experience it, such as 
drylands, low-lying coastal or mountainous area86 or different countries or continents 
who may be affected. 87 The impact of three drivers on certain regions in particular 
has garnered a lot of attention: the impact of sea-level rise on low-lying islands and 
coastal zones, the impact of drought and desertification on drylands, and the impact 
of severe or extreme weather or climatic events, such as floods and storms, on 
multiple locations. These will now be considered in tum. 
Sea-Level Rise and Low-Lying Islands or Coastal Areas 
The impact of climate change upon sea levels is increasingly documented, though 
the extent of anticipated sea-level rise is hotly debated. Estimates of possible rises 
range from several milli1netres per year through to the end of the century to a total of 
five metres in the same timeframe. 88 Sea-level rise is thought to present particular 
85 See, eg, Morrissey, above n 6. 
86 See, eg, Foresight, above n 5. 
87 See, eg, Environmental Change and Forced Migration Scenarios Project, Synthesis Report (2009) 
<http: //www.each-for.eu/docmnents/EACH-FOR_Synthesis_Report_0905l5.pdf>. 
88 See, Axel Bojanowski, 'UN Climate Body Struggling to Pinpoint Rising Sea Level ', Der Spiegel 
( online ), 15 June 2011 <http ://www.spiegel.de/intemational/world/contradictory-studies-un-climate-
body-struggling-to-pinpoint-rising-sea-levels-a-774706.html>. The author links to a draft paper co-
authored by NASA 's James Hansen, which argues for the doubtful five metres rise by 2100; see 
James E Hansen and Makiko Sato, Paleoclimate Implications for Human-Made Climate Change 
(2011), 14 <http: //www.columbia.edu/ ~jehl/mailings/201 1/20110118_MilankovicPaper.pdf>. As far 
as the author of this thesis has been able to discern, the paper has not been published for peer review. 
For evidence that substantial sea-level rise is now indeed unavoidable due to oceanic thermal inertia, 
see TM L Wigley, 'The Climate Change Commitment ' (2005) 307 Science 1766. What seems certain 
is that sea levels rose by 1. 8 mm per year between the 1960s and the turn of the century but that this 
has increased to an average of 3.3 rmn per year rise since (almost doubling); see Philip Sutton, 
Climate Code Red: The Case for Eniergency Action (Scribe, 2008) 33. 
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challenges to low-lying small-island states, especially those located in the South 
Pacific and the Indian Ocean.89 Furthermore, Roger Zetter has argued that 'the 
notion of "forced" migration is plausible [in relation to] sea-level rise' .90 
Nevertheless, the relationship between sea-level rise and people movement is not 
mono-causal and sea-level rise may contribute to displacement in several ways: for 
example, rising sea levels may lead to the salinisation of freshwater resources, 
reducing access to water suitable for human consumption or agriculture, and 
inundation may make at least some coastal areas uninhabitable.91 
Early studies on the relationship between sea-level rise and displacement 
assumed that determining likely coastal areas to be inundated would provide an 
indication of the quantitative extent of the problem .. 92 Robert Nicholls,93 for example, 
relied on findings from the Special Report on Emission Scenarios, published by the 
IPCC in 2000, to highlight how the different economic trajectories contemplated by 
the IPCC (and therefore different emissions scenarios, therefore -different levels of 
sea-level rise) may impact upon how sea levels affect populations. 
89 See, eg, Jon Barnett and W Neil Adger, 'Climate Dangers and Atoll Countries ' (2003) 61 Climatic 
Change 321, David Corlett, Stormy Weather: The Challenge of Climate Change and Displacement 
(UNSW Press, 2008), who focus on the island nation of Tuvalu, Alexander Gillespie, 'Small Island 
States in the Face of Climatic Change: The End of the Line in International Environmental 
Responsibility ' (2003-2004) 22 UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 107, and Nobuo 
Mimura, Leonard Nurse, Roger McLean, John Agard, Lino Briguglio, Penehuro Lefale, Rolph Payet 
and Graham Sern, ' S1nall Islands' in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 
2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 687. But note a 2010 study which caused a bit of a stir by arguing that so-called 'sinking 
islands ' were not, in fact, sinking, despite sea-level rise; see Arthur P Webb and Paul S Kench, 'The 
Dynan1ic Response of Reef Islands to Sea-level Rise: Evidence from Multi-decadal Analysis of Island 
Changes in the Central Pacific ' (2010) 72 Global and Planetary Change 234. Although the authors 
themselves 1nake suggestions why their study does not mean that future climate change and its effects 
(including sea-level rise) will not impact island nations. 
90 Roger Zetter, 'The Role of Legal and Nonnative Frameworks for the Protection of Environmentally 
Displaced People ' in Laczko and Aghazarm, above n 5, 385, 396; also Morrissey, above n 6, 30. 
91 Morrissey, above n 6, 32f; also Foresight, above n 5, 77 and Mimura et al, above n 89, Introduction. 
92 M01Tissey, above n 6, 32. 
93 Robert J Nicholls, 'Case Study on Sea-Level Rise Impacts ' (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Paris, 2003) and Robert J Nicholls, above n 17. 
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Countering such analysis, Black94 argues that it is one thing to calculate 
populations 'at risk' from sea-level rise and quite another to use this as the basis for 
predicting flight. Human mobility, in many instances, may simply be one response 
amongst several to inundation and other impacts from rising seas. The IPCC' s 
Fourth Assessment Report notes the possibility that, in the face of climate change 
impacts such as sea-level rise, 'small islands could focus their efforts on enhancing 
their resilience and implement appropriate adaptation measures' ,95 thereby reducing 
the consequences of such impacts. Equally, several authors have noted the multiple 
social and other factors that iinpact upon mobility in relation to possible sea-level 
inundation. 96 
Nevertheless, although there can be no doubt that enhancing social capital and 
resilience building have a place in preventing flight, the IPCC also notes the burden 
this presents for many of those affected. In relation to small island states, for 
example, it argues that many 'have already perceived a need te reallocate scarce 
resources away from economic development and poverty alleviation, and towards 
the implementation of strategies to adapt to the growing threats posed by global 
warming' ,97 further increasing the socio-economic vulnerabilities that undoubtedly 
also play a part in mobility decisions. 98 
One more dynamic is presented in a 2011 report: although in the relationship 
between sea-level rise ( and the inundation and other physical impacts it leads to) and 
people movement it is often noted that sea-level rise will contribute to movement 
94 Black, above n 46, 7f; also Foresight, above n 5, s 3.3. 
95 Mi1nura et al, above n 89, 690. 
96 Eg, Sheila Arenstam Gibbson and Robert J Nicholls, 'Island Abandonment and Sea-Level Rise: An 
Historical Analog from the Chesapeake Bay, USA' (2006) 16 Global Environmental Change 40 and 
Colette Mortreux and Jon Barnett, 'Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu' 
(2009) 19 Global Environmental Change 105. 
97 Mimura et al, above n 89, 690. 
98 The IPCC also highlights equity issues when arguing that such a reallocation of resources occurs 
even though small island states themselves have emitted less than one percent of global greenhouse 
gases that contribute to clilnate change in the first place; Ibid. 
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away from affected or vulnerable areas99 (for example, from small islands), what is 
ignored is the fact that a key ongoing global mobility pattern is rural-to-urban 
migration, especially towards coastal mega cities, driven by many environmental and 
economic push and pull factors influenced also by environmental change. 100 This 
means that people may well move towards more vulnerable and hazardous areas 
(prone to inundation and flooding, etc.), rather than escaping them, with some unable 
to leave once there due to poverty and deprivation. 101 This indicates a pernicious 
dynamic: climate change may contribute to making rural livelihoods more 
precarious. This contributes to rural-to-urban migration, which contributes to the 
possibility of habitation in even more vulnerable settings, which some will seek to 
escape and others cannot. 
Drought or Desertification and Dry/ands 
Poor or unpredictable precipitation levels have long been a no-table issue for the 
world ' s drylands. 102 In the East African context, Oxfam has recognised ' that broader 
climate change mean[ s] wet seasons were beco1ning shorter. Droughts have 
increased from once a decade to every two or three years.' 103 Modelling supports the 
notion that there will be 'net decreases in moisture' (i.e. precipitation) and increases 
in drought in the coming decades, particularly in parts of Africa. 104 At the same time, 
a study linking precipitation and human mobility showed that 'migration decisions 
are clearly affected by changing rainfall variability and the vulnerability of 
99 A dynamic the rep01i does not deny; see Foresight, above n 5, s 3.3. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid, 84f. 
102 Stefanie M Hermam1 and Charles F Hutchinson, 'The Scientific Basis: Links Between Land 
Degradation, Drought and Desertification' in Pierre Marc Johnson, Karel 11ayrand and Marc Paquin 
(eds), Governing Global Desertification (Ashgate, 2006) 11. 
103 Paul Smith Logan, East Africa Director, Oxfam, in Frank Nyakairu, 'East Africa Drought Leaves 
Millions Hungry ', Reuters ( online ), 29 September 2009 <http: //www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSTRE5 8S 1F520090929>. 
104 Foresight, above n 5, 70. 
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households to these changes.' 105 It is clear that areas affected 'frequently experience 
net outmigration', 106 both as displacement or more 'routine' (economic) migration, 
with the difference sometimes blurred. 107 Overwhelmingly, studies linking drought, 
drylands/desert margins and people movement highlight mobility in this context as a 
'customary coping strategy', a 'response to spatio-temporal variations in climatic 
and other conditions' .108 
Jon Barnett and Michael Webber109 suggest that present and past movements 
generally may be a good guide to future movement. A large variety of research 
suggests that drought and desertification is connected to mobility: Jan van 
Apeldoorn 110 noted how drought in Nigeria in the 1970s impacted upon mobility 
patterns there. Markos Ezra and Gebre-Egziabhar Kiros 111 linked drought to people 
movement induced by food insecurity in Ethiopia. Robert McLeman et al and Robert 
McLeman and Barry Smit's112 studies of displacement from American mid-Western 
dustbowl affected communities in the 1930s show how poverty, multiple other 
socio-economic, as well as environmental factors influenced the nature and extent of 
displacement in concert. Michelle Leighton analyses a 1nultitude of other 
examples. 113 Although not denying that such movement is in response to harsh and 
unpredictable environments, rather than emphasizing it as a problem, most of these 
105 Koko Warner et al, 'When the Rain Falls ', above n 5, 112. 
106 Foresight, above n 5, 70. 
107 Ibid, 7f. 
108 Black, above n 45, 6. 
109 Jon Barnett and Michael Webber, 'Accommodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate 
Change ' (Policy Brief Prepared for the Swedish C01nmission on Climate Change and the World Bank 
World Development Repmi 2010, 2009) 17. 
11 0 G Jan van Apeldoorn, Perspectives on Drought and Famine in Nigeria (Allen & Unwin, 1981). 
111 Markos Ezra and Gebre-Egziabhar Kiros, 'Rural Out-Migration in the Drought-Prone Areas of 
Ethiopia: A Multi-Level Analysis' (2001) 35 International Migration Review 749. 
112 Robe1i McLeman, Dick Mayo, Earl Strebeck and Barry S1nit, 'Drought Adaptation in Rural 
Eastern Oklahoma in the 1930s: Lessons for Climate Change Adaptation Research ' (2007) 13 
Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change 3 79 and Robert McLeman and Barry Smit, 
'Migration as an Adaptation to Climate Change' (2006) 76 Climatic Change 31. 
113 Michelle Leighton, 'Desertification and Migration' in Pierre Marc Johnson, Karel Mayrand and 
Marc Paquin (eds), Governing Global Desertification (Ashgate, 2006) 43; as does Morrissey, above n 
6, 19ff. 
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(and other) studies largely confirm it as a viable and common adaptive solution to 
. 1 . d 1 b·1· 114 environmenta uncertainty an vu nera 11ty. 
Again, the relationship between climatic event (lack of rain, drought) and 
mobility is not mono-causal. 115 Poverty and other pre-existing vulnerabilities interact 
with environmental factors to contribute to mobility or lack thereof. 116 Implementing 
adaption measures may counter at least some pre-existing vulnerabilities; however, 
individuals, communities or authorities in poorer drought-prone regions may also 
struggle to support the necessary measures. 117 
Severe or Extreme Weather Events and Natural Disasters 
There is little doubt that 'migration correlates with natural disasters [ ... ]. Shocks 
stimulate people to migrate to escape the negative effects of disasters.' 118 Extreme 
climatic events such as Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the precipitation that led to 
severe flooding in Pakistan in 2010, for example, leave little doubt about the often 
significant displacement consequences of natural disasters. Flight after such events is 
generally considered forced ( or involuntary). 119 The -Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council cite 32.4 million people as 
having been newly displaced by natural disasters in 2012, 16.4 million in 2011, a 
particularly staggering 42.3 million in 2010, 16.7 million in 2009 and 36.1 million in 
2008 - the majority by weather-related and not geophysical events. 12° Climate 
114 Black, above n 45, 6, relying on Johann Pottier, 'Migration as a Hunger-Coping Strategy: Paying 
Attention to Gender and Historical Change' in Henrik S Marcussen (ed), Institutional Issues in 
Natural Resource Management (Roskilde University, 1993) 201. 
115 See also Foresight, above n 5, s 3.2. 
116 Ibid , 73; also Morrissey, above n 6, 19ff. 
117 Koko Warner et al, 'When the Rain Falls', above n 5, 112 
118 Bruce Murray, Mass Migration - A Worldwide Phenomenon (2009) <http://www.analysisonline. 
org/site/aoarticle _ display.asp?sec _id= l40002434&news _idl 40001396&issue _id=l >. 
119 Asmita Naik, 'Migration and Natural Disasters ' in Laczko and Aghazarm, above n 5, 295. 
120 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, 'Global Estiinates 
2012: People Displaced by Disasters' (2013) 6, 11. 
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change will undoubtedly exacerbate the occurrence of extreme weather events and 
natural disasters: for example, since 1950, heat waves have occurred more regularly 
and since at least the 1970s, and despite variability from year-to-year (which at least 
partially explains the variability in displacement figures just noted), there have been 
noted increases in the intensity and duration of storms or hurricanes. 121 The IPCC 
highlights in one of its reports that 
[i]f disasters occur more frequently and/or with greater 1nagnitude, some local areas 
will beco1ne increasingly 1narginal as places to live or in which to 1naintain 
livelihoods. In such cases, migration and displacement could become permanent and 
could introduce new pressures in areas of relocation. For locations such as atolls, in 
s01ne cases it is possible that 1nany residents will have to relocate. 122 
Even single events can have massive displacement consequences: a single large 
event in 2010 (flooding in China), for example, displaced 15 .2 million people. 123 
Nearly 90 percent of environment-related displacement in 2011 was attributable to 
just a quarter of all natural disasters which occurred. 124 
Concerning storn1s, there can be little doubt that the devas_tation they wreak 
leads to displacement. Experience with Hurricane Katrina in the United States 
evidences this, for example. 125 A noteworthy caveat to this, however, is noted by 
Morrissey, who argues that 'marginalised groups [ are often] forced to occupy lands 
more exposed to "natural disasters'" such as storms in the first place. The term 
(natural disaster) therefore 'hides the social elements of the processes which leave 
121 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 74, 107 . 
122 Intergovermnental Panel on Clilnate Change, 'Summary for Policy Makers' in Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to 
Advance Climate Change Adaptation (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 14. 
123 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre and Norwegian Refugee Council, ' Global Estimates 
2011: People Displaced by Natural Hazard-Induced Disasters' (2012), 4. Note that IDMC figures are 
estimates - based on cross-checked information from relevant sources ( e.g. government, international 
organisations, media, etc.). 
i24 Ibid. 
125 See, eg, Foresight, above n 5, 13. Other studies, concerning other storms, also evidence this; see, 
eg, John C Belcher and Frederick L Bates, 'Aftermath of Natural Disasters: Coping Through 
. Residential Mobility' (1983) 7 Disasters 118. 
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marginalised groups more exposed' in the first place. 126 In other words, extreme 
climatic events become more hazardous also because of particular vulnerabilities and 
exposure existing in certain localities127 - lack of early warning, poor housing stock, 
habitation in hazardous locations, etc. 128 Despite being particularly vulnerable or 
exposed, without assistance affected populations may sometimes struggle to move 
when a disaster has occurred, even when they should or desire to. 129 Or they will 
move into equally or more dangerous areas. 130 
Though not always the case, there is evidence that those displaced by natural 
disasters or extreme weather events can and often do eventually return, sometimes 
quite rapidly. 131 However, their ability to do so is dependent on factors such as the 
availability of economic resources. 132 Local economies may struggle to recover from 
what otherwise amounts to only 'temporary disruption' following disasters and 
displacement. 133 So people return, but to greater hardship and vulnerability, unless 
supported. 
5. Utility and Complexity: What Does This Mean for Justice and for International 
Law? 
Several matters of i1nportance for the analysis to follow in later chapters arise out of 
the material thus far presented. One, in particular, emerges from the early 
'maximalist' discourse concerningthe environment/climate change and 
displacement, and the various representational tools (mass flight, refugee influx, 
126 Morrissey, above n 6, 32. 
127 Intergoverrunental Panel on Clilnate Change, above n 122, 8. 
128 Naik, above n 119, 275f. 
129 F . ht b 5 ') ') ors1g , a oven , s .) . .). 
130 Ibid. 
131 Naik, above n 119,289. 
132 Foresight, above n 5, 48. 
133 Ibid, 177. 
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cns1s, etc.) used to bolster it. Sensationalising the issue through deployment of a 
number of devices certainly increased its visibility and prominence. This, it was 
frequently hoped, would stimulate action on environmental matters that were felt to 
be increasingly urgent, including climate change. 134 'Climate refugees' or 
'environmental refugees' therefore had utility for environmental purposes - but 
seemingly only if they could also be construed as a potential problem - to global, 
regional or domestic stability, for example. 135 Such conceptualisations, however, 
may not only have been factually, conceptually or methodologically misplaced (the 
numbers proposed are not realistic, persons concerned would not be refugees, 
environmental factors do not compel displacement alone) but also have 
consequences for both justice and international law considerations of climate change 
displacement, the framing components of this thesis. 
First of all, it is true that international law pays little attention to the elusive. 
Commentators have repeatedly pointed out international law and-policy's tendency 
to be overwhelmingly responsive only to crisis, 136 or events, instances or phenomena 
which are perceived to be critical. 137 Johns et al argue that it is amongst certain 
stand-out moments that 'international lawyers have prospected [ ... ] for certain 
possibilities for international law.' 138 Emphasizing the heightened character of 
phenomena is therefore indeed often important to break through to a lethargic 
system. The image of the nearly-drowned islander, or a 'postcard from the future' 
depicting large refugee camps in the center of a Western capital city therefore hold 
134 See, eg, Farbotko, above n 47 and Morrissey, above n 8. 
135 E M . b 8 g, orr1ssey, a ove n . 
136 See, eg, Hilary Charlesworth, 'International Law: A Discipline of Crisis ' (2002) 65 Modern Law 
Review 377 . . 
137 Fleur Johns, Richard Joyce and Sundhya Pahuja, 'Introduction ' in Fleur Johns, Richard Joyce and 
~undhya Pahuja (eds), Events: The Force of International Law (Routledge, 2010) 1. 
1.,s Ibid, 2. 
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great strategic potential in making those pay attention who might otherwise not. 139 
The problem is that 'crisis-talk' ( even that which has the perhaps admirable goal to 
stimulate environmental action) also encourages an 'international law world' prone 
to support muscular or militant response. 140 In portraying climate change displacees 
as a problem ( e.g. of international and domestic security and stability or as a 
potential welfare state burden in receiving countries), the possibility of legitimizing 
very undesirable responses against them is raised ( at worst, the use of force) and 
therefore not the best is asked of the 'international law world' for potential 
displacees. The dichotomy set up in the process - victim = potential host states, 
regions or comn1unities; culprit = displacees - also impacts upon justice 
considerations. Justice, in essence, stipulates that amongst interacting parties, each is 
to be granted what it is due. 141 This presupposes that none is unduly victimized 
( corrective justice) or disadvantaged ( distributive justice). However, a construction 
of climate change displacees as culprits (problems) largely precludes their 
conceptualization in those terms. 
Commendably, the climate change (and environmental) migration and 
displace1nent field has begun to move on from its early reliance on blunt 
representational tools. An increasingly nuanced picture is emerging of interactions 
between people and some of the complex and varied factors which interact with 
climate change effects to influence mobility - for exan1ple, vulnerability, inequality, 
· poverty, but also human adaptability and agency, etc. 142 Many varied expressions of 
mobility ( or lack thereof) in response to multiple factors have been uncovered. 
139 See, eg, Morrissey, above n 8. 
140 See Hilary Charlesw01ih, above n 136. 
141 Ch 4 of this thesis deliberates this in greater detail; see also The Law Dictionary, Justice (2012) 
<http: //thelawdictionary.org/justice-n/> 
142 See, eg, Carol Farbotko, 'Review: Cliinate Change and Displacement: Multi-disciplinary 
Perspectives' (2012) 36 Progress in Human Geography 833. 
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However, nuance and complexity also have consequences for both international law 
and justice-based analyses of the climate change displacement. For international law, 
on the one hand, a greater relevance is evoked for more of its many branches and 
sub-branches. Uncovering this will be the purpose of the next chapter. However, in 
an 'international law world' overwhelmingly responsive to crisis - that is acute, 
prominent threats - phenomena which are nuanced or complex also face challenges. 
As Martti Koskenniemi has argued, they may simply 'slowly disappear as part of the 
background so that we can no longer distinguish anything remarkable in it' .143 The 
effect this produces is that they are conceived as 'business as usual' and thereby 
possibly condemned to an indifferent international law and policy arena, 144 also the 
subject of greater investigation in the chapter to follow. 
And nuance and complexity have ramifications also for justice considerations. 
The contribution this thesis will seek to make to the international law scholarship on 
climate change and displacement is of course a justice-based analysis of the 
intersection of the two. However, at the heart of justice enquiries is the question of 
responsibility - for harm, loss damage or disadvantage, for example. Justice-based 
enquiries seek to establish whether something has been unjustly denied or taken from 
an entity - which would then warrant a claim against any entity ( or entities) found to 
be responsible. Complex, nuanced, multi-causal chains of interacting factors 
naturally complicate and bind any such enquiry, a dynamic paid attention to and 
dissected in 1nany of the chapters to follow. 
143 Martti Koskenniemi, 'Foreword' in Johns et al, above n 137, xvii, xvii. 
144 Ibid and Fanny Thornton, 'Climate Change, Displacement and International Law: Between Crisis 
and Ambiguity' (2013) 30 Australian Yearbook of International Law 147. 
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6. Conclusion 
Climate change and displacement is undoubtedly a complex phenomenon influenced 
by interacting causes and effects, including the effects of a changing climate. 
Although any movement associated with climate change will not be compelled 
solely by the impacts of climate change, a two-fold consensus is emerging: a) that, 
with climate change, there will be an increase in the occurrence of more climate 
extremes; 145 and b) that there is at least 'medium agreement' and 'medium 
evidence' 146 supporting the notion that ' [ d]isasters associated with climate extremes 
influence population mobility and relocation, affecting host and ong1n 
communities' .147 In other words, the relationship is not negligible ( or 'limited' given 
the IPCC terminology): anthropogenic climate change impacts on global average 
temperatures and with it climatic events and rising seas, which, in confluence with 
other factors, contributes to the movement of people in complex ways. Assuming 
that the resulting 'affect upon host and origin communities' _ is one considered 
undesirable (not what is due), this begs the question whether those contributing to 
anthropogenic climate change, thereby contributing to displacement, are responsible 
for ( at least son1e of) the ill effects generated, from which certain consequences 
should then arise. The international law scholarship on climate change and 
displacement has hesitated to explore this question in any detail. The reasons for this 
are multiple and, arguably, plausible: causality issues seem too complex, 
responsibility questions could turn the discourse into a 'blame game'. However, 
causal chains contributing to displacement do include anthropogenic climate change 
145 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, above n 122, l0ff. 
146 The IPCC has outlined what such terms might mean; see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change, 'Guidance Note for Lead Authors of the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report on Consistent 
Treatment of Uncertainties' (2010). In other words, in the case of mobility, there is more than 'low 
agreement' or 'limited evidence'. 
147 Intergovernn1ental Panel on Climate Change, above n 122, 14. 
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and its effects. So asking if certain responsibilities and consequences could arise 
from this is equally valid. Doing so, this thesis will employ a justice lens through 
which a relationship between doer and sufferer will be set up and analysed. Justice 
and ethical considerations are employed regularly when discussing responsibility for, 
and resolution of, many (inter-country and other) aspects concerning climate 
change: 148 for example, the distribution of greenhouse gas emissions or the sourcing 
and allocation of adaptation funding. There is no reason not to apply this approach 
also to the question of climate change and displacement. Before e1nbarking on 
setting up the justice framework and justice-based analysis in later chapters, the 
following chapter will first interrogate the international law scholarship on the 
subject. 
148 See, eg, the many contributions in S Gardiner, S Caney, D Jamieson and H Shue, Climate Ethics: 
Essential Readings (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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CHAPTER3 
Climate Change, Displacement and International Law: Response or 
Responsibility? 
Before the law stands a doorkeeper. To this door-keeper there comes a man 
from the country and prays for admittance to the Law. But the doorkeeper says 
that he cannot grant admittance at the moment. The man thinks it over and 
then asks if he will be allowed in later. 'It is possible, ' says the doorkeeper, 
'but not at the moment. ' Since the gate stands open, as usual, and the 
doorkeeper steps to one side, the n1an stoops to peer through the gateway into 
the interior. Observing that, the doorkeeper laughs and says: 'If you are so 
drawn to it, just try to go in despite my veto. But take note: I am powerful. And 
I am only the least of the door-keepers. ' [ . .} The doorkeeper gives him a stool 
and lets him sit down at one side of the door. There he sits for days and years. 1 
(Franz Kafka, 1925) 
1. Introduction 
International law scholarship concerning climate change and human displacement 
has grown in recent years. 2 With the increasing appreciation of the inherent 
complexities and nuance highlighted in the previous chapter has come interest in the 
potential relevance of several of international law's sub-disciplines to displacement 
in the climate change context. Substantial inroads · have thus been made into 
uncovering the possible significance of a wide range of international law's areas of 
speciality. These range from international refugee and human rights law to 
international disaster law and norms on humanitarian assistance, complementary 
protection, statelessness and some others. The substantive findings from these 
enquiries will be presented in the following sections. The chapter 's purpose, 
however, also goes beyond this: it will show how the disciplinary focus is marked by 
1 Franz Kafka, 'Vor dem Gesetz' in Der Process [trans. Willa and Edwin Muir, 'Before the Law' in 
The Trial (Schocken Books, 1984)] [first published 1925]. 
2 Note, in particular, the comprehensive analysis presented in Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced 
Migration and International Lm,v (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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two inter-related constraints. First, it is overwhelmingly concerned with uncovering 
the relevance of the norms of the positive law. This means the discipline is engrossed 
in the asking of many very important questions but not always other, equally salient 
ones, including concerning justice, the focus of this thesis.3 As Martti Koskeniemmi 
highlights, 'positive law is always insufficiently expressive of justice. ' 4 This has 
contributed to a second constraint: a focus on uncovering opportunities for how 
displacement in the climate change context is best responded to, how to deal with its 
consequences - through the positive law ( and various policy routes). A range of 
options have been proposed, depending on how movement is conceptualised: as a 
protection issue, a human rights issue, a humanitarian issue, etc. 5 In relation to most 
of these, the following sections will show, the discipline has revealed that a robust 
response is improbable and that only some possibilities are raised for dealing with 
the consequences of displacement in the climate change context. Commonly 
excluded from most such deliberation is a conceptualisation of sueh movement as an 
issue of responsibility - for harrri, damage or disadvantage, for example. In other 
words, the discipline has been hesitant to formulate conceptualisations that consider 
3 Rare exceptions include Peter Penz, 'International Ethical Responsibilities to "Climate Refugees"' 
in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart 
Publishing, 2011) 153, who considers briefly both compensation and insurance as corrective justice, 
also the focus of later chapters. Also Angela Williams, 'Achieving Justice within the International 
Legal System: Prospects for Climate Refugees' in Benjamin J Richardson, Yves Le Bouthillier, 
Heather McLeod-KilmmTay and Stepan Wood (eds), Climate Law and Developing Countries 
(Edward Elgar, 2009) ch 4, who briefly considers remedial and distributive justice. Also some 
consideration of the notion of 'restorative justice' in Roger Zetter, 'The Role of Legal and Normative 
Frameworks for the Protection of Environmentally Displaced People' in Frank Laczko and Christine 
Aghazarm (eds), Migration, Environment and Climate Change: Assessing the Evidence (International 
Organization for Migration, 2009) 3 85. Laura Westra has considered environmental justice issues in 
relation to the environn1entally displaced more generally; see Laura Westra, Environmental Justice 
and the Rights of Ecological Refitgees (Earthscan, 2009). . 
4 Maitti Koskennie1ni, ' What is International Law For?' in Malcohn Evans (ed), International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) 57, 78. Jean-Fran9ois Durieux also highlights a gap concerning 
(climate) justice in scholarship about the relationship between climate change, people move1nent and 
international law; see Jean-Fran9ois Durieux, 'Book Review: Climate Change, Forced Migration, and 
International Law '(2013) 25 Jnternational Journal of Refugee Law 187, 189. 
5 See Jane McAdam, 'Refusing "Refuge" in the Pacific: (De)Constructing Climate-Induced 
Displacement in International Law' in Etienne Piguet, Antoine Pecoud and Paul de Guchteneire (eds), 
Migration, Environment and Climate Change (UNESCO, 2011) 102, 107. 
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the full breadth of root causes of displacement (i.e. human involvement) in the 
climate change context, and any consequences or obligations which could or should 
arise from this , something the justice-based enquiry central to this thesis will seek to 
do in later chapters. The following sections will first outline the key findings which 
·have emerged in the scholarship and then note the gap this thesis seeks to fill. 
2. Refugeehood? 
A preoccupation with the idea that climate change is capable of 'producing' 
refugees, especially on a large scale, was noted in Chapter Two. Despite the 
popularity of this idea, however, the path to refugeehood is strewn with several well-
rehearsed, significant obstacles for persons affected by environmental or climatic 
change. The starting point for such contemplation is usually Article 1 (A)2 of the 
1951 Refugee Convention, 6 which stipulates that a refugee is any person who 
[ .. . ] o,;ving to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, 1nembership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his forn1er habitual residence as a result of such events, is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it. 
That this does not include all those who flee grave circumstances, including those 
who may have to escape the effects of climate change, has been pointed out by 
many. 7 Although so1ne have called for modifications to the Convention whereby 
6 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951 , 189 UNTS 150 
(entered into force 22 April 1954); henceforth also 'Refugee Convention' or ' Convention' as 
appropriate - to be read in conjunction with the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted 
31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967) art 1(2); henceforth also 
'Refugee Convention Protocol', ' 1967 Protocol ' or 'Protocol ' as appropriate. 
7 See, eg, Angela Williams, 'Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in 
International Law' (2008) 30 Law and Policy 502; Aurelie Lopez, 'The Protection of 
Enviromnentally-Displaced Persons in International Law' (2007) 37 Environmental Law 365; Roger 
Zetter, above n 5 and Jane McAdam, above n 2 (and elsewhere). 
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those escaping environmental stressors could be recognised as refugees, 8 for the time 
being three reasons in particular are noted that prevent the Convention from applying 
to the environmentally-displaced: First, Convention refugees are supposed to be 
unable to avail themselves of the protection from persecution by their own 
government (the government, one of its agents or even a non-state agent9). It may be 
very difficult to construe that a person's own government is somehow the 
persecutory agent, or that it has failed to prevent persecution, where harm has 
occun·ed as a result of cli1nate change effects. 10 Secondly, even if it was somehow 
possible to locate persecutory elements in the detrimental consequences arising in 
connection with climate change, persecution would still have had to occur for one of 
five carefully delineated Convention reasons - namely, race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion. Jessica Cooper has 
discussed how victims of environmental harm or damage, which purportedly could 
include that induced by climate change, might belong to a 'social group' that lacks 
8 See, eg, Ministry of Enviromnent, Energy and Water, Republic of the :t'1aldives, 'Report on the First 
Meeting on Protocol on Envirornnental Refugees: Recognition of Enviromnental Refugees in the 
1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees ' (14-15 August 2006); cited in 
Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, 'Protecting Clilnate Refugees: The Case for a Global Protocol ', 
Environment ( online ), November/December 2008 <http: //www.enviromnentmagazine.org/ Archives/ 
Back%20Issues/NovemberDec ember%202008/Biermann-Boas-full.html>; also Jessica B Cooper, 
'Envirornnental Refugees : Meeting the Require1nents of the Refugee Definition' (1998) 6 NYU 
Environmental Law Journal 480, 523-526, who has argued that no modification is necessary as the 
'membership of a paiiicular social group ' ground applies; see discussion below. Note in this context 
also an Australian Greens paiiy initiative to push for an ' envil·omnental refugee ' category under the 
Migration A ct 1958; although the initiative failed in 2007 (see also Migration (Climate Refugee) 
Amendinent Bill 2007 (Cth)), it is still cwTently (April 2013) listed as a policy goal on the party' s 
website; see Australian Greens, Immigration and Refitgees: Principles <http ://greens.org.au/policies/ 
care-for-people/ilmnigration-and-refugees>. 
9 Regarding the latter see, eg, Walter Kalin, 'Non-State Agents of Persecution and the Inability of the 
State to Protect' (2001) 15 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 415. 
10 In the ' enviromnental refugee ' context, Christopher Kozoll has argued that 'persecution' may occur 
in at least two circumstances: a) when ' a govermnent systematically ilnposes risks and burdens of 
decisions impacting envirornnental quality on members of a particular race, religion, nationality, 
social group or political opinion on account of one or more of these protracted factors ' and b) 'where 
the relevant authority refuses to mitigate or mitigates inadequately envirornnental disasters, whether 
of human origin or not, and in so doing 'targets' a group based on one of the listed factors '; see 
Christopher Kozoll, 'Poisoning the Well: Persecution, the Enviromnent and Refugee Status ' (2004) 
15 Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 271 , 273-274. However, this 
presupposes a degree of targeted malicious intent by govermnent or its agents. 
44 
CHAPTER THREE LEGAL BACKGROUND 
the power and influence to prevent environmental factors from impacting them 
negatively. 11 However, although the 'membership of a particular social group' 
criteria, in particular, is meant to be flexible and was intended to cover at least some 
potential gaps not covered by the other four grounds, 12 persons concerned would still 
have to show a 'fundamental immutable characteristic' that is not the stipulated 
· persecution itself to qualify as refugees. 13 Dana Zartner Falstrom notes that 'political 
powerlessness is not an immutable characteristic that will make a person or group of 
persons members of a particular social group', unless something else connects them 
further and thus defines them as a social group.14 A third challenge relates to the fact 
that the path to refugeehood should include an international border crossing, which 
in the case of displacement in the climate change context may not always ( or even 
often) be the case. 15 Despite such obstacles, Refugee Convention claims in relation 
to the feared impacts of climate change are not completely the stuff of legal fiction, 
although those who have applied for refugee status have not be@n successful. In a 
case involving an applicant from Kiribati, for example, who feared 'return to his 
country of nationality because there is substantial scientific .evidence that rising sea 
levels will devastate that country', 16 the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal held in 
2009 that 
11 Cooper, 'above n 8, 523-526. She argues that the environmental justice 1novement accepts this. 
12 Lopez, above n 7, 382. Though note that it is not meant to be a 'catch-all criteria' and has not been 
applied as such. 
13 Jane McAdam and Ben Saul, 'An Insecure Climate for Human Security? Climate-Induced 
Displacement and International Law' in Alice Edwards and Carla Ferst1nan (eds), Human Security 
and Non-Citizens: Law, Policy and International Affairs (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 357, 
372. 
14 Dana Zaiiner Falstrom, 'Ste1mning the Flow of Environmental Displace1nent: Creating a 
Convention to Protect Persons and Preserve the Enviromnent' (2002) 13 Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 1, 13. 
15 See, eg, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Climate Change, Migration 
and Displacement: Who Will Be Affected? Working Paper Submitted by the Informal Group on 
Migration/Displacement and Climate Change of the IASC, 31 October 2008 (2008), 1 <http: //un 
fccc.int/resource/docs/2008/smsn/igo/022.pdf>. 
16 0907346 [2009] RRTA 1168 (10 Dece1nber 2009) para 47. 
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[i]n this case, the Tribunal does not believe that the element of an attitude or 
motivation can be identified, such that the conduct feared can be properly considered 
persecution for reasons of a Convention characteristic as required. [ ... ] There is 
simply no basis for concluding that countries which can be said to have been 
historically high e1nitters of carbon dioxide, or other greenhouse gases, have any 
element of motivation to have any impact on residents in low-lying countries such as 
Kiribati, either for their race, religion, nationality, membership of any particular social 
group or political opinion. 17 
Partially in recognition of the fact that the . Refugee Convention definition is 
restrictive, several regional instruments have emerged in the decades since the 1951 
Convention which provide broader pathways to refugeehood. For example, the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU)1 8 1969 Convention Governing the Specific 
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa reaffirms the Refugee Convention definition 
but then states 
the term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, 
occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing the public order in 
either part or the whole of his country or origin or nationality, is compelled to leave 
his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his 
country of origin or nationality. 19 
This, too, does not expressly refer to the possibility of refugeehood in relation to 
environmental reasons. However, should environmental events 'seriously disturb the 
public order', affected persons could, conceivably, fall under protection obligations 
in this region.20 Indeed, in relation to the Convention and other relevant provisions,21 
Vikra1n Kolmannskog cites a Kenya-based officer of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) as stating: 'If drought and 
17 Ibid, para 51. 
18 Disbanded and replaced by the African Union (AU) in 2002. 
19 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refitgee Problems in Africa, signed 10 September 
1969, 1001 UNTS 45 (entered into force 20 June 1974) art 1; henceforth also 'African Convention', 
' OAU Convention' or 'Convention' as appropriate. 
20 See Walter Kalin, 'Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement ', in McAdam, above n 3, 81 , 
88; also Lopez, above n 7, 390. 
21 In this case, the Refitgees Act, 2006 [Kenya] , no 13 of 2006 (30 December 2006) 
<http: //www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,NATLEGBOD,KEN,456d621e2,467654c52,0.html>, which 
recognises as refugees those who fall under the 1951 and OAU Conventions. 
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conflict coincide, we will not split hairs' 22 when determining the status of persons 
displaced from Somalia. Nevertheless, there are some doubts that regional states are 
'ready to accept [ ... ] an expansion of the concept [ disturbing the public order] 
beyond its conventional meaning of public disturbances resulting in violence. ' 23 
Alice Edwards has argued that when displacees from natural disasters are hosted in 
the region, 'receiving states rarely declare that they are acting pursuant to their OAU 
Convention obligations. ' 24 Finally, even where persons meet the additional, broader 
criteria set forth in the African Convention (but not the 1951 Convention criteria), 
protection obligations thus raised are temporary and such persons can be prevented 
from remaining permanently in the host state.25 This poses problems in applying the 
African Convention in contexts where return may not be an option. 
Likewise, the Organization of American States (OAS) 1984 Cartagena 
Declaration on Refugees provides that 
in addition to containing the elen1ents of the 1951 Convention [ ... ] and the 1967 
Protocol [ ... ], among refugees [should be included] persons who have fled their 
country because their lives, safety or freedo1n have been threatened by generalized 
violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, 1nass violations of human rights or 
other circu1nstances which have seriously disturbed the public order.26 
The International Conference on Central American Refugees has previously made an 
in1portant distinction in relation to 'circumstances which have seriously disturbed the 
public order', however: in interpreting the Declaration, it has differentiated persons 
affected by disruptive 'human-1nade events' as opposed to those affected by 'natural 
22 Vikram Kohnannskog, 'Cliinate Change, Hmnan Mobility and Protection: Initial Evidence from 
Africa' (2010) 29 Refugee Quarterly 103, 112. 
23 Kalin, above n 20, 88. 
24 Alice Edwards, 'Refugee Status Determination in Africa' (2006) 15 African Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 204, 227; also McAdam and Saul, above n 13, 8. 
25 See Lopez, above n 7, 390 and Cooper, above n 8, 498. 
26 Cartagena Declaration on Refitgees, adopted 22 November 1984, in Annual Report of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, OAS Doc OEA/Ser.L/V/II.66/doc.10, revl, 190, art 3; 
. henceforth also 'Cartagena Declaration' or 'Declaration' as appropriate. 
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disasters', with only the former eligible to be recognised as refugees.27 A creative 
interpretation of this restriction means that acceptance of the anthropogenic (human-
made) nature of climate change could lead those displaced by its effects to be 
recognised as refugees in the region, an unlikely scenario, however. Furthermore, it 
is important to note that, unlike the OAU Convention, the Declaration is not 
binding.28 
International refugee law has been found to provide a very limited array of 
opportunities for potential protection seekers in the climate change context. Of 
course, challenges arising from the law are joined by structural ones. Although 
broader 'refugee' conceptualisations have emerged in regional contexts in recent 
decades, the 'climate change refugee' discourse enters the global stage at a time of 
increasing restrictions concerning asylum seekers and refugees ( often justified by the 
'myth of difference' introduced in the previous chapter), with wealthy nations, in 
particular, curtailing rights and commitments where possible. 29 In this process, 'legal 
categories ' become 'devices for inclusion but also of exclusion' .30 Roger Zetter has 
shown how the 'refugee' category has become 'blurred' over time. Frequently, 
asylu1n seekers and refugees are detained or housed in despicable conditions and 
have limited access to legal or social support systems. 31 Willing ' climate change 
refugees' into being is therefore questionable also in light of a system that not only 
27 
'Principles and Criteria for the Protection of and Assistance to Central American Refugees, 
Returnees and Displaced Persons in Latin Alnerica', UN Doc CIREFCA/89/9 (January 1990) 
[English version]; in Lopez, above n 7, 3 90. 
28 Note, however, that it has been incorporated into the national legislation of several regional states 
and, to a significant degree, fonns the basis of refugee policy in the region. 
29 See, eg, Adam Roberts, 'More Refugees, Less Asylum: A Regime in Transformation' (1998) 11 
Journal of Refugee Studies 375. Anmesty International has noted the rising dangers faced by 1nany of 
the world's refugees; see Anmesty Inten1ational, 'Alnnesty International Report 2013: The State of 
the World's Human Rights ' (2013). 
3
° For more on this dynamic see, B S Chimni, 'The Bilih of a "Discipline" : From Refugee to Forced 
Migration Studies ' (2009) 22 Journal of Refugee Studies 11 , 12. 
31 See on this Roger Zetter, 'More Labels, Fewer Refugees: Remaking the Refugee Label in an Era of 
Globalization' (2007) 20 Journal of Refugee Studies 172; also B S Chimni, 'Globalisation, 
Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection' (Working Paper No 3, Refugee Studies 
Centre, Oxford University, 2000) . 
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will not recognise them but would condemn them to hopeless lives even where, 
h . d.d 32 some ow, 1t 1 . 
3. Statelessness? 
The 'climate change refugee' notion usually entails the assumption that spaces have 
beco1ne uninhabitable or livelihoods ruined through climatic impacts, forcing those 
affected to move elsewhere. Something possibly more dramatic and traumatic is 
envisioned by others: that whole nations might altogether disappear under rising sea-
levels, forcing their inhabitants to abandon their homelands and seek shelter 
elsewhere as stateless persons.33 Noted in this context in particular are small island 
nations in the South Pacific and Indian Ocean, which have come to be referred to as 
'sinking islands' or 'disappearing states' in the climate change context. States 
concerned have highlighted this possibility in the international arena themselves. For 
example, in debates from which, in 2009, emerged a General Assembly Resolution 
on 'Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications' ,34 Kalkot Matas 
Kelekele, President of Vanuatu, noted that 
some Pacific colleague nations will be sub1nerged. If such a tragedy should happen, 
then the United Nations and its members will have failed in their first and most basic 
duty to a Mernber and its innocent people, as stated in Article 1 of the Charter of the 
United Nations.35 
Similarly, Marcus Stephens, President of the Republic of Nauru, urged 
32 See Jane McAdam and Maryanne Loughry, 'We Aren't Refugees ', Inside (online), 30 June 2009 
<http: //inside.org.au/we-arent-refugees/>; the authors highlight Pacific Islander hesitation in relation 
to the refugee designation in the climate change displacement context. 
33 See, eg, Nicholas Schmidle, 'Wanted: A New Home for my Country ', The New York Tim es 
( online ), IO May 2009 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/l 0/magazine/1 0MALDIVES-t.html?page 
wanted=all& r=0>. 
34 UN GAOR, 63 rd sess, ' Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications ', UN Doc 
A/RES/63/281 (11 June 2009). 
35 UN GAOR, 63rd sess, 11 th plen mtg, UN Doc A/63/PV. l l (26 September 2008), Mr Kalkot Matas 
Kelekele. 
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the Security Council [to] review particularly sensitive issues such as the implications 
of the loss of land and resources and the displacement of people for sovereignty and 
international legal rights.36 
What drives concern about 'sinking islands' or 'disappearing islands' is their 
particular physical and geographical characteristics. Island nations such as Tuvalu, 
Kiribati and the Maldives each peak out of the ocean by little more than a few 
metres. Some island nations have an average altitude of no more than one or two 
metres. 37 It is thought that such low elevations make them particularly susceptible to 
sea-level rise, and even complete submergence. 
For international lawyers, this has led to the asking of an array of questions, 
including whether states ever really cease to exist ('disappear'), or whether affected 
persons could be legally regarded as stateless and thereby become subject to 
international protection. 38 Regarding the former, what has been found is that 
international law does consider the vanishing of a state, though usually in relation to 
'absorption by another state', 'merger with another state' or 'dissolution with the 
emergence of a successor state' - thus 'in the context of state succession' .39 Jane 
McAdam has argued that the vanishing of a state as a result of rising seas is 
manifestly different, because any territory lost is presumably not available to 
another.40 
~6 rd th 
., UN GAOR, 63 sess, 9 plen mtg, UN Doc A/63/PV.9, (25 September 2008), Mr Marcus Stephen. 
37 Susin Park, 'Climate Change and the Risk of Statelessness' (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 2011) 1. 
38 See Jane McAdam, "'Disappearing States", Statelessness and the Boundaries of International Law' 
in McAdam, above n 3, 105, 118. For more on statelessness, see also Kate Darling, 'Protection of 
Stateless Persons in International Asylum and Refugee Law (2009) 21 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 742. 
39 McAdam, above n 38, 105, 106, 109; relying on James R Crawford, The Creation of States in 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2006) ch 17. Note the two treaties on state 
succession: Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to Treaties, signed 23 August 
1978, 1946 UNTS 3 (entered into force 6 November 1996) art 2(1)(b) and Vienna Convention on 
Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, signed 8 April 1983 (not yet in 
force) art 2(1)(a). 
40 See McAdam, above n 38, 106. 
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Those env1s1oning disappearing states most often imply that island nations 
would cease to exist, or 'disappear' , because they have simply lost their territory,41 
through submergence following sea-level rise - no territory, no state, the logic goes. 
And indeed, as Rosemary Rayfuse points out: 
[i]n an international community still based on the Westsphalian notion of states, it 
1nay not be appropriate or realistic to envisage the permanent establishment and 
continuing existence of deterritorialised states ad infinitum.42 
However, statehood may persist stubbornly. Thomas Grant has argued that 'territory 
is not necessary to statehood, at least after statehood has been established [ ... ]. 
[O]nce an entity has established itself in international society as a state, it does not 
lose statehood by losing its territory or effective control over that territory. ' 43 
McAdam has analysed more concretely how statehood may persist in relation to 
territory in the 'sinking islands ' context, as well as in relation to a number of other 
statehood criteria.44 She argues that ' [ w ]hile all four criteria [ defined territory, 
permanent population, effective government and capacity to enter _into relation with 
other states] would seemingly need to be present for a state to come into existence, 
the lack of all four may not mean the end of a state [ ... J because of [a] strong 
presumption of continuity of existing states' .45 This raises questions about if and 
when states will indeed lose their statehood, truly becoming 'disappeared states ', 
41 Ibid, 109. 
42 R_osemary Rayfuse, 'W(h)ither Tuvalu? Inte1national Law and Disappearing States' (Working 
Paper No 9, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales, 2009) 13. 
43 Thomas D Grant, 'Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents' (1999) 37 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 403 , 435; quoted in McAdam, above n 38, 7. 
44 McAdam, above n 38, l l0ff. She argues that ' the absence of population, rather than of territory, 
may provide the first signal that an entity no longer displays the full indicia of statehood '; ibid, 106. 
For statehood criteria, see the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed 26 
December 1933, 165 LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934). For suggestions, some quite 
creative, as to how states might continue to survive in relation to several statehood criteria, see Lilian 
Yamamoto and Miguel Esteban, 'Atoll Island States and Climate Change: Sovereignty Implications' 
(Working Paper No. 166, Institute of Advanced Studies, United Nations University, 2011); Maxine 
Burkett, 'The Nation Ex-Situ: On Climate Change, Deterritorialized Nationhood and the Post-Climate 
Era' (2011) 2 Climate Law 345; and McAdam, above n 38 . 
4-) McAdam, above n 38, 110. 
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which also has consequences for the second question that arises in the 'sinking 
islands' context - could affected populations be protected under international 
provisions concerning statelessness. 
Statelessness is generally found to be an 'anomaly to be prevented' .46 Two 
conventions seek to do just that. However, their applicability to the 'disappearing 
states' notion has been found to be minimal. One, the 1961 Convention on Reduction 
of Statelessness,47 asks states only to prevent statelessness when territory is re-
allocated, in other words it concerns statelessness in the context of succession. The 
definition of a stateless person is further delineated as 'a person who is not 
considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law' in the other, the 
1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons. 48 In other words, only 
persons stateless de jure would be recognised as such, persons who have no 
nationality through the operation of domestic law.49 McAdam highlights that, in the 
case of small island nations at risk of territorial loss and population displacement as a 
result of climate change, the state would therefore officially have to withdraw 
nationality from its citizens and only thereby bring its population within the -realm of 
46 Park, above n 37, 16; for expressions of a 'right to nationality ' see, eg, art 15, Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, adopted 10 December 1948, UNGA Res 217A; hencef01ih also 'Universal 
Declaration' ; art 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed 20 November 1989, 1577 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) stipulates ' [t]he right to have a name from birth and to 
be granted a nationality'; also, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed 16 
Dece1nber 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) art 24(3); also the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 
signed 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 93 (entered into force 1 July 2003) art 29 and Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, signed 18 December 1979, 1249 
UNTS 13 (entered in to force 3 Septe1nber 1981) aii 9 and International Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, signed 7 March 1966, 660 UNTS 195 (entered 
into force 4 January 1969) art 5(d)(iii); though note there is no duty to confer it. 
47 Convention on Reduction of Statelessness, signed 30 August 1961, 989 UNTS 175 (entered into 
force 13 December 1975) mi 10; it is not ratified widely. 
48 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, signed 28 Septe1nber 1954, 360 UNTS 117 
(entered into force 6 June 1960) art 1(1) [italics by thesis author]; also not ratified widely. 
49 McAdain, above n 38, 119. Note the Office of the United Nations High Connnissioner for 
Refugees, however: ' affected 'populations would be likely to find themselves largely in a situation 
that would be similar to if not the saine as if statehood had ceased'; see United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Climate Change and Statelessness: An Overview (19 May 2009), 2 
<http: //unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/s1nsn/igo/048.pdf>; 
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legally qualifying as stateless, 50 surely a despicable prospect for those concerned. 
Risk of territorial loss and population movement alone is not enough to trigger the 
provisions of the statelessness regime. 51 
It seems that, for now, the so-called 'sinking -islands' or 'disappearing states' 
concepts have mainly strategic importance in two ways: first, they are often invoked 
by island nations themselves who want to draw attention to their particular 
vulnerabilities and plight. Secondly, they are invoked by those who depend on 
dramatic imagery to push for global climate change abatement measures. 52 Those 
hopeful that the concept involves the possibility of recognition and protection of 
displaced persons under international norms on statelessness (' some status at last') 
have ended up as disappointed as those who hope for the same in relation to 
refugeehood. States simply do not disappear so easily or rapidly. Although the 
features that define states may eventually be affected to the point where states cease 
to exist,53 this affords no solutions to diplacees from small island-states which may 
emerge in the meantime. Only when a state has actually physically ceased to be a 
state, or when an organ of the state has withdrawn nationality from its citizens, could 
stateless persons be 'created'. Not only are both terrifying prospects but even where 
they come to pass, a limited array of 'solutions' is available, curtailed by the 
limitations in the relevant regime and the limited uptake of relevant instruments. 54 
50 McAdam, above n 38, 120. 
51 Ibid. 
52 See, eg, Carol Farbotko, 'Wishful Sinking: Disappearing Islands, Climate Refugees and 
Cosmopolitan Experimentation' (2010) 51 Asia Pacific Viewpoint 47, McAdam, above n 5, 110 and 
McAdam, above n 38, eg 105, 107; see also the previous chapter. 
53 McAdam, above n 38, 128; also Park, above n 37, 23. 
54 McAdam, above n 3 8. 
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4. A New Treaty? 
Recognition that both the international treaty regime concerning refugees and that 
concerning stateless persons would be of limited relevance to displaced persons in 
the climate change context has underpinned calls for the development of a new treaty 
or additions to, or amendments of, existing treaties. Proposals here include: a new 
treaty altogether, or additional protocols to either the 1951 Refugee Convention or 
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 55 Such proposals 
envision a regime operated by either an existing organisation (i.e. UNHCR, 
UNFCCC) or a new international body. Despite their appeal, serious questions have, 
however, been raised about the viability and practicability of a treaty approach, in 
particular by McAdam, 56 who has highlighted the following concerns: First, if the 
point is to recognise and protect the environmentally displaced, or, more specifically, 
those displaced in connection with the impacts of climate change, it may be difficult 
to separate environmental factors or climatic events and their consequences as the 
sole drivers of displacement, which may make it difficult to formulate a viable 
delineation of those whom · are to be protected. 57 Chapter Two highlighted that 
climate change impacts often interact with other factors in forcing people movement. 
Secondly, there are questions as to why a new instrument should privilege only one 
type of displacee not currently protected, in a world full of people who may deserve, 
55 See, eg, Biennann and Boas, above n 8; Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas, 'Preparing for a Warmer 
World: Towards a Global Governance System to Protect Climate Refugees' (2010) 10 Global 
Environmental Politics 60; Williams, above n 7; 'Draft Convention on the Inte~ational Status of 
Environmentally-Displaced Persons ' (2008) 4 Revue Europeene de Droit de ! 'Environment 375 (a 
second draft was published in 2010); Bonny Doche1iy and Tyler Giannini, 'Confronting a Rising 
Tide: A Proposal for a Convention on Clilnate Change Refugees' (2009) 33 Harvard Environmental 
Law Review 349. 
56 Jane McAdain, ' Swiln1ning Against the Tide: Why a Climate Change Displacement Treaty is Not 
the Answer' (2011) 23 International Journal of Refugee Law 2. Further outlined in her book; see 
McAdam, above n 2, 186ff and also McAdam, above n 5. 
57 McAdam, above n 2, 187. 
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but also do not enjoy, this. 58 Thirdly, as has been pointed out before, movement in 
relation to the effects of climate change may well be internal, which means an 
instrument premised on international protection in a host state may not be most 
relevant. 59 Fourthly, the citizens of some nation states conceivably affected by 
displacement in the climate change context (if not now, certainly in future) may 
resist the notion of being recognised and protected under already-existing protection 
regimes (refugees) for reasons of the systemic weaknesses regarding protection 
already noted. Some kind of formal, refugee-like status, they fear, may not 
necessarily equate to dignified or acceptable treatment. 60 Other mechanisms (not 
protection-based) that facilitate their movement may be preferred (for example, 
labour migration). 61 Finally, and more practically, McAdam notes that 'political 
appetite' for a new instrument is likely to be negligible in an environment in which 
many potential receiving states are already increasingly curbing their obligations 
towards the 'other' .62 
The following illustrates the latter difficulty in particular: aware of the restrictive 
nature of the Refugee Convention, the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) hosted a ministerial-level meeting 
concerning, amongst other issues, external displacement in the climate change 
context at the end of 2011. One goal of the meeting was to seek agreement 
concerning the possible development of an international framework (soft law) 
instru1nent to pe1iain to such movement. In the end, however, UNHCR was faced 
with the majority of states parties evidencing a great reluctance to accept ( or even 
58 Ibid, 187f. 
59 Ibid, 193f, 195. 
60 See also McAdam and Loughry, above n 32. 
61 Ibid; and McAdam, ' Swimming Against the Tide' , above n 56, 16ff and McAdam, above 2, 20lff. 
6? 
- Eg, McAdain, above n 2, 188, 197. 
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discuss) any new obligations.63 A treaty-based approach to protection in the context 
of climate change displacement is therefore likely not realistic. 
5. Complementary and Discretionary Protection? 
With treaty-based recognition and protection unlikely, at least for now, another 
avenue of disciplinary enquiry has concerned complementary and discretionary 
protection. 64 Although 'plagued by imprecision', 65 as the name implies, 
complementary protection usually refers to protection which is complementary 
(additional) to that offered under the Refugee Convention and its Protocol. It 
concerns commitments to protect persons who cannot be removed from a host state 
for several, usually serious reasons not covered by the 1951 Convention; for 
example, because conflict rages in their home country, or because they fear 
persecution, albeit not for a Convention reason. The Convention itself prohibits 
states from expelling persons or returning them to places where their life or freedoms 
would be threatened for at least one of the aforementioned five Convention 
63 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Challenges Relating to Climate 
Induced Displacement (29 January 2013), 6 <http: //www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/510a3a372.html>. 
Note, however, the Nansen Initiative, inspired by a gathering of experts in Oslo in 2011 and 
financially supported by the governments of Norway and Switzerland (two countries which had 
pledged in the aforementioned 1ninisterial 1neeting to assist UNHCR), as well as the European 
Conunission. The Initiative ' s overall goal is to foster a platform for continuing debate of the 
protection needs of those displaced across borders by natural disasters (in the context of climatic 
change and otherwise) ; see, eg, Walter Kalin, 'The Nansen Initiative and the UN Guiding Principles 
for Internally Displaced Persons - Models for the Protection of Environmentally Displaced Persons ' 
(Speech Delivered at the Climate Friendly Convention: Millions of Displaced People Without 
Protection: Climate Change Induced Displacement in Developing Countries, Deutsche Gesellschaft 
fur die Vereinten Nationen, Berlin, 29 January 2013); also The Nansen Initiative (2013) 
<http://www.nanseninitiative.org/>. 
64 See, eg, Jane McAdam, 'Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary 
Protection Standards' (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011); also 
some consideration in McAdam and Saul, above n 13. 
65 Jane McAdain, Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford University Press, 
2007) 1. 
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reasons. 66 The principle of non-refoulement, more broadly, prohibits the expulsion or 
removal of persons to a receiving country where they would be at real risk of harm 
or maltreatment, though its legal character and scope is debated. 67 Non-refoulement 
obligations that do arise are commonly founded in international and domestic human 
rights norms. McAdam notes how this includes the prohibition to remove persons 'at 
risk of arbitrary deprivation of life' (invoking the human right to life enshrined in all 
impo1iant human rights treaties) and persons 'at risk of torture, or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment' (invoking the prohibition qf torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment also common to many international rights 
instruments).68 She argues that other human rights norms may also be relevant. 
However, for the most part, such provisions 'permit a balancing test between the 
interests of the individual and the State, thus placing protection from refoulement out 
of reach in all but the most exceptional cases. ' 69 Even applicability of the 'inhuman 
or degrading treatment' provision is carefully delineated to prevent socio-economic 
conditions from becoming a ground for non-refoulen1ent. 70 
Also plagued by imprecision, discretionary protection refers to usually 
temporary protection which falls within the ambit of sovereign discretion ( and is 
therefore also outside the scope of Convention Protection).71 It is granted to persons 
who are not to be removed from a host country (at least temporarily) because they 
would otherwise face extraordinary circumstances, including the aftermath of a 
66 Art..,.., 
.J .J . 
67 See Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 3rd ed, 2007) versus James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refitgees under International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
68 McAdam, above n 64, l 6ff. 
69 Ibid, 17. For the relevance of socio-economic rights, see Michelle Foster, 'Non-Refoulement on the 
Basis of Socio-Economic Deprivation: ·The Scope of Complimentary Protection in International 
Human Rights Law (2009) Nei.,v Zealand Law Reviei.,v 257. 
70 Ibid . 
71 Alice Edwards, 'Temporary Protection, Derogation and the 1951 Refugee Convention' (2012) 13 
Melbourne Journal of International Law l , 3. 
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natural disaster, at home. It offers emergency protection, commonly also in cases of 
'mass influx' of protection seekers. 72 
Many countries and regions have i:i;nplemented complementary and discretionary 
protection measures, offering both temporary and longer-term protection in specified 
circumstances. Some are of certain relevance to displacement in the climate change 
context.73 For example, many countries do not return non-nationals, where return 
would subject such persons to the after-effects of a severe natural disaster. The 
United States (US) provides Temporary Protected Status (TPS) to those who cannot 
return on account of 'an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other 
environmental disaster in the [origin] state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, 
disruption of living conditions' .74 In the climate change context, this may be relevant 
to those who face return to the aftermath of a serious natural disaster. However, to be 
eligible for protection, a person n1ust already be located in the United States, their 
ho1ne state must have formally requested TPS designation, the granting of which is 
discretionary, and, crucially, protection is envisaged to be temporary. 75 A person 
could neither escape a natural disaster to arrive in the US and be granted TPS, nor 
could a non-national in the US who is granted this status usually expect to stay for 
very long, certainly not permanently. 
The European Union's (EU) Temporary Protection Directive also grants 
te1nporary protection, in instances of mass influx to 
72 Ibid, 1 f, 1 Of. 
73 Relevant schemes are reviewed, eg, in Susan F Martin, ' Climate Change and International 
Migration ' (The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010) 3f, and McAdam, above n 64, 
36ff. For further examples of complementary protection schemes see, eg, Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Complementmy Protection in Europe (29 July 2009) 
<http: //www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a72c9a72.html>. 
74 Immigration and Nationality Act, para 244, 8 USC para 125; TPS status has been granted on several 
occasions; e.g. following Hurricane Mitch in 1998 and 201 O Haiti emihquake. Note that, at times, 
longer-term protection has been offered through the provision, although this is not foreseen. 
75 Several authors have outlined these features: eg, McAdam, above n 64, 37f, and Martin, above n 
73 , 3. 
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' [ d]isplaced persons' [ ... ] who have had to leave their country of origin, or have 
evacuated [ ... ] and are unable to return in safe and durable conditions because of the 
situation prevailing in that country [ ... ] in particular (i) persons who have fled areas of 
armed conflict or endemic violence; (ii) persons at serious risk of, or who have been 
the victims of, systematic or generalized violation of their human rights.76 
This could, conceivably, include persons affected by an environmental disaster, as 
the two provisions do not expressly preclude it- but, crucially, only in instances of 
mass influx (it has never yet been triggered). In addition to obligations which may 
arise under the Directive, several Union member states also have policies by which 
con1plementary protection can be granted in relation to environmentally-induced 
displacement: Sweden's asylum law, for example, offers shelter to those who cannot 
return on account of a natural disaster. 77 The Finish Aliens Act provides for asylum 
in instances where a person is faced with the 
threat of death penalty, torture or other inhu1nan or treatment or treatment violating 
hun1an dignity, or if they cam1ot return [ho1ne] because of an armed conflict or 
. 1 d' 78 environmenta 1saster. 
However, there is so1ne evidence that these provisions cover only situations where a 
pronounced environmental disaster has occurred, and not calamities of a slow-
evolving kind. 79 McAdam notes that both provisions have also re1nained untested. 80 
Finally, several countries have, in the past, provided exceptional leave to remain on a 
discretionary, ad hoc and temporary basis, where a person would otherwise be 
returned to the afte1math of a natural disaster ( e.g., Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
76 Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum 
Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on 
Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts Between Member States in Receiving such Persons and 
Bearing the Consequences Thereof, [2001] OJ L212/12, art 2(c). 
77 Aliens Act [Sweden] ch 4, s 2(3). 
78 Aliens Act [Finland] s 55; see also s 109 (regarding temporary protection in cases of mass 
displacement). 
79 Vikram Kolmannskog and Finn Myrstad, 'Environmental Displacement in European Asylum Law' 
(2009) 11 European Journal of Migration and Law 313. 
80 McAdam, above n 64, 39. 
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and Canada suspended returns of certain nationals after the 2004 Boxing Day Indian 
0 ") 81 cean tsunami . 
To conclude, complementary and discretionary protection, though very 
necessary additions to Convention protections available to displaced persons, are 
hampered by being ill-delineated, sometimes ad hoc, sometimes subject to 
discretionary decision-making, usually relevant only in the context of non-return 
and, importantly, relevant usually only in the context of extreme disasters. Their 
applicability to the climate change context is therefore limited. 
6. Internal Displacement? 
Non-return is usually relevant and applicable only to those who find themselves in a 
host country. Climate change, however, may well contribute to an on-going trend: 
displacees, 1nore often than not, do not move across international borders. UNHCR, 
for example, in its 2012 Yearbook noted, amongst a total population of concern of 
35.8 million, 10.5 million refugees but 17.7 million internally displaced persons 
(IDPs). 82 International norms pertaining to the internally displaced have therefore 
also been scrutinised in the climate change displacement context. The possible 
relevance of several rights-based instruments have been noted: in particular, the 1998 
UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 83 the 2006 Protocol on the 
Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons84 and the 2009 African 
Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons 
81 See, eg,, Martin, above n 73 , 4. 
82 See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statistical Yearbook 2012 
(2013) 6; figures for 2013 were not available at the time of thesis submission. 
83 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, UN Doc E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (l lFebruary 1998); 
henceforth also 'Guiding Principles'. 
84 Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, adopted 15 December 
2006 (entered into force 21 June 2008); this covers the Great Lakes Region of Africa. 
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zn Africa. 85 The Guiding Principles, derived from existing human rights and 
humanitarian law, describe IDPs as 'persons or groups of persons who have been 
forced or obliged to flee or to leave their home or places of habitual residence, in 
particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of [ ... ] natural or human-made 
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border' . 86 
This allows for protection in relation to movement that results from both human-
made and natural disasters, 87 not the case with the two regional refugee instruments 
outlined earlier, in relation to movement that is in response to rapid-onset events, 
movement that results from the slow loss of human habitats and movement which is 
in response to violence stemming from climatic change, resource scarcity or 
disasters. 88 Importantly, the Guiding Principles and other IDP instruments leave little 
doubt that IDPs are entitled to the same degree of human rights protection as is the 
general population, and in all stages of displacement. 89 
There can be no doubt that instruments on IDP protection are very important in 
the climate change displacement context: they are very relevant in that they concern 
a type of moven1ent which is expected to be prevalent in that context - within 
country - and they afford protection to persons who move in response to a greater 
array of drivers than other instruments ( e.g. the 1951 Refugee Convention). In the 
domestic context, the Guiding Principles ( or at least parts of it) have been 
incorporated into domestic law: in 2000, Angola, for example, incorporated the 
Principles in resettlement law. In Peru, Congress also passed a law based on the 
85 Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, adopted 23 
October 2009, 49 ILM 86 (entered into force 6 December 2012); also known as the 'Kampala 
Convention'. 
86 Introduction, para 2. The two other aforementioned instruments revolve around the same definition. 
87 See Kalin, above n 20, 87. 
88 Ibid, 92f. 
89 Ibid. They remain citizens, after all, and are therefore afforded the rights that are afforded citizens. 
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Principles in 2004.90 And they appear widely in the resolutions, recommendations, 
statements or reports emanating from international organisations or bodies. 91 The 
Kampala Convention, on the other hand, has (December 2012) entered into force and 
is now creating legal obligations upon a considerable number of regional states 
parties. And yet, although there is much promise in IDP protection instruments, it is 
also important to remember that the Kampala Convention is not a global instrument 
and binds only ce1iain states. The Guiding Principles, on the other hand, are not 
binding at all, though their no1mative importance rises with each instance of 
domestic application or incorporation in international documents and instruments. 
Nevertheless, as human rights-based no1ms they face another particular challenge 
noted by Stephen Humphreys in relation to human rights provisions more generally: 
it is precisely in emergency situations (including droughts, disasters, etc.) where 
human rights are easily curtailed, with both domestic and international human rights 
instruments supporting the notion that derogation from human ri-ghts norms, even 
binding ones, is permitted (at least temporarily) during emergencies.92 
7. Human Rights and Extra-Territoriality? 
Continuing \}\rith human rights, it has been noted that climate change may impact 
negatively upon the enjoyment of many human rights, especially those of a socio-
90 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Response to the Principles <http: //www.internal-displace 
ment.org/8025708F004 D404D/(httpPages )/l 68DF53B 7 A5D0A8C802570F8005 l 8B64 ?OpenDocume 
nt>. Also, Nina Schrepfer, 'Addressing Internal Displacement through National Laws and Policies: A 
Plea for a Promising Means of Protection' (2012) 24 International Journal of Refugee Law 667. 
91 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, above n 90. For an example see 'Resolution Adopted by 
the Human Rights Council: Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons ' (2012) 24 International 
Journal of Refugee Lavv 879. 
92 See, eg, Stephen Humphreys, ' Introduction' in Stephen Humphreys (ed), Human Rights and 
Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 1, 6. 
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economic nature. 93 Where such rights are violated, displacement may occur, which 
raises further human rights implications. Human rights norms and instruments, such 
as the Guiding Principles, may play an important part in countering at least some of 
the consequences of such situations.94 However, the fact that certain communities 
may face greater struggles with rights protection or provision in the face of climate 
change, in particular in areas already challenged to ensure enjoyment of many basic 
human rights, has also been indicated.95 In light of such inequities, and aligning 
more closely with the questions of justice and of responsibility at the heart of this 
thesis, have been those who have asked whether climate change presents 
opportunities to view the source or origin of any ensuing rights violations, and 
therefore responsibility for their rectification, as located elsewhere, that is, across 
borders.96 Fundamentally, the answer to this question is negative, certainly in legal 
terms. Human rights remain remarkably bound to the domestic context.97 The noted 
political philosopher Giorgio Agamben, drawing on Hannah Arendt; has observed: 
In the system of the Nation-State, the so-called sacred and inalienable hu1nan rights 
are revealed to be without any protection precisely when it is no longer possible to 
conceive of the1n as rights of the citizen of a State.98 
There are, of course, some extra-territorial responsibilities that bind states in relation 
to human rights, particularly in two circumstances:99 in instances where states 
93 Ibid, 1. 
94 See, eg, Roger Zetter, 'Protecting People Displaced by Climate Change: Some Conceptual 
Challenges' in McAdam, above n 3, 131 , 135; also McAdam and Saul, above n 13. 
95 Humphreys, above n 90, 1. 
96 See, eg, John H Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights (BePress, 2009) and McAdam and Saul, 
above n 13. 
97 Giorgio Agamben, 'Beyond Human Rights' in Paolo Virno and Michael Hardt (eds), Radical 
Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics (University of Minnesota Press, 1996) 162; also Knox, above n 
96. 
98 Ibid; connecting Agamben to 'climate refugees' is Angela Oels, 'Asylum Rights for Climate 
Refugees? Fr01n Agamben' s Bare Life to the Autonomy of Migration' (Paper Presented at the Annual 
Convention of the International Studies Association, San Fransisco, 26 March 2008). 
99 For an analysis engaging with the limited applicability of extraterritoriality in relation to social, 
economic rights and cultural rights see, eg, Fons Coomans, 'The Extraterritorial Scope of the 
International Covenant on Econ01nic, Social and Cultural Rights in the Work of the United Nations 
C01nmittee on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights ' (2011) 11 Human Rights Law Review 1; 
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exercise 'effective control', or in relation to the activities of private actors over 
whom they exercise jurisdiction. 100 In Saldano v Argentina, the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights held that it 
does not believe [ ... ] the term "jurisdiction" in the sense of Article 1(1) is limited to, 
or 1nerely coextensive with, national territory. Rather, the Commission is of the view 
that a state pmiy to the A1nerican Convention 1nay be responsible under certain 
circu1nstances for the acts and 01nissions of its agents which produce effects or are 
undertaken outside that state's own territory. 101 
Neve1iheless, human rights re1nain largely tied to national territory or jurisdiction 
and the 'circumstances' alluded to by the Commission, or in relevant case law, do 
not really apply to those arising in relation to climate change or states' and other 
entities' greenhouse gas emissions. 
Nonetheless, in light of the extra-te1Titoriality principles the Commission has 
established, 102 the Inuit Circumpolar Council, a non-governmental organisation 
representing 160,000 Inuit people of Alaska ( extraterritoriality not an issues) and 
Canada, Greenland and Russia ( extra-territoriality an issue) and _ tasked, amongst 
other things, with the promotion of human rights for Inuit people, 103 in 2005 
requested a declaration from the Commission that the United_ States, at the time the 
largest national greenhouse gas en1itter in the world, was responsible for degrading 
their environment and livelihoods bases through their emissions, thereby diminishing 
oppo1iunities to practice a way of live which Inuit peoples had adhered to for 
also Matthew Craven, 'The Violence of Dispossession: Extra-Territoriality and Economic, Social and 
Cultw·al Rights ', in Mashood A Baderin and Robe1i McCorquodale (eds), Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in Action (Oxford University Press, 2009). 
100 See, eg, Lopez Burgos v Uruguay [1979] HRC Comm, No Rl2/52. 
101 Saldano v Argentian [1998] Inter-Am CHR, Rep No 38/99, OEA/Ser.LN/II.95 , Doc 7 rev at 289, 
para 17; echoed, eg, in Coard and Others v United States (US Military Intervention in Grenada) 
[1999] Inter-Am CHR, Rep No 109/99, Case No 10.951 , para 37: 'Under certain circumstances the 
exercise of its jurisdiction over acts with an extra-territorial locus will not only be consistent with but 
required by the norms which pertain.' 
102 And other bodies; see, eg, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Loizidou v Turkey 
[1998] Eur Comi HR, No 40/1993/435/514. 
103 See Inuit Circumpolar Com1cil, About ICC (2013) <http://inuit.org/en/about-icc.html>. 
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centuries. 104 They argued that the United States, more than any other country, was 
responsible for emission levels which violated a host of socio-economic and 
indigenous rights. 
The request was unsuccessful: in a 2006 letter, the Commission declared that it 
'will not be able to process your petition at present [ ... ]. [T]he information provided 
does not enable us to determine whether the alleged facts would tend to characterize 
a violation of rights protected by the American Declaration.' 105 According to Timo 
Koivurova et al, this highlights just how difficult it may be to derive 'effective 
protection' from the detrimental impacts of climate change via ' traditional rights 
mechanisms ' ,106 aggravated by what Humphreys notes to be a general absence of 
strong international enforcement institutions and mechanisms, especially where the 
enforcement of social, economic and indigenous rights are concemed. 107 Mary 
Robinson, former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, has 
nevertheless appealed that, despite such obstacles, human rights law and institutions 
104 Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations 
Resulting from Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (7 December 
2005) <http: //www. earthjustice.org/library/legal_ docs/petition-to-the-int~ramerican-commission-on-
human-rights-onbehalf-of-the-inuit-circumpolar-conference.pdf>. For a more detailed analysis 
providing the relevant background to the case, see Donald Goldberg and Maiiin Wagner, Petitioning 
for Adverse Impacts of Global Warming in the Inter-American Human Rights System (2002) 
<http ://www. ciel. org/Pub lications/PetitioningG lo bal Warming_ IAHR. pdf> and Joanna Harrington, 
'Climate Change, Human Rights, and the Right to be Cold' (2007) 18 Fordham Environmental Law 
Review 513 and Tilno Koivurova, Eva C H Keskitalo and Nigel Banks, Climate Governance in the 
Arctic (Springer, 2009) 21 Off. Note also that the Office of the High C01nmissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) has examined the relationship between climate change and human rights, requested by the 
Republic of the Maldives, an Indian Ocean island nation often thought to be threatened by sea-level 
rise; see Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Report of the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Relationship Between Climate Change and 
Human Rights, UN Doc AJHRC/10/61 (15 January 2009). Analysing the report is John H Knox, 
'Lil1king Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations' (2009) 33 Harvard 
Environmental Law Review 4 77. 
105 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 'Letter of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights to Mr. Crowley, Ref: Sheila Watt-Cloutier et al' (2006) in Svitlana Kravchenko, 
'Right to Carbon or Right to Life: Hmnan Rights Approaches to Clilnate Change' (2008), 535 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=l304844>. Though note that the Commission did schedule a meeting to 
discuss the issue of human rights and climate change; it was not widely attended; see Earth Justice, 
Press Release, Nobel Prize Nominee Testifies About Global Warming (2007) <http ://www.earth 
justice. org/news/ press/007 /no bel-prize-nominee-testifies-about-glo bal-warming.html>. 
106 Koivurova et al, above 104, 219. 
107 See Humphreys, above n 92, 4f. Also Stephen Humphreys, 'Are Social Rights Compatible with the 
Rule of Law? ' (Working Paper 10/06, Hauser Global Law, 2006). 
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must be able to address justice issues raised by climate change, including those 
raised across borders. 108 Whether this will be the case remains to be seen. 
8. Disaster Response, Humanitarian Assistance? 
International frameworks concerning disaster management and humanitarian 
assistance and relief have provided a final key avenue through which responding to 
climate change and displacement has been conceptualised in the disciplinary 
scholarship. 109 An increase in the occurrence of natural disasters in recent decades, 
and their possible displacement consequences, has already been noted in the previous 
chapter. John Holmes, former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for 
Humanitarian Affairs, described this trend (more frequent and severe disasters) as a 
'curtain raiser on the future' in 2008. 110 In this context, the International Law 
Commission (ILC) began working on the drafting of articles concerning the 
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters in 2007, 111 whereby it acknowledges 
that ' [ d]isasters affect large numbers of individuals each year', 'which has given rise 
to the need for enhanced legal regulation' and makes the protection of such persons a 
'necessary component for a complete international disaster relief regime' .11 2 The 
Draft A1iicles' aim is to 'facilitate an adequate and effective response to disasters 
that meets the essential needs of the persons concerned, with full respect of their 
108 Mary Robinson, 'Foreword' in Humphreys~ above n 92, xvii. 
109 See, eg, Michelle Leighton, 'Climate Change and Migration: Key Issues for Legal Protection of 
Migrants and Displaced Persons ' (German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010); McAdam, 
above n 59, esp. 46ff; Sarah Collinson, 'Developing Adequate Humanitarian Responses ' (German 
Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010). 
110 John Holmes, 'The Need for Collaboration' (2008) 31 Forced Migration 4, 4. 
111 See International Law C01mnission, Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters (2012) <http :// 
untreaty. un. org/ilc/ guide/ 6 _ 3 .ht1n>. 
112 International Law Com1nission, 'Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters: Memorandum by 
the Secretariat', UN Doc A/CN.4/590 (11 December 2007) 1, 3. 
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rights' .113 Crucially, a duty to cooperate interstate is enunciated in Draft Article 5 .114 
However, eligible events include only those of a 'calamitous' nature, 115 and although 
'persons concerned' could also refer to displacees, displacement is nowhere 
1. . 1 . d 116 exp 1c1t y ment1one . 
The 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action117 has also been noted as a possibly 
relevant instrument in the climate change displacement context. 118 It is an 
amalgamation of pre-existing instruments concerning disaster risk and response. 119 It 
stipulates that 'developing countries, especially least developed countries, warrant 
particular attention, in view of their higher vulnerability levels, which often exceeds 
their own capacity to respond to and recover from disasters ' and therefore 
encourages 'enhance[ d] international and regional cooperation and assistance' .120 
Importantly, in the context of climate change displacement, it asks that governments 
ensure that where measures are taken to assist displaced persons, that these do not 
further intensify risks and vulnerabilities. 121 Michelle Leighton notes that 
cooperation duties stipulated could include that states provide assistance also to 
disaster victims that have crossed an international border - at least temporarily. 122 
113 International Law Commission, 'Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters: Texts of Draft 
Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 as Provisionally Adopted by Drafting Committee', UN Doc A/CN.4/L758 (24 
July 2009) art 2. 
114 The draft article stipulates that ' [ fJ or the purposes of the present draft articles, cooperation includes 
humanitarian assistance, coordination of international relief actions and communications, and making 
available relief personnel, relief equipment and supplies, and scientific, medical and technical 
resources.' See International Law Commission, 'Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters: Texts 
and Titles of Draft Articles 5 bis, 12, 13, 14 and 15, Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting 
Committee from 5 to 11 July 2012', UN Doc A/CN.4/L.812 (12 July 2012). 
115 International Law Commission, above n 113, art 3. 
116 S d ee McA am, above n 64, 47. 
117 Hyogo Framework/or Action 2005 - 2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to 
Disaster (Extract from the Final Report of the Word Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction), UN 
Doc A/CONF.206/6 (16 March 2005); henceforth also 'Hyogo Framework' or 'Framework' as 
appropriate. 
118 See, eg, Leighton, above n 109. 
119 Ibid, 2. 
PO 
- Hyogo Framework, para 13(g) and 13(h). 
121 Hyogo Frameworks, para 19(ii)(i). 
122Leighton, above n 109, 3. 
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The principles espoused by the Framework are further incorporated, for example, in 
the 2006 Operational Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disaster adopted by 
the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) 123 and the International Committee of 
the Red Cross's (ICRC) Guidelines on Disaster Relief and Disaster Recovery 
Assistance. 124 The cooperation norms in the Framework, finally, echo human rights 
norms, including in relation to international assistance to displacees. 125 
Despite the promise of these developments, however, emerging norms on 
humanitarian relief and disaster response remain poorly delineated and limited in the 
scope of protection and assistance they can provide, shortcomings acknowledged by 
those who have explored their relevance to migration or displacement in the climate 
change context: First, most relevant norms are voluntary, no more than soft law, 
leaving those who may have to move at the whims of political expediency, 126 and 
possibly at the mercy of acts not subject to 'legal rules but the logic of situations' 
which are easily deployed 'to legitimate a range of dubious practices' .127 Secondly, 
already the humanitarian and disaster relief system is ill-equipped to cope with 
present volumes of people displaced or otherwise vulnerable, largely a result of 
' [ d]istortions in the relative levels of donor assistance flowing to different countries 
due to competing political and strategic considerations' .128 Thirdly, humanitarian 
relief for displaced persons is overbearingly concentrated on providing (short-term) 
123 Inter-Agency Standing Committee, 'Protecting Persons Affected by Natural Disasters: IASC 
Operations Guidelines on Human Rights and Natural Disasters ' (Brookings-Bern Project on Internal 
Displacement, 2006) <http: //www.refwor ld. org/ cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain ?page=publisher&pub lisher 
=IASC&type=THEM GUIDE&coi=&docid=4a54bbcfd&skip=0>. 
124 Inten1ational Committee of the Red Cross, Guidelines for the Domestic Facilitation and 
Regulation of International Disaster Relief and Disaster Recovery Assistance (2007) <http ://ocha. 
unog.ch/drptoolkit/PreparednessTools/IL%20Frameworks/IDRL%20guidelines%20-%20en.pdf>; 
also Leighton, above n 109, 3 for these two. 
125 Leighton, above n 109, 3. More on this also in ch 8 of this thesis . 
126 Ibid, 7. 
127 Chimni, above n 31, 3. Both Bhupinder Chimni and Giorgio Agamben have persuasively argued 
that hmnanitarian actors or actions do not always foster human welfare; see Chimni, Ibid and Giorgio 
Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford University Press, 1998) 13. 
128 Collinson, above n 109, 4. 
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'material relief which often ignores the long-term needs of affected persons, 129 
including those who may have moved from areas that have become permanently 
uninhabitable. Finally, and a similar dynamic has already been highlighted in 
relation to many of the other instruments and provisions investigated, relief for those 
facing slow-onset change, is not seen as compelling compared to those facing the 
aftermath of sudden, high-impact events. 130 
9. Response or Responsibility? 
The disciplinary enquiry concerning displacement in the climate change context has, 
importantly, focused on how international law is relevant if, when and where 
displacement happens. A plethora of international norms and instruments have been 
investigated in the process, in an effort to uncover their usefulness in responding to 
displacement in the climate change context. Many have been found to be relevant to 
a degree in theory - at least some of those affected may hold some rights, though a 
response to their plight will more likely be ad hoc and uncertain in practice. Like 
Kafka' s man from the country, then, who appears in the chapter' s opening quote, 
affected persons in the climate change displacement context may find themselves 
tantalised by the Law' s possibilities but may ultimately be largely deserted by it. 131 
Focusing on how to respond to displacement in the climate change context has 
meant that the discipline has asked important questions about what is possible, 
uncovering that, certainly where displacement is internal, or where it is in response 
to significant natural disasters, or where it is in response to the total loss of living 
129 Ibid. 
130 Leighton, above n 109, 8. 
13 1 See Agamben, above n 127, 50. 
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spaces the law does raise some possibilities. What is asked more rarely, however, is 
what is right. Current climate change is not a random phenomenon; it is 
anthropogenic, man-made. Although it is true that climate change impacts will not 
compel displacement in isolation of other factors, there is no question of their 
contribution to displacement. It is right and necessary, therefore, to ask of the law 
not only how it may help to ensure that displacement is properly responded to, but 
also whether and how questions of responsibility are engaged. Rather than the 
response-focused framework which has dominated the disciplinary interrogation, this 
thesis will therefore employ a justice-based framework, at the heart of which will be 
questions concerning responsibility. 
10. Conclusion 
The present chapter has sought to present the key findings which have emerged from 
the disciplinary outputs concerning climate change and displacement. A lot of 
territory has been covered: multiple legal fra1neworks have been applied to the many 
manifestations of displacement in the climate change context. A somewhat 
fragmented picture of international law's relevance is thereby beginning to emerge, 
within an overall frame which seeks to find solutions for how to deal with 
displacement where it occurs. Although treaty-based protection seems unlikely 
( certainly for the foreseeable future), several other mechanisms may well be 
relevant. These will ce1iainly not capture all those affected, but they may capture a 
share, especially where people move without crossing borders (the internally 
displaced), where they move in certain regions (whether crossing borders or not; for 
example, in Africa), or where they 1nove in response to highly visible natural 
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disasters of catastrophic proportions. The thesis from here on will proceed by 
applying a different lens, asking how the law is relevant if one views displacement in 
the climate change context as an issue of responsibility instead - in particular, for 
harm, loss or disproportionate disadvantage and burden. Giving structure to this 
approach will be the application of justice theory, in particular that pertaining to 
corrective and distributive justice. The picture which will emerge from this 
endeavour may also be fractured (not provide 'a single, triumphant truth' 132) but will 
contribute to the overall question of what to do about displacement in the climate 
change context in meaningful ways. The next chapter presents the justice framework 
which will underpin analysis throughout the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
132 Hilary Charlesworth, 'Fe1ninist Methods in International Law' (1999) 93 American Journal of 
International Law 379, 379. 
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CHAPTER4 
Why Justice? What Justice? 
Whatever its shortcomings, international law also exists as a promise ofjustice.1 
(Martti Koskenniemi, 2003) 
Now is the time for international lawyers to focus on issues of fairness in the law. The new 
maturity and complexity of the system calls out for a critique of law 's content and 
consequences. 2 
(Thomas Franck, 1995) 
1. Introduction 
The thesis has so far introduced the topic of climate change and human displacement 
and its treatment in the international law scholarship. The goal of this thesis, 
however, is more specific - to uncover whether a justice-based analysis can assist in 
illuminating the role and relevance of international law in relation to climate change 
and human displacement in ways which are novel. Undoubtedly, this necessitates at 
least a brief discussion of 'what is justice?' This is, of course, easily conceived not 
only as the subject of a lengthy separate dissertation but is a question which has 
underpinned millennia of philosophical and academic debate. An in-depth analysis of 
the concept is therefore beyond the scope and purposes of this chapter and the thesis. 
What is beyond doubt, however, is that justice matters, or should matter, in human 
interactions. The American political philosopher John Rawls, for example, held that 
'[j]ustice is the first virtue of social institutions ' and '[b ]eing first virtues of human 
activities, truth and justice are uncompromising. ' 3 One dictionary definition of the 
1 Maiiti Koskem1iemi, 'What is International Law For? ' in Malcolm Evans (ed), International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2003) 57, 57. 
2 Thomas M Franck, Fairness i.n International Law and Institutions (Clarendon Press, 1995) 9. 
3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, revised ed, 1999) 3, 4 [italics added by 
thesis author]. 
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concept stipulates that justice is about 'just behaviour or treatment', including 'the 
quality of being fair and reasonable', also in 'the administration of the law or 
authority in maintaining this' ,4 which indicates a construction of justice as fair 
process. Otherwise, justice has often been described as the 'constant and perpetual 
disposition to render every man his due' 5 (usually understood in relation to human 
interactions or relations and their consequences), which appears to emphasise just 
outcomes. The basic tension or relationships between the two, process and outcome, 
is one which continues to stimulate debate. Some have emphasised that justice is 
really about both simultaneously. Terry Nardin, for example, holds that justice 
~involves the idea of impartial rules as well as that of the impartial application of 
rules. ' 6 More basically, Samuel Fleischacker considers justice 'a virtue that protects 
individuals ' - from harm and interference with their belongings, rights or freedoms. 7 
The goal of justice is therefore to counter a range of possible ills or wrongs (many 
more will find mention in the pages of this and later chapters) which can befall 
people, or groups of people, especially in their interactions with others. Given the 
array of ills or wrongs it is meant to have the potential to alleviate, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that 'justice' is not singular. Rather, a sometimes bewildering range of 
justice paradigms or conceptualisations have emerged over the centuries which seek 
to address different situations and relationships. 8 Amongst these, corrective and 
distributive justice, the foci of this thesis, stand out. 
4 Oxford Dictionaries, Justice (2012) <http ://oxforddictionaries.com/ defmition/ english/justice> . 
5 The Law Dictionary, Justice (2012) <http ://thelawdictionary.org/justice-n/> . A similar notion is 
expressed also in Plato, The Republic [trans.Benjamin Jowett (ebook@Adelaide, 2012)] 33 le; there, 
Polemarchus claims that justice is about restoring to every 1nan what is his due. 
6 Terry Nardin, Law, Morality and the Relations of States (Princeton University Press, 1983) 258. 
7 Samuel Fleischacker, A Short History of Distributive Justice (Harvard University Press, 2004) 6. 
8 To name just a few: corrective justice, distributive justice, retributive justice, participatory justice, 
social justice, communitarian justice, cosmopolitan justice, global justice, etc. Admittedly, many of 
those just mentioned may fall under the larger distributive justice umbrella, so participatory justice is 
about the just distribution of participation in public fora, etc. 
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Subsequent sections of this chapter will delve deeper into the two justice 
paradigms chosen as the reference points for this research. However, the following 
section will first engage in more depth with the question of justice as the framework 
for this thesis, justifying the overall justice approach and the two particular justice 
angles chosen. This will be followed by a section which briefly engages with the 
'promise of justice' in international law that was alleged in the opening quote of this 
chapter. Section Four will explore the Aristotelian origin of the corrective/ 
distributive justice dichotomy and how it has been interpreted over time. Sections 
Five and Six will delve deeper into each justice paradigm individually, seeking to 
tease out key points - of both contention and agreement. The chapter will conclude 
with indications of how the justice framework presented in this chapter is relevant to 
the analysis to follow in subsequent chapters. 
2. Why Justice? What Justice? 
Like the idea of human rights, justice is understood to be of universal impo1iance and 
value. 9 Beyond this, Tom Campbell has argued that significant disagreement exists 
as to its nature and scope: 10 Is it a negative virtue which stipulates how people 
should not treat each other, or does it demand more proactive action to find 
implementation? Does it concern interactions, and their consequences, only between 
individuals, or also those between any interacting parties? Does it reach across 
borders? 11 Is it linked with other normative systems - for example, law - or 
9 See, eg, Tom Campbell, Justice (Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd ed, 2010) 1. 
10 Ibid, 7ff. 
11 See, eg, Thomas Nagh, 'The Problem of Global Justice ' (2005) 33 Philosophy and Public Affairs 
113 and Andrew Linklater, 'The Evolving Spheres of International Justice ' (1999) 75 International 
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independent? Is it rhetoric or something more? In other words, justice evokes 
immense complexity which easily defies all claims to its alleged universality and 
which confounds justice-based analyses. 12 Nevertheless, as Campbell states: 
In the absence of the nai've belief that there is a 'true' or ' correct' meaning of 'justice ', 
we [can] proceed by elucidating the actual deployment of the language of justice in all 
its variety to the point where stipulative choices [can] be made in order to arrive at a 
clear and coherent set of conceptual distinctions which point up the nature of the [ ... ] 
questions which are at issue in the contemporary world. There may be no one correct 
analysis of justice but there are certainly 1nore or less useful ones.13 
He points out that the key to justice having utility as an analytical tool is to recognise 
the 'differing and competing moral views' which coexist under the overall concept of 
'justice' , but which actually underpin differing conceptions of 'justice' .14 It is the 
latter - 'conceptions' - which should provide the 'evaluative criteria' to be applied in 
justice-based analyses, as only they can offer a useful and targeted framework that 
avoids the application of overly vague or broad principles and perspectives. 15 
The distinction between the 'concept' of justice and 'conceptions' of justice this 
raises is important for this thesis. An analysis of the role of international law in 
relation to climate change and human displacement in light of justice (the task of this 
thesis) under the 'concept' umbrella would undoubtedly turn out to be so broad-
brush as to be methodologically and practically nearly useless. However, a focus on 
particular 'conceptions ' of justice may permit a more targeted, contextualised and 
bounded analysis. But why focus on corrective and distributive justice 'conceptions'? 
Why not others? The answer to this is manifold but does go back, most simply, to 
what justice, as an overall 'concept' , is . As stated in the chapter introduction, justice 
is fundamentally (and vaguely) about rendering each party its due in relation to 
Affairs 473 and Duncan French, 'Global Justice and the (lr)relevance of Indeterminacy' (2009) 8 
Chinese Journal of International Law 593 . 
12 Campbell, above n 9, 13. 
13 Ibid, 13. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
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human interactions and their consequences. This evokes an immense complexity. 
What a corrective/distributive justice framework permits is to reduce this complexity 
to just two considerations: the injustice of having one party not rendered its due 
because something has unjustly been taken from it and the injustice of having one 
party not rendered its due because something owed to it has not been granted or 
shared. Even though this may or may not represent an exclusive way of looking at 
what may be owed in relation to the consequences of human interactions, in the 
words of Ernest Weimib, it represents 'a comprehensive and fundamental mode[ ... ] 
of ordering external relationships' .16 It essentialises them to, arguably, their most 
'mutually irreducible forms' and their 'barest and most inclusive abstractions' .17 
What, more specifically, is involved in either justice 'conception'? Both are 
undoubtedly concerned with the same outcome or goal - equalisation ( and thereby 
justice; the rendering of what is due) between different parties. 18 Weimib argues that 
' [ d]istributive justice divides a benefit or burden [equally] in accordance with some 
criterion. An exercise of distributive justice consists of three elements: the benefit or 
burden being distributed, 19 the [parties] among whom it is distributed, and the 
criterion according to which it is distributed.' Corrective justice, on the other hand, 
'features an equality of quantities. It focuses on a quantity that represents what 
rightfully belongs to one party but is now wrongly possessed by another party [ or has 
been taken] and therefore must be shifted back to its rightful owner. ' 20 
Ultimately, then, a corrective/distributive justice fra1nework permits a 
comprehensive, yet targeted and coherent investigation of justice and of 
responsibilities which arise in relation to human interactions and their consequences, 
16 Ernest J Weinrib, 'Corrective Justice' (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 403, 416: 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid, 404 f and throughout. 
19 Ibid, 408 
20 Ibid. 
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an angle almost completely ignored in analysis (including legal) of climate change-
and human displacement, although it is undeniably worthy of discussion, as this 
thesis will seek to do. In particular, corrective justice will permit analysis of the 
climate change and human displacement phenomenon as arising from interactions 
which are unequal (therefore unjust) because the actions of some contribute to taking 
what rightfully belongs to others, for example, livelihoods, property, home, personal 
security or well-being. Distributive justice, on the other hand, will permit analysis of 
the climate change and human displacement phenomenon as ans1ng from 
interactions which are unequal (therefore unjust) because the actions of some 
contribute to creating burdens for others, with the distribution of burdens and 
benefits that arise from processes that create such burdens unequally distributed or 
shared. 
But is justice connected to law? Is it 'part of law or [ ... ] simply a moral 
judgement about law' , which is sometimes understood as 'officially promulgated 
rules of conduct, backed by sanctions for their transgression?' 21 Arguably, 
international law is about more than just ' rules'. Rather, -according to Rosalyn 
Higgins, it is about 'the entire decision-making process, and not just the reference to 
the trend of past decisions which are termed "rules". ' 22 But the question about the 
connection between law and justice remains. It is as puzzling and long-standing as 
the question about what justice is, yet is vital to the context of this thesis, whose task 
it is to position a particular phenomenon at the intersection of both law and justice. 
Legal positivists often argue against a connection between the two, usually citing a 
21 Anthony D' Amato, 'On the Connection Between Law and Justice ' (Faculty Working Paper, 
Northwestern University School of Law, 2011) 2, 4. 
22 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford University 
Press, 1995) 2, 3. 
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lack of 'objective criteria' by which to evaluate or implement the latter as cause for 
concern.23 Positivist Hans Kelsen, for example, famously stipulated 
There is not, and cannot be, an objective criterion of justice because the state1nent: 
something is just or unjust, is a judgment of value referring to an ulti1nate end, and 
these value judg1nents are by their very nature subjective in character, because based 
on emotional elements of our mind, on our feelings and wishes. They cannot be 
verified by fact, as can state1nents about reality [ ... ]. This is the reason why in spite of 
the atte1npts made by the 1nost illustrious thinkers of 1nankind to solve the proble1n of 
justice, there is not only no agreement but the most passionate antagonis1n in 
answering the question of what is just.24 
For this reason, positivists persistently argue against linking justice with law.25 More 
specifically, Kelsen notes the corrective/distributive justice framework as developed 
by Aristotle as lacking a specific 'mechanism for determining what is each person' s 
due' , as a 'tautology devoid of content,' 26 and therefore of limited use to law or legal 
application. However, Weinrib has countered this by stating that the very discovery 
of the two conceptions was of immense value: 
[W]e should first ask whether Aristotle has correctly fonnulated the problem. For 
without a correct fonnulation of the problem, no solution will be adequate; and, 
conversely the formulation of the proble1n presu1nably itnposes a certain structure on 
the solution and is, therefore, the first step in its discovery.27 
He concludes, ultimately, that the conceptions can 'inform legal arrangements ', and 
have in fact done so, nowhere more so than in modern domestic tort law, which, 
according to Weinrib, has corrective justice (returning something that has been 
taken) at its heart. 28 In other words, 'in distinguishing these two forms of justice, 
Aristotle sets out the justificatory structures to which coherent legal arrangements 
confonn. ' 29 Justice, therefore, informs law and can be law. But what about justice 
23 See, eg, Ernest J Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford University Press, 2012) eg, s 3.1 and 
Weinrib, above n 16. . 
24 Hans Kelsen, What is Justice And Justice, Law and Politics in the Mirror of Science (University of 
California Press, 1957) 295. 
25 Also D' Ainator, above n 21 , 6. 
26 Weinrib, above n 16, 411. 
27 Ibid, 411. 
28 Ibid, 418. 
29 Ibid. 
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beyond the realm of domestic law? Does it feature as a concern or integral part of 
international law and scholarship which engages with it? Can it? Should it? The 
following section will engage with such questions. 
3. Justice and International Law: The Scholarly Debate 
Scholars of international law have expressed an interest in the relevance of justice to 
that legal order, although no agreement exists as to what justice means to 
international law or the extent to which it does or should feature there. Carlo 
F ocarelli has noted the natural law origins of international law, which concerns 
questions of justice. He argues that ' [i]nternational law was actually born out of 
natural law as understood in the Western philosophical, theological, political, and 
legal tradition, and continues to be at centre stage in current "global law" projects' .30 
Justice matters here because natural law is underpinned by a focus on what is right or 
wrong and a desire to prevent 'unjust laws' which reflect only the priorities of 
powerful actors but not the common good (what is the due of all). 31 Emphasising the 
connection between natural and international law was also Roman jurist Gaius, who 
held that 'what natural reason establishes among all men and is observed by all 
peoples alike, is called the jus gentiu1n, as being the jus which all nations employ. ' 32 
And yet, international law is implicated in fostering or not preventing great 
3
° Carlo Focarelli, International Law as Social Construct: The Struggle for Global Justice (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 94. 
31 Ibid, lOlf. 
32 Gaius, Institutes [trans. 0 F Robinson and W M Gordon, The Institutes of Gaius (Duckworth, 
2001)] 1,1,1; also Focarelli, above n 30, 95f. 
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injustices, for example, historically, in relation to the Western-Christian civilising 
mission and, more contemporarily, in current processes of globalisation.33 
Realists would argue that justice does not belong in international law and 
relations in the first place. They note that all states do, and perhaps even should do, is 
pursue self-interest in a system akin to the 'Hobbesian state of nature ' :34 'For [ ... ] 
realists, international politics [ .. . ] is a struggle for power, but unlike domestic 
politics, a struggle dominated by organized violence' .35 They envision a world of 
state interaction, in other words, in which justice ( consideration of what is another 's 
due) has no place. In fact, realists would argue that states ' pre-occupation with their 
own interests is preferable to them acting in light of other considerations (i.e. justice, 
the greater good, etc.), which 'may result in large-scale human disasters, due to a 
deadly combination of fallibility, ideological bias and hubris ' .36 International law, 
too, in this view is largely irrelevant; ' legalistic-moralistic' at best and ' intolerably 
invasive' at worst. 37 
So far, two extreme positions concerning the role of justice in international law 
( and relations) have been presented: one which holds that international law is 
strongly imbued with justice considerations, given its alleged natural law origins, and 
another which denies any role for justice considerations whatsoever. More subtly 
integrating both of these positions has been a body of international law, influenced 
by the Critical Legal Studies movement, and usually referred to as NAIL (New 
Approaches to International Law), which has sought to argue that international law, 
33 See, eg, Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005); also Focarelli, above n 30, 94. 
34 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundation for International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2003) 30. 
35 Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Addison Wesley Longman, 2nd ed, 
2011) 20; in Buchanan, above n 34, 30. 
36 Buchanan, above n 43 , 36; he relies on Hans Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for 
Power and Peace (Alfred A Knopf, 6th ed, 1985). 
37 Focarelli, above n 30, 107. 
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or rather the discourse which concerns it, veers between support for, and denial of, 
justice's relevance (amongst other normative considerations) in international law. 
Martti Koskenniemi, in his seminal From Apology to Utopia,38 highlights in 
particular a disciplinary dialogue divided between two states - 'apology' and 
'utopia'. That is, apology for international realist tendencies to pursue self-interest, 
on the one hand, and a utopian state or predisposition which expresses some hope 
that self-interest may be constrained in the name of morality, justice or some other 
perceived greater good or normative consideration, on the other hand. All 
international legal debate, Koskenniemi argues, oscillates between the two, but both 
'end up being politics in disguise, either to justify actions taken regardless of law or 
to promote value-laden goals. ' 39 
Fro1n Apology to Utopia 'was to provide resources for the use of international 
law's professional vocabulary for critical or emancipatory causes' ,40 and many NAIL 
scholars will highlight that countering global wrongs is at the heart 0f their project.41 
And yet, according to Nigel Purvis, NAIL 'seems to offer little more than the 
opportunity to exist as a convincing nay-sayer' .42 Certainly, -no comprehensive or 
specific commitment to justice in international law and relations emerges in such a 
context. 
Another scholarly movement, TW AIL (Third World Approaches to International 
Law), has raised doubts that international law fosters both self-interest and a greater 
good, and has presented a mono-directional system which seemingly always works 
38 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 1989). 
39 Focarelli, above n 30, 113. 
40 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2005) 589. 
41 See, eg, David Kennedy, 'A New Stream of International Law Scholarship ' (1988) 7 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal l and James Boyle, ' Ideals and Things: International Legal Scholarship 
and the Prisonhouse of Language (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Journal 327. 
42 Nigel Purvis, 'Critical Legal Studies in Public International Law' (1991) 32 Harvard International 
Law Journal 81, 123 
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in favour of richer states of the Global North and against poorer states of the Global 
South. Fundamentally, 'TW AIL insists on [ ... ] the imperialist structure of 
international law since the Conquest of the New World. Globalization is routinely 
seen as a new form of imperialism imposed by Western states. ' 43 It holds that 
international law 'help[ s] to legitimize and sustain the unequal structures and 
processes that manifest themselves in the growing north-south divide. ' 44 Given such 
structural inequities, its goal is 'to transform international law from being a language 
of oppression to a language of emancipation', and to implement and foster 'truly 
global justice' .45 Yet, despite such noble goals, how to achieve this is often left ill-
addressed. Some have therefore described TW AIL as little more than 'illusory, [ ... ] 
rhetorically colourful but programmatically vacuous' .46 Focarelli argues that 
'TWAIL smuggles for legal what is a political claim' .47 
Two further scholarly and fairly recent engagements with the question of justice 
1n international law deserve attention: In Justice, Legitimacy and Self-
Determination, 48 Allen Buchanan criticises the realist take concerning international 
law and relations - which emphasises states' pursuit of self-interest. Instead, he 
argues that international law, 'can and ought to be evaluated from the standpoint of 
moral principle, including, pre-eminently, principles of justice', justice here being 
about 'the most basic moral rights and obligations that persons have ' .49 In other 
words, the object of justice in international law must be the individual. At the 
43 Focarelli, above n 30, 130. 
44 BS Chimni, 'Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto' (2006) 8 International 
Community law Review 3, 3. 
45 A Anghie and B S Chunni, 'Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflict' (2003) 77 Chinese Journal of International Law 77, 79; in 
Focarelli, above n 30, 130. 
46 Brad Roth, Governmental Illegitimacy and Neocolonialism: Response to Review by James Thuo 
Gathii' (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 2056, 2057. 
47 Focarelli, above n 30, 131. 
48 Buchanan, above n 34. 
49 Ibid, 1-2 · [ italics by thesis author]. 
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moment, the international legal order fails individuals. It is ' inadequate to the task of 
coping with secession crises, ethnic conflicts, failed states, and global terrorism' 50 
and a range of other ills that also have consequences for individuals. As a solution, 
Buchanan makes 'principled proposals for reform' , in particular, the limiting of state 
sovereignty in relation to human rights. 51 Justice, in other words, is about removing 
barriers to achieving human rights. 
Thomas Franck, in Fairness in International Law and Institutions , argues that 
because there can no longer be a question as to whether 'international law is law' , 
'international lawyers are now free to undertake a critical assessment of its content', 
which should include debate as to whether international law is legitimate and fair. 52 
Fairness, he argues, will depend in particular on two considerations - the 
simultaneous application of both procedural and distributive justice: 
The fain1ess of international law, as of any other legal system, will be judged, first by 
the degree to which the rules satisfy the paiiicipants ' expectations of justifiable 
distribution of costs and benefits, and secondly by the extent to which the rules are 
1nade and applied in accordance with what the participants perceive as right process.53 
Unlike many others who engage with international law and the question of justice, 
-
Franck thereby ties his analysis to particular 'conceptions ' of justice. Returning to 
Campbell ' s argument about the 'concept' of justice versus ' conceptions' of justice, 
this is important. Many agree that international law has ' a symbolic, as well as a 
regulative function' , 54 is both utopian and apologetic, fosters , or aspires to self-
interest as well as justice, or a greater good. Others (i.e. TW AILers, Buchanan) feel 
that justice is fundamentally lacking in the international law world, but have made 
50 Ibid, 15. 
51 Ibid, 430. A changing position of the individual under international law has been noted for some 
time, ·however. See, eg, Louis B Sohn, 'The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of 
Individuals Rather than States ' (1982) 32 Utah Lm,v Review l. 
5? 
- Franck, above n 2, 6f. 
53 Ibid, 7. 
54 Hilary Charlesworth, 'Feminist Methods in International Law' (1999) 39 American Journal of 
International Law 379, 393. 
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contributions as to how it could and should be imbued with 'justice' . However, with 
the exception of Franck, much of the international law scholarship that engages with 
questions of justice in that legal order ignore particular ' conceptions ' of justice and 
instead conceive of justice as conceptually vague. Terry N ardin, however, has stated 
that ' [ a ]rguing about justice [ should] force one to articulate and clarify the standards 
on which one' s judgements are based. ' 55 This, then, is precisely the task set by this 
thesis: to take one global phenomenon - climate change and displacement - and 
evaluate its possible treatment in and through international law in relation to the 
standards or features involved in two particular justice paradigms or ' conceptions ' -
corrective and distributive justice. The chapter will now tum to the philosophical 
origins of both conceptions and then detail the features of each in greater detail. 
4. Two Theories of Justice: Origins 
Although leaning on others, 56 it is Aristotle who is thought to have developed the 
con·ective/distributive justice dichotomy which will inform this thesis. 57 To 
understand the Aristotelian distinction between the two constructs, it is important to 
understand a more fundamental justice distinction made by Aristotle - that between 
universal, that is higher or divine justice, and particular justice, that is justice which 
concerns pariicular human interactions. 58 It is within particular justice where 
55 Nardin, above n 6, 257. 
56 For example, Plato; see Izhak Englard, Corrective and Distributive Justice: From Aristotle to 
Modern Times (Oxford University Press, 2009) 6. 
57 See, eg, Ibid, 1, 6; also Benjamin Zipursky, 'Philosophy of Tort Law' in Martin P Golding and 
William A Edmundson (eds), The Blaclnvell Guide to the Philosophy of Lcn,v and Legal Theory 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2 0 04) 122, 13 3 . 
58 Englard, above n 56, xi, l f. 
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Aristotle then positions the distinction between distributive and corrective justice. 59 
According to Aristotle: 
Particular justice on the other hand, and that which is just in the sense corresponding 
to it, is divided into two kinds. One kind is exercised in the distribution of honour, 
wealth, and the other divisible assets of the community, which may be allotted among 
members in equal or unequal shares. The other kind is that which supplies a corrective 
. . 1 [ ] 60 pnnc1p e . . . . 
More specifically concerning distributive justice, he stipulates: 
It follows therefore that [distributive] justice involves at least four tenns, namely, two 
persons for who1n it is just and two shares which are just. And there will be the same 
equality between the shares as between the persons, since the ratio between the shares 
will be equal to the ratio between the persons; for if the persons are not equal, they 
will not have equal shares; it is when equals possess or are allotted unequal shares, or 
persons not equal equal shares, that quarrels and complaints arise. This is also clear 
from the principle of' assignment by desert'. All are agreed that justice in distribution 
must be based on desert of some sort, although they do not mean the same sort of 
desert; de1nocrats make the criterion free birth, those of oligarchical sympathies 
wealth or in other cases birth [ ... ].61 
Concerning corrective justice, he stipulates: 
This justice is of a different sort from the preceding. For justice in distributing 
co1n1non property always conforms with the proportion we have described since when 
a distribution is made from the common stock, it will follow the same ratio as that 
between amounts which the several persons have contributed to tfie common stock; 
and the injustice opposed to justice of this kind is a violation of this proportion. But 
the just in private transactions, although it is equal in a sense (and the unjust the 
unequal) is not the equal according to geometrical but according to arithmetical 
proportion. For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man 
or a bad one a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has committed 
adultery; the law looks only at the nature of the damage, treating the parties as equal, 
and merely asking whether one has done and the other suffered injustice, whether one 
inflicted and the other sustained damage. [ ... ] [T]he judge endeavours to make them 
equal by the penalty or loss he imposes, taking away the gain.62 
Significant similarities and distinctions emerge: As has been noted before, both types 
of justice are pre-occupied with the idea that equality is created, or rather re-created, 
between separate entities. In corrective justice, this concerns the equality between the 
doer and sufferer of harm or damage, with the relationship between the two to be 
equalised through the imposition of a penalty, usually compensation. Distributive 
59 Ibid, 2. 
60 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics [trans. H Rackham (Harvard University Press, 1962)] 267. 
61 Ibid, 271-273. 
62 Ibid, 273 -275. 
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justice, on the other hand, concerns the equality that should exist between deserving 
entities and the things that ought to be shared amongst them (usually broadly 
conceived to be benefits but also burdens63) - in proportion to desert. The following 
table will further illuminate similarities and differences: 
Table 1: Corrective Justice vs Distributive Justice 
Corrective Justice Distributive Justice 
Parties • Victim/Victimiser • Haves/Have-Nots 
• Loss Bearer/Perpetrator • Possibly enjoined in some 
(this - a specific communal sense through 
perpetrator/victimiser - which desert is assessed (this 
matters to Aristotle and those 
matters to Aristotle, but 
corrective justice theorists that increasingly less so in later follow in his footsteps, but 
constructions of distributive 
less so to others, as a later justice, as a later section of the 
section of this chapter will 
chapter will show) 
show) 
Point of • Damage, Harm, Injury, • Sharing of Benefits (and 
Contention Loss, Fault (again, the latter Burdens) -
matters more to some more 
• Access off or Denial to 
than others, as the chapter will Benefits 
show) 
Proportionality • 
• Desert/ Merit (this features 
strongly in the Aristotelian 
construction and those that flow 
from it and less in at least s01ne 
contemporary constructions of 
distributive justice, where desert 
may arise si1nply from being 
human or disadvantaged, for 
example) 
Goal • To Equalize • To Equalise 
• To Restore • To Share and Distribute 
• To Return What Was 
Taken 
• To Compensate 
• To Return Prior State of 
Affairs 
63 See also the discussion in s 6 of this chapter. 
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Debate about the Aristotelian distinction and the two types of justice it concerns 
has continued since it was first introduced. Former Judge of the Supreme Court of 
Israel, Izhak Englard, has comprehensively traced its history in a landmark study,64 
highlighting the following key features: Most fundamentally, scholars have debated 
whether corrective and distributive justice are indeed two fundamentally different, 
separate types of justice.65 Englard notes one particular argument in support of the 
two being different has been that corrective justice is often held to entail more 
concrete duties as compared to distributive justice - sharing or distribution do not 
evoke the same concrete responsibilities as restoring what was taken, it has been 
argued - ' [ t ]he duty arising from a prior right [ may be] much stronger. ' 66 Englard 
concludes that '[t]he logical result of that view [may be] that in any case where a 
duty of compensation was to be recognized, its foundation had to be in [corrective] 
justice. ' 67 
Questions concerning the nature and scope of duties inherent in both justice 
constructs soon also led to questions about how punishment or penalties fit with both 
or either type of justice, with some arguing that 'vindictive-justice [ ... ] is to fall 
under commutative [corrective] justice' 68 and others asserting 'that punishment [also] 
belongs to distributive justice. ' 69 Others yet again have held that 'vindictive 
(punitive) justice constitutes a separate kind of justice' altogether. 70 
A third debate has concerned the relationship of either type of justice with law, 
in particular their fit with private and public law. Englard argues that 
64 See Englard, above n 5 6. 
65 This debate continues to this day; see, eg, Peter Benson, 'The Basis of Corrective Justice and Its 
Relation to Distributive Justice' (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 515. 
66 Englard, above n 56, 35. Englard discusses this at length throughout his book, but particularly in chs 
2 and 3. 
67 Ibid, 210. 
68 Ib'd ') 8 1 ' .) . 
69 Ib'd ') 6 1 ' .) . 
70 Ibid, 211. 
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[t]he idea itself that [corrective] justice relates to private acts, distributive justice to 
public ones, was already explicitly expressed by Aristotle. It was later applied in 
practice by scholastic authors, who used the Aristotelian distinction as a 1neans for the 
basic classification of legal fields that ran somewhat parallel to that of public and 
. 1 '71 pnvate aw. 
However, he notes how 18th Century German scholar Donatus Hoffman contended 
that either type of justice can apply to either type of law, as 
the state 1nay engage into buying and selling like private persons; correspondingly, the 
head of a fainily may distribute among its members rewards and charges. Hence it is 
appropriate to distinguish between public distributive and [corrective] justice, and 
private distributive and [corrective] justice.72 
Finally, Englard notes how some have tried to link distributive justice elements with 
corrective ones. This idea arises in particular in the context of a weakness to be noted 
in Aristotle's corrective justice construct - that it does not include the possibility of 
correcting harm, damage or loss in relation to what are seemingly accidents, 1n 
situations, for example, where there is no identifiable or particular victimiser or 
perpetrator - no apparent faulty party. Englard shows how one of the first to 
therefore propose a role for distributive justice in the correction of harm, loss or 
damage was German scholar Josef Esser, who argued: 
Out of this apparently insoluble situation conducts us the recogn1t1on that the 
distribution of accidental losses, as well as that of goods, is not the task of 
' [corrective] ,' i.e. of retributive or reciprocal justice, but that of 'distributive,' 1.e. 
apportioning and allocating justice.73 
In other words, hann, damage or losses may have to be corrected through schemes 
that involve a distributive ( or collective, or not strictly or 'purely' corrective) 
element, an idea which will underpin the discussion in Chapter Six of this thesis. 
However, Englard also notes that Esser points to an inherent vagueness in the idea of 
distributive justice - that many 'possible substantive solutions are conceivable ' in 
71 Ibid, 177. 
72 Ibid, 178. 
73 Josef Esser, Grundlagen und Entwicklung der Gefahrdungshaftung [Origins and Development of 
Strict Liability] (CH Beck, 1941) [trans. Izhak Englard, above n 56, 183]. 
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relation to it but none are strictly or concretely foreseen, 74 an issue also plaguing 
distributive justice-based approaches to resolving injustices related to climate 
burdens, as subsequent thesis chapters will show. In the context of debates about the 
nature of tort law which emerged particularly in the United States in the latter part of 
the 20thth Century between purists (who held that the goal of tort law should be to 
implement corrective justice between a victim and a particular perpetrator) and 
instrumentalists ( who held that tort law should also have instrumental, social goals, 
in particular the reversal of losses) significant opposition to the idea that distributive 
( or collectivised) elements have a role to play in corrective justice arose. As Englard 
notes: 
Those scholars who opposed the instru1nental approach, being oriented towards 
econon1ic efficiency, e1nphasized the postulate of corrective justice that required an 
exclusive concentration . upon the concrete litigants on a basis of strict equality. [ ... ] It 
1neant that the very introduction of distributive considerations into the notion of 
liability constituted a violation of corrective justice and was, therefore, illegiti1nate' 75 
The debate thus sparked continues: purists insist that . corre_ctive justice is 
fundamentally about the relationship between doer and sufferer, and responsibilities 
which arise from this. Others support 'rougher' understandings of corrective justice 
which e1nphasise correction as the goal, irrespective of how and through whom this 
is to be achieved. As this distinction is essential to the analysis presented in Chapters 
Five and Six, the following section of this chapter will dissect it in greater detail. 
Overall, Aristotle sparked a debate which has carried on for centuries about the 
nature and scope of his corrective/distributive justice paradigm and the linkages that 
exist between its constitutive parts. Much of the debate, in the words of Englard, has 
concerned 'the right understanding of the two notions of justice and their relationship 
74 Englard, above n 56, 184. 
75 Ibid, 190. 
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to the substance of law.' 76 This thesis will assume that fundamental differences exist 
between the two conceptualisations of justice proposed by the Greek philosopher but 
that both can nevertheless be applied to the same phenomenon ( that is, climate 
change and displacement) and in legal analysis of it. In the words of James Gordley, 
'distributive justice secures a fair share of resources for [all]. Commutative or 
corrective justice preserves this share.' 77 The following sections will highlight further 
the key features of both types of justice, which will then permit their application to 
the question of the role of international law in climate change and displacement to be 
investigated in later chapters. 
5. Corrective Justice 
For Aristotle, corrective justice is about 'asking whether one [entity] has done and the 
other suffered injustice, whether one inflicted and the other sustained damage', which, if the 
case, entails responsibilities.78 Like distributive justice, corrective justice thereby raises 
questions of allocation and of equality: 
The question of corrective justice is not the question of whether and to what extent and 
in what form and on what ground [ something] should now be allocated among [ the 
parties] , but the question of whether and to what extent and in what form and on what 
ground it should now be allocated back from one party to the other, reversing a 
transaction that took place between them.79 
According to Weimib: 
Corrective justice e1nbraces quantitative equality in two ways. First, because one party 
has what belongs to the other paiiy, the actor's gain is equal to the victim's loss. 
Second, the holdings of the parties iffilnediately prior to their interaction provide the 
baseline fro1n which the gain and the loss are computed. That baseline, accordingly, 
functions as the mean of equality for this form of justice.80 
76 Ibid, 214. 
77 James Gordley, 'Enforcing Promises ' (1995) 83 California Law Review 547, 549. 
78 Aristotle, above n 60, 273-275 . 
79 John Gardner, 'What is Tort Law For? -Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice ' (2011) 30 Law and 
Philosophy 1, 8 [italics by present author]. 
80 Weinrib, above n 16, 408 . 
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To put it more simply, for Aristotle, Weimib and others what is involved is that one 
entity has unjustly taken something from another. The loss (harm or damage) thereby 
generated must be reversed and the prior state of affairs re-instated, through a 
corrective measure imposed upon the entity which has taken something ( and thereby 
gained, in relation to the equality that once existed). 81 Others, however, have argued 
that 'corrective justice is a type of justice which [may] concern the conduct of the 
wrongdoer in particular, while opening up the possibility that [entities] other than the 
wrongdoer can play a role in its exercise'. 82 This view implies that there must 
certainly be a loss bearer, and that that loss bearer should be restored to its prior state 
of affairs. But it also implies that the latter could be achieved by means other than 
affecting correction via a wrongdoer only. The distinction just raised - between a 
corrective justice which is 'pure' ( or based in Aristotle), and which is about the 
relationship between victim or loss bearer and wrongdoer, versus a corrective justice 
which is more 'rough' (which departs from Aristotelian origins to a degree), and 
which supports the seeking of correction via channels that do not necessarily include 
a specific wrongdoer - is one which will inform the corrective justice-based analysis 
utilised in this thesis. Before outlining this distinction in greater detail, the following 
subsections will first briefly consider other key moments in the evolution of 
corrective justice thought and debate following Aristotle. 
Following Aristotle 
After Aristotle, some sought to discover whether 'the dignity of a person is relevant 
to [ ... ] co1Tective justice' - that is whether in 1neting out penalties for corrective 
81 Ernest J Weinrib, 'Corrective Justice in a Nutshell' (2002) 52 Toronto Law Journal 349, 355. 
82 Andrew Gold, A Theory of Redressive Justice (7 October 2011), 8 <http ://papers.ssm.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1940594&download=yes>. 
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injustices these should be 'more severe for a person who hits a prince than for one 
who hits an ordinary person.' 83 In other words, the possibility was raised that 
committing the same faulty act should have different consequences depending on the 
entities involved. 84 The aforementioned discussion concerning the nature and scope 
of duties in corrective justice ( as opposed to distributive justice) also flourished for 
long. Renaissance scholar Francisco de Vitoria, for example, argued: 
If Petrus owes me ten ducats, the debt is that he renders me the equal amount. Yet in 
distributive justice not so much is owed. Given I am suitable for a certain office, then 
when the King does not give it to me, he does not cause me as much injustice as if it 
had been mine [ ... ] Equally, note that it is possible that a debt occurs in distributive 
justice as well as in commutative [corrective] justice, nevertheless a greater debt is in 
commutative justice, hence if here a mistake is made a greater injustice is done.85 
Similarly, Vitoria's near-contemporary, Francisco Suarez, stipulated that only a 
'violation [ of con·ective justice] gives rise to a duty of restitution'. 86 Englard shows 
how some contemporary ' authors continue to claim that only [corrective] justice is a 
strict and perfect kind of justice', although others have sought to argue that ' rights 
under distributive justice are no less stringent'. 87 
Equal Freedoni and Kant 
It was 18 th century German Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel Kant who brought 
great novelty to thinking about corrective justice (and distributive justice, for that 
matter, as a later sub-section of this chapter will show). To understand his 
contributions, it is important to consider his concept of 'equal freedom', or the idea 
that all humans, in equal measure, have free will, from which their equal worth, 
rights and freedoms arise. According to Kant: 
83 Englard, above n 56, 18; he notes that this was stipulated by Thomas Aquinas, for example. 
84 Ibid . 
85 Francisco de Vitoria, De justitia [trans. in Izhak Englard, above n 56, 29] vol 1, 2.2, ques LXI, art 2, 
") 
.) . 
86 Englard, above n 56, 35 [italics added by thesis author]. 
87 Ibid, 77. 
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[Man] regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of a morally practical reason, is 
exalted above any price; for as a person he is not to be valued merely as a means to the 
ends of others or even to his own ends, but as an end in himself, that is, he possesses a 
dignity (an absolute inner worth) by which he exacts respect for himself from all other 
rational beings in the world. He can measure himself with every other being of this 
kind and value himself on a footing of equality with them. 88 
What does this mean for corrective justice? Because all human beings are 
fundamentally equal, imbued with equal worth, rights and freedoms, none should 
take from others what is not their due (to put it in justice terms), what rightfully 
belongs to others. According to Richard Wright, then, a Kantian version of corrective 
justice would be about 'securing [the] person and [its] existing stock of instrumental 
goods from interactions with others that are inconsistent with his or her right to equal 
[ ... ] freedom' . 89 
Ethicists versus Instrumentalists - 'Pure' versus 'Rough ' Corrective Justice 
For the corrective justice-based analysis in chapters to follow the perhaps most 
-important scholarly debate arises out of the aforementioned disagreement about the 
nature of tort law and loss recovery, and the role for, or scope of, corrective justice in 
them. As was highlighted in a previous sub-section, in the late 20th century a dispute 
arose between instrumentalists and those who could be termed ethicists about what 
matters in loss recovery. Peter Cane has outlined how the two camps differ: 
The treatment of tort law as a complex set of ethical principles of personal 
responsibility (and freed01n) [note Kant] which concerns how people 1nay, ought or 
ought not to behave in their dealings with others may be contrasted with what are 
often called 'instrumental' approaches. Instrumentalists view (tort) law as a means ( or 
'instrument') for achieving desired social goals. The social goals most commonly 
associated with tort law are compensation for injuries and losses, deterrence of 
harmful conduct, fair distribution of accident risk and costs throughout society, and 
economic efficiency. An instrumentalist will attempt to explain and justify the rules 
and principles of tort law as 1neans to a particular end, will criticize rules or principles 
which do not contribute to the achievement of that end, and may classify them as 
88 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals [trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge University Press, 
1991)] [1797] 434-435. 
89 Richard W Wright, 'Private Nuisance Law: A Window on Substantive Justice ' in Andrew 
Robertson and Donald Nolan (eds), Rights and Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 491 , 493. 
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'mistakes'. For the instrumentalist, tort law is best understood as the means to a 
90 
chosen end. 
In other words, on the one side are ethicists, who centre tort law around the idea that 
specific entities are responsible for correction when an unjust loss, harm or damage 
has occurred (incorporating Aristotle's version of corrective justice), on the other 
instrumentalists, who argue that the correction (i.e. compensation) itself or other 
instrumental matters may be more vital than a focus on the responsibilities of 
particular entities. 
Although this debate has been vigorously conducted by many scholars, the 
arguments of two stand out. Ainerican scholars Jules Coleman and Ernest Weimib 
have, respectively, defended strongly the instrumentalist and ethicist approach. 
Weimib's position has already been sketched in a previous section. Relying strongly 
on Aristotle, he argues that in 
corrective justice, quantitative equality pairs one party with another. Corrective justice 
treats the defendant's unjust gain as correlative to the plaintiffs unjust loss. The 
disturbance of the equality connects two, and only two, [parties] .91 
Furthermore, it is 
[t]he defendant's gain at the plaintiffs expense [which] justifies simultaneously 
diminishing the defendant's resources and augmenting the plaintiffs. In contrast, to 
reject Aristotle is to postulate that the reason for taking resources from the defendant 
is not the saine as the reason for giving resources to the plaintiff. [ ... ] Once plaintiff 
and defendant are separated, the reason for diminishing the defendant's resources will 
connect the defendant not to the plaintiff but to other [entities] to whom that reason 
applies, without justifying the plaintiffs singling out the defendant.92 
The latter, Weimib argues, is not supported by corrective justice. It is a particular 
party which must have caused harm for another which supports a loss recovery claim 
founded in corrective justice. Coleman, on the other hand, has asked ' [ w]ith all the 
90 Peter Cane, The Anatomy of Tort Law (Hart Publishing, 1997) 24. 
91 Weinrib, above n 16, 410 
92 Ibid, 409. 
94 
CHAPTER FOUR JUSTICE BACKGROUND 
options available for allocating costs [ ... ] why impose them on particular injurers?' 93 
Instead, Coleman enunciates his 'annulment thesis' which 'holds only that the 
victim's losses ought to be annulled' ,94 irrespective of the method. After all, 
On balance, it might be that the fairest and 1nost efficient compensation and liability 
sche1ne is one in which victims draw payment fro1n a fund stocked by liability 
judg1nents against injurers who are at fault, though no such injurer is directly liable to 
his victim and no victim recovers directly from his injurer.95 
Weinrib and Coleman have not reached agreement. Weinrib has remained critical of 
Coleman's theory; as it does not insist on a specific perpetrator, in response to which 
Coleman has attempted to tweak his 'annulment thesis' to a degree. 96 Coleman 
certainly does agree that 'the claims of corrective justice arise only with respect to 
losses associated with human agency' in some form. 97 He also notes that 
clai1ns in corrective justice are claims to repair or rectification. Again, different 
accounts are likely to pick out different objects of rectification. One way in which 
Ernest Weinrib's theory and 1nine differ is that in his account the object of 
rectification is the 'wrong', whereas in 1ny account it is the 'wrongful loss'. The 
difference between us reflects differences in our overall political and metaphysical 
con1mitments. For n1e, corrective justice is to be understood as a practice [ ... ] that 
e1nphasizes autonomy and well-being: thus, the e1nphasis on loss, which I think of in 
terms of ditninished welfare. For Weim·ib, [ ... ] the important normative objects are 
abstract and only indirectly connected to human welfare or interests: thus, the 
emphasis on wrongs [ ... ] . Whatever our differences, both of us are co1nmitted to the 
i1nportance of rectification as an ele1nent of corrective justice.~8 
What remains are two visions for corrective justice in the recovery of losses. One, 
which this thesis will refer to as 'pure', as it is founded more closely in Aristotle ' s 
original construction of corrective justice, and which insists that a particular 
wrongdoer or perpetrator must be responsible for recovering losses and re-instating a 
93 Jules Coleman, 'Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice ' (1992) 67 Indiana Law Journal 
349, 352. 
94 Ibid, 368. 
95 Ibid, 352. 
96 See Curtis Bridgeman, 'Corrective Justice in Contract Law: Is There a Case for Punitive Damages? 
(2003) 56 Vanderbilt Law Review 237, Stephen Perry, 'Comment on Coleman: Corrective Justice ' 
(1992) 67 Indiana Law Journal 381 ; also Ernest J Weinrib, 'Non-Relational Relationships: A Note on 
Coleman's New Theory (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 445. 
97 Jules Coleman, 'The Practice of Corrective Justice' in David Owen (ed), Philosophical Foundations 
of Tort Law (Clarendon Press, 1995) 53 , 66. 
98 Ibid. 
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prior state of affairs (although this could be several that are jointly responsible, as 
long as they are all specifically responsible). In other words, a particular party ( or 
parties) has acted faultily, entailing its responsibility. The other version, which this 
thesis will refer to as 'rough' , insists only that there must be a loss bearer and loss 
recovery, but it does not insist on one form or mode of recovery, or tying loss 
recovery necessarily to a particular party which has acted faultily. Jules Coleman 
notes how this opens up various possibilities as to how correction is enacted: 'Should 
valid claims to repair be made good by the use of a general insurance scheme? 
Should they instead be covered by [an] injurer?' 99 Adrian Vermeule, amongst many 
others, has argued in favour of a 'rough justice' in some reparations context: rough 
justice, for him, is about ' the intuition that sometimes it is permissible, even 
n1andatory, to enact a scheme of compensatory reparations that is indefensible 
according to any first-best criterion of justice' , 100 or in light of 'purer' versions of 
corrective justice. 
Final Words 
Corrective justice theory has stimulated much debate since Aristotle made it an 
integral part of his justice paradigm. Debate has concerned the nature and source of 
duties which arise under corrective justice. Importantly for this thesis, a recent 
dialogue has also concerned whether corrective justice must be applied through law 
in its 'pure ' Aristotelian conception, or whether there are opportunities for corrective 
justice under ' rougher' conceptualisations of the construct. How or on what grounds 
the re-instatement of a prior state of affairs occurs differs amongst the two versions: 
one depends on the faulty conduct of a specific actor ( or actors) against another, from 
99 Coleman, above n 93 , 352. 
100 Adrian Vermeule, 'Reparations as Rough Justice ' (Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 
No 105, Law School, The University of Chicago, 2005) 2. 
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which, in legal terms, liability arises. The other emphasises the establishment of a 
loss, and thereby loss bearers, and less so the faulty action of a particular loss causer. 
Even in the absence of the latter, it argues that restoration of a loss, or a prior state of 
affairs, must be affected where human involvement has led to loss. 
Chapters Five and Six of this thesis will seek to exploit this distinction. Chapter 
Five will focus on opportunities to frame climate change and displacement as an 
injustice in the 'pure' corrective justice sense - where an explicit faulty party ( or 
parties) responsible for displacement can be established. As the chapter will show, 
this remains very challenging. Chapter Six will therefore tum to ' rough' con·ective 
justice and analyse how no-fault compensation schemes such as insurance, which do 
not depend on a particularised faulty party or wrongdoer, may be relevant. However, 
the current chapter now first turns to exploring the evolution of distributive justice, 
which, in later chapters (Seven and Eight) will permit analysis of the climate change 
and displacement topic as an issue of unequal distribution of benefits and burdens, 
for which different legal remedies or mechanisms apply. 
6. Distributive Justice 
Aristotle and After 
Aristotle argued that ' [ a ]11 are agreed that justice in distribution must be based on 
desert of some so1i, although they do not mean the same sort of desert ' .101 In other 
words, ' [i]n its original, Aristotelian sense, "distributive justice" referred to the 
principles ensuring that deserving people are rewarded in accordance with their 
101 Aristotle, above n 60, 27lf. 
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merits, especially regarding their political status' .102 This may, perhaps, not represent 
the most suitable basis by which to consider the range of distributive justice issues 
that arise in relation to climate change and displacement. 103 As argued by 
Fleischacker, ' [t]o say that a person "merits" a certain thing suggests that he or she 
has some excellent quality or has performed some excellent action to which that 
thing is fitting.' 104 However, in a landmark study of the historical evolution of 
distributive justice thought and debate, Fleischacker shows, how, over time, 
distributive justice came to refer to distribution not only as tied to desert or merit but 
other matters, including simply a person's humanity or a person's ( or other entity's) 
disadvantage, which makes its application useful to consider for the purposes of this 
thesis in more wide-ranging ways. Fleischacker has traced distributive justice's 
evolution as follows: 
Merit and desert continued to dominate distributive justice thinking for centuries 
following Aristotle. For example, Thomas Aquinas noted in the 13 th century, that it 
concerns 'co1nmon property [which] is distributed to the individual according to the 
latter's excellence [ ... ] in the community.' 105 Fleischacker shows how eventually, 
however, notions of charity, beneficence or the needs of others began to enter 
distributive justice thinking, even where not always expressly focused on justice per 
se. Cicero, for example, 
contrasts justice with beneficence, saying that justice can and should be legally 
required of us while beneficence should not be, that violations of justice inflict 
positive harm, while failings of beneficence merely deprive people of a benefit and 
that duties of justice are owed to anyone, anywhere, while duties of beneficence are 
owed more to friends , relatives, and fellow citizens than to strangers. 106 
102 Fleischacker, above n 7, 2. 
103 Although, as ch 8 of this thesis will argue, it is a partially suitable basis by which to consider 
opportunities for burden-sharing amongst states the 'burden' of displacement. 104 Fleischacker, above n 7, 7. 
10-) Englard, above n 56, 15f. 
106 Fleischacker, above n 7, 20; see Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Officiis [trans. M T Griffin and EM 
Atkins, On Duties (Cambridge University Press, 1991 )] [ 44 BC]. 
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Three things are important here: beneficence is not justice, it is not a duty and it is 
only owed communally ( certainly not across borders). This makes it difficult to apply 
to distributive justice analysis in the climate change context. 
Hugo Grotius introduced 'a distinction between expletive justice, which governs 
human laws according to legal tights, and attributive justice, which relates to virtues 
such as generosity and compassion', 107 or charity and beneficence again. In relation 
to the latter, he also developed a concept intriguingly called the 'law of love', which 
does not 'belong to the legal domain' but should compel virtuous human action in 
relation to fellow hu1nan beings. 108 Samuel Pufendorf argued that there are 'perfect 
rights' (concrete) and 'imperfect rights' ( not concrete) evoked by different types of 
justice: 'perfect rights can be exacted more rigorously than imperfect ones, but 
imperfect ones can in principle also be exacted', particularly in grave 
circumstances. 109 In other words, need may determine what is owed. John Locke 
argued that 'justice gives every man a title to the product of his honest industry and 
the fair acquisition of his ancestors [ ... ], so charity gives every man a title to so much 
out of another's plenty as will keep him from extreme want where he has no means 
to subsist otherwise'. 110 
Fleischacker shows how it is Adam Smith who more concretely tied 'imperfect 
rights' to distributive justice - which means it is not owed absolutely but only to 
some: 'Smith takes distributive justice to include duties of parents to children, of 
beneficiaries to benefactors, of friends and neighbours to one another, and of 
107 Marco Grasso, Justice in Funding Adaptation under the International Climate Change Regime (Springer, 2010) 32; see Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres [trans. Francis W Kelsey, On 
the Law of War and Peace (Oxford University Press, 1925)] [1625]. 
108 Fleischacker, above n 7, 23f. 
109 Ibid, 24; see Samuel Pufendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium [trans. C H Oldfather and W A 
Oldfather, The Law of Nature and Nations (Clarendon Press, 1934)]. 
11 0 John Locke, Two Treaties of Government (Orion Publishing, 1993) vol I, 4.42; in Fleischacker, 
above n 7, 25. 
99 
CHAPTER FOUR JUSTICE BACKGROUND 
everyone to people of 'merit' .111 In line with Aristotle, merit still matters, in other 
words: 'we are said to do injustice to a man of merit who is connected with us [ ... ] if 
we do not exert ourselves to serve him', Smith argues. 112 · 
Distributive justice thinking following Aristotle therefore evidences several 
features: under the influence of Aristotle, many continued to argue that it is tied to 
merit - whether based on political standing (Aristotle himself), excellent 
contributions to community (Aquinas) or the familial or communal ties that bind us 
to others (Smith). Others began to contemplate that charity or support of some kind 
may be owed to others (i.e. Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke), not necessarily because they 
merit it on account of their standing, or even as a matter of justice, but because of 
circumstance. Although this may not be owed strictly, the more need is implied in a 
given situation, the stronger the impetus to assist should be. For the discussion of the 
relevance of distributive justice to the climate change and displacement context this 
is relevant only in as so much that those who can assist should feel -compelled to do 
so the more dire the circumstance. 
Broadening the Scope of Distributive Justice 
From its origins, Fleischacker notes how it is 18th century 'political developments 
that made the eradication of poverty begin to look possible, from which the modern 
notion of distributive justice was born. ' 113 He argues that it is Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
who first made citizens, specifically, responsible for this (poverty eradication) and 
countering other social ills: ' if society causes most human suffering, we can infer 
that society should also be able to cure most human evils,' in particular through 
111 Fleischacker, above n 7, 27. 
112 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments [ed. D D Raphael and A L Madie (Oxford 
University Press, 1976)] [1759] 269; in Fleischacker, above n 7, 27. 
113 Fleischacker, above n 7, 54. 
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employment of its formal institutions. 114 So distributive justice here is no longer so 
much about the distribution of benefits to 'excellent people' (Aristotle, Aquinas) but 
the countering of burdens borne by the least well-off as a collective social goal. 
Broadening the scope of duties in relation to distributive justice (and to 
deprivation in particular) even further was Immanuel Kant, whose concept of 'equal 
freedom' has already been introduced in a prior section. Fleischacker notes how, first 
of all, it is important to understand that what Kant meant by 'distributive justice' is 
'the mechanism by which laws are enforced' - so the 'distribution' inherent in 
process. 115 Nevertheless, Kant also considered in some detail other questions of 
distribution - as pertaining to property, resources and assistance. Fleischacker shows 
. 
how Kant essentially crafts two arguments in relation to human deprivation ( or the 
duties between haves and have-nots): First, he makes an economic argument rooted, 
to a degree in his 'equal freedom' concept: 'The thought seems to be that the goods 
provided to us by nature come in a fixed amount, so if they were divided up fairly, 
everyone would get an equal share of them. Wealth, then, is only possible if some 
people cheat others out of what is rightfully theirs.' 116 Public authority should 
counter this tendency and work for the benefit of those who do not have what they 
deserve. Fleischacker calls this 'an embarrassingly bad argument' ('wealth as 
robbery'). 117 
Kant also pursued a different argument, also strongly supportive of public 
assistance to the needy and rooted in his 'equal freedom' notion: 
State-run provision of the poor, on Kant's view, has moral advantages over private 
charity. Kant sees moral corruption in the private relationships by which well-off 
114 Ibid, 5 5 f. 
115 Ibid, 69. 
116 Ibid, 71. 
117 Ibid, 70, 71. 
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people bestow their bounty to the needy and looks to the state to provide for a more 
respectful relationship between rich and poor.' 11 8 
He argues for a distribution by which 'the poor man could [ .. . ] be helped in some 
other way which would not entail his being degraded by accepting alms,' 119 with his 
equal worth thereby diminished. 120 Rather, responsibilities to those well-off should 
be collectivised, for example through the raising of taxes, making 'care for the poor 
[ ... ] everyone' s obligation to one another, a part of the duties moral equals have to 
one another, rather than an expression of the special virtues of some.' 121 In the 
context of 18th century social revolutions, such thinking found fertile ground. 122 
The 18th century brought new direction to distributive justice thinking: both 
Rousseau and Kant argued that the object of distribution must not only be the 
allocation of benefits amongst 'deserving' people but also public assistance for the 
benefit of those who suffer deprivation (the alleviation of their burdens). Kant, in 
particular, contended that responsibilities in the context of human deprivations are 
not owed because people must be deserving on account of their standing in 
community but because of their innate humanity and equal worth. For the purposes 
of the analysis in later sections of this thesis what is important is that this permitted 
the idea of distributive justice to become disconnected from the idea of deserving it 
on account of co1nmunity standing. The reconceptualization from benefit sharing to 
burden alleviation will also be important. I-Iowever, both Kant and Rousseau's ideas 
operate, still, in the context of the nation - in other words, though evidencing much 
broader conceptualisations of distributive justice, its beneficiaries are envisioned to 
11 8 Ibid, 71. 
119 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics [ eds. J B Schneewind and Peter Heath, trans. Peter Heath, The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge University Press, 1997)] 236; in 
Fleischacker, above n 7, 70. 
12
° Fleischacker, above n 7, 72. 
12 1 Ibid, 73. 
122 Ibid, 75ff. 
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be citizens. With climate change and its effects a global, cross-border issue, 
distributive justice thinking had to develop further before it is fully applicable for the 
purposes of this thesis. 
It may also be important to note that the 18th century brought great resistance to 
the idea of public support in the context of human deprivation. Fleischacker 
highlights, in particular, the thinking of Thomas Malthus, Edmund Burke and 
Bernard Mandeville. Mandeville, for example, supported the 'utility of poverty ' 
notion, arguing that 
hunger was useful in that it spurred the poor to labor. But this makes hunger useful 
both to society as a whole and to the poor themselves; once they labored, they would 
eat, and if they did not have the spur of hunger, they would waste and drink away their 
lives. For the Social Darwinists, the hunger of the poor was useful to the rest of 
. 1?3 society. -
This thesis will not engage with whether any of this may be useful to thinking about 
the detrimental consequences of climate change (it will simply assume that it is not). 
However~ the ideological battles inherent in the juxtaposition of_ the two visions 
which crystallised in the 18th century - one in favour of public intervention to 
counter misery, one clearly against it - undoubtedly continues _in many places to this 
day; memorably during contemporary elections campaigns in the United States.124 
The Greatest Benefit fo r the Greatest Number 
Fleischacker next turns to 19th century utilitarians and their concerns over a 
' tendency to poverty on the part of the many, [ and] the ostentation of excessive 
wealth on the pa1i of the few' . 125 He argues that 
123 Ib'd 8 ~ 1 ' ) . 
124 See, eg, Paul Adams, 'Obama and Romney: A Battle of Ideologies', BBC News (online), 20 
October 201 2 <http : //www.bbc.eo .uk/news/world-us-canada-19976747>. 
125 William Thompson, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Distribution of Wealth Most Conducive to 
Human Happiness (Oxford University Press, 1824) xvii. 
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[ u ]tilitarianism is not a doctrine friendly to the idea that individuals have any absolute 
rights. The emphasis on the absolute importance of individual human beings, and of 
their freedom rather than their happiness, does not sit well with the utilitarian 
e1nphasis on spreading happiness among as many people as possible. 
Utilitarian Jeremy Bentham therefore stipulated that '[n]o law ought to be made that 
does not add more to the general mass of felicity than it takes from it. ' 126 The rise of 
the welfare state in many countries can be attributed directly to utilitarians such as 
Bentham, and with it social structures which were arguably more just. 127 
And yet, Fleischacker argues that justice per se is not easily located in 
utilitarianism. 128 He notes that John Stuart Mill provided one reason why this is so: 
'people find it difficult to see in justice only a particular kind or branch of general 
utility.' 129 Fleischacker puts this slightly differently: why should some individuals 
accept that they may be 'sacrificed' for the greater good?' and for this then to be 
conceptualised as justice. 130 Utilitarians have not been able to provide an acceptable 
justification. Furthermore, 'utilitarianism aims at pleasure and avoidance of pain', 
that is 'feelings' or 'sensory states', which, Fleischacker argues, may be a doubtful 
foundation for a just ordering of the social world.131 
Utilitarians shaped thinking about distributive justice and their vision influenced 
societies arguably distributively more fair and balanced in practice. In theory there is 
nothing that prevents consideration of the 'greater happiness for the greatest number' 
notion also in a cross border context. However, applying the concept to climate 
change and its detrimental effects, it may be doubtful that a concept focused on being 
relevant to the many would necessarily address those most in need. 
126 Jeremy Bentham, 'Anarchical Fallacies: Being an Examination of the Declarations of the Rights 
Issued During the French Revolution' in John Brownin (ed), The Works of Jeremy Bentham (William 
Tait, 1838-1843) vol 2, 493; in Fleischacker, above n 7, 106. 
127 Fleischacker above n 7, 104 ff, 
128 Ibid, 107. 
129 John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (ebooks@Adelaide, 2012) ch 5. 
13
° Fleischacker, above n 7, 107f. 
131 Ibid, 108f. 
104 
CHAPTER FOUR JUSTICE BACKGROUND 
The Means to Production and the Good of Others 
19th century Germany philosopher Karl Marx also made a novel contribution to 
distributive justice thinking, although Fleischacker notes that ''it is a mistake to see 
Marx himself as a defender of distributive justice' .132 In fact, Norman Geras has 
queried whether 
Marx himself condemn[ ed] capitalism as unjust? There are those who have argued 
energetically that he did not; and as many who are equally insistent that he did-a 
straightforward enough division, despite some differences of approach on either side 
of it. To prevent misunderstanding, it is worth underlining at the outset that the 
question being addressed is not that of whether Marx did indeed condemn capitalism, 
as opposed just to analysing, describing, explaining its nature and tendencies. All 
parties to this dispute agree that he did, agree in other words that there is some such 
nonnative dimension to his thought, and frankly, I do not think the denial of it worth 
taking seriously any longer. The question is the more specific one: does Marx 
conde1nn capitalism in the light of any principle ofjustice? 133 
What is beyond doubt is that Marx dealt with questions of distribution, but his focus 
was not on the distribution of charity, benevolence, assistance, or a greater good for 
the greatest number, but the means to production, which influences 'the balance of 
power in any society [ ... ] far more [ ... ] than the distribution of goods.' 134 Justice 
thinking itself he considered a 'baleful historical relic' .135 
Finally, Marx also leaned on Rousseau and Kant in encouraging consideration of 
the ' other': 
According to hi1n, we human beings are 'species beings,' which means both that we 
think in tenns of universals [ ... ] and that we 1nost fully and freely express our nature 
by acting as 1ne1nbers of our species rather than acting as if we were isolated 
individuals. [ ... ] [S]ince we think about everything in universal terms, we think of 
ourselves in universal tenns too, and we therefore distort our own conception of 
ourselves when we treat ourselves as isolated individuals. Instead, we should see 
ourselves as instances of the universal kind, 'human being.' [ ... ] The distinction 
between individual and society would disappear, and societies would act for their 
individual n1e1nbers even while those 1nembers acted to promote the good of the 
society. Like the three 1nusketeers, all would be for one and one would be for all. 136 
132 Ibid, 96. Note, for example, Karl Marx in Critique of the Gotha Programme (Wildside Press, 
2008). 
133 See, eg. Norman Geras, 'The Controversy about Marx and Justice ' (1985) 150 New Left Law 
Review 47, 47. 
134 Fleischacker, above n 7, 97. 
135 Ibid, 96. 
136 Ibid, 1 00f. 
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In other words, even though Marx did not expressly think in justice terms, he argued 
that our nature and our interests should compel us to work also for the benefit of 
others ( all others, not just 'deserving others'). 
For the analysis of climate change-related issues, several matters are important: 
first, it may be possible to construe injustices in relation to the concept of the 'means 
to production'. As Chapter Seven, in particular, will argue, greenhouse gas emissions 
have been, and are, overwhelmingly the result of processes of production in just a 
handful of countries. Their detrimental consequences, however, will overwhelmingly 
be felt elsewhere, in places where their generation cannot be impacted. Secondly, 
Marx encourages acts which promote also the well-being of other members of 
'society', on account of our 'species being'. Applying this to climate change and its 
harmful consequences depends, however, on one's conceptualisation of 'society'. 
Only where 'international society' is implied could this be relevant. To support such 
an argument, this section now turns to John Rawls and those who have extended his 
theory of justice beyond borders. 
The Least Well-Off and the 'Veil of Ignorance' 
The most important contemporary contribution to distributive justice theory and 
debate originates from the late Alnerican scholar John Rawls and his landmark 
monograph, A Theory of Justice. Rawls took for granted that 'a society is a 
cooperative venture for mutual advantage', and that 'social cooperation makes 
possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his 
own efforts.' 137 He then argued that 'a set of principles is required for choosing 
among the various social arrangements [ ... ] an agreement on the proper distributive 
137 Rawls, above n 3, 4. 
106 
CHAPTER FOUR JUSTICE BACKGROUND 
shares', 'the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social 
cooperation.' 138 He argued that this must be founded in the understanding that '1nen 
born into different positions have different expectations of life determined, in part 
[ ... ] by economic and social circumstances [ ... ], which are especially deep 
inequalities [ ... ] that affect 1nen' s initial chances in life; yet they cannot possibly be 
justified' .139 From here, Rawls developed a distributive justice theory based on the 
following two essential principles: 
1. Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total syste1n of equal 
basic liberties co1npatible with a siinilar syste1n of liberty for all. 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
a) To the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just 
savings principle, and 
b) Attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality 
f . 140 o opportunity. 
To achieve the arrangement of social and economic inequalities for the benefit of the 
least advantaged, Rawls suggested several devices: first the concept of the 'veil of 
ignorance', whereby people ( decision makers) 'do not know bow [ ... ] various 
alternatives will affect their own particular case and they [thereby] are obliged to 
evaluate principles solely on the basis of general consideration,' without knowledge 
of their 'own place in society, [their] class position and social status; nor [their] 
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities' .141 On this basis, he urged 
adherence to the 'difference principle', by which it is 'the least advantaged 
representative man whose expectations we are to maximize' ,142 because that 'man' 
may also be 'me', certainly if one is to operate from behind a ' veil of ignorance'. 
Fleischacker notes how far Rawls had advanced distributive justice theory from its 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid, 7. 
140 Ibid, 266. 
141 Ibid, 118. 
142 Ibid, 69. 
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Aristotelian origins in the notion of particular merit and desert to the notion that its 
object must be the least well-off. 143 
Fleischacker also notes how there are several matters not addressed by Rawls; 
for example, what exactly is to be distributed. 144 Rawls had 'primary goods ' in mind, 
things that all rational beings are meant to desire, more particularly, 'rights, liberties, 
and opportunities, and income and wealth.' 145 Others have considered the 
distribution of 'cultural membership' or 'recognition capital' .146 Amartya Sen and 
Martha Nussbaum have also trenchantly challenged a focus on 'goods': Sen, for 
example, has stated: 'Rawls takes primary goods as the embodiment of advantage 
rather than taking advantage to be a relationship between persons and goods.' 147 
Fleischacker shows how Sen instead urges that 'we need to be concerned not so 
much with the goods people have but as with their capacity to act' .148 From this 
premise Martha Nussbaum has developed a 'list of human capabilities at whose 
development distributive justice ought to aim.' 149 
Perhaps more important for the analysis in later chapters have been debates 
which concern the applicability of Rawls' theory of justice in the cross border 
context. Rawls himself based his theory on the idea of a ' basic structure of society', 
which 'should be appraised form the position of equal citizenship ' in a nation 
state. 150 In his Law of Peoples he also argues that the difference principle is 
143 Fleischacker, above n 7, 112. 
144 Ibid, l l 6ff. 
145 Rawls, above n 3, eg, 79. 
146 Fleischacker, above n 7, 122. He cites, eg, Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Clarendon Press, 1989) and James Tully, 'Struggles over Recognition and Distribution' (2000) 7 Constellations 469. 
147 An1artya Sen, 'Equality of What? (Tanner Lecture on Human Values, Stanford University, 1979) 216; in Fleischacker, above n 7, 118. 
148 Fleischacker, above n 7, 118. 
149 Ibid; he cites Martha Nussbaum, Sex and Social Justice (Oxford University Press, 1999). 150 Rawls, above n 3, 82. 
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constrained by borders. 151 Others have questioned the logic of this: 'Unless liberal 
theory can satisfactorily explain why a social contract should include only certain 
individuals while leaving others out, a global contract seems the only possible option 
[ ... ].' 152 Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz have been particularly forceful in arguing 
that Rawls' theory could and should apply across borders. Pogge, for example, has 
maintained that 
[n]ationality is just one further deep contingency (like genetic endowment, race, 
gender, and social class), one more potential basis of [ ... ] inequalities that are 
inescapable and present from birth. Within Rawls's conception, there is no reason to 
treat this case differently fro1n the others.153 
Beitz has contended: 
[I]f evidence of global economic and political interdependence shows the existence of 
a global sche1ne of social cooperation, we should not view national boundaries as 
having fundainental moral significance. Since boundaries are not coextensive with the 
scope of social cooperation, they do not mark the limits of social obligation. Thus the 
parties to the original position cam1ot be assumed to know that they are members of a 
particular national society, choosing principl~ of justice primarily for that society. 
The veil of ignorance must extend to all 1natters of national citizenship, and the 
principles chosen will therefore apply globally.154 
Social cooperation in the context of the nation state is essential to Rawls - it lies at 
the heart of justifying distribution. However, Pogge maintains that ' [ o ]n the wide 
notion of basic structure which I am presupposing, any comprehensive social system 
has a basic structure and thus falls within the purview of Rawls's conception of 
justice.' 155 Therefore, '[t]aken seriously, Rawls's conception of justice will make the 
life prospects of the globally least advantaged the primary standard for assessing our 
. 1 . . . '156 soc1a 1nstitut1ons. 
Rawls will be important for the analysis in later chapters. Both the 'difference 
principle' and the 'veil of ignorance' will form vital analytical backbones to 
151 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1999). 152 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton University Press, 1993) 120. 153 Thomas Pogge, Realising Rawls (Cornell University Press, 1989) 247. 154 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1979) 151. 155 Pogge, above n 153, 24. 
156 Thomas Pogge, 'Rawls and Global Justice ' (1988) 18 Canadian Journal of Philosophy 241. 
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arguments advanced. The difference principle, which holds that the purpose of 
justice is to benefit the least-advantaged, will underpin, in particular, analysis in 
Chapter Seven, which investigates what is owed in relation to those burdened by 
climate change impacts ( the least advantaged) and those who have contributed to 
such burdens. The 'veil of ignorance' will reappear in Chapter Eight, which 
investigates opportunities for burden-sharing of displacees, which states may wish to 
engage in under conditions of uncertainty about burdens that they face. Rawls 
himself is therefore important. More important may be that his theory of justice has 
been conceptualised as applying also beyond borders - amongst 'international 
society' . Climate change is not a domestic issue; its causes and effects are not bound 
by borders. Rawls, as extended by Beitz, Pogge and others, therefore provides a 
particularly relevant distributive justice theorytj-
Final Words 
The preceding sub-sections present several challenges and opportunities for the 
distributive justice based analysis to follow in later chapters (Seven and Eight): First, 
the idea of distributive justice has been extended as applying not only between 
deserving or closely bounded parties and the benefits which should be shared 
amongst them but, more generally, between those advantaged and disadvantaged, 
and the burdens that should be alleviated amongst them (see, e.g. , Rousseau and 
Kant). In fact, in accordance with Rawls, the object of distributive justice ought to be 
the least well off, towards whom resources are to be channelled. This provides a 
solid basis from which to argue that distributive justice in the climate change context 
should evolve for the benefit of those who will be most burdened by its effects. In the 
climate change displacement context, more particularly, Chapters Seven and Eight 
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will explore the burden that is displacement itself for those affected, as well as the 
burden that is -responding to it. The chapters will set up both issues as matters of 
distributive injustices and explore their distributively just resolution in the context of 
justice theories just explored and in relation to international law. 
Secondly, the preceding sections highlight a trajectory whereby distributive 
justice has moved from concerning those who have merited or deserved it based on 
the belonging to political, cultural or familial community, to those who deserve it 
based on their belonging to national community, to those who are deserving based on 
their membership in 'international society'. In other words, the importance of the 
border to distributive justice thinking (at least) has slowly been eroded, making it a 
particularly worthwhile construct to resort to for analysis of a phenomenon which 
arises in connection with a global issue such as climate change . . 
Finally, however, as highlighted by several commentators explored in the 
preceding pages, distributive justice, arguably, supports a weaker duty-rights 
relationship as compared to corrective justice and therefore may present challenges 
of legal enforceability (nowhere more so than in the context of international law, as 
will be shown). Although later chapters will contend that the demands which could 
be raised for distributive justice are particularly clear and pronounced in the 
anthropogenic climate change context (including climate change and displacement), 
the reality that distributive justice is often not necessarily regulated ( or enforceable) 
through (hard) law prevails, 1naking distributive justice for those burdened by the ill 
effects of climate change an uncertain prospect. 
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7. Conclusion 
Kelsen accused Aristotle of having provided a paradigm empty of substance. 157 
Countering this, Weinrib has argued 'that the corrective and distributive justice of 
Aristotle's account are formal categories, not substantive prescriptions' .158 Their 
importance 'lies in the [very] differentiation between corrective and distributive 
justice [ ... ]. Aristotle's account as a whole is not tautologous', 159 'the forms are [ ... ] 
decisive for whatever content one might consider' .160 In any case, the multiple 
thinkers and scholars considered in this chapter have put 'flesh on the bones' of 
Aristotle's basic construction. 
This thesis accepts that corrective and distributive justice indeed provide useful 
analytical structures or forms by which to consider the phenomenon of displacemen 
in the climate change context. Rather than simply formulating it as a concern of one 
or the other, the following four chapters seek to analyse in particular its potential 
treatment in, or resolution under, international law in light of either justice paradigm. 
Drawing on the debates just presented, Chapter Five will seek to discuss whether a 
'perfect' or 'pure' corrective claim could materialise under international law - one 
which is able to identify both loss bearers and the specific perpetrator( s) of harm or 
loss, locate faulty or wrongful conduct and isolate quantifiable harm. It will also 
discuss the extent to which international law incorporates and reflects corrective 
justice and how this may influence the likelihood of a successful 'pure' corrective 
claim. Given, in particular, the many causality issues and uncertainties surrounding 
climate change and displacement (and climate change more generally) as outlined in 
earlier chapters, Chapter Six will rely on instrumentalist approaches to co1Tective 
157 Weinrib, above n 16, 411. 
158 Ibid. 
159 Ibid, 412. 
160 Ibid, 413. 
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justice, as, for example, advanced by Coleman, to analyse corrective justice-based 
solutions for climate change and displacement that are more 'rough', that do not 
insist on the establishment of a particular duty bearer through whom corrective 
justice must be achieved. The potential role of no-fault insurance as corrective justice 
and in relation to climate change and displacement will be investigated, as will be 
support for cross-border insurance under international law. 161 
Elizabeth Anderson has noted that distributive justice could also be 
conceptualised in terms of 'compensation', in 'that people should be compensated 
for undeserved misfortunes and that the compensation should come from that part of 
others' good fortune that is undeserved' 162 Chapter Seven will therefore move the 
discussion from displacement in the climate change context being a (wrongful) harm 
to it being an unjust and disproportionate burden or misfortune which is connected to 
others' unjust and disproportionate benefits and advantages, from which certain 
assistance responsibilities (this thesis will not conceptualise such responsibilities as 
compensation) should arise under distributive justice. Chapter Seven will also show 
how international law incorporates and reflects distributive justice principles and the 
extent to which this 1nay support the . distribution in particular of the many costs 
associated with climate change burdens, such as displacement, to those affected. 
Chapter Eight, finally, will consider distributional issues connected to carrying the 
sheltering burden related to displacees. The chapter will therefore use the distributive 
justice lens to investigate if and how the concept of international burden-sharing may 
present a viable international mechanism to distribute some of the costs and burdens 
arising in relation to displacement in the climate change context. It locates 
commitments to international burden-sharing in broader international principles of 
161 Note that the key themes presented in Chapters Five and Six will inform a forthcoming publication. 162 Elizabeth S Anderson, 'What is the Point of Equality?' (1999) 109 Ethics 287, 290. Also Matt Matravers, Responsibility and Justice (Polity Press, 2007) 71f. 
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solidarity and co-operation and will discuss the extent to which these feature in 
international law. It will also consider the history of burden-sharing theory and 
practice to analyse the concept' s relevance to displacement in the climate change 
context. 
Permeating the chapters, and the thesis conclusion, will be analysis of the 
consequences of framing the problem and its resolution correctively or distributively. 
Questions already raised in relation to the nature and extent of rights and duties 
which arise under each justice paradigm, for example, will therefore be applied to the 
discussion. In that sense, the thesis will not only investigate the possibilities that exist 
in international law for corrective or distributive resolution of the climate change and 
displacement phenomenon but also evaluate the strength, weakness and 
consequences of either approach against the other. 
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CHAPTERS 
Fault-Centred, 'Pure' Corrective Justice 
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation 
to make reparation in an adequate form. 1 
(Factory at Chorzow Case, 1927) 
1. Introduction 
Previous chapters have described the phenomenon \~rith \Nhich this thesis is 
concerned, its treatment in the international la\v scholarship and the conceptual 
fratne\:vork \Vhich 'AriU infi:nm analysis in the remaining chapters. Chapter Five "Nill 
focus on one paii of the justice fi·ame·v.rork just introduced - that is, it \Vill investigate 
in paii icular opportunities for corTective justice under international lavl for entities 
irnpacted by displacement in the climate change conte2ct. More specifically, the 
chapter is conce1ned "vith a conception of corrective justice \Vhich is fault-centred 
and based on the idea that a pm·ticular entity ( or several specific ones) has acted 
faultily (has caused hmm that is unjust and "\VTongful), thereby causing unjust lo sses, 
damage or harm for another entity ( or several), making it liable for con·ection .. This 
,Ya.s considered a. '·puier' version of corrective justice in the previous chapter, as it 
insists on a direct link henveen a loss bearer and a. pariicular entity responsible for 
that loss (or harm or damage) , from \vhich emanates a duty to compensate (Ernest 
\t./einrib ' s version of distributive justice~ introduced in the Ia.st chapter and strongly 
based in .!~ristotle '). In other \Vords, compensation here can only be enacted via. the 
specific a.gent responsible for the harm, damage or loss in the first place. In essence, 
this means that t\\-o parameters ";vill have to be isolated before correction can be 
1 Facto,, or:::oH' rGermmTI' i- Pol [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 17~ -+ 
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contemplated: a) the bearer(s) of harm, loss or damage; b) perhaps more importantly, 
a specific perpetrator ( or several) to whom faulty action leading to loss, damage or 
harm (for the loss bearer) could specifically be attributed. It is also important to c) 
investigate if the harm, loss or damage induced is actua)ly correctable (in particular 
through compensation), as corrective justice - 'pure' or not - presumes that a prior 
state of affairs can be restored. Because this thesis is concerned with international 
law, the relevance of corrective justice to that particular legal order, naturally, also 
requires significant attention. The following sections will therefore seek to tease out 
the following: First, whether it is possible to isolate casualties or loss bearers in the 
cli1nate change displace1nent context and whether such entities could find a forum 
where correction of their losses could be demanded. Secondly, and perhaps most 
importantly, whether climate change and its detrimental impacts such as 
displacement provide opportunities to isolate a particular perpetrator ( or several) to 
whom faulty (harmful and wrongful) action leading to damage, loss-or harm could be 
attributed. Thirdly, whether it is actually possible to restore a prior state of affairs in 
the displacement context through compensation. Finally, although where pertinent, 
findings throughout the chapter will have been related back to relevant provisions in 
international law, it is a final section which will consider in greater detail whether 
'pure' corrective justice is a feature of international law in ways that are of some 
relevance to considering climate change-related harms, loss or damage, including in 
relation to displacement in the climate change context. 
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2. From Responsibility to Legal Liability 
This thesis uses justice theory to contemplate the various responsibilities ( especially 
legal ones) held by certain greenhouse gas emitters towards those who may 
experience detrimental consequences ( especially displacement) from such emissions. 
Chapter Five is particularly concerned with the idea that a specific entity ( or several) 
could be held legally liable for the detrimental consequences of their emissions. 
Before analysing how all the different entities and elements in a 'pure ' corrective 
justice claim may be dissected, the current section will first briefly outline how 
responsibility for emissions and their consequences is at least in theory converted 
into the legal liability of certain emitters, particularly in relation to displacement. 
Responsibility itself is conceptually intricate. Fundamentally, three different 
types of responsibility can be distinguished: causal, moral and legal.2 Relating the 
first conception back to the climate change context, we might now say with some 
certainty that the burning of fossil fuels as a result of relatively recent human activity 
is responsible for current global warming. In that vein, the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change's (IPCC) 4th Assessment Report left little doubt that recent 
observed increases in global average temperatures are 'very likely' the result of 
known recent increases in anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.3 The IPCC 
indicates that there is also evidence that as a result of this there will be an increase in 
the occurrence of climatic extremes and some evidence that this impacts on the 
2 See, eg, Steve Vanderheiden, Atmospheric Justice: A Political Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2008) ch 5, esp 143f; also Joel Feinberg, 'Action and Responsibility' in Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton University Press, 1970) ch 6; and H LA Hart, 'Post-
script: Responsibility and Retribution' in Punishment and Responsibility (Oxford University Press, 2008) 210. 
3 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 'Summary for Policy Makers' in Contributions of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 10. 
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occurrence of human mobility and displacement.4 Such constructions of 
responsibility are not usually that problematic and concern . causality between 
separate phenomena or entities that involve little moral agency or attribution of fault, 
wrongfulness or liability. Whether they are true might be debated but they can 
usually be supported empirically. 5 
Responsibility in the moral sense usually requires, however, that the causal 
responsibility of an entity for certain actions is coupled with fault and wrongfulness 
inherent in such actions. 6 To continue with the prior line of enquiry concerning 
responsibility in the climate change and displacement context, then, responsibility 
may be invoked in a cliff erent sense if one claims that the greenhouse gas emissions 
emanating from one or multiple entities not only impact upon climatic events and 
thereby upon human mobility and displacement, but that the latter ensuing from the 
former is somehow wrong 7 - that it is wrong that some may lose their home and 
livelihoods on account of the faulty actions of others, thereby compelled, in some 
instances, to move. The formerly descriptive statement has become prescriptive and 
normative and the possibility that a particular entity ( or several) is morally 
responsible for an act ( and its consequences) is raised. 8 That said, wrongfulness 
operates differently in international law, where wrongful conduct is not necessarily 
that which leads to harm or loss per se but usually that which arises in connection 
only with a failure to abide by an agreed or accepted obligation, a matter to which 
Section Six will pay greater attention. 
4 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, ' Summary for Policy Makers', in Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 14. 
5 Vanderheiden, above n 2, 144, 145, 146. 
6 Ibid, l 46f. 
7 Which is not to say that the only harmful effects are concerning humans; concerns over biodiversity 
and species loss have also been widely noted in the literature on climate change; see, eg, Thomas E Lovejoy (ed), Climate Change and Biodiversity (Teri Press, 2005). 8 Vanderheiden, above n 2, 144, 146. 
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Legal notions of responsibility (in the 'pure' corrective justice sense), finally, 
are engaged in connection with the understanding that responsibility for the harmful 
consequences of a faulty or wrongful act entails liability and should, ultimately, 
necessitate corrective measures against the party (parties) which has engaged in it.9 
Generally speaking, our statement therefore alters one final time in the following 
manner: displacement which ensues in connection with the greenhouse gas emissions 
discharged by one or multiple entities is not only wrong but entails the liability of 
such entities and therefore the obligation to correct the wrong ( or reverse a faulty 
act), to compensate for it. Given the nature of international law, of course, the 
statement would have to read that displacement which occurs in relation to the 
greenhouse gasses emitted by one or 1nultiple entities is in breach of an international 
obligation, and thereby entails liability to correct, a possibility dissected in the 
penultimate section of this chapter. 
Before engaging in greater detail with the intersection of corrective justice, 
displacement in the climate change context and international law, the following 
sections will first seek to dissect whom correction might be owed to in the climate 
change displacement context, where affected entities may be able to seek redress, as 
well as the challenges of identifying responsible parties and wrongful harm, loss or 
damage. 
3. The Loss Bearers 
Identifying Loss Bearers, Casualties or Victims 
Corrective justice-based claims ('pure' or not) inevitably require the identification 
of a loss bearer, casualty or victim - against whom an act leading to damage, harm or 
9 Ibid, 146. 
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loss has been committed by another entity ( or entities). Harm, loss or damage usually 
refers to 'a disruption of or interference in [an entity's] well-being, including damage 
to [its] body, psychological state, capacities to function, life plans, or resources over 
which we take [it] to have an entitlement.' 10 The fact that climate change 
displacement is a complex phenomenon has already been pointed out. 11 Its 
casualties, and their losses, may therefore be difficult to delineate at times. 
Fundamentally, it may be possible to construe the casualties of displacement in the 
climate change context to consist of either affected individuals, affected 
communities or affected states, which also has consequences for if, how and where 
such entities may be able to seek redress. 
A number of different ways to conceptualise casualties or loss bearers in the 
climate change displacement context are possible. A typology of those who will 
warrant a response, developed by Walter Kalin, is useful to think likewise about loss 
bearers, in particular as it also corresponds to several drivers- of displacen1ent 
discussed in Chapter Two and Three. Amongst others, Kalin' s conceptualisation 
includes those displaced by both rapid- and slow-onset disasters and those displaced 
in relation to 'sinking islands'. 12 Chapter Two highlighted how climate change will 
contribute to the occurrence of natural disasters. Displacement in relation to such 
events may be preceded by significant personal and communal losses, though it may 
be possible that affected persons and communities can eventually return, a process 
made more likely if recuperation or reversal of losses has occurred. 13 Losses with 
displacement consequences following disasters 1nay also involve maJor 
10 Jean Hainpton, 'Defining Wrong and Defining Rape' in Keith Burgess-Jackson (ed), A Most Detestable Crime: New Philosophical Essays on Rape (Oxford University Press, 1999) 118, 120. 11 See ch 2 of this thesis. 
12 Walter Kalin, 'Conceptualising Climate-Induced Displacement' in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2010) 81, 85f. He further includes 'high risk zones' and 'public order disturbances' in his conceptualisation. 13 Also ibid, 85. 
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infrastructure, more likely of concern to the state. Secondly, previous chapters have 
highlighted the possibility of displacement resulting in connection with slow-onset 
change or degradation, for example in relation to drought and desertification or in 
relation to sea-level rise. In such instances, eco- and life support systems decline 
slowly, and with it the viability of human habitation. 14 Assessing loss in relation to 
displacement, let alone wrongful loss as a result of climate change, may be difficult 
in such circumstances, as multiple factors including environmental change are very 
likely to interact. However, unlike areas affected by rapid-onset natural disasters, 
areas affected by slow-onset environmental change may ultimately be permanently 
unsuitable for human habitation, making displacement from such areas permanent. 15 
Losses associated with displacement, and their bearers, may become more obvious at 
that point, though loss recuperation might then only occur long after some affected 
persons have left. Thirdly, the notion that whole states may slowly disappear was 
discussed in Chapter Three. Certainly, it is possible that large areas, including some 
sn1all nation states, may eventually becorne unsuitable at least for habitation, even if 
they do not physically or legally 'disappear' .16 Preceding such losses may be a 
variety of impacts such as flooding, loss of agricultural production, loss of 
infrastructure such as roads, etc., which may require the relocation of individuals or 
whole communities. States, too, may therefore become victims in displacement 
scenarios, in that it may fall upon them to aid and support relocation in the face of 
threatened human habitats. An additional opportunity to think about loss bearers was 
discussed in Chapter Two: it outlined how the casualties of climate change-induced 
events may also include those who cannot move, facing on-going vulnerabilities and 
risks in precarious locations. Casualties here are those who should and perhaps want 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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to move, but who cannot do so. Rob Nixon has called this phenomenon 
'displacement without movement', affecting individuals who become stuck in places 
increasingly devoid of the characteristics that would make them inhabitable. 17 
Beyond tangible losses such as homes, infrastructure and livelihoods, harm may well 
also be psychological and emanate from disrupted lives, broken families or 
communities and a sense of despair, factors well-known, for example, in relation to 
development-related dislocation. 18 
Where Can Loss Bearers Claim Redress? - Problems of Jurisdiction 
It is one thing to contemplate the potential loss bearers or casualties of displacement 
in the climate change context. The chapter is about to tum to the question as to 
whether it is possible to match them with a particular perpetrator ( or perpetrators) 
whose faulty or wrongful conduct led to their rosses ( or harm and damage). First, 
loss bearers face another hurdle worth at least a brief exploration, ·however - that is, 
jurisdiction and the availability of a legal forum where, or legal regime through 
which, corrective justice could be affected. The following sub-sections will briefly 
outline the significant obstacles faced by loss bearers 19 - both states and private 
entities. 
17 Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Harvard University Press, 2011) 19. 
18 See, eg, Michael M Cemea and Hari Mohan Mathur (eds), Can Compensation Prevent Impoverishment? Reforming Resettlement through Investment and Benefit-Sharing (Oxford University Press, 2008). More about this s 5 of this ch, which also deals with precedent for 
compensation of non-material losses emanating from displacement and relocation. 19 See also, eg, Andrew L Strauss, 'Climate Change Litigation: Opening the Door to the International Court of Justice ' in William C G Burns and Hari M Osofsky (eds), Adjudicating Climate Change: State, National, and International Approaches (Cambridge University, 2009) 334. 
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States 
A state may want to pursue a claim . against another state for the losses, harm or 
damage it has experienced. Concerning climate change-related claims, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)20 does stipulate in 
Article 14.2 that, in relation to disputes which may arise for Convention reasons, 
states parties may declare their acceptance of compulsory submission to the ICJ or 
arbitration. However, only Cuba, The Netherlands, Solomon Islands and Tuvalu 
have registered a declaration with the UNFCCC regarding Article 14.221 and 
'convention reasons' are somewhat unlikely to generate a dispute over 
compensation, as the Convention is not set up around that notion or possibility. 
Jurisdiction and other matters remain a serious challenge for many states: for 
example, Tuvalu raised a stir in 2002 by announcing that it was going to sue the 
United States over its continuous refusal to ratify the Kyoto Protocol to the 
UNFCCC.22 However, because it has not ratified it, the United States has no 
obligations under the Protocol. Furthermore, Tuvalu would have likely struggled to 
find an appropriate international forum, as the United States was not then ( or is now) 
subject to compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).23 No 
wonder, then, that no actual legal ·challenge materialised. Nevertheless, an inter-state 
20 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted 9 May 1992, 1771 UNTS 107 (entered into force 21 March 1994) art 14(2); henceforth also 'UNFCCC' or 'Convention', as 
appropriate. 
21 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Declarations by Parties - United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2013) <http: //unfccc.int/essential_background/ 
convention/items/541 0.php> 
22 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted 11 December 1997 2303 UNTS 148 (entered into force 16 February 2005); henceforth also 'Kyoto Protocol' or 'Protocol', as appropriate. 
23 Former US President Ronald Reagan revoked this in relation to the Nicaragua Case in 1986 -Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392; see also Rebecca Elizabeth Jacobs, 
'Treading Deep Waters: Substantive Law Issues in Tuvalu's Threat to Sue the United State in the International coUii of Justice' (2005) 14 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 103; also Strauss, above 
n 20 and Peggy Rodgers Kalas and Alexia Herwig, 'Dispute Resolution under the Kyoto Protocol' (2000) 27 Ecology Law Quarterly 53. 
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claim is not completely out of the question.24 If there is agreement concerning 
submission of a matter to a relevant forum, international norms concerning state 
responsibility could conceivably be applied ( a possibility that Section Six of this 
chapter will deal with in greater detail), as well as domestic liability principles, 
especially concerning such protracted questions as joint and several liability or 
· 25 causation. 
Non-State Entities 
In theory, a private loss bearer allegedly displaced or otherwise harmed by climate 
change and its effects could also bring a claim against a state which purportedly 
caused or failed to prevent that harm. Michael Faure and Andre Nollkaemper have 
outlined in detail how this might occur: Certainly, in relation to environmental 
damage or environment-related harm in general, this happens regularly in various 
international human rights forums 26 and the aforementioned Inuit petition lodged 
with the Inter-American Human Rights Commission raises this as a possibility also 
in relation to climate change harm specifically. 27 Nevertheless, because a claim 
could likely only be brought against a claimant's own state, and because extra-
24 See, eg, Richard S J Tol and Roda Verheyen, 'State Responsibility and Compensation for Climate 
Change Damages -A Legal and Economic Assessment' (2004) 32 Energy Policy 1109. 25 See Michael G Faure and Andre Nollkaemper, ' International Liability as an Instrument to Prevent 
and Compensate for Climate Change' (2007) 43A Stanford Journal of International Law 123, 129 
and 129; they rely also on Hersch Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies of International 
Lcrvv (Longmans, Green & Co, 1927) 3 8-42. The authors argue that domestic principles may apply in 
their capacity as 'general principles of law'. 
26 See also, eg, Donald K Anton and Dinah Shelton, Environmental Protection and Human Rights (Cambridge University Press, 2011) esp chs 4 and 5. 
27 Although it is important to note that the Inter-American C01mnission cannot require compensation 
or impose injunctive relief; see Donald Goldberg and Martin Wagner, 'An Inuit Petition to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights for Dangerous Impacts of Climate Change' (Paper 
Presented at the 10th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention, Buenos Aires, 15 December 2004) 2. 
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territoriality applies in such curtailed fashion in the human rights context, 
applicability of international human rights law is limited.28 
Otherwise, Faure and Nollkaemper show how non-state loss bearers may be able 
to bring a claim against a state under domestic tort law. Although unlikely, 
especially in the context of displacement, and long the subject of severe restrictions, 
the authors note that legal developments in at least some places now enable private 
parties to raise tort-like claims against a state, making this a possibility also in the 
climate change context.29 Whether such claims, or any of the tort-based options to be 
discussed below, for that matter, are permitted or not, however, is not regulated by 
. . 11 30 1nternat1ona aw. 
A private entity or entities harmed by the effects of climate change may bring a 
clai1n against another private party. Considering issues of causality, it may be 
difficult to envision that a court or tribunal anywhere will find that the emissions 
associated with a single or individualisable entity (for example, a co-mpany, or even a 
conglomerate of businesses) have been substantial enough, or are causally-related 
enough, to cause harm, damage or loss in another entity ( especially such that it leads 
to displaceinent). 31 Nevertheless, it is important to consider briefly the possibility of 
claims between private parties. Faure and Nollkaemper note how those who suffer 
climate change-related harm or losses would likely have to bring a suit in a 
defendant's state, as domestic conflict of law rules will usually stipulate that only the 
28 See ch3 , s 7 of this thesis; also Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25 , 130. 29 Ibid. They rely upon Walter van Gerven, J ere1ny Lever and Pien-e Larouche, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law (Hart Publishing, 2000) 358-394. Also 
various entries in Michael Faure and Marjan Peeters (eds), Climate Change Liability (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011). 
3
° Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25 , 132. 3 1 Ch 2 of this thesis dealt with the difficult causality issues involved in climate change-induced displacement; s 4 of this chapter will deal with causality issues in relation to potential perpetrators of 
climate change harm or losses. 
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legal system there is eligible to consider it.32 Here, several barriers emerge: First, 
there are questions of access. 33 Only some legal systems, foremost amongst them the 
United States (US), provide relatively expansive access to foreign plaintiffs.34 
International law also provides for equitable alien access to courts in the state where 
harm originated, at least where transboundary harm from ultra-hazardous activities is 
concemed.35 Secondly, questions will also arise as to whether a claimant can find a 
relevant regime.36 In the case of the United States, victims of damage caused by US 
entities overseas sometimes take advantage of tort provisions only available there. 37 
The Alien Tort Statute, in particular, is often highlighted as one possible avenue in 
the climate change harm context.38 However, conceptual uncertainties relating to 
legal constructs such as 'public nuisance', 'proximate cause', 'pre-emption' and 
'proof of damages' may provide many challenges in claims relating to climate 
change in domestic legal systems. 39 Challenging again will be to find a regime 
32 Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25, 136. 
33 Ibid, 134. 
34 Faure and Nollkaemper cite US 'diversity jurisdiction'; above n 25, 135. 35 Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25, 135. See Principle 6 (2) of the International Law Commission, Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transbounda,y Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eights Session, UN Doc A/61/10 (1 October 2006): 'Victilns of transboundary damage should have access to 
remedies in the State of origin that are no less prmnpt, adequate and effective than those available to 
victilns that suffer damage, from the same incident, within the territory of that State.' 36 Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25 , 136. 
37 Ibid, 135 
38 Alien Tort Statute, 28 USC, para 1350; also known as the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which 
stipulates that · [t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for 
a t01i only, corrunitted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.' For 
assessments of the ATCA's relevance to global warming-related litigation, see also Rose1nary Reed, 
'Rising Seas and Disappearing Islands: Can Island Inhabitants Seek Redress under the Alien Tort Clailns Act?' (2002) 11 Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal 399 and Mini Kaur, 'Global Warming Litigation Under the Alien Tort Clailns Act: 'What Sosa v Alvarez Machain and its Progeny Mean for Indigenous Arctic Cmnmunities' (2006) 13 Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice 155. For case law, note the Sosa and Kiobel decisions: Sosa v Alvarez-Machain, 542 US 692 (2004) and Kiobel v Royal Dutch Petroleum, 185 L Ed 2d 671. Sosa spelled out that the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) does permit clailns based on customary international law; Kiobel, however, has put in doubt the extra-territorial application of the Statute. Some have therefore predicted the demise of the Alien Tort Statute; see, eg, Roger Alford, The Death of the ATS and the Rise of Transnational Tort Litigation (17 April 2013) <http: // opinio juris.org/2013/04/17 /kio bel-instthe-death-of-the-ats-and-the-
rise-of-transnational-tort-litigation/>. 
39 See Daniel A Farber, 'Basic Compensation for Victilns of Clilnate Change' (2007) 155 Pennsylvania Law Review 1605, 1615. 
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relevant to displacement. To conclude, then, although legal options for loss bearers 
(both individuals and collectives) to pursue claims in relation to climate change 
harms or losses exist in theory, in practice they may be of extremely limited 
relevance, in particular in the displacement context. 
Final Words 
It is important to remember that corrective justice is meant to support correction 
where it takes place after an act leading to harm, damage or loss has occurred. 
Although climate change undoubtedly contributes to increasing the risk of 
displacement, and states are also obliged to act with precaution, even in the face of 
scientific uncertainty about climate change and its effects, it is difficult to construe 
an increase in risk alone as specifically harmful in the corrective justice sense.40 Of 
course, because corrective justice raises the possibility of compensation, it may act 
as a deterrent and thereby reduce risk. But an actual claim based in-corrective justice 
could likely only materialise when potential loss bearers have become actual loss 
bearers. Even where loss bearers have materialised, jurisdictional and other obstacles 
in their pursuit of corrective justice may remain significant. Even though there can 
be little doubt that many will be harmed by the effects of climate change, including 
through the loss of home, livelihood and infrastructure, which may compel human 
displacement, finding a forum where affected persons or states could seek correction, 
or a legal regime by which this could be affected, may prove challenging. 
40 Although Roda Verheyen and Peter Roderick show how, under the 'no hann rule ', states do have duties of prevention in relation to environmental harm; see Roda Verheyen and Peter Roderick, 
'Beyond Adaptation: The Legal Duty to Pay Compensation for Climate Change Damage ' (Report for World Wildlife Fund - UK, 2009) 15f. And note the precautionary principle; eg, in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change it reads : 'The Parties should take precautionary 
measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse 
effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty 
should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures' ; art 3 (3). 
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Challenging again may be that at least 'pure' corrective justice is based on the 
premise that a victim and its losses are causally related to a specific perpetrator ( or 
several) and the faulty acts engaged in by the latter, for which compensation is due 
by that entity. As one court found in a global warming lawsuit in the United States, 
however, climate change is 'too general, too unsubstantiated, too unlikely to be 
caused by [ a specific] defendant's conduct'. 41 And yet, also in the domestic context, 
Vincent Oleszkiewicz and Douglas Sanders have argued that difficult causal hurdles 
may eventually be overcome: 
Past litigation in the U.S. courts against industries such as the tobacco industry and 
asbestos industry proceeded cautiously . at first. Plaintiffs adapted to defense 
arguments, science caught up with the causation arguments and discovery often 
resulted in unfavourable documents being produced [ ... ]. Causation remains a big 
challenge for potential plaintiffs to overcome in climate change litigation [ . .. ]. [P] lain tiffs and their attorneys will draw on the saine lessons discussed above to 
pursue claims and will reach a point where they can obtain significant discovery from 
defendants. Lawsuits do not have to be successful on the merits before they cause a 
defendant to spend significant time and resources.42 
The following section will engage with the difficult questions of causality and 
scientific uncertainty raised by anthropogenic climate change, thereby seeking to 
investigate whether the particular perpetrator necessary for a 'pure' corrective claim 
in the displacement context can be isolated. 
4. The Perpetrator(s) 
Identifying a perpetrator or perpetrators in relation to displacement in the climate 
change context in the 'pure' corrective justice sense means that one or several 
41 Center for Biological Diversity v Abraham, 218 F Supp 2nd 1143 (ND Cal, 2002). Although Kevin Healy and Jeffrey Tapick, for example, argue that, at least in domestic settings, many similar hurdles have been surmounted, for example in tobacco cases in the 1990s in the United States; see J Kevin Healey and Jeffrey M Tapick, 'Climate Change: It's Not Just a Policy Issue for Corporate Council -It 's a Legal Problem' (2004) 29 Columbia Journal or Environmental Law 89, 102. 42 Vincent S Oleszkiewicz and Douglas B Sanders, 'The Advent of Climate Change Litigation Against Corporate Defendants ' (2005) 27 International Environmental Report 936, 937. 
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entities would have to be isolated whose actions have been faulty, that is harmful, 
and likely also wrongful, that is, not innocent,43 and specifically causally related to 
the possible damage, harm and losses outlined in relation to the victims of 
displacement. Disaggregating this is complicated because unambiguous causal 
chains do not necessarily exist - neither in relation to climate change per se, nor to 
displacement that arises in connection with it more specifically44 - and knowledge of 
greenhouse gas emission' s harmful consequences is relatively recent, one of many 
obstacles to establishing wrongfulness in relation to a significant share of emissions 
(those emitted when emitters could still claim innocence). Several issues deserve 
contemplation: is there a single entity, or several; is there a temporal dimension by 
which to consider the perpetrator ( or perpetrators) and its conduct; is it only harm 
which matters or also benefit which has accrued? These will now be considered. 
The Perpetrator(s): Individual or Collective? 
Identifying a particular perpetrator ( or several) who has causally and morally acted 
wrongly in the climate change displacement context is complex. There is the 
question of if and how human activity has caused climate change in the first place, 
although that climate change is anthropogenic is no longer doubted except by a small 
number of sceptics. Secondly, there are the intricacies of establishing how climate 
change contributes to the occurrence of certain climatic events or phenomena and 
how these then in tum impact upon displacement. There is some agreement that 
climate change effects contribute to human mobility,45 but using this as the basis for 
arriving at a conclusive perpetrator ( or even several) - a responsible entity ( or 
several) which has acted wrongfully and which is causally related to those who 
4" 
., See, eg, Hampton, above n 10, 121. 
44 See ch 2 of this thesis. 
45 See ch 2 of this thesis. 
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experience displacement - is not easy. At least in theory, it is possible to consider 
different actors or entities that at least contribute to climate change through their 
greenhouse gas emissions and thereby may be responsible ( certainly causally and at 
least partially) for contributing to its ill effects, including displacement.46 This 
includes both individual and collective entities: persons, companies, states, geo-
political groupings ( e.g. the developed world), even certain generations (usually 
considered to be past ones and/or the current one). The UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol, by emphasising national responsibility in relation to the principle of 
'common but differentiated responsibility' 47 stipulate that it ought to be 'the 
developed country Pa1iies [which] should take the lead in combating climate change 
and the adverse effects thereof ' 48 This does not, however, diminish the elusive 
nature of allocating or enforcing responsibilities in relation to the multiple harms 
which emanate from climate change. 49 Co1Tective justice, certainly in its 'pure' form, 
envisions concretely that those who have specifically caused harm or damage correct 
it. 5° Conce1ning harm related to the environment this understanding is most notably 
enshrined in the 'polluter pays ' principle, ,vhich holds that those ,vho pollute and 
thereby cause harn1 or damage should meet the costs related to ceasing the polluting 
activity and those related to any ill effects which have arisen. It also holds that 
potential polluters meet the costs of pollution control and prevention in the first 
place. 51 A comprehensive study of the principle, published by the Organisation for 
46 See, eg, Simon Caney, ' Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change' (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Lm,v 74 7 and Edward A Page, 'Distributing the Burdens of Climate Change' (2008) 17 Environmental Politics 556. 47 See United :Nations Fram ev.,ork Convention on Climate Change, art 3(1), also art 4(1) and Kyoto Protocol, art 10. 
48 United Nations Framei.vork Convention on Climate Change, art 3(1) [italics by thesis author]. 49 Page, above n 46, 557; although it is an important statement supporting distributive justice, as ch 7 
of this thesis will argue. 
50 See ch 4 of this thesis. 
51 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'The Polluter Pays Principle: Definition, Analvsis and Implementation ' (2008) 15. 
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Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2008, lists numerous case 
studies where the principle has found application in the national context.52 
Importantly, in the international realm the principle forms the backbone of Principle 
16 of the Rio Declaration. 53 It has also surfaced in the international climate change 
negotiations and IPCC reports. In its Third Assessment Report, for example, the 
IPCC highlighted it as possibly relevant in the climate change context: 
[T]he polluter-pays principle, an economic principle that polluters should bear the cost 
of abate1nent without subsidy, is based upon fault or, alternatively, upon an amoral 
rationale of causal responsibility, or sin1ply that the assigmnent of burden creates an 
. . 11 54 1ncent1ve to not po ute. 
Implementing a compensatory polluter pays principle was also suggested in the 
negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol. Instead, the aforementioned 'common 
but differentiated responsibilities ' concept emerged, which does not construct 
responsibility as a matter of compensation. 55 An early Brazilian proposal had 
envisioned that major polluting countries must contribute to a con1pensatory Clean 
Development Fund commensurate with their responsibility for emissions, to be used 
to pay for adaptation measures in poorer countries. However, the Kyoto Protocol 
enshrined as one of its 'flexible' instrun1ents a Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) which is not compensatory or based on direct responsibility. 56 Attempts to 
apply the polluter pays principle to responsibilities arising in connection with 
52 Ibid, 93ff. 
53 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, proclaimed 3-14 June 1992, UN Doc A/Conf.151/26 (Vol I) (12 August 1992). For a useful outline of the emergence and early history of the principle, please see H C Bugge, 'The Principles of Polluter Pays in Economics and Law' in E Eide and R van der Bergh (eds), Law and Economics of the Env;ronment (Juridisk For lag, 1996). 54 Intergovernmental Panel on Cliinate Change, 'Decision-making Frameworks' in Contributions of Worhng Group Ill to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cainbridge University Press, 2001) 668, 670. 55 See Vanderheiden, above n 2, 231. Note, however, developments concerning a loss and damage 
mechanism under the umbrella of the UNFCCC, discussed in the following chapter of this thesis. 56 Ibid; see also Emilio L La Rovere, Laura Valente de Macedo and Kevin Baumert, 'The Brazilian Proposal on Relative Responsibility for Global Warming ' in Kevin A Baumert, Odile Blanchard, Silvia Llosa and James F Perkaus (eds), Building on the Kyoto Protocol: Opt;ons for Protecting the Climate (World Institute, 2002) 157, 159. Though note that although not compensatory, the CDM fa the main source of contributions for the UNFCCC Adaptation Fund, established in 2007; further discussion in ch 7 of this thesis 
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anthropogenic climate change nevertheless abound. Simon Caney, prominently, has 
h . 1 . hi 57 soug t to tease out its re evance 1n t s context. 
Fundamentally, the polluter pays principle raises important questions about who, 
specifically, is the entity 'polluting', or in this case emitting greenhouse gases, so 
excessively that it causes harm. It is vital to remember that, in line with 'pure' 
corrective justice, the principle is usually applicable to an individualisable, single 
entity, for example, a person or a company. 58 Anthropogenic climate change seems 
to indeed derive from small, separate acts engaged in by individuals or individual 
entities. However, only where those acts are combined do detrimental (harmful) 
impacts, including in relation to displacement, arise. 59 This may make individuals ( or 
individualisable entities, such as certain companies) responsible in the 
aforementioned causal sense to varying degrees, but does this also make them 
somehow morally culpable or legally liable?60 The well-known Stern Review of 
Economics and Climate Change, released in 2006, highlighted- that in the last 
hundred years, or so, human activity has been behind the release of many billions of 
tonnes of carbon. 61 We also know that greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere are now at the 400ppm CO2-equivalency mark, 62 alleged to be beyond a 
57 Caney, above n 46; also Henry Shue has argued that the historical responsibility of wealthy states 
means they should bear also the extra-territorial cost and burdens associated with climate change; see Henry Shue, 'Global Environment and International Inequality' (1999) 75 International Affairs 533; Caney notes that ' burdens ' can be divided into mitigation and adaptation burdens; Caney, above n 46, 75 lf; this thesis is concerned more with the latter as it is more directly concerned with the potential ill 
effects of climate change. 
58 Siinon Caney makes this point and then distinguishes between a micro-version of the polluter pays principle (actor x causes pollution) and a macro-version of it (actors x, y and z causing pollution), 
only the latter of which provides a useful conceptual framework in the climate change context; see Caney, above n 46, 753f 
59 Vanderheiden, above n 2, 159f. 
60 Ibid, 160. 
61 Nicholas Stem, The Economics of Climate Change: Stern Review (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 221; henceforth also 'Stem Review' . 
62 Earth Systems Laboratory, Trends in Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide (2013) <http: //www.esrl.noaa. gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/>; it continues to grow at a rate of approximately 2 to 4ppm every year. 
132 
CHAPTER FIVE CORRECTIVE JUSTICE-FAULT-CENTRED 
level considered safe or harmless for humans and the planet. 63 However, deriving 
specific moral or legal responsibility from this in relation to a specific actor remains 
quite difficult. Some of these contributions are the result of ordinary human activity 
not, at least until recently, known or suspected64 to induce hann. 65 It seems therefore 
that though able to affect people detrimentally (including through displacement) , 
climate change may generate 'some bad outcomes [which, however,] appear to have 
been caused by entirely blameless acts. ' 66 No individual act is necessarily faulty or 
wrong: none such act alone has caused harm and none was intended or known to do 
·1 1 67 so - untl recent y. 
Should we therefore disregard small individual contributions as harmless, or not 
wrongful? Steve Vanderheiden has shown how noted British philosopher Derek 
Parfit would warn against this as a 'mistake in moral mathematics', leading to flawed 
assun1ptions as to the harmless nature of separate acts and therefore their continuing 
benevolent nature if committed in the collective. 68 Parfit, in - fact, has urged 
abandonment of the view that an individual act is neither right nor wrong if its 
effects are imperceptible individually but hannful when committed in the collective, 
' in particularly when the stakes are very high' 69 (as they arguably are with climate 
change). 
63 Some scientists have stated that atmospheric CO2 concentrations must be kept below 350ppm, in 
order to re1nain at safe levels; see, eg, Jim Hansen et al, 'Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity Ai1n?' (2008) 2 Open Atmospheric Science Journal 217. CO2 refers to carbon dioxide. 64 Arguably, not until publication of the IPCC' s first Assessment Report in 1990; the Kyoto Protocol 
also seems to take just this approach by disregarding pre-1990 en1ission levels; see Vanderheiden, 
above n 2, 231. Regarding the ethical issues this raises, see, eg, Paul Baer, 'Equity, Greenhouse Gas Emissions, and Global Common Resources ' in Stephen H Schneider, Armin Rosenkranz and John 0 Niles (eds), Climate Change Policy: A Survey (Island Press, 2002) 393. 65 Vanderheiden, above n 2, 160. According to Caney, an 'ignorance excuse' may therefore be valid; 
see Caney, above n 46, 761ff. 
66 Vanderheiden, above n 2, 160. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Derek Parfit, Persons and Reasons (Clarendon Press, 1984) 75. considered, eg, in Steve Vanderheiden, 'Climate Change and the Challenge of Moral Responsibility ' (2006) Ethics and Life Sciences 85 and Vanderheiden, above n 2, 160ff. 69 Parfit, above n 68, 75 and 82 and Vanderheiden, above n 2, 161, 164, 165ff. 
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Domestic tort law, undoubtedly, has long found ways to deal with situations 
where individual polluters have seemingly only collectively contributed to an 
environmental issue or problem: 
The rule that has evolved is that, at least where both [ or several] causes involve 
comparable blaineworthiness, both actors are liable, even though the conduct of either 
one was not a sine qua non of the injury because of the conduct of the other. There is 
no reason why a polluter should be insulated from responsibility in a case where a 
traditional tortfeaser would not be. 70 
Relying on principles of moral philosophy, courts have argued, in line with Parfit, 
· that polluters cannot be excused if their individual action is seemingly not faulty: 
Take the philosophers' exainple [ ... ] of the kitchen with a light switch at each end. 
When two people simultaneously flip both switches on, the light goes on. Neither 
person's conduct is a sine qua non, because the light would have gone on anyway. 
Neither individual's conduct 1nade a difference to the outcome. [This] analysis would 
con1pel the conclusion that neither person caused the light to go on. 
[This] argu1nent that liability can only attach to conduct that is a sina qua non of the 
harn1, even for causally overdetennined harm, cannot be right, as the kitchen light 
hypothetical case shows. The problem with [this] argu1nent is that where the result is 
overdetermined, each person's argument is as strong as the other's identical argument. 
If we accept one person's argun1ent that he did not cause the light to go on, then we 
have to accept the identical and equally valid argument of the other person that he did 
no cause the light to go on. Each accurately points out that his switching the light on 
was not a sine qua non of its going on. It is true that the light would have gone on 
anyway because of the other person's conduct. If conduct had to be a sine qua non 
even for this overdetennined result, then neither person's conduct caused the light to 
go on. But the light went on. And it did so by human agency, not spontaneously. So 
the conclusion that argu1nent compels, that no one caused the light to go on, is false. 
Because the correct answer has to be the saine for the two individuals, by eli1ninating 
the false answer, we have left only one possible answer which 1nust be true: each of 
the two persons caused the light to go on.71 
Transferring such arguments to harm arising out of greenhouse gas emissions, even 
where ham1ful conduct seemingly arises only where individual emitters' actions are 
combined, all of them have made a causal contribution and all of them may 
therefore, in some way, be responsible and held responsible. 72 In the context of 
70 Boeing Company v Cascade Corporation, 207 FSupp 3d 1177, 1183 (9th Cir, 2000); in Daniel A Farber, 'The Case for Climate Change Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a Complex World' (2008) Utah Law Review 377, 391. 71 Ibid, 1184-85. 
72 Farber, above n 70, 390ff. 
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company shareholders, arguments supporting individual responsibility in the context 
of a collective are sometimes made: 
Investors who purchase shares in corporations, or who authorize others to purchase 
shares on their behalf, as through a mutual fund, do have control over their exposure 
to the risk that the enterprise's activities will go awry. Their intentional participation 
in the collective endeavour does not make them blaineworthy - they have done 
nothing wrong by purchasing stock, nor have they failed in any way in their duties as 
shareholders (whatever those might be). But it does render them accountable in the 
d01nain of repair for the company's accidents, when the company cannot meet its 
d 1 · 73 warrante c auns. 
Arguing that individuals or individual entities, certainly via the collective social, 
political and economic arrangements in which they participate, may be responsible, 
and held responsible, for victimising others through harm emanating from their 
individual emissions does not therefore seem entirely out of the question. 
At the individual level, responsibility for anthropogenic climate change is in any 
case not denied. 74 Research has repeatedly shown the extent of people's acceptance 
certainly of individual causal responsibility for climate change.75 For example, 
Jennifer Kent cites an Accountability and Consumers International Survey in the 
United States and United Kingdom, which found that 66 percent of respondents 
accepted that they are personally responsible for contributing to global warming. 76 A 
si1nilar survey in Australia found that 81 percent of respondents there acknowledged 
that taking personal responsibility to combat global warming is important.77 
However, Pidgeon et al have noted the 
73 Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Lm,v for a Collective Age (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 246; quoted in Farber, above n 70, 398. 
74 See, eg, Jennifer Kent, ' Individualized Responsibility and Climate Change: "If Climate Protection becomes Everyone's Responsibility, Does it End up Being No-one 's?"' (2009) 1 Cosmopolitan Civil Societies Journal 132. 
75 Ibid, 141. 
76 Ibid. See AccountAbility and Consumers International, What Assures Consumers on Climate Change? Switching on Citizen Power (2007), 9 <http: //www.accountability.org/images/ 
content/2/ l /211/What%20Assures%20Consumers%20on%20Climate%20Change.pdf> . 77 Net Balance Foundation, AccountAbility and LRQA, What Assures Consumers in Australia on Climate Change? Switching on Citizen's Power (2008 Update - Australian Survey) (2008), 11 
<http://www.accountability.org/images/content/0/6/061 /Wbat%20Assures%20Consumers%20in%20 Australia%20on%20Climate%20Change.pdf>. 
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discrepancy between individuals ' intentions to mitigate and their actual behaviours; 
while people indicate frequently that they are willing to [ ... ] save energy in the home, 
only a 1ninority of people do take 1neasures to reduce their energy consumption for 
. 1 78 env1rorunenta reasons. 
Perhaps people have not received enough encouragement to change their behaviour 
and it should be those who could regulate behaviour who should be held (morally 
and legally) responsible? The concept of vicarious liability, whereby the bearers of 
causal responsibility are decoupled from those who incur liability, is of course a 
long-familiar concept in many collective settings, including the military and places 
of employment. 79 In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, a landmark international case 
concerning transboundary pollution, it was also held that '[a] State owes at all times 
the duty to protect other states against injurious acts by individuals from within its 
jurisdiction' .80 
States, of course, are also the primary subjects of international law, with which 
this thesis is concerned. Perhaps they ought to be the responsible entity into which 
all other options collapse and international law then the framework which facilitates 
allocation of responsibility for harm and losses. The standard suggestion in the 
climate change context has indeed often been that it is certain individual countries 
which ought to bear responsibility for harm and damage resulting from excessive 
emissions,81 and to compensate for it. The obstacle here, however, is that 
co1npensation derived from a collective may involve a ' blanket assessment of group 
78 Nick F Pidgeon, Irene Lorenzoni and Wouter Poortinga, 'Climate Change or Nuclear Power - No Thanks! A Quantitative Study of Public Perceptions and Risk Framing in Britain ' (2008) 18 Global Environmental Change 69, 73 ; quoted in Kent, above n 74, 142. 79 See, eg, Vanderheiden, above n 2, 173, 177. Although note some controversy around this in relation to military activity, particularly in relation to international criminal law and the notion of joint 
criminal enterprise; see, eg, Kai Ambos, ' Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility ' (2007) 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 159; also the judgement in Tadic [IT-94-1 ], Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999. 
80 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v Canada) [1941] III RIAA 1905, 1963 81 See, Caney, above n 46, 754; Shue, above n 57; Eric Neumayer, 'In Defense of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions' (2000) 33 Ecological Economics 185. Though Eric Posner and David Weisbach rigorously discount the idea of collective national responsibility; see Eric Posner and David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice (Princeton University Press, 2010). 
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liability', ignoring the fact that burdens are thereby allocated equally to individual 
group members with often very different (sometimes non-existent) levels of 
contribution to harm. 82 This is problematic for 'pure' corrective justice, which 
demands that only specifically-responsible entities are liable for correction. 
This issue has been highlighted prominently by Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein, 
who argued in a 2007 working paper that 'the consequence of tort-like thinking 
would be to force many people who have not acted wrongfully to provide a remedy 
to many people who have not been victimized' 83 and that any 'crude state-to-state 
remediation scheme results in innocents being punished and non-victims being 
compensated'. 84 And indeed, some individuals may well have curbed their personal 
contributions to greenhouse gas emissions and would be unduly punished or 
burdened by an interstate compensation scheme (for example, through the imposition 
of higher taxes in the harming nation). 85 However, both Daniel Farber and Steve 
Vanderheiden have pointed out a fallacy with Posner and Sunsteln's argument: it 
does not consider the individual as citizen and voter. 86 Climate change, they argue is 
also the result of government policy making action or inaction, which can be 
influenced by individuals in their capacity as citizens. With many governments at 
least minimally answerable to their citizenry, collective responsibility can therefore 
not be entirely discounted if one thinks of individuals also as citizens and voters and 
therefore their contribution to the climate change problem in that capacity. 87 Some 
may well have taken political (as well as consumer) action that favours greenhouse 
gas reductions, but this may not prevent them from also bearing some of the 
82 Vanderheiden, above n 2, l 67f. 
83 Eric Posner and Cass R Sunstein, 'Climate Change Justice ' (University of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper 177, 2007) 21, 25. 
84 Ibid, 25. 
85 Farber, above n 70, 399. 
86 Ibid and Vanderheiden, above n 2, l 77f. 
87 Farber, above n 70, 398 and Vanderheiden, above n 2, 176,205. 
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compensation burdens for climate change harm. 88 A case in point may be potentially 
analogous compensation schemes: For example, the United Nations Compensation 
Scheme (UNCS), established in the aftermath of the first Iraq War to administer 
claims against that country, awarded billions of dollars in over one hundred 
successful claims. 89 Vanderheiden argues that with such schemes citizens not 
suppo1iive of war or invasion are usually also inevitably burdened.90 In any case, a 
nation' s tax system, which will likely be the source of raising the necessary funds to 
compensate the casualties of cli1nate change harm at the inter-state level, will most 
·ce1iainly provide for appo1iioning of burdens that is just in a rudimentary fashion: 
wealthier citizens consume more, thereby generating more greenhouse gases through 
their consumption choices, but they also usually pay more in taxes. 91 
The fact that climate change ha1ms are the result of greenhouse gas emissions 
originating from more than one state ( and its citizens) is also not necessarily a 
hindrance to holding individual states responsible under international law. 92 The 
Corfu Channel case is illustrative here: it suggests that Albania's obligations (to 
warn of mines in Albanian waters) prevailed despite the simultaneous responsibility 
of a third state (Yugoslavia). 93 In a separate opinion in the Oil Platfonns case,94 
Judge Simn1a fuiihermore sought to suggest that the principle of joint and several 
liability, more familiar from domestic legal systems, could be incorporated into 
88 Farber, above n 70, 398 and Vanderheiden, above n 2, 169ff. 89 The UN Security Council held that Iraq 'is liable under international law for any direct loss, damage, including envirornnental damage and the depletion of natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals, corporations, as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait'; see United Nations Security Council, Res 687, UN Doc 5/RES/687 (3 April 1991) para 16; for a detailed analysis, see Hans van Routte, 'The United Nations Compensation Commission' in Pablo de Greiff (ed), The Handbook of Reparations (Oxford University Press, 2006). Farber also introduces this and other relevant compensation sche1nes; see Farber, above n 39, 1619ff. 90 See Vanderheiden, above n 2, 17 4 f. 
91 Farber, above n 70, 399. 9? 
- Faw·e and N ollkaemper, above n 25, l 66ff. 93 Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 16-18, 36; also Faw·e and Nollkaemper, above n 25 , 167. 
94 Oil Platforms (Iran v United States) [2003] ICJ Rep 90, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma. 
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international law.95 The ILC's Articles on State Responsibility also stipulate in 
Article 4 7 that the responsibility of separate states may be invoked in instances 
'where several states are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act'. 
However, whether climate change harm could ever be considered to result from the 
same internationally wrongful act might be doubtful. What is harmful, after all, are 
aggregate separate acts. What constitutes an internationally wrongful act in the first 
place will be the subject of investigation in Section Six of this chapter. 
The Perpetrator(s): Past, Current or Future? 
The idea that it is certain states which should correct harm and damage inflicted by 
climate change is intuitively appealing - only when considering emissions at the 
level of bigger collectives such as states (particularly those with very high emissions) 
could it be argued that total emissions quantitatively amount to something harmful 
and even wrongful. Certainly, measuring the contributions of each country to overall 
greenhouse gas emissions is a process which has become more reliable; allocating at 
least causal responsibility for emissions therefore seems possible at that level.96 
However, there are several other, complicating factors to consider which raise doubts 
about the n1oral or legal responsibility of states. In their aforementioned working 
paper, for example, Posner and Sunstein pose the following, which is relevant when 
considering the problem from an individualist or collective perspective: 
The cunent stock of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is due to the behaviour of 
people living in the past. Much of it is due to the behaviour of people who are dead. 
The basic proble1n for conective justice is that dead wrongdoers cannot be punished 
or held responsible for their behaviour, or forced to co1npensate those they have 
hanned. Holding Americans today responsible for the activities of their ancestors is 
not fair or reasonable on corrective justice grounds [ ... ].97 
95 Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25, 167. 
96 See Page, above n 46, 557; also Vanderheiden, above n 2, 181. 97 Posner and Sunstein, above n 83, 27. 
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In a later version of their paper, they similarly argue that corrective justice is difficult 
to apply in relation to climate change because 'many of the relevant actors are long 
dead ' and 'much of the contribution [to climate change harm] was probably due to 
people who died years ago'. 98 This is an understandable sentiment and, at first 
glance, supported by science. Climate change is, after all, not the result of human-
induced emissions of any particular time or place.99 Greenhouse gases act as 'stock 
pollutants ' which alter the climate on account of cumulative accumulation over long 
periods of time. 100 On the other hand, annual outputs in any given year contribute no 
more than four percent, which means historic emissions would have to be accounted 
for in developing responsibility models, 101 a notion Posner and Sunstein challenge. 
Nevertheless, relying on greenhouse gas emissions data concerning the United 
States, Farber shows that although CO2 emissions between 1990 and 2004 amounted 
to only 25.5 percent of total emissions from that country, those emitted between 
1970 and 2004 amounted to 53.5 percent of total emission and, going back further, 
those emitted between 1950 and 2004 amounted to 72.5 percent of total emissions. 
He goes on to argue that, with the majority of contemporary Americans alive during 
the latter time frame, it is flawed to argue that emissions somehow amount to a 
'historical phenomenon' .102 Furthermore, a country such as the United States has not 
in the past hesitated to compensate for harm with a historical dimension in the 
do1nestic context: For example, USD 800 million in compensation were paid after 
the second World War to Native Americans for improper seizure of their land as far 
back as the American Revolution in the 18th century. Millions in compensation were 
98 Eric A Posner and Cass R Sunstein, 'Climate Change Justice' (2008) 96 Georgetown Law Journal 
1565, 1597. 
99 Page, above n 46, 558. 
100 See Ian W H Parry, 'Fiscal Interactions and the Case for Carbon Tax over Grandfathered Carbon 
Permits ' (2003) 19 Oxford Review of Economic Policy 385, 396; also Page, above 47, 558. 101 p b age, a oven 46, 558. 
102 b Far er, above n 70, 395-396. 
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also paid in the 1990s in connection with the hundreds of poor Alabama 
sharecroppers who were denied treatment for syphilis, even though a cure had 
become available (penicillin), as part of a government-sponsored experiment 
between 1932 and 1972. 103 
However, historical outputs present several other challenges: state boundaries 
have not remained the same since anthropogenic greenhouse gas discharges began to 
accumulate. 104 Eric Neumayer suggests that to tackle this issue, responsibility 
models should only consider emissions post-1990, when national boundaries, he 
argues, became largely established as they are today. 105 But even if this was true, 
historical responsibility for emissions remains difficult to construe on account of the 
fact that emitters did not know, until fairly recently, that their actions might have 
harmful consequences. This knowledge, some argue, could likely not have been 
expected until 1990 and the publication of the First Assessment Report by the IPCC, 
which only then warned comprehensively of the likely detrimental consequences of 
continued unfettered emissions. 106 Perhaps some form of discounting for moral 
103 Farber reviews these, and many other potentially analogous compensation sche1nes; see Farber, 
above n 39, 1633, and throughout. For further details, see also Saul Levmore, 'Privatizing Reparations ' (2004) 84 Boston University Law Review 1291 , 1303; also Eric Yamamoto, 'Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims' (1998) 40 Boston College Law Review 477. Although note that the issue of reparations and compensation have remained 
unresolved with such protracted issues such as slavery; see, eg, Eric A Posner and Adrian Vermeule, 
'Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices' (2003) 103 Columbia Law Review 689 and Saul Levmore, 'Changes, Anticipation and Reparations ' (1999) 99 Columbia La:vv Review 1657. 104 S ee, eg, Neumayer, above n 81 , 196, and Page, above n 46,559. 105 See Neumayer, above n 81 , 189. Page, however, highlights that significant alterations to boundaries have occurred since 1900; see Page, above n 46, 559. 106 See, eg, Page, above n 46, 5 60; also Vanderheiden, above n 2, 189f. Although note Svante Arrhenius, 'On the Influence of Carbonic Acid in the Air upon the Temperature on the Ground' (1896) 41 The London, Edinburgh, and Dublin Philosophical Magazine and Journal of Science 237. He is concerned about the effects of human CO2 emissions in 1896. And note GS Callendar in 1938: 
'As man is now changing the composition of the atmosphere at a rate which must be very exceptional 
on the geological time scale, it is natural to seek for the probably effects of such a change. From the best laboratory observations it appears that the principal result of increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide [ ... ] would be a gradual increase in the mean temperature of the colder regions of the Earth'; in G S Callendar, 'The Artificial Production of Carbon Dioxide and Its Influence on Temperature' (1938) 64 Quarterly Journal of the Royal Meteorological Society 223. 
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responsibility is therefore vital. 107 Certainly, wrongful (not innocent) action is not so 
easily construed, certainly not until recently, when considering historical dimensions. 
Complicating matters further is that contributions to greenhouse gas emissions 
levels keep shifting over time. For example, at 20.6 percent of global annual 
emissions, a 2005 study determined that the United States was the largest emitter of 
greenhouse gases at the beginning of the century108 (and had been for a long time 
prior). However, China now emits more carbon dioxide than all of North America 
combined 109 and developing countries (if China and India are included) as a whole 
have, in recent years, surpassed developed countries in annual greenhouse gas 
emissions, 110 whilst nevertheless simultaneously suffering, or expecting to suffer, 
many of its adverse consequences, including displacement. 
International law, too, raises issues in relation to responsibility for the historic 
emissions of states.111 Article 13 of the Articles on State Responsibility, for example, 
affirms: 'An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation 
unless the State is bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs' .112 
In the Island of Palmas arbitration, Judge Huber similarly found that 'a juridical fact 
must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not the law in 
107 Arguing for this is Page, above n 46, 559. For more on discounting in the climate change harm 
context, see also Silnon Caney, 'Clilnate Change and the Future: Discounting for Time, Wealth, and Risk' (2009) 40 Journal of Social Philosophy 163. For views contrary to discounting, see, eg, Neumayer, above n 81, 18. 
108 See Kevin Baume1i, Tim Herzog and Jonathan Pershing, 'Navigating the Numbers: Greenhouse Gas Data and International Climate Policy' (World Resources Institute, Washington, 2005) 110; data 
relied upon is largely from 2000. 
109 United States, Energy Information Administration, International Energy Statistics (2013) <http: // 
www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3 .cfin?tid=90&pid=44&aid=8&cid=r l ,r7,&syid=2011 &eyi d=201 l&unit=MMTCD>. 
110 See Ben Webster, 'Developing Nations Outstrip Rich on Greenhouse Gases', The Times, 18 November 2009. 
111 S ee Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25 , l 7lf. 112 See International Law Commission, Report of the International Lcn,v Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, UN Doc A/56/10 (12 December 2001). Note that the Articles may not 
represent binding international law; however, they are considered an important guide concerning 
norms on state responsibility; see Tol and Veryheyen, above n 24, 1111. 
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force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.' 113 
Responsibility for historic emissions may thus be challenged by international norms 
concerning state responsibility; legal obligations to curb climate change are very 
recent and apply only to some actors. Faure and Nollkaemper concur but argue that 
e1nitting greenhouse gases is a 'composite act' which becomes wrongful at a certain 
point in time only over time. Although identifying that exact point presents its own 
challenges, 'the effect will be that past emissions will only be subjected to a 
responsibility regime at the date when they become [ ... ] wrongful', 114 a point likely 
in the much more recent past. 
The Perpetrator(s): Unjust Harm or Unjust Benefit? 
A final way of dealing with the historical dimensions presented by climate change 
and the harms and losses emanating from it might be to recall that corrective justice 
is about re-establishing an equilibrium between losses or harm and felated gains. It is 
perhaps not so difficult to establish losses and harm in the climate change context, 
including that arising in relation to displacement: although causal and moral 
attributions present multiple challenges, many of which have been explored in the 
preceding pages, that 1nany of the effects of climate change upon its victims may 
ultimately be significant, harmful and unjust may not be so difficult to argue. 
However, what about unjust gains? A novel inter-generational argument proposed in 
particular by Henry Shue crystallises here: today's inhabitants of developed 
countries undoubtedly enjoy privileged lifestyles. However, such lifestyles, Shue 
argues, are not 'completely unrelated' to the activities of their prior fellow 
countrymen, including those activities that led to the emission of greenhouse 
113 Island of Palmas (Netherlands v United States) [1928] 2 RIAA 829, 845; in Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25, 172. 
114 F d aure an Nollkaemper, above n 25, l 7lf. 
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gases. 115 Neumayer makes a similar argument when stating that current high living 
standards in wealthy countries are the direct result of 'having had the possibility of 
burning large amounts of fossil fuels' in the past as well as now. He goes on to argue 
that therefore 
[t]he fundamental counter-argument against not being held accountable for emissions 
undertaken by past generations is that the current developed countries readily accept 
the benefits from past e1nissions in the form of their high standard of living and 
should therefore not be exen1pted fro1n being held accountable for the detrimental 
side-effects with which their living standards were achieved. 116 
In the climate change context, such a 'beneficiary pays' 117 approach thus stipulates 
that, as a matter of corrective justice (at least in its 'pure' form) , perpetrators may be 
responsible for the detrimental effects of emissions not only because they are the 
agents of harm and losses but also as a matter of unjust benefits which 
simultaneously accumulated over several centuries in the case, certainly, of many 
developed countries. 118 
Nevertheless, establishing a specific perpetrator, or perpetrators, remains a 
difficult task. Yes, there are those who have emitted greenhouse gases. Yes, those 
emissions, certainly in the collective, have harmful consequences, including 
impacting upon human displacement. However, the challenge that potential loss 
bearers will face in any 'pure' corrective justice-based claim is to causally and 
morally connect the harm or losses they experience with the particular actions of a 
particular entity, whether individual or collective. Fault or wrongful action, in 
particular, are simply not so easily established given that only collective action leads 
to harm, but not any one particular act; given that only action over time leads to 
ham1, and not the action of one particular actor at one particular point in time; and 
115 Shue, above n 57, 536; also outlined in Caney, above n 46. 116 Neymayer, above n 81, 189. 
117 Caney coins this, amongst others; see Caney, above n 46, 756. Caney also questions this approach. 118 Admittedly, this argwnent is quite reminiscent of distributive justice with its emphasis on balance between burdens and benefits; see ch 7 of this thesis for more. 
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given that the harmfulness of the action concerned has been known to be harmful 
only for a relatively short period of time, and not for the entire length of time the 
activity now known to be harmful has been engaged in. Envisioning a fault-centred, 
'pure' corrective justice-based claim is therefore complicated (if not altogether 
doubtful) by a multitude of factors; in relation to displacement also the fact that it is 
rarely the result of a single or only a climatic cause. A final parameter to consider in 
relation to opportunities for a corrective justice-based claim ('pure' or not) in the 
climate change displacement context is whether the re-instatement of a prior state of 
affairs so vital to corrective justice is possible, especially through compensation. In 
other words, the method of correction needs to be considered in relation to its object. 
5. Correctable Harm or Damage? 
The chapter has so far considered how it may be possible to isolate casualties in the 
climate change displacement context (the bearers of harm); how to isolate a 
particular perpetrator, or several, (the agent of harm and therefore the entity/entities 
potentially liable for correction); and how the two entities may be connected 
causally. A final component to consider when contemplating any corrective justice 
claim ('pure' or not) is whether the harm concerned amounts to one that is 
correctible - to dissect, in other words, the method of rectification. Since correction 
is usually envisioned to occur through compensation in some shape or form, a related 
question for the purposes of the chapter may be whether compensation specifically 
can correct the losses experienced in relation to displacement, and thereby reinstate 
the prior state of affairs. Many factors will have to be considered in contemplating 
such questions: How would responsibility for losses and their correction be 
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allocated? What should or can be compensated? Is there relevant precedent of 
involuntary displacement having been corrected through compensation, particularly 
in the context of climatic or environmental change? Has it been successful? These 
questions will all be contemplated in the following sub-sections. 
Attribution and Compensation 
How, in the first instance, to conceptualise correction/compensation in the climate 
change displacement context may depend on important questions of attribution and 
allocation. The many difficulties concerning the attribution of certain events and 
their consequences (including displacement) to the actions of certain actors have 
already been explored. Undoubtedly, however, questions concerning attribution 
influence the award of compensation. Several possibilities are worth considering and 
suggested by Faure and Nollkaemper: 11 9 Most simply, victims may wish to argue 
that a con1pensation claim could be based on establishing some 'statistical chance ' 
that ce1iain greenhouse gas emissions have contributed to a certain event with 
displacement consequences and that full compensation should emanate from any 
such probability (from emitters). Alleged perpetrators, on the other hand, will likely 
seek to argue that compensation is due only if greenhouse gas em1ss1ons can be 
linked to an event with displacement consequences in an absolute sense. Both of 
these positions 1nay be unjust: the first asks that perpetrators bear responsibility even 
in instances where the probability that they have contributed to harm could be slim. 
The second would permit that perpetrators are excused from any responsibility even 
where their contribution to ha1m may not be negligible. 120 A compromise may be 
119 Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25 , 162f. For more regarding allocation, see also Daniel A Farber, 'Apportioning Climate Change Costs ' (2008) UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 21. 
l?O 
- Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25, 163. 
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that compensation is awarded only when a certain probability threshold has been 
breached, realistically at least fifty percent, with no compensation due below that 
threshold and full compensation due above it. Faure and N ollkaemper have 
suggested a fourth approach. This has the advantage of permitting at least the 
possibility of successful (if partial) compensation, though it would not permit that a 
prior state of affairs is reinstated fully. Applying their model to displacement, 
allocation of damages would look something like this: if the probability that climate 
change triggered a particular flooding event with displacement consequences is thirty 
percent, entities affected by the flooding should be able to receive compensation 
amounting to thirty percent of the damages and losses they experienced. 121 
Realistically and effectively seeking compensation on this basis, or any of the 
probability or attributions scenarios just outlined, is hampered, however, by the 
multitude of actors that have contributed to emissions which may have contributed to 
climate change and thereby increased the risk of flooding (so even-if the likelihood 
of an event with displacement consequences having been triggered by anthropogenic 
climate change is only thirty percent, no single entity is responsible for even that 
thiiiy percent share). The proportional share of separate actors' (e.g. country) 
emissions Vlould therefore also have to be considered before awards of compensation 
could materialise. 
Furthe1more, in thinking about attribution and compensation duties in the 
climate change displacement context, it is important not only to consider what is 
attributable to likely perpetrators. Chapter Two noted that climate change does not 
influence human mobility in isolation of other pre-existing factors , for example local 
circumstance, politics and culture. Such factors , too, may impact on likely 
121 Ibid, 164. 
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displacement in the climate change context. Contemplating compensation, the ref ore, 
must also take note of the possible contribution that affected individuals, 
communities or states may have themselves made to displacement, or at least the 
circumstances for which others cannot, realistically, be held responsible (including, 
in some cases, emissions that have not been insubstantial in countries also facing 
displacement). In domestic legal systems this is referred to as 'contributory 
negligence'. 122 In international law, the International Law Commission (ILC) 
recognised that contributions to harm by an injured state, whether wilful or 
negligent, would also have to be considered in determining reparations. 123 The ICL 
has argued that only this would implement a reparations regime 'consistent with 
fairness' .124 
Precedent 
Despite the difficulties of attributing duties of compensation, -it is of course 
fundamentally possible to conceive of displacement as a compensable harm. 
Literature on development-related displacement and relocation has noted failures but 
also successes in compensatory processes that respond to displacement or 
relocation. 125 At least contemplating what may be compensable and how 
co1npensation should operate is therefore possible. In relation to climate change 
impacts, quantifying losses associated with the possibility of displacement in the 
climate change context has already been undertaken by a number of threatened 
122 International Law C01nmission, ' Commentary on Article 39' in Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts - With Commentaries, UN Doc A/56/10 (12 December 2001) para 1. 
123 See International Law Commission, 'Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts' in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, UN Doc A/56/10 (12 December 2001); henceforth also 'Articles on State Responsibility'. 124 International Law Commission, above n 122, para 2. 125 See, eg, the various entries in Ce1nea and Mathur, above n 18. 
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communities in Alaska. At least twelve indigenous communities there need to move 
elsewhere (internally) due to the effects of climate change (in particular, flooding 
and erosion resulting from melting permafrost and diminishing sea ice ). 126 For some, 
the need to relocate is becoming urgent. 127 The United States Army Corps of 
Engineers and other government offices have compiled several reports which 
concern eventual relocation, including associated timeframes and costs. According to 
a 2006 report, the villages of Kivalina, Newtok and Shishmaref, for example, all had 
less than 15 years before they would become uninhabitable (by ca. 2020), with the 
costs of relocation estimated to range from USD 95 Million to USD 200 Million per 
village, 128 in the case of one village, Newtok, USD 380,000 per resident. 129 These 
figures were arrived at by anticipating 'the cost of relocating the entire community to 
a new site, including all the existing facilities, structures and utilities that could be 
n1oved and replacement of those that could not.' 130 The Corps also, however, 
acknowledges that the cost/benefit approach taken in its report may not be 
' appropriate for relocation analysis ', as many non-material or non-monetary items 
not connected to infrastructure, perhaps best described as social capital, cannot be 
easily reflected in dollar teims.131 In any case, none of the communities has actually 
relocated (although some have initiated measures that would facilitate eventual 
126 See Robin Bronen, 'Clin1ate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating an Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine ' (2011) 35 NYU Review of Lm,v and Social Change 357; Robin Bronen, 'Climate-Induced Displacement of Alaska Native Collllnunities' (Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, 2013); also United States Government Accountability Office, Alaska Native Villages : Limited Progress Has Been Made on Relocating Villages Threatened by Flooding and Erosion (2009) <http ://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0955 l .pdf> . 127 See United States Army Corps of Engineers - Alaska District, Alaska Village Erosion Technical Assistance Program (April 2006) <http: //www.housemajority.org/coms/cli/ A VETA_ Report.pdf> . P& Ib"d E . S 
- 1 , xecut1ve ummary. 
129 Anna York, Alaskan Village Stands on Leading Edge of Climate Change (2009) <http ://unc.news 21.com/index.php/climate-refugees.html>. There is evidence that these figures were overestimated; 
see a Brookings Institute sponsored panel discussion on arctic indigenous peoples' displacement and 
climate change: Adventures in Climate Change, Arctic Indigenous Peoples, Displacement, and Climate Change: Tracing the Connections (2013) <http ://adventures-in-climate-change.com/capital-
correspondent/>. 
130 United States Army Corps of Engineers - Alaska District, above n 127, 7. 131 Ibid, 4. 
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relocation), though the inhabitants of some now reside in very poor conditions. 
Difficulty in receiving funding and other support for relocation has been the most 
significant challenge for those affected. 132 
An important international example of compensation for both the material and 
some of the non-material losses experienced through displacement and relocation is 
provided in relation to compensation claims sought in connection with 20th century 
United States ' nuclear testing in the South Pacific. 133 Between 1946 and 1958, the 
US conducted sixty-seven nuclear tests in the Marshall Islands, at the time a United 
Nations Trust Ten·itory administered by the US, therefore obliged to 'protect the 
inhabitants against the loss of their lands and resources. ' 134 Prior to conducting its 
tests, the United States nevertheless removed people from several of the area' s atolls, 
keeping them in exile on more distant, isolated and resource-poor islands for 
decades, whilst scarcely providing for their basic needs and contaminating their 
home atolls. 135 As early as 1982, affected persons, by now returned-to only partially 
restored atolls, filed compensation claims in US cou1is, all of which were dismissed 
on jurisdictional grounds when a Compact of Free Association 136 went into effect, 
which established a Nuclear Fund ' to address past, present and future consequences 
of the Nuclear Testing Program' 137 and implemented a Nuclear Claims Tribunal as 
132 See Branen, 'Climate-Induced Community Relocations', above n 126. Note that one of these 
villages, Kivalina, was involved in a damages suit founded in 'nuisance'; see Native Village of Kivalina v Exxon Mobil Corporation, No C 08- 1138 SBA (ND Cal, 2009). The case was dismissed based on ' political question doctrine' . 
133 See, eg, Davor Pevec, 'The Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims Tribunal: The Claims of the Enewetak People' (2006) 35 Denver Journal of International Lm,v and Policy 22 1. 134 Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, signed 6 July 1947, 8 UNTS 189, art6. 
135 P b l ')') 2,...,8 evec, a ove n .J.J , L . 
136 Compact of Free Association (United States and Marshall Islands), signed 25 June 1983, 99 Stat 1770 ( entered into force 19 86). 
137 See Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Marshall Islands for the Implementation of Section 177 of the Compact of Free Association (1983), Preamble 
<http ://www.nuclear claimstribunal. com/ 1 77text.htm>. 
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the only means to seek compensation. 138 Claims to the Tribunal have since included 
those for the 'loss of use of land' during exile and for ongoing costs of ' restoration 
and rehabilitation' of land following nuclear testing, but also for the 'hardship and 
suffering' involved both in being displaced and returning to only partially restored 
and inhabitable atolls. 139 In the case of the Enewetak people, for example, relocated 
to a tiny atoll for 33 years, the Tribunal awarded between USD 3,000 and USD 
4,500 per year per person exiled - or a total of USD 34 Million - for hardship and 
suffering alone. 140 Although receiving funding in this - and all other categories - has 
been hampered by political haggling and the fact that the Nuclear Fund was set up 
with a finite budget, these cases, as well as the Alaskan example, nevertheless 
provide an important background by which to consider compensation for 
displacement in the climate change context and relocation. 
The Alaskan example provides an important precedent because it relates directly 
to displacement ( and the necessity to relocate) induced by what are thought to be 
climate change-related impacts and because attempts to quantify losses at both the 
individual and community level have already been made there. Such losses, or rather 
the costs involved in co1Tecting them, are relatively large ( even where only physical 
asset recovery is sought). Naturally, the figures a1Tived at are not directly 
transferable to other contexts, but there is no reason that quantification of at least 
many of the physical losses or damage in other contexts is not equally possible. The 
nuclear testing in the South Pacific example provides a useful precedent because 
displacement and relocation also occurred in relation to a degraded environment, 
because compensation considered both the material and non-material losses incurred 
in relation with such movement, because it considered compensation even where 
138 Pevec, above n 133, 229f. 
139 Ibid, 23 1 ff. 
140 Ibid, 23 7. 
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eventual return was possible, and because it includes a cross-border dimension. In 
other words, compensation was enabled even for lengthy but temporary 'loss of use'. 
Nevertheless, it is one thing to argue that compensation in some shape or form is 
possible for displacement in the climate change context. It is quite another to argue 
that displacement is a harm which is correctable - that compensation could truly 
rectify the consequences and reinstate the prior state of affairs. 
Compensation or Correction? 
The problem with a purely compensatory approach (that is monetary compensation) 
to correcting the consequences of displacement in the climate change context is that 
experience with development-related displacement and involuntary relocation has 
long shown that compensation is not straightforward or necessarily leads to positive 
outcomes. As can be recalled from_ Chapter Four, corrective justice supports the 
notion that any correction should restore the prior state of affairs. Iri theory, this is a 
noble goal. However, achieving this in practice through compensation and in the 
displacement context might provide challenges. 141 Seth Lazar, for example, has 
outlined the limits of compensation as follows: 
[T]he practical feasibility of this 1nethod of rectification [ co1npensation] is undennined by its 1noral insensitivity when taken too far - the belief that all losses can be 
compensated 111ight entail a gross conflation of categorically different values, such as 111oney and hu111an life; it 111ight also i111ply that the pay111ent of co1npensation renders 
the injury permissible.142 
The 'justice' of correction may therefore be in question if it is to be enacted through 
compensation. Essentially, with a compensatory approach to correcting the causes 
and consequences of displacement in the climate change context, no more than 
141 See also Michael Cemea, 'Compensation and Investment in Resettlement: Theory, Practice, Pitfalls, and Needed Policy Refonn ' in Cemea and Mathur, above n 18, 11 , 57. 142 Seth RM Lazar, 'Conective Justice and the Possibility of Rectification' (2008) 11 Ethic Theory 
and Moral Practice 355, 356. 
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market value may be attached, and only to some (usually tangible) losses (the issue 
in the Alaskan example just provided). Usha Ramanathan and others have argued 
that this inevitably confuses displaced persons with 'willing sellers' and will not 
necessarily resolve the task of restoring incomes and livelihoods, a dynamic long 
familiar from development-related displacement, condemning many to 
impoverishment that bears no relation to the conditions of their prior lives. 143 How, 
after all, does one attach market value to broken communities, lost heritage, lost 
employment opportunities, and the many other human sufferings so often involved 
in the displacement or relocation experience?144 Furthermore, how would 
compensation be implemented where affected populations are not, as is frequently 
the case, structured around 'formal legal rights', for example in relation to the 
ownership of property and other resources?145 
Given these difficulties, it may be unsurprising that there is strong evidence 
indicating that impoverishment and suffering persist long after, ~and in spite of, 
compensation for displacement or involuntary relocation in many cases. 146 Nowhere 
has this been more visible than in relation to involuntary relocation in connection 
with mega-dams. For example, the experience of over 21,000 families (resident in 
one hundred villages) dislocated by the Srisailam project in Andhra Pradesh, India in 
the early 1980s has been well-documented: 
The govern1nent has conceived and executed the Srisailam project [ ... ] without taking into consideration the human problem seriously [ ... ]. The disbursement of 
compensation (in cash) did not encourage plans for resettlement. In the disbursement 
143 See Usha Ramanathan, 'Displacement and the Law' (1996) 31 Economic and Political Weekly 1486, 1491. Also, more generally, Michael M Cemea, 'For a New Economics of Resettlement: A Sociological Critique of the Compensation Principle ' (2003) 55 International Social Science Journal 37, 38f and, more recently, eg, Sreya Maitra, 'Development Induced Displacement: Issues of Compensation and Resettlement - Experiences from the Narmada Valley and Sardar Sarovar Project' (2009) 10 Japanese Journal of Political Science 191. 144 See eg, Ramanathan, above n 143, 6 and United States Anny Corps of Engineers -Alaska District, 
above n 127, 7. 
145 Ramanathan notes many of these shortcomings of displacement; above n 143, 6. 146 C b emea, a oven 143, 40; also Cemea, above n 141, 41. 
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of compensation there appears to have been widespread corruption. Large and rich 
farmers managed to receive compensation, for both house sites and land lost, at 
reasonably competitive terms; people with low economic and social status did not get 
fair compensation for the property lost. The people were neither educated nor taken 
into confidence regarding the various issues involved in co1nputing compensation, 
. d h b·1· . 147 evacuation an re a 1 1tat1on. 
Ultimately, then, a monetary compensation approach alone is not enough, especially 
if driven by little more than the replacement of (some) tangible assets. Rather, Susan 
Tamondong cites several measures that must accompany compensation, including 
consultation (participatory justice), income and livelihood restoration and other 
additional safety nets. 148 To prevent 'under-compensation' , 149 this will likely also be 
vital in any compensatory approach to displacement connected to climate change. 
6. Corrective Justice and International Law 
The chapter has so far dissected various parameters essential to a 'pure', fault-
centred corrective justice claim in the climate change displacement context: loss 
bearers (the recipients of injustice), perpetrators (the agents of injustice) and method 
(the means of correction). Where possible and relevant, connections to international 
law have already been dravvn. However, if correction is to be operationalised through 
international law, a n1ore full discussion of how fault-centred corrective justice 
features in international law in ways that may be relevant to climate change harms 
such as displacement is necessary. First and foremost, liability regimes that are 
directly relevant to con·ecting climate change harm, let alone to displacement in the 
147 Lokayan, quoted in Ravi Hemadri, Harsh Mander and Vijay Nagaraj , 'Dams, Displacement, Policy 
and Law in India ' (World Commission on Dams, 1999) xii. 148 Susan D Tamondong, ' Can Improved Resettlement Reduce Poverty?' in Cemea and Mathur, 
above n 19, 394. 
149 A term used by Cemea, eg, above n 143. 
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climate change context, currently do not exist under international law. 150 Although 
liability regimes permitting correction of environment-related harm do exist, 151 their 
applicability to the climate change context is doubtful. 152 The limitations of 
international human rights law have already been discussed. 153 It has therefore been 
suggested that norms regarding state responsibility for breaches of international 
obligations may be a better way to approach correction of climate change-related 
h . h . . l 154 arms 1n t e 1nternat1ona arena. 
What is important to understand here is that '[a]ll rights of an international 
character involve international responsibility. If the obligation in question is not met, 
responsibility entails the duty to make reparation.' 155 More specifically, in the 1928 
Pennanent Court for International Justice (PCIJ) Chorzow Factory case, it was 
famously stated that '[i]t is a principle of international law that the breach of an 
engagement involves an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form' 156 and 
that 'reparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal 
act and re-establish the situation that would, in all probability, have existed if that act 
had not been committed. ' 157 The International Law Commission's 2001 Articles on 
150 Philippe Cullet, 'Liability and Redress for Human-Induced Global Warming: Towards and International Regime ' (2007) 43A Stanford Journal of International Law, 99, 106. 151 Note again the aforementioned International Law Commission, Draft Principles on the Allocation 
of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising out of Hazardous Activities, in Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-Eights Session, UN Doc A/61/10 (1 October 2006). 
152 Cullet, above n 150; see also RR Churchill, 'Facilitating (Transnational) Civil Liability Litigation for Environmental Damage by Means of Treaties: Progress, Problems, and Prospects' (2001) 12 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 3. 153 See, eg, ch 3 of this thesis. 1-4 ) See, eg, Tol and Verheyen, above n 24. 
155 Judge Huber, Spanish Zone of Morocco [1924] 2 RIAA 615, 641; translation provided in James Crawford, Brownlie 's Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 2008) 541. 
1-6 ) Factory at Chorzow (Germany v Poland) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 17, 29. 157 Fact01y at Chorzow (Germany v Poland) [1927] PCIJ (ser A) No 17, 47. 
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State Responsibility (the result of over 40 years' work158) also include the obligation 
to fully repair injuries arising from internationally wrongful acts, 159 stipulating 
further that reparation duties apply to any damage, both material and moral 160 (the 
latter refers to immaterial damage or loss, pain and suffering, for example; as was 
pointed out in the last section, this may be important in the climate change 
displacement context, where tangible damages or losses may not be the only ones 
experienced). Reparations may be in the form of restitution, compensation or 
satisfaction, or a combination of these. 161 James Crawford notes, however, that 
'[p ]ecuniary compensation is usually an appropriate and often the only remedy for 
injury caused by an unlawful act.' 162 A breaching state is also under the obligation to 
h . . 11 ful d · · · 163 cease t e 1nternat1ona y wrong act an to con1m1t to non-repetition. 
Seemingly, corrective justice is therefore a feature of international law. 
However, what is important to consider is perhaps not that international law accepts 
the importance of notions such as reparation and correction of harm 164 but that 
responsibilities for correction are engaged only in relation to the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act and not any act that is harmful or damaging. What is 
considered wrongful, faulty, or correctable, in other words, is the breach of an 
international obligation and not any activity leading to harm, damage or loss 
158 For a historic take on the topic in the ILC, see James R Crawford, The International Law Commission's Articles on State Responsibility: Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
159 Art 31(1). 
160 Ali 31(2). 'Moral damage includes such items as individual pain and suffering, loss of loved ones 
or personal affront associated with an intrusion on one's hmne or private life'; International Law Commission, 'Cmnmentary on Article 31' in Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts - With Commentaries, para 5, 92; see also Malcolm N Shaw, International Lcrw (Cambridge University Press, 6th ed, 2008) 805, who furthermore cites a number of 
cases where this has occurred. 
161 Art 34. 
16? 
- Crawford, above n 155, 571. 
163 Art 30. 
164 In fact, this is finnly embodied in many international legal instruments and has been confirmed in the jurisprudence of 1nany courts; see REDRESSS, What is Reparation? (2004) <http://www. 
redress.org/what-is-reparation/what-is-reparation>. 
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elsewhere. Although strict state responsibility has been debated, 165 and the ILC has 
proposed the development of rules concerning harm arising out of potentially 
harmful but legal acts, 166 for the time-being any wrongful act engaging state 
responsibility and duties of reparation will likely be limited only to either a violation 
of a treaty obligation or a norm as enshrined under customary international law. 167 
As Crawford notes, 'there is no acceptance of a contract/derelict (tort) dichotomy' .168 
For displacement in the climate change context specifically, this does not bode well: 
although a right not to be displaced (and corresponding obligations) could be 
construed as an emerging right under international law, it is founded on little more 
than soft law instruments. 169 Perhaps more importantly, it is not conceptualised to 
apply extra-territorially. 170 Nevertheless, more generally state responsibility for the 
detrimental effects of climate change (possibly including displacement) may arise 
out of breaches of obligations enshrined elsewhere. 
Treaties 
It has been suggested that it may be possible to construe that state responsibility for 
climate change harms could be invoked in relation to breaches of the obligations 
165 See, eg, Toland Verheyen, above n 24, 1113 and Roda Verheyen, Climate Change Damage and International Law: Prevention Duties and State Responsibility (Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) 169ff; also Phoebe N Okawa, State Responsibility for Transbounda,y Air Pollution in International Lcn,v (Oxford University Press, 2000) 
166 In relation to ultra-hazardous activities. 167 Although the Articles on State Responsibility also make 1nention of ' the international 
responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach by a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law ' ; see art 40. Nevertheless, Malcolm Shaw notes that 
only where 'an unlawful act has taken place, which has caused injury and which has been cormnitted by an agent of the state, that state will be responsible in international law'; see Shaw, above n 160, 783. 
168 Crawford, above n 155, 542. He similarly notes that 'broad formulas on state responsibility are 
unhelpful and, when they suggest municipal analogies, even a source of confusion; Ibid, 555. 169 See, eg, Michele Morel, Maria Stavropoulou and Jean-Franc;ois Durieux, 'The History and Status 
of the Right not to be Displaced' (2012) 41 Forced Migration Review 5 170 Ibid, 7. However, Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam note that ' [a]n ambulatory principle 
nevertheless operates, obliging States to exercise care in their domestic affairs in the light of other States' legal interests, and to cooperate in the solution of refugee problems; see Guy S Goodwin-Gill 
and Jane McAdam, The Refitgee in International Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2007) 3. 
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contained in either the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol, for example. 171 Fundamentally, 
the UNFCCC stipulates, in Article 2, that its main objective is 'the stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations' and 'the prevention of 'dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system'. Article 3.3 asks that states act with precaution 
to 'prevent or minimize the causes of clin1ate change and mitigate its adverse 
effects' , even where full scientific certainty is lacking. Several more concrete 
obligations and their possible breaches have been highlighted. Faure and 
Nollkaemper, for example, have argued that where states are a party to the UNFCCC 
only ( e.g. the United States), it may be possible to construe breaches under Article 4 
of the UNFCCC: 172 although that Article raises many largely ambiguous obligations 
- for example, to cooperate in climate change adaptation preparations 173 and to 
provide general assistance for developing country parties 174 - Annex I countries are 
further obliged to 'take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate 
change, by limiting [ ... ] anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and protecting 
and enhancing [ ... ] greenhouse gas sinks and reservoir' .175 Failure to do the latter 
may provide a basis state responsibility claim. 176 Where states have obligations 
under both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, Faure and Nollkaemp-er 'argue that 
the more explicit responsibilities enshrined in the latter may give rise to a state 
responsibility clain1: 177 Annex B of the Protocol, in particular, has bound certain 
countries to specified emissions reductions. Article 3(1) of the Protocol provides 
further impetus that Annex I parties should not exceed their assigned em1ss1ons 
171 See, eg, Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25, 142 and Verheyen, above n 165, 43ff. 172 Faure and Nollkae1nper, above n 25, 143. 173 United Nations Framework Convention on Clilnate Change, art 4(1)(e). 174 Ibid, art 4( 4 ). 
175 Ibid, art 4(2)(a). Faure and Nollkae1nper, above n 25, 143. 176 Faure and Nollkaemper, above n 25 , 143. 177 Ibid, 144. The first commitment period under the Protocol ended in 2012; however, a new 
coilllnitment period has, in principle, been agreed, although it is not yet in force; see, eg, United Nations Frainework Convention on Clilnate Change, Doha Amendment (2013) <http: //unfccc.int/ ky_oto _proto col/doha _amendment/items/7362.php>. 
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quantities. At least in theory, it is therefore possible to conceive that a failure to 
comply with obligations to both mitigate and assist with adaptation efforts breaches 
treaty obligations. However, the jurisdictional and causality issues already discussed 
present significant hurdles in finding an appropriate venue for, and causal basis of, 
such a claim, particularly in relation to displacement. Also, although the UNFCCC 
outlines many commitments and general obligations, it incorporates few specific 
duties that bind states concretely. It is, after all, a framework instrument. Roda 
Verheyen notes a lack of 'obligations of results', for example in relation to emissions 
reductions targets. 178 The future of the Kyoto Protocol, in the meantime, is somewhat 
uncertain. 
Other treaty regimes have been investigated for their potential to provide the 
foundation for a state responsibility claim in the climate change context. 179 Of these, 
the Law of the Sea Convention (UN CLOS) may be particularly relevant. It provides 
that 
States shall take all n1easures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause dan1age by pollution to other States and their environ1nent, and that pollution arising fro1n incidents or activities 
under their jurisdiction or control does not spread beyond the areas where they 
exercise sovereign rights in accordance with this Convention.180 
It continues by specifying that such measures 'shall deal with all sources of pollution 
of the marine environment, ' specifically 'the release of toxic, harmful or noxious 
178 Roda Verheyen, above n 165, 8lf. 
179 See Andrew L Strauss, 'The Legal Option: Suing the United States in International Forums for Global Warming Emissions ' (2003) 33 Environmental Law Reporter 10185, 10188f, who examines both the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the world trade regime. For more on the obligations arising under the world trade regime (specifically, the World Trade Organization -WTO), see also Meinhard Doelle, 'Climate Change and the WTO: Opportunities to Motivate State Action on Climate Change through the World Trade Organization' (2004) 13 Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 85. 180 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into force 16 November 1994) art 194(2); henceforth also 'Convention' as 
appropriate. 
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substances, especially those which are persistent, from land-based sources, from or 
through the atmosphere or by dumping.' 181 Importantly, 'pollution' is defined as 
the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine 
environ1nent which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and 1narine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine 
activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment or quality 
.c f d d . f . . 182 1or use o sea water an re uction o amenities . 
Such provisions may prove particularly useful when considering responsibilities in 
connection with threatened island nations and coastal states facing livelihood 
challenges with displacement consequences related to marine environments. 
Although high-emitting states like the United States are not signatory to the 
Convention, and there may be many practical hurdles requiring resolution before 
either a lawsuit ( or at least advisory opinion) is to materialise, many of its provisions 
are generally considered a codification of customary international law and therefore 
may provide a basis for a legal challenge in principle. 183 
Norms of Customary International Law 
Customary international law may also contain further relevant _norms as the basis for 
establishing state responsibility for climate change harms, even where an emitting 
state is not committed under a specific treaty. Customary international law is defined 
as ' evidence of general practice accepted as law' .184 Roda Verheyen and Peter 
Roderick argue that one such practice accepted as law is contained in the so-called 
'no harm rule ' .185 Based on the idea that states shall not cause injury or harm 
( environmental or otherwise) in other states, the rule has made states responsible for 
18 1 Ibid, art 194(3)(a). 
182 Ibid, mi l(l)(a). 
18"' 
., See Strauss, above n 179, 10188. 
184 Art 3 8, Statute of the International Cowi of Justice. 185 Verheyen and Roderick, above n 40, 15. Roda Verheyen, in particular, has repeatedly argued 
convincingly that this provides a strong basis for a claim based on state responsibility; see, eg, Verheyen, above n 165 ; see also Christina Voigt, 'State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages ' (2008) 77 Nordic Journal of International Law 1 . 
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trans-boundary pollution at least since the Trail Smelter Arbitration. 186 It was 
reiterated by the ICJ in another important case, the Corfu Channel case, 187 and is 
further incorporated in the Preamble to the UNFCCC and both the 1972 Stockholm 
Declaration188 and 1992 Rio Declaration, 189 the latter of which holds, for example, 
that 
States have [ ... ] the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States 
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.' 190 
The ICJ also acknowledged its legal character in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons 
Advisory Opinion: 
[T]he existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
· 191 enviromnent. 
Generally, the rule obliges states to prevent harms from occurring in the first 
place. 192 Veryheyen and Roderick further argue that it is 'a_pure duty of conduct, and 
no _intent to cause harm is necessary ' . Rather, prevention duties apply in any 
circumstance where ' an activity can be reasonably shown to cause damage or 
risk' .193 Nevertheless, the rule does not imply that states could be held responsible 
for any damage occun·ing as a result of their greenhouse gas emissions. Rather, a 
state ' s activities must breach ce1iain standards of care. 194 
186 Trail Smelter Arbitration (United States v Canada) [1941] III RIAA 1905 . 187 Corfil Channel Case (Un ;ted Kingdom v Albania) [1949] ICJ Rep 244. 188 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Hum an Environment, proclaimed 16 June 1972, UN Doc A/Conf.48/14/Rev 1(1973); henceforth also ' Stockholm Declaration' . 189 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, proclaimed 3-14 June 1992, UN Doc A/Conf.151 /26 (Vol I) (12 August 1992), henceforth also 'Rio Declaration' . 190 Principle 21. The Preamble to the UNFCCC reads essentially the same. 191 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) [1996] 35 ILM 809 ; italics by thesis author. 
192 Verheyen and Roderick, above n 40, 15. 193 Ibid, 16. 
194 Ibid. 
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All that said, however, significant challenges remain: First, there are questions 
as to whether the no harm rule is, in fact, a binding norm of international law, as it 
has been so rarely applied. 195 Secondly, there is some concern over the no harm 
rule's relevance in the climate change harm context because of the difficulties that 
any claimant would have to overcome the fact that climate change may not amount 
to trans-boundary harm, premised as that concept is, historically, on the notion that 
harm in one state must be traceable, specifically and unequivocally, to the specific 
and conclusive actions of an immediate neighbour. Roda Verheyen shows how 
responsibilities in relation to the no ha1m rule have become more broadly applied 
over time. 196 Nevertheless questions prevail as to whether climate change impacts 
can amount to transboundary pollution or harm and whether the causal issues 
already discussed would hinder reparative claims founded in the no harm rule. 197 
Some cause for optimism may have been provided by an interesting case concerning 
the expansion and extension of the Czech Prunefov II coal-based power plant, a 
significant source of CO2 emissions. 198 Prior to approving the expansion and 
extension, in 2008, the Czech Ministry of Environment considered the ordering of a 
trans-boundary environmental impact assessment (TEIA) but struggled to initiate it, 
as well as failing to notify 'potentially affected states' of its intention, even though it 
195 Verheyen, above n 165, 153. Verheyen maintains that it is ; ibid. 196 See Verheyen, above n 165, 166f. For example, the Draft Articles on Prevention ofTransboundary Harm from Harzardous Activities hold that "'transboundary harm" means harm caused in the territory of or in other places under the jurisdiction or control of a State other than the State of origin, whether or not the States concerned share a common border '; see International Law Commission, Report of the International Law Commission, UN Doc A/56/10 (12 December2001) art 2(c). 197 Verheyen, above n 165, 165f. Veryheyen cites Meinhard Schroder as denying this, 'Klimaschutz als Problem des Internationalen Rechts ' (1993) 21 Jahrbuch des Um.welt- und Technikrechts 191 ['Climate Protection as a Matter of International Law' (1993) 21 Yearbook of Environmental and Technical Law 191] argues this. 
198 See Greenpeace International, Legal Steps Taken by the Federated States of Micronesia against the PruneFov II Coal-fired Power Plant, Czech Republic: Background Information (2010) <http :// www .greenpeace.org/intemational/Global/intemational/planet-2/report/2010/3/teia _fsm.pdf>; also Maketo Robert et al, 'Transboundary Climate Challenge to Coal: One Small Step Against Dirty Energy, One Giant Leap for Climate Justice ' in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing World (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 589. 
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was obliged to do so under both domestic law and the Espoo Convention, 199 of 
which the Czech R~public is a signatory.200 In December 2009, the Federated States 
of Micronesia201 nevertheless requested that a TEIA be conducted, arguing that the 
climate change impacts of the project deserved assessment. 202 Although an 
assessment eventually performed cleared the way for the expansion and extension of 
the plant, the Ministry of Environment also acknowledged that Micronesia was an 
'affected state', and that its climate concerns would have to be addressed by several 
emissions reduction measure to be implemented by the plant. 203 Importantly, the case 
makes it possible to conceive of climate change impacts as trans-regional and that 
responsibilities to counter the detrimental consequences of greenhouse gas emissions 
may arise even where states are not immediately adjoined.204 
7. Conclusion 
Aristotle outlined the importance of corrective justice to his overall justice paradigm 
millennia ago.205 It is vital to think about corrective justice also in relation to the ill 
effects arising from anthropogenic climate change, though there can be no doubt that 
climate change provides many particular conceptual, legal and other challenges that 
stand in the way of its effective or likely implementation. Nevertheless, harmful 
action has occurred and is occurring, whether this is attributable to individual or 
199 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, adopted 25 February 199, 1989 UNTS 309 (entered into force 10 September 1997); also 'Espoo Convention'. 200 Greenpeace International, above n 198, 4f. 201 Supported by Greenpeace International and the Environmental Law Service. 202 Greenpeace International, above n 198, 5. 203 Greenpeace lnten1ational, Threatened Pacific Island Nation Makes Legal H-istory by Challenging European Carbon Emitter (23 May 2011) <http ://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/press/ 
releases/Threatened-Pacific-Island-Nation-makes-legal-history-by-challenging-European-carbon-em itter/>. 
204 Ibid. 
205 See ch 4 of this thesis. 
163 
CHAPTER FIVE CORRECTIVE JUSTICE -FAULT-CENTRED 
collective, past or present entities. Although the causal, moral and especially legal 
responsibility for such action is complicated, not at least contemplating recompense 
would, in the words of Pablo de Greiff constitute ' a form of injustice that consists 
[ of] depriving [someone] of the sort of consideration which is owed to whoever is 
negatively or severely affected by the actions of others. ' 206 Relying on. de Greiff, 
Maxine Burkett highlights how a reparative process (irrespective of outcome) in 
itself may also lead to solidarity amongst, and recognition for, those who partake in 
it, at least as important as more tangible outcomes otherwise desired. 207 
The present chapter has pondered, in particular, the possibility of addressing 
harm, damage and losses which emanate in connection with displacement in the 
climate change context. It has sought to do so through corrective justice which is 
fault-centred or 'pure ' ; in other words, which prescribes that responsibility for 
correcting harm, damage or losses must be borne by a particular entity ( or several) 
to whom fault can be ascribed. This fits well with both the Aristotelian construction 
of corrective justice and that of Weimib, as outlined in Chapter Four. Weimib, in 
particular, has conceived of corrective justice as ' the disturbance of [ ... ] equality 
[that] connects two, and only two, [parties]. ' 208 The multiple causal, practical and 
legal issues which may stand in the way of such an approach in relation to 
displacement in the climate change context have been discussed in the chapter. 
Ultimately, this_ makes it seemingly easy to conclude that no correction, or 
compensation, is due or possible in that context, not if one wants to implement 
'pure ' corrective justice. Such a conclusion, of course, in its own way, also supports 
206 Pablo de Greiff, ' Justice and Reparations ' in de Greiff, above n 89, 460. 207 Maxine Burkett, 'Climate Reparations' (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 509, 534. 
208 Ernest J Weinrib, 'Corrective Justice ' (1992) 77 Iowa Lmv Review 403 , 410. 
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compensation, except that it should be no more than zero, hardly a just approach,209 
even in the context of displacement in the climate change context, to which many 
factors and agents causally contribute. Surely, some redress is due, which would 
acknowledge the external influences that do contribute. Supporting this notion is 
Adrian V ermeule, who has advocated the idea of correction via his concept of 
reparations as 'rough justice': he has argued that even where obstacles ( causal and 
many others) to justice and to compensation are seemingly significant, ' a rough 
version of corrective justice suggests [wrongdoers] should pay something, more than 
zero ' ,210 even where this cannot deal with all inevitable discrepancies involved in 
particular phenomena or interactions, or achieve all desired goals. Daniel Farber has 
argued similarly: ' [ n ]o plausible system will precisely measure harm and match 
victims with historic GHG [greenhouse gas] emitters, but some form of rough justice 
seems achievable' .211 
The next chapter will seek to argue that ' rough' corrective-justice may be 
achieved most realistically or successfully for loss bearers in the climate change 
displacement context via conceptions of the construct which· consider establishing 
fault and a specific perpetrator subsidiary to the notion that harm, damage or losses 
must be corrected, even in the absence of an isolatable agent ( or several) that is 
directly or exclusively responsible for having caused them. Jules Coleman, in 
particular, has questioned why loss recovery must be ' impose[ d] on particular 
injurers ' 212 and cannot be operationalize via other mechanisms that do not focus so 
heavily on perpetrators. Ultimately, the chapter will show how, through removing 
209 Adrian Vermeule, 'Reparations as Rough Justice ' (Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 105, Law School, The University of Chicago, 2005) 9. 2 10 Ibid, 7; also Duncan French, ' Global Justice and the (Ir)relevance of Indeterminacy' (2009) 8 Chinese Journal of International Law 593 . 21 1 Daniel A Farber, above n 39, 1608. 
212 Jules Coleman, 'Tmi Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice' (1 992) 67 Indiana Law Journal 349, 352. 
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fault and the search for an exclusive perpetrator, not only is it possible to 
reconceptualise how corrective justice ought to function in relation to displacement 
in the climate change context but also how it is enacted. 
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CHAPTER6 
No-Fault, 'Rough' Corrective Justice: Insurance 
Why be 'content to leave the compensation of casualties to the fortuitous outcome of 
litigation based on outdated and unrealistic notions of fault '? 1 
(John Fleming, 1971) 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter pondered the possibility of addressing harm and losses which 
emanate in connection with displacement in the climate change context through a 
compensation claim founded in 'pure' corrective justice, in other words, a corrective 
justice which is fault-centred, which prescribes that responsibility for correcting 
harm, da1nage or loss must be borne by the very entity ( or several) which is 
specifically responsible for inducing it. The chapter outlined the multiple legal, 
conceptual, causal, practical and jurisdictional issues which may stand in the way of 
operationalizing such an approach under international law. The chapter nevertheless 
concluded that finding corrective justice-based solutions for loss bearers in the 
climate change context is important, as they would otherwise be left with the 
thoroughly unjust situation of having no means to seek redress. The current chapter 
will therefore proceed with the idea that achieving corrective justice for those 
affected by displacement in the climate change context must be made possible, even 
if through a more 'rough' version of corrective justice - and that it must be possible 
to affect it under international law. The chapter will continue working with the 
assumption that there are certainly identifiable victims in the climate change 
displacement context (thought they are not a homogenous group, or easily 
1 John G Fleming, The Law of Torts (The Law Book Company, 4th ed, 1971) 9. 
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delineated) and that the losses and harms they experience could be, if implemented 
thoughtfully, rectified in meaningful ways through compensation. Where this chapter 
will depart from the previous one is that it will no longer insist that there must be an 
isolatable, exclusive perpetrator to affect or operationalize corrective justice. Rather, 
it will proceed with the idea that a wrongful, certainly a harmful act ( or a multitude), 
may indeed have occurred, even though it is difficult to identity who, specifically, is 
at fault for its occurrence, and even though it is difficult to argue that causal chains 
are simple or straightforward. Removing explicit fault for harm, and relenting on the 
search for a specific, exclusive perpetrator, the chapter will show, means some 
difficult hurdles related to causality and other matters become less of an impediment 
to a successful corrective justice-based compensatory claim (though by no means all 
causality (and many other) matters can be resolved through this approach). In 
particular, the chapter will argue that this could best be achieved through 
approaching correction and con1pensation through a mechanism -akin to no-fault 
. insurance . 
Insurance, of course, is increasingly noted as an important device to respond to 
at least some of the detrimental consequences of climate change.2 Initially, the 
relationship between insurance and climatic change was contemplated by large 
insurance companies and re-insurers who rightly began to be concerned about the 
potential cormnercial i1npact of increasing 'climatic variation' some decades ago 
already. Large German re-insurer Munich Re, for example, stipulated as early as 
1973 that 
[i]nvestigations. into the overall trend of clai1ns experience are indispensable, and here 
clin1atic variations becon1e most significant. Such investigations involve a study of 
thennodynainic processes such as, for example, the rising temperature of the earth' s 
2 See, eg, the various entries in a special issue of Climate Policy (vol 6, 2006) on insurance and 
climate change, some of which have been cited in this chapter. 
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atmosphere (as a result of which glaciers and the caps recede [ ... ]) [ ... ] We wish to 
enlarge on this complex of problems in greater detail, especially as [ ... ] its conceivable impact on the long-range risk trend has hardly been examined to date.3 
More recently, the potential role of insurance as an adaptive response mechanism to 
climate change impacts, particularly in poorer countries, has been highlighted and 
analysed. Koko Warner et al, for example, outline its possible role as an adaptive 
instnnnent in responding in particular to the aftermath of disasters.4 They argue that the 
adaptation benefits of insurance for climate change-affected persons and communities 
could include the continued availability of revenue in the immediate aftermath of a 
disaster, thereby preventing a down-ward spiral into poverty and increasing 
vulnerability, and the prevention of long-term negative after-effects of calamitous 
events. 5 These are indeed important aspects of insurance in the climate change 
context and they will be explored more in later sections. However, equally important 
is to stress insurance's corrective justice potential,6 whereby insurance is 
conceptualised not only as an adaptation response to the negative .consequences of 
clin1ate change but also as compensation for climate change losses, damage and 
harm. This is hardly a novel conceptualisation of insurance: it has long played a role 
as a compensatory mechanism. What makes it different is that it does not usually 
rely on fault, on the establishment of a particular or exclusive duty bearer who 
unequivocally is causally connected to a loss bearer through the commission of a 
harmful act, in order to affect compensation. It is therefore a 'rougher' version of 
3 Munich Re, 'Flood/Inundation' (August 1973); quoted in Walter R Stahel, 'In Favour of a Proactive Insurance Approach to Climate Change' (2009) 34 The Geneva Papers 319, 321. 4 Koko Warner et al, 'Adaptation to Cliinate Change: Linking Disaster Risk Reduction and Insurance' (Paper Submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention for the 6th Session of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-Tenn Cooperative Action Under the Convention (AWG-LCA) from 1 until 12 June 2009, 6 June 2009) 4. 
5 Ibid, 10. 
6 See Peter Penz, 'International Ethical Responsibilities to "Climate Refugees"' in Jane McAdam (ed), Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives (Hart Publishing, 2010) 151 , 164, 167. 
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corrective justice, which enables compensation even in the face of intricate causal 
challenges, which makes it particularly relevant in the context of climate change, and 
more especially displacement, and the many difficult causal hurdles it entails. 
This chapter, therefore, will address the following: the rationale behind, and rise 
of, no-fault compensation schemes, in particular insurance, as alternative corrective 
mechanisms, highlighting especially how this is important to the climate change 
context; the various ways in which the concept of insurance has arisen in relation to 
international law and to climate change, including the corrective justice components 
of such concepts; the potential of micro insurance; opportunities for insurance-based 
compensation to address in particular the needs and priorities arising in relation to 
displacement in the climate change context; and, finally, how best to operationalize 
compensation internationally through insurance. 
2. Corrective Justice: From Fault-Centred to No-Fault Compensation 
Vincent Covello and J eryl Mumpower have traced the long history of insurance and 
argue that it 'is one of the oldest strategies for coping with risks' .7 They trace its 
origins to Babylonian times, 5000 years ago and note how the 4000 year old Code of 
Hammurabi contained explicit insurance-like provisions. 8 Fallowing the end of the 
Roman Empire, insurance waned, at least in Europe, but experienced a revival 
through the activities of the Hanseatic League and the Lombards from the 12th 
century.9 Many different types of insurance soon emerged: life insurance, marine 
7 See, eg, Vincent T Covello and Jeryl Mumpower, 'Risk Analysis and Risk Management: An Historical Perspective' (1985) 5 Risk Analysis 103, 108. 8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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insurance and even disaster-related in insurance in the form of fire insurance, 
following London's Great Fire of 1666. 10 The fact that insurance has a long history, 
including as a disaster response mechanism, is hardly controversial. However, this 
chapter explores its potential as no-fault compensation and 'rough' corrective justice. 
To understand how, historically, insurance came to play this role, it is important to 
understand, in particular, the emergence of no-fault workers' compensation in 19th 
century Europe. 11 
Some form of workers' compensation had existed already in antiquity. The 
afore-mentioned Code of Ha1nmurabi, for example, provided remedies for certain 
work-related injuries. 12 During medieval feudalism, serfs could, at least in theory, 
expect that their injury engaged certain responsibilities of their masters under the 
'doctrine of noblesse oblige' ('nobility obliges'). 13 As tort law developed, liability-
based claims against employers became a more distinct possibility for injured 
workers. 14 However, this was long subject to several significant restrictions, outlined 
by Gregory Guyton: 15 First, the doctrine of 'contributory negligence' stipulated that 
even where employers themselves had provided unsafe conditions, they were not 
liable if an injured worker had contributed ( even insignificantly) to his own injury. 
Secondly, the 'fellow servant rule' stipulated that employers would not be liable 
where a co-worker had contributed (significantly or not) to a worker's injury. 
Finally, and perhaps worst of all, the 'doctrine of assumption of risk' meant that 
10 Ibid. 
11 See also Penz, above n 6, 167 and David Schmidtz and Robert E Goodin, Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility (Cainbridge University Press, 1998) esp l 56f. 12 Gregory Guyton outlines the history of worker's compensation in greater detail; see Gregory Guyton, 'A Brief History of Worker' s Cmnpensation' (1999) 19 Iowa Orthopedic Journal 106. Peter Cane, Atiyah 's Accidents, Compensation and the Law (Butterworths, 7th ed, 2006) is also useful for a historical and legal take . 
l " 
.) Guyton, above n 12, 107. 
14 Schmidtz and Goodin, above n 11. 156. 15 Guyton, above n 12, 108. 
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simply by contractually committing themselves to a certain work environment, 
employees acknowledged and accepted any risks potentially involved in the job, 
thereby relieving employers of liability when injury occurred. Many contracts, in 
fact, included clauses by which workers pro-actively absolved their employers from 
work injury-related liability. 16 Even where no such clauses were signed, and even 
where a liability claim did materialise, the above restrictions, as well as the expense 
and length of claims, often led to failure for the applicant and therefore to significant 
suffering for workers. 17 Only well-off workers were able to · cover themselves for 
prospective injury, for example via the English 'Friendly Societies' or the German 
'Krankenkassen' .18 
In the context of social movements, in particular in Germany in the late 19th 
century, the plight of injured workers increasingly led to political den1ands that the 
workers' compensation system be altered.19 The system was rightly seen as unjust, 
favouring heavily employers over employees. In particular, the insistence that fault 
must be the key to compensation was soon isolated as a factor which condemned 
most injured worker to a system that could not provide them with a remedy.20 By the 
late 19th century, workplace injury reparation was therefore removed from the realm 
of to1i law and operationalized through no-fault insurance instead. 21 This had several 
advantages: all workers were suddenly covered by basic insurance; premiums were 
usually covered by employees; the benefit to both parties was that lengthy and costly 
litigation could be avoided; most importantly, because establishing fault (and 
therefore duty bearers) was no longer the focal point of a claim, workers gained 
16 Ibid. 
17 Schmidtz and Goodin, above n 11 , 156 and Guyton, above n 12, 108. 18 Guyton, above n 12, 108. 
19 Ibid, 109. 
20 Schmidtz and Goodin, above n 11 , 156f. 21 Ibid and Penz, above n 6, 167. 
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more predictable and certain access to compensation for work place injury.22 The 
advantages and benefits inherent to no-fault compensation in the work injury context 
were soon recognised in other contexts and it has come to be applied, for example, in 
relation to no-fault personal injury compensation23 and no-fault car accident 
compensation, to name a few. 24 In some places, compensation claims are now more 
frequently addressed through no-fault corrective schemes than claims in the courts.25 
Why is any of this relevant in the context of climate change harm, loss or 
damage? First, no-fault insurance, as the name implies, is a compensatory 
mechanism that does not put fault (and therefore particularised responsibility) at the 
centre of compensation claims. This means that complicated causal chains usually 
involved in liability claims are no impediment to awarding compensation.26 In other 
words, at least some of the complicated causality issues highlighted in the previous 
chapter would not necessarily stand in the way of compensation if a no-fault 
compensatory mechanism was available.27 Secondly, fault-centred compensatory 
claims are slow, uncertain, costly and often unsuccessful, 28 even where causal issues 
are less con1plex than they are in the climate change and climate change and 
displacement context. This alone will make fault-centred correction an unlikely 
avenue to be pursued by the victims of climate change. 29 In relation to tort-like 
approaches to compensation, Peter Cane has asked 
22 Ibid. 
23 Note, in paiiicular, New Zealand' s well developed scheme. See Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), About ACC <http: //www.acc.co .nz/about-acc/index.htm>. 24 Schlnidtz and Goodin, above n 11 , 157; the authors also cite no-fault divorce as an example. 25 See Talina Drabsch, 'No-Fault Compensation' (Briefing Paper No 6/05, NSW Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2005) 46. The author notes this in relation to Canada, for example. 26 Schlnidtz and Goodin, above n 11 , 156ff and Penz, above n 6, 167, 169. 27 See, eg, Penz, above n 6, l 68f. 
28 Drabsch, above n 25 , 50f 
29 Also Penz, above n 6, 169. 
173 
CHAPTER SIX NO-FAULT CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
whether the huge cost of delivering tort compensation is worth the 'benefits' that 
would be lost in the 1nove to a no-fault system [ ... ]' 30 
No-fault compensation in the climate change context would mean that legal fees 
become largely redundant, unless a dispute over a compensation award arises, that 
intricate causal chains may not have to be dissected and that claimants can receive 
compensation relatively quickly. In other words, it would foster a more efficient 
compensation system.31 And, finally, it would foster a fair system.32 Fault-based 
systems are often noted for not being fair: 'The fault system fails to accept the 
philosophy that is said to support it. It does nothing at all for the innocent victims of 
no-fault accidents ' . 33 Patrick Atiyah, on the other hand notes that '[j]ustice may 
require payment of compensation without fault' . 34 Without recourse to compensation 
via no-fault schemes, loss bearers in the climate change context would likely face a 
grave injustice. 
Final Words 
No-fault con1pensation, enacted particularly through insurance, has become a much-
utilised tool to ensure compensation in the face of causal uncertainty in many 
don1estic settings. Rather than focusing on the dissection of causal chains and 
insisting on the establishment of fault that can be exclusively attributed to a 
particular duty bearer, no-fault compensation schemes accept that this is often futile 
but stress that this cannot 1nean that no recompense is due. They thus emphasise 
compensation, and the re-establishment of a state of affairs before harm, a loss or an 
30 Peter Cane, 'Reforming Tort Law I Australia: A Personal Perspective ' (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 654, 675. 
31 Drab sch, above n 25 , 5 Of. 
32 Ibid, 49f. 
33 National Cmnmittee of Enquiry, Compensation and Rehabilitation in Australia (1974) 103. 34 PS Atiyah, Accidents, Compensation and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 1980) 475. 
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injury have occurred, over fault and fault-bearers. Operationalizing such schemes is 
often done through no-fault insurance. Relatively small premiums are paid, in the 
case of workers' compensation often by those who would otherwise be a defendant 
in a liability clai1n, through which more certain compensation is guaranteed. All of 
this is highly relevant when thinking about the uncertain prospects of gaining 
compensation through a fault-centred claim in relation to climate change harm or 
losses, including those which arise in connection with displacement. Insurance 
would provide a significantly more reliable, fair and efficient mechanism by which 
compensation could be sought. However, it is one thing to say that no-fault 
insurance, or a scheme akin to it, would be efficient, fair and perhaps even 'roughly' 
rooted in corrective justice - certainly if those who contribute to greenhouse gas 
e1nissions above certain thresholds were collectively made to fund the scheme (not 
as a matter of 'pure' corrective justice making them directly liable but as a matter of 
'rough' corrective justice which acknowledges as least some contribution to harm). It 
is quite another to argue that international law supports the establishment of 
insurance, in particular as a corrective mechanism. The following sections will try to 
locate opportunities for insurance in the climate change context, both under 
international human rights law and under the international climate change regime. 
3. Insurance in International Law: Human Rights 
One area where the possibility of insurance arises in connection with international 
law is in the international human rights context, particularly concerning the right to 
social protection and the related right to social security, which is affirmed in several 
international human rights instruments. Both concern positive measures that states 
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should progressively implement, independently and collectively, to ensure, in 
particular, the equitable enjoyment of socio-economic and cultural rights. Such 
measures could include insurance, social or otherwise. 
The importance of social security as a right is recognised in several international 
human rights instruments. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for 
example, states: 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to the 
realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in accordance 
with the organization and resources of each State, of the econo1nic, social and cultural 
rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.35 
It adds that: 
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of hi1nself and of his fainily, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circu1nstances 
beyond his control.36 
Article 9 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights similarly 'recognise[ s] the right of everyone to social security, including 
social insurance' .37 In the regional context, the African Union endorsed the 2006 
Livingstone Call for Action, 38 through which officials from 13 African states had 
acknowledged that social protection is a human right and that its implementation 
reduces poverty and inequality. 
Historically, the goal for social security to be an internationally protected right 
emerged in the early part of the 20th century amongst efforts by the International 
35 Art 22. 
36 Art 25.1. 
37 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 
December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976) [italics added by thesis author]; 
henceforth also ' ICESCR' or ' Convention' as appropriate, see also art 5(e)(iv) of the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art 26 of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and art 11 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. 
38 See African Union, The Livingstone Call for Action (2006) <http: //www.ipc-undp.org/doc_africa_ 
brazil/Li vingstone-call-for-action. pdf>. 
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Labour Organisation to protect workers' rights. 39 To extend such rights, by the end 
of the Second World War, the ILO declared that it would increase its efforts to 
further ' the extension of social security measures to provide a basic income to all in 
need of such protection' ,40 presumably not just workers. Nevertheless, as Cichon et 
al outline, the concept remained largely tied to protecting the rights of workers 
making their livelihood in the formal economy.41 Even recently, in its World Social 
Security Report 2010/11 , 42 the ILO prioritised that measures to implement social 
security are first of all about protection from income volatility and unemployment.43 
This explains in pa1i why the concept is of limited relevance: if social security, 
including social insurance, is linked to participation in the formal economy, then 
many individuals remain unprotected, especially in places where unemployment or 
participation in informal economic activity is high.44 In large parts of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America, in particular, most of those who work do so in the informal 
economy, for example.45 Thus it is not surprising that only one in five working 
people enjoy access to social security schemes globally, although as little one in 
twenty do so in poorer countries. 46 Furthermore, it has been noted how in many 
countries, including those where inhabitants have for several generations enjoyed 
39 See Michael Cichon, Christina Behrendt and Veronika Wodsak, 'The UN Social Protection Floor 
Initiative: Moving Forward with the Extension of Social Security' (2011) 2 International Politics and 
Society 32, 33. 
40 International Labour Organization, Declaration Concerning Aims and Purposes of the International 
Labour Organization (Declaration of Philadelphia) (1944) s III(f) <http: //www.ilo.org/ilolex/eng 
lish/iloconst.htm> [italics by thesis author]. 
41 Cichon et al, above n 39, 33. 
42 International Labour Organization, 'World Social Security Report 2010/1 1: Providing Coverage in 
Times of Crisis and Beyond' (International Labour Office, 2010). 
43 Ibid, 13; though it also notes health care and general poverty and social exclusion. 
. 
44 Cichon et al, above n 39, 36, 37f. 
45 International Labour Organization, above n 42, 28 . 
46 See Ibid, 29f; ch 2 of the report cites many more important figures . 
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formidable access to social security, spending on social security measures is now 
being reduced, a result of processes including globalisation and financial crisis.47 
Given the historically limited scope of the social security concept, ' social 
protection' has gained some traction as a broader concept which incorporates 
protection from scarcity or impairment in more wide-ranging contexts.48 For 
example, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development has outlined 
the scope of the social protection concept as follows: 
[it] is concerned with preventing, managing, and overcoming situations that adversely 
affect people's well-being. It helps individuals maintain their living standard when 
confronted by contingencies such as illness, maternity, disability or old age; market 
crisis such as unemployment; as well as economic crises or [importantly for this 
chapter] natural disasters.49 
It includes social insurance and social assistance amongst the methods by which this 
is to be achieved, with the latter in particular refen·ing to ' transfers to those who are 
unable to work or [are] excluded from gainful employment and who are deemed 
eligible, whether on the basis of their income, their vulnerability stqtus or their rights 
as citizens. ' 50 According to the World Bank, social protection ' focuses specifically 
on the poor, since they are the most vulnerable to risk' .51 The World Commission on 
the Social Dimension of Globalization has emphasised that 'a minimum level of 
social protection' must underpin the operation of the global economic order. 52 
47 See, eg, Vito Tanzi, ' Globalization and the Future of Social Protection ' (2003) 49 Scottish Journal 
of Political Economy 116; also International Labour Organization, above n 42, 28; also Cichon et al, 
above n 39, 34. 
48 Cichon et al, above n 39 and International Labour Organization, above n 42, 13. 
49 United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, ' Combating Poverty and Inequality: 
Structural Change, Social Policy and Politics ' (2010) 135. 
50 Ibid. 
51 The World Bank, 'The Contribution of Social Protection to the Millennium Development Goals ' (2003) 3. 
52 See World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, 'A Fair Globalization: Creating 
Opportunities for All ' (International Labour Office, 2004) . 
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Finally, social protection has also been considered a key mechanism by which to 
implement the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs ). 53 
Christian Jacquier et al emphasise the obligations raised in relation to social 
protection: They require all states 'to take appropriate legislative, administrative, 
budgetary, judicial or other measures' to guarantee such protection.54 States ' 
obligations in this regard may be measured through their conduct - have they put 
certain measures in place (for example, insurance), or through outcomes - have 
certain aims been reached. 55 The authors also emphasise that realising social 
protection may have to include 'equity subsidies from the rich to the poor' and 
assistance fro1n the international community. 56 Certainly, the Universal declaration 
leaves little doubt that international cooperation is vital to its implementation. 
There can be no doubt that anthropogenic climate change will increase the need 
for the implementation of many social protection and security measures, including 
insurance, as it increases the risk of many harmful events with consequences for 
individual and community resilience and vulnerability occurring (impacting further 
also upon displacement, as Chapter Two outlined). 57 As was noted in Chapter Two, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has suggested that an 
overall increase in global average temperatures now underway, the result of human-
induced greenhouse gas emissions, will lead to changes in precipitation amount, 
intensity and frequency, to more droughts, floods, heatwaves and storms and to 
53 The World Bank, above n 51 , 3 and Cichon et al, above n 39, 42f. 
54 See Christian Jacquier, Gabrielle Ramm, Philippe Maradent and Valerie Schmitt-Diabate, 'The 
Social Protection Perspective on Microinsurance ' in Craig Churchill (ed), Protecting the Poor: A 
Microinsurance Compendium (Munich Re Foundation, 2006) 45 , 49. 55 Ibid, 50. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Warner et al, above n 4, 6. 
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rising seas. 58 The IPCC has also noted that such events may impact poorer nations 
and their inhabitants more significantly than those better off. 59 A stark example of 
this is that 90 percent of human fatalities resulting from natural disasters occur in 
developing countries. 60 In the face of such stressors, social protection and security 
measures have been implemented in poorly-resourced states, including insurance. 61 
However, external support may be vital to ensure that such measures can be 
implemented more broadly and reach more people. 62 
Nevertheless, although a strong case can be made that vulnerable populations 
must be supported through social protection and security measures, including 
insurance, in the climate change (including displacement) context, and many 
international human rights instruments also seemingly raise this possibility, such 
instruments provide few opportunities to argue that this can be demanded of an actor 
other than an affected person's own state. The International Labour Organization has 
stated that 'resource scarcity does not relieve States of certain minimum obligations 
in respect of the implementation of the right to social security. ' 63 However, the 
resources of many states will increasingly be stretched by the impacts of climate 
change. Viewed as a matter of corrective justice, this is unjust. At a time where 
social security or protection needs will rise, the ability of many states to provide 
58 See Intergovermnental Panel on Climate Change, Frequently Asked Questions: From the Report 
Accepted by Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007) and ch 2 of 
this thesis. 
59 Intergovermnental Panel on Climate Change, 'Synthesis Report ' in Contribution of Working Group 
II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) s 5.2. 
60 International Development Association, 'Managing Natural Hazards, Reducing Risks to 
Develop1nent' (The World Bank, July 2009) 2. 
61 Warner et al, above n 4, 7ff. A variety of schemes are introduced in James Midgley and Mitsuhiko 
Hosaka (eds), Grassroots Social Security in Asia: Mutual Aid, Microinsurance and Social Welfare (Routledge, 2011). 
62 Warner, above n 4, esp 19. 
63 International Labour Organization, 'Extending Social Security to All: A Guide through Challenges 
and Options' (International Labour Office, 2010) 13. 
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either will be detrimentally impacted. As a matter of corrective justice this situation 
should be remedied through the provision of social protection, including through 
insurance, by those who have detrimentally impacted states' own ability to provide 
it. Unfortunately, international human rights law provides very little opportunity to 
build this case. Although international cooperation is mentioned in the social 
security context in the Universal Declaration, it does not create binding legal 
obligations. Achieving corrective justice through insurance in the international 
human right context is therefore highly unlikely. The following chapter will explore 
other avenues. 
4. Insurance in the Climate Change Negotiations Context 
Where the topic of insurance against the detrimental consequences of climate change 
has arisen more expressly is in the context of the international climate change 
negotiations. In fact, it is firmly enshrined in many provisions of the international 
climate change regime. Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC, for example, stipulates that 
based on their co1nrnon but differentiated responsibilities, developed country parties 
consider taking actions that meet the needs of their developing country counter-parts 
in the climate change context, which could include the provision of insurance. 
Article 3 .14 of the Kyoto Protocol similarly requires that Annex I states parties strive 
to minimise the adverse impacts of climate change upon poorer states through the 
establishinent, amongst other measures, of insurance. The Bali Action Plan, which in 
2007 committed UNFCCC states parties to 'enhanced action on adaptation', 
encouraged consideration of ' [ r] isk management and risk reduction strategies, 
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including risk sharing and transfer mechanisms such as insurance' 64 as an adaptive 
strategy. 
Based on such foundations , several concrete proposals have emerged. Generally 
speaking, these can be divided into two categories. Some, in line with the Bali 
Action Plan vision, conceptualise insurance as a risk sharing and response tool and 
therefore as an adaptive response mechanism. Fewer conceptualise insurance also as 
no-fault compensation. Discussion of several prominent proposals will illustrate the 
difference. 
Insurance as a Risk Management or Response and Adaptation Measure 
A 2006 proposal envisioned the establishment of an international Climate Change 
Funding Mechanism ( CCFM) to provide state-level financial support in particular 
for public infrastructure losses resulting from the effects of climate change through a 
system akin to insurance. 65 Participation was to be prioritised for 'less developed 
countries' and a key condition of the scheme was that participation was to be 
dependent upon the implementation of risk reduction measures. Several important 
features crystallised:66 a) only 'public sector assets ' would be covered; b) only 
damage resulting from ' extreme catastrophic events ' would be covered; c) to counter 
moral hazard (risk taking behaviour), 'minimum risk reduction measures ' would 
have to be implemented by each participating state to be eligible for the scheme; d) 
participating states would be responsible for covering premium payments into the 
64 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Revised Draft Decision -/CP.13: 
Ad How Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention: Proposal by the 
President, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/L.7/Rev.1 (14 December 2007) para l (c)(ii); henceforth also 
'Bali Action Plan' . 
65 See Christoph Bals, Koko Warner and Sonja Butzengeiger, ' Insuring the Uninsurable: Design 
Options for a Climate Change Funding Mechanism' (2006) 6 Climate Policy 637. 
66 Ibid, 641 ff. 
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scheme; e) however, the proposal acknowledges that many potential participants 
would a have a 'low' or 'non-existent ' ability to participate on that basis; f) the 
scheme therefore ideally envisioned developed country participation and 
subsidisation; finally, g) participating states could reduce their contributions through 
implementing risk reduction measure, which would be considered in-kind payments. 
The proposal has several innovative features , especially in that it combines risk 
reduction with insurance pa1iicipation. However, since the purpose of this chapter is 
to investigate the role of insurance as co1Tective justice, the proposal is found to be 
lacking from that perspective. 67 Although it encourages international support to help 
poorer countries cover premiums, it does not raise the possibility that high emitting 
nations ( often richer nations) may have the responsibility to cover premiums/pay 
outs because of their contribution to the occurrence, in the first place, of losses and 
damage to be covered by the scheme. The scheme does instead raise the possibility 
that the premium burden on poorer countries could be reduced. However, the basis 
for this would be the implementation of risk reduction measures by policy holding 
states themselves, affordability of which may be an issue in and of itself for many 
poorer nations. 68 Joanne Linneroth-Bayer and Reinhard Mechler note one final issue 
with the stipulated risk and premium reduction measures, one which might have 
consequences in relation to displacement: who is to say that people may not, for 
example, be forced to leave an area targeted for measures that are eligible under the 
scheme' s risk and premium reduction measures?69 In other words, without 
67 The authors do acknowledge that they wish to explore in particular the role insurance could play in 
adaptation; ibid, 63 7. 
68 Joanne Linneroth-Bayer and Reinhard Mechler, ' Insurance for Assisting Adaptation to Cliinate 
Change in Developing Countries: A Proposed Strategy' (2006) 6 Climate Policy 621, 625. 69 Ibid. 
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appropriate oversights, states' efforts to engage in CCFM premium reduction eligible 
measures may well have harmful consequences for some. 
Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler themselves have prominently advocated for a 
two-tier system which would provide both insurance and a mechanism for 
uninsurable climatic disasters. 70 Regarding the first tier, the authors envision that it 
could be operationalized through a single entity or institution or through agreements 
between various stakeholders in public-private partnerships at the local, national or 
global levels. 71 Contributions to the scheme could be financial but also in the form of 
technical expertise. 72 They emphasise that insurance instruments must be affordable, 
especially for 'vulnerable and marginalised communities' , which could be achieved 
through various levels of donor support, for example, premium subsidies and risk 
spreading via reinsurance. 73 The proposal also emphasises that prevention of moral 
hazard (risk taking behaviour) must be an integral component to the scheme (both 
tiers). 74 
A second tier75 would be set up exclusively for losses emanating from uninsured 
or uninsurable disasters. The authors envision that the financial inputs for this tier 
would originate from developed countries. Because the second tier is about 
responding to losses in the context of disasters, the proposal argues that 'pre-
negotiated terms' should foster a rapid response where a disaster has occurred. 
Innovative features of this proposal include that it accounts for the possibility 
that there are some potential losses in the climate change context that may not be 
insurable but which can nevertheless not be ignored. However, from a corrective 
70 Ibid, 625ff. 
71 Ibid, 626. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid, 631 f. 
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justice perspective, this proposal is once again lacking: it suggests an insurance 
scheme that does not address insurance's potential as no-fault compensation. Rather, 
it suggests a scheme that operates much like aid does today. It encourages the 
international community, especially wealthier countries, to consider their role in 
implementing a system that is altogether more affordable and efficient. However, it 
does not ultimately make those who contribute to climate change harms through 
emissions responsible, in some way, for loss recovery through insurance. 
An Example 
The kind of international insurance schemes outlined in climate change insurance 
proposals, including the ones just reviewed, are founded in more than theory. 
Already, inter-country insurance schemes that cover at least severe natural disasters 
exist, funded and operated, to a large degree, with the assistance of international aid 
and financial institutions. The World Bank, for example, has been a driving force 
behind the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF), established in 
2007. The area is subject to frequent and severe natural disasters. Fifteen significant 
storms occurred in the area in 2004, for example, including Hurricane Ivan, which 
caused significant damage in many regional countries (USD 800 million in Grenada 
alone). 76 Dealing with such impacts is difficult for each individual island nation and 
there had been little access to disaster insurance until the involvement of the World 
Bank. 77 The scheme developed by the Bank is based on the idea of inter-country risk 
pooling, which keeps premiums relatively low. Both country members and donor 
76 Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, 'Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance 
Facility (CCRIF): Pooling Risk to Protect Against Natural Disasters ' (2011) 1. 
77 Ibid and Francis Ghesquierre et al, 'Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility: A Solution to 
the Short-Term Liquidity Needs of Small Island States in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters' (The 
World Bank, 2003) 1. 
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contributions have funded it and it is partially linked to financial and insurance 
markets, for example through re-insurance. 78 Each country contributes in accordance 
with a risk profile that has been established for it and compensation pay outs are 
triggered when certain pre-determined thresholds ( e.g. intensity of a storm) are 
reached. 79 The scheme has largely been hailed a success: several pay outs totalling 
millions of dollars have been made since the scheme was established in 2007, 80 
though it is important to note that it covers only the initial post-disaster needs that 
states have and not all losses. 81 
Insurance as Compensation: A OSIS Proposals 
It was the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), many of whose members 
anticipate to be impacted also by displacement in the climate change context, which 
suggested an international insurance scheme ( or 'pool') in the early 1990s, that was 
founded in the notion of insurance as compensation. In particular, -it made wealthier, 
high-emitting countries ( as a whole) responsible for mandatory compensation of sea-
level rise-associated losses in low-lying nations in the climate change context. 82 The 
pool, to be set up under the auspices of the UNFCCC, was to compensate: 
(i) in situations where selecting the least cli1nate sensitive development option 
involves incurring additional expense and 
(ii) where insurance is not available for damage resulting from cli1nate change.83 
There was to be a formal administering body which would collect contributions and 
administer payouts. 
78 Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery, above n 76, 1. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid and Ghesquierre et al, above n 77. 
82 Intergovermnental Negotiating Committee, 'International Insurance Pool ', UNFCCC, 2nd Sess, UN 
Doc Al AC.237/Misc.l/Add3 (18 June 1991); also Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler, above n 68, 623f. 83 Intergovermnental Negotiating Committee, above n 82. 
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This proposal, for the first time, suggests that insurance in the climate change 
context is not only about adaptation and risk management, response or pooling but 
also about compensation and therefore corrective justice. Contributions to fund the 
scheme, importantly, are not envisioned to be made by affected countries but by 
those who, overall, have contributed most to global warming and with it an increase 
in the necessity for addressing harm, loss and damage. And they are envisioned to be 
mandatory. However, the proposal also presents several obstacles - both practically 
and morally: Practically, the valuation of property and other processes envisioned by 
the scheme may prove costly and time-consuming. 84 Morally, it is never made quite 
explicit why the proposal suggested a financial compensation mechanism for only 
one type of loss driver - sea-level rise, or for one geo-political entity - small island 
and low-lying states. 
Dealing with some of these shortcomings, AOSIS has since expanded its vision 
for no-fault compensation in the climate change context, including through 
insurance. Its 2008 Multi-Window Mechanism to Address Loss and Damage from 
Climate Change consists of the following three components: 85 First, insurance is to 
counter the particular financial exposures emanating from climate change harms in 
all vulnerable countries, including small island developing states (SIDS). AOSIS 
thereby acknowledges that insurance must indeed cover the losses not only of one 
subset of vulnerable countries or one type of loss driver. Secondly, a rehabilitation/ 
compensation component would address negative impacts of climate change that are 
progressive and slow-onset, including sea-level rise and ocean acidification, and 
which may not be insurable but which must be compensated for. A third component, 
84 For 1nore, see also Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler, above n 68, 624. 
85 See Alliance of Small Island States, Proposal to the AWG-LCA: Multi-Window Mechanism to 
Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts, UN Doc A/AC.237/15 (6 December 2008) 
lf; henceforth also 'Multi-Window Mechanism'. 
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risk management, was to facilitate both risk management and risk assessment and 
was to feed into the other two components. 
Importantly, the Multi-Window Mechanism stipulates that funding must 
collectively come from Annex I parties to the UNFCCC, with respective levels of 
contribution tied to emissions and ability to pay. 86 It outlines how the responsibility 
for such funding is supported by a number of international obligations, including 
state responsibility, common but differentiated responsibilities and the polluter pays 
principle. 87 In the spirit of no-fault compensation and 'rough' corrective justice, 
funding the scheme does not arise for one particular entity which is specifically 
liable but collectively for all those who can be argued to have contributed to climate 
change and its effects in significant \Vays. The Mechanism is envisioned to be 
situated under the umbrella of the UNFCCC, with various sub-entities providing 
administrative and technical support. 88 
Work Programme on Loss and Damage 
AO SIS' s has continued to advocate its Multi-Window Mechanism, though it has not 
been implemented. However, developments conce1ning the possibility of no-fault 
compensation or 'rough' corrective justice in the ongoing climate change 
negotiations are worth considering for their con·ective justice potential: 89 As has 
been mentioned, the Bali Action Plan had deservingly elevated climate change 
86 Ibid, 3. Although note that AO SIS also suggests that funding comes from 'additional contributions ' 
and other 'sources'; Ibid. 
87 Ibid. The relevance of the first and third to compensation in the climate change context were 
discussed in the previous chapter; common and differentiated responsibilities will be analysed in the 
context of distributive justice and international law in the following chapter. 
88 Ibid, 4. 
89 See also Roda Verheyen, 'Tackling Loss and Dam~ge: A New Role for the Climate Regime?' 
(Germanwatch, 2012) 4 and see also Ilona Millar, Catherine Cascoigne and Elizabeth Caldwell, 
'Making Good the Loss: An Assessment of the Loss and Damage Mechanism under the UNFCCC 
Process ' in Michael B Gerrard and Gregory E Wannier (eds), Threatened Island Nations: Legal 
Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing World (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 433. 
188 
CHAPTER SIX NO-FAULT CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
adaptation to a more prominent place within the international climate change 
negotiations, joining mitigation as an important task for enhanced international 
action. However, in recent years, a third possibility has been raised, by AOSIS and 
many other particularly vulnerable countries - that climate change abatement activity 
is insufficient, that adaptation is not a panacea to deal with all potential detrimental 
consequences of climate change and that therefore due consideration must be given 
also to a loss and damage mechanism by which adaptation-resistant losses and 
damage can be recovered (without having resort to an international court or 
tribunal).90 A first significant expression of the concept of 'loss and damage' in the 
international negotiations emerged with the Cancun Agreement in 2010 which 
acknowledged, at least, 
the need to strengthen international cooperation and expertise in order to understand 
and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, 
including impacts related to extreme weather events and slow onset events.91 
It further listed the following 'events' as possibly leading to loss -.and damage: sea-
level rise, increasing temperatures, ocean acidification, glacial retreat and related 
impacts, salinization, land and forest degradation, loss of biodiversity and 
desertification.92 More particularly, it was agreed to 
establish a work prograinme in order to consider, including through workshops and 
expert 1neetings, as appropriate, approaches to address loss and damage associated 
with cli1nate change i1npacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to 
the adverse effects of climate change.93 
In Durban in 2011, the Conference of the Parties then stipulated more concretely that 
it 
90 See Verheyen, above n 89, 3. 
9 1 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010 - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Sixteenth Session, UN Doc, FCCC/CP/20 I 0/7 /Add.I (I 5 
March 201 I) 6, para 25. Though note that the Multi-Window Mechanism also expressly mentions 
'loss and damage', as does the Bali Action Plan. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid, para 26. 
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[ a ]ppreciates the need to explore a range of possible approaches and potential 
mechanis1ns, including an international mechanis1n, to address loss and damage, with 
a view to making recommendations on loss and damage to the Conference of the 
Parties for its consideration at its eighteenth session [ ... ] .94 
A 'work programme' to develop possible recommendations soon emerged, framed 
around three areas of enquiry: 
1. The1natic Area 1: Assessing the risk of loss and dainage associated with the 
adverse effects of climate change and the current knowledge on the same; 
2. Thematic Area 2: A range of approaches to address loss and damage associated 
with the adverse effects of climate change, including impacts related to extreme 
weather events and slow onset events, taking into consideration experience at all 
levels; 
3. Thematic Area 3: The role of the Convention in enhancing the implementation of 
approaches to address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of 
climate change.95 
Roda Verheyen notes that although several international and regional activities and 
discussions were quickly planned around areas one and two, this was not the case for 
area three, although it has been the subject of submissions by various stakeholders. 96 
Perhaps predictably, trying to progress the loss and damage 'cause' has not been 
easy. Many developed countries, in particular, have resisted its further progression in 
the international climate change negotiatjons. What is not lost upon them is that the 
language of loss and damage may 'ultimately [be] about liability and potentially 
compensation as well' .97 Ed Davey, the UK's Secretary of State for Energy and 
Clin1ate Change has warned in this context that '[w]e should be cautious about 
saying we are strictly liable for some particular event or some particular change, but 
that does not mean we shouldn't work with others to try to help some of the poorest 
94 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on its Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011 - Part Two: 
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2011 /9/Add.2 (15 March 2012) 6, 
para 5. 
95 Ibid, 6f. 
96 Verheyen, above n 89, 4. 
97 Saleemul Huq, quoted in Megan Rowling, 'Countries Clash over Loss and Damage at UN Climate 
Talks', AlertNet ( online ), 4 December 2012 <http: //www.trust.org/alertnet/news/countries-clash-over-
loss-and-damage-at-un-climate-talks>. 
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people in our world adapt to the impact of climate change. ' 98 In other words, there 
are efforts underway to de-emphasise the compensatory, corrective potential of a 
prospective loss and damage mechanism and to keep it on the negotiation agenda as 
an issue of adaptation (even charity - 'help'). In Doha, in late 2012, the COP 
nevertheless agreed to 'undertake activities' that would 'explor[ e] possible 
institutional arrangements, such as an international mechanism [ . .. ] to address loss 
and damage associated with the impacts of climate change'. 99 And yet, many issues 
will need clarification: where financial resources for a potential international 
mechanism would come from (for corrective justice purposes, they would have to be 
tied in some 'rough' way to emissions), on what basis they would be sourced and 
whether they should be 'additional' to current aid. 100 The establishment of a 
compensatory mechanism, including no-fault insurance, 101 under the UNFCCC 
umbrella therefore remains uncertain, though not off-the-agenda. 
5. Microinsurance and Climate Change-Related Compensation 
International insurance proposals have made great strides in developing insurance as 
a possible response model for the detrimental impacts of climate change. They have 
con1bined pay outs with risk reduction measures, insurable losses with uninsurable 
losses and, certainly in the case of AOSIS, conceptualised insurance also as a 
98 Ed Davey, quoted in Rowling, ibid [italics by thesis author]. 
99 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Approaches to Address Loss and 
Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts in Developing Countries that are Particularly 
Vulnerable to the Adverse Effects of Climate Change to Enhance Adaptive Capacity, UN Doc 
FCCC/CP/2012/L.4/Rev. l (8 December 2012) 5, para 12a. 
100 See, eg, Sam Bickersteth, Mairi Dupar and Dan Hamza-Goodacre, Opinion: Doha Talks Highlight 
Loss and Damage - And Leave Much Work Ahead (13 December 2012) <http: //cdkn.org/2012/12/ 
opinion-doha-talks/>. 
101 In the context of the work programme on loss and damage AOSIS 's Multi-Window Mechanism 
remains impmiant and is debated, so insurance is part of that agenda; see Verheyen, above n 89, 4. 
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potential compensatory mechanism in the climate change context. A further matter 
which warrants attention is the possible role of micro-insurance, which covers small, 
personal asset losses, rather than the public losses sometimes emphasised in climate 
change-related insurance proposals. This is important in the displacement context, as 
it might well be small, personal losses that precede displacement and not only those 
related to damage to public assets. The importance of microinsurance and similar 
financial mechanisms to a 'rough' corrective justice will therefore be analysed in the 
following sub-sections. 
What is Micro insurance? 
In his comprehensive study of microinsurance, Craig Churchill outlines its purposes, 
goals and general mechanisms: 102 Microinsurance provides a more formal way for 
low-income people and those making their livelihood informally to provide 
protection in relation to a variety of risk factors. As is the case with other types of 
insurance, a premium is usually paid (in this case a small one), in return for which 
there is some certainty to recoup losses when certain events have occurred. What is 
'micro' , in other words, are contributions to insurance and not necessarily the 
potential risks facing contributors. 103 Some microinsurance schemes are 
implemented in the context of ' social protection' , as outlined above, others are set up 
as profit-seeking, commercial enterprises. 104 At times, the public and private sector 
co-operate to establish microinsurance programmes. Churchill notes, for example, a 
102 Craig Churchill provides these introductory pointers in Craig Churchill, 'What is Insurance for the 
Poor? ' in Churchill, above n 54, 12, 13ff. 
103 Ibid, 13. 
104 Ibid, 15. S01ne deal with 'unbanked' customers, those without any access to the banking sector or 
banks accounts, etc. See, eg, 'Finally, Micro-insurance Takes off in Nigeria', This Day Live ( online ), 
27 November 2013 <http ://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/finally-micro-insurance-takes-off-in-nige 
ria/165284/>. 
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partnership between German · insurer Allianz, the United Nations Development 
Programme and the German Gesellschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (a major 
aid organisation), who came together to offer a microinsurance scheme in both India 
and Indonesia. 105 Many other channels to deliver microinsurance exist and access to 
microinsurance is growing: Thomas Laster and Dirk Reinhard note, for example, 
that access to microinsurance policies grew by eighty percent in the span of just a 
few years up to 2009 in Africa. 106 They further note that such policies, importantly, 
already cover risks that will also grow with climate change. 107 The next section will 
analyse in greater detail a number of the more prominent microinsurance schemes 
around the world, paying particular attention to their relevance in the climate change 
compensation context. 
Targeting Specific Climatic Events, Developing Triggers, Preventing Moral Hazard 
A first scheme to note is one implemented in Malawi in 2005, which is important for 
three reasons: first, it targets compensation for losses related to a specific type of 
clin1atic event also known to be exacerbated with climate change - drought; 
secondly it targets compensation for losses in relation to a slow-onset climatic event, 
and not sudden disasters, so often contemplated in the climate insurance literature; 
thirdly, it accounts for the possibility of moral hazard (risk taking behaviour) and has 
found ways to operationalize a scheme where this would be minimised. In particular, 
the scheme targets groundnut farmers subject to repeated, sometimes severe drought. 
It is operated in public private partnership, with a local farming cooperative, the 
105 Ibid, 13. 
106 Thomas Loster and Dirk Reinhard, 'Microinsurance and Climate Change' in Emanuela Morelli, 
Giorgio A Onnis, Walter J Ammann and Corina Sumer (eds), Microinsurance: An Innovative Tool for 
Risk and Disaster Management (Global Risk Forum Davos, 2010) 39, 39. 
107 Ibid, 40. 
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World Bank and international aid organisations all having cooperated in its 
establishment and implementation. Essentially, a system was set up whereby farmers 
paid a small insurance premium on top of loans for farming-related activities, which 
would lead to rapid compensation payments ( on loans) when precipitation levels 
were registered below a certain threshold. 108 Farmers are thereby protected from 
defaulting upon loans and have more certainty to be eligible for loans, and therefore 
continued farming, again in future. However, with no-fault insurance schemes such 
as the one in Malawi, moral hazard is sometimes cited as an issue. 109 According to 
Howell et al: 'The principal weakness of no-fault schemes is the difficulty of 
ensuring that the [ ... ] optimal amount of care is taken by potential loss-causers, as 
the links between their potential to cause loss and the costs of their actions are 
severed.' 110 In other words, it is feared that insurance ( and the assumed certainty of 
compensation) incentivises risk-taking behaviour (i.e. poor farming practices) that 
would otherwise not have been taken. However, the Malawi scheme was able to 
counter this possibility by making the trigger for compensation not what has 
happened on a particular farm but the reaching of a certain, pre-determined 
(precipitation) threshold measured objectively at regional weather stations. 111 The 
scheme provides a first opportunity to think about how compensation in the form of 
micro insurance n1ight make a difference to those detrimentally affected by climate 
change and a first opportunity to think about how climate change-related losses 
could be compensated at the microinsurance level, that is through contributions to 
108 For more see, eg, Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler, above n 68, 628 and Ulrich Hess and Joanna 
Syroka, 'Weather-based Insurance in Southern Africa: The Case of Malawi ' (Agriculture and Rural 
Development Discussion Paper No 13, The World Bank, 2005). 
109 Eg, Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler, above n 68, 628 and Daniel Clarke and Dermot Grenham, 
'Micro insurance and Clilnatic-Related Disasters: Challenges and Options' (Foresight, 2011). 110 Brownwyn Howell, Judy Kavanagh and Lisa Mariott, 'No-Fault Public Liability Insurance: 
Evidence from New Zealand' (2002) 9 Agenda 135, 137. 
111 Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler, above n 68, 628. 
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insurance premiums that protect individuals and communities from the full brunt of 
such losses. 
Compensation through Risk Absorption 
Although not strictly 'micro ' and not necessarily concerning climatic risks, another 
insurance scheme evidences that sometimes only external contributions make such 
schemes viable: Much of Turkey is prone to earthquakes, yet assets had historically 
been largely unprotected by insurance. 112 Following significant damage and major 
losses in relation to several earthquakes in the late 1990, the government 
implemented the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP), through which 
earthquake insurance became mandatory for many residential property owners who 
contribute to the scheme in accordance ,vith their particular risk profile. 113 However, 
importantly, the scheme . only became feasible when the World Bank agreed to 
absorb a portion of the earthquake risk prevalent in Turkey, committing itself to 
injecting the TCIP with capital in instances where it could not alone meet its 
obligations. 114 Risk absorption therefore provides another financial channel to make 
contributions to micro insurance ( and other types of insurance; for that matter) in the 
climate change context, in addition to contributions to premium payments. 
Compensation through Technical Contributions 
Microinsurance schemes, like other types of insurance, depend upon the 
establishment of thresholds that trigger pay outs ( also to avoid the aforementioned 
moral hazard issue). Here, a third opportunity for contributions by those who should 
112 Selamat Yazici, The Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (TCIP) and the Compulsory Earthquake 
Insurance Scheme (2003), 1 <http: //info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/114 715/istanbul 03/docs/ 
istanbul03/1 lyazici3n%5Bl %5D.pdf> . 
113 Ibid and Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler, above n 68, 629. 
114 Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler, above n 68, 629. 
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contribute to no-fault compensation in the climate change context arises - technical 
contributions, rather. than financial inputs towards premiums or risk absorption. 
Warner et al outline how in Kenya's Marsabit district it was a lack of local data 
which seemingly prevented triggers, and therefore microinsurance, from being 
established for livestock-related losses. 115 However, eventually usable data was 
developed with external assistance and an insurance scheme for livestock farmers 
was put in place. What this means is that not only funding insurance (premiums, pay 
outs) itself may be vital when thinking about how compensation for climate change 
harm or damage might be affected but also providing technical expertise, including 
the development of relevant data and compensation thresholds which would allow 
insurance to be set up in the first place. 116 
Compensation through Contributions to Risk Reduction 
The importance of combining risk reduction measures with insur-ance has already 
been noted. 117 It has also been noted that taking such measures may be difficult ( e.g. 
unaffordable) for affected individuals, communities or states. Implementation of risk 
reduction measures must therefore also be part of any compensatory insurance 
mechanism set up in relation to climate change. One scheme in the Hom of Africa 
has already successfully combined risk reduction with insurance. The scheme, 118 
called the Horn of Africa Risk Transfer for Adaptation (HARITA), was created by 
Oxfa1n in partnership with other private and public actors. It provides threshold-
115 Koko Warner et al, ' Solutions for Vulnerable Countries and People: Designing and Implementing 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Insurance for Adaptation' (Policy Brief, Munich Climate Change 
Initiative, 2010) 17. 
116 See Eugene Gurenko [Senior Insurance Officer at the World Bank/IFC Insurance and Contractual 
Savings Unit] in Warner et al, above n 115, 18. 
117 See, eg, Bals et al, above n 65. 
118 See Oxfam America, Weather Insurance (2013) <http ://www.ox famamerica.org/issues/private-
sector-engagement/weather-insurance> and Warner et al, above n 115, 7. 
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based micro-insurance to poor farmers in drought-prone Ethiopia. But importantly, it 
also puts risk reduction at the heart of the scheme, through farming education, water 
conservation and storage efforts, and erosion control, thereby building community 
resilience in addition to making available basic compensation for farming-related 
losses. 119 
Compensation through Contributions from Public-Private Partnerships 
Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler introduce a microinsurance scheme120 which 
evidences some of the potential benefits of public-private partnerships that could be 
incorporated into an international climate change insurance scheme: The scheme 
operates in India's Andhra Pradesh region, subject to frequent natural disasters, the 
displacement consequences of which have been noted elsewhere. 121 Microinsurance 
here targets women and covers life and property risks. 122 Importantly, the scheme 
exists because of the participation of both private and public actors~-on the one hand, 
private insurance companies in India have statutory obligations to also cover low-
income market segments. In fact, they are 'motivated [ ... ] to actively pursue 
business with the poor' . 123 On the oth~r hand, the microinsurance scheme in Andhra 
Pradesh was co-financed by Oxfam, which, at least initially, covered half the cost of 
premiums.124 This is important for thinking about an international climate change 
compensation/insurance sche1ne in two ways: first, as has been noted before, 
contributions to co1npensation could simply be about covering premiums. Secondly, 
119 Oxfam America, above n 118. 
120 Linneroth-Bayer and Melcher, above n 68, 628f. Also in Linneroth-Bayer et al, 'Insurance, 
Developing Countries and Clin1ate Change' (2009) 34 Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance 381. 
12 1 See Oxfam India, Climate Change Affecting Fisher Folk in Coastal Andhra Pradesh <http ://oxfam 
india. wordpress. cmn/hmnan-impact/ climate-change-effecting-fisher- fo lk-in-coastal-andhrapradesh/>. 
122 Linneroth-Bayer and Melcher, above n 68, 628. 
123 Ibid, 629. 
124 Ibid. 
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however, if contributing states are concerned about the financial exposure this 
presents, some of their responsibilities could be diverted to private insurance 
markets, as is the case in India. Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler argue that insurance 
companies there 'appear willing to incur a loss on their micro insurance business in 
order to [keep their] access to the broader market. ' 125 
Microinsurance and Compensation 
Microinsurance will undoubtedly have to be an important component of an 
international climate change insurance scheme. In relation to displacement, it targets 
the very assets (property, livelihoods, etc.) that might matter in migration decisions 
(the following section will elaborate this in greater detail). Already, many 
microinsurance schemes compensate for losses incurred in relation to climatic 
factors that will be exacerbated with climate change. Many such schemes are 
currently supported by international aid. However, as a matter of -corrective justice, 
such schemes should be implemented as no-fault compensation for the benefit of 
those who suffer climate change's consequences and by those who contribute to 
climate change and its effects above certain thresholds. There are many ways by 
which contributors could partake: covering premiums, absorbing risk, providing 
technical advice, implementing risk reduction measures, implementing risk pooling 
and developing public-private partnerships. Some of these measures could also go a 
long way to n1inimise the financial exposure to contributors. More importantly, such 
contributions would significantly decrease the detrimental impacts of climate change 
upon those who do not have the resources to counter such impacts independently. 
125 Ibid, 628f. 
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How this might matter in the displacement context will be the subject of analysis in 
the following section. 
6. Insurance, Compensation and Displacement 
Insurance, Compensation and Displacement 
Migration is sometimes highlighted as a risk or threat management strategy; it is 
'informal insurance' in and of itself. 126 That is not to say', however, that climate 
change presents no need to further think about formalised strategies or tools, 
including insurance, for those who have to move, or those who would like to stay 
even in the face of climate change impacts. In fact, as the following sections will 
argue, there is great scope for insurance to counter many different aspects of 
mobility - it could foster prevention of movement where this is desired, better 
coping when mobility occurs or, indeed, return. If conceived as no-fault 
compensation, it would have the additional benefit of affecting corrective justice in 
the context of mobility and thereby addressing the justice issues inherent to 
displacement in the climate change context. The various benefits of insurance to 
climate change-related people movement will now be discussed. 
Deterrence, Mitigation and Prevention 
First and fore1nost, at least in theory, a compensatory mechanism akin to insurance 
could have a deterrent and preventative function: if set up with the notion of 
correction through co1npensation at its heart, contributions to an insurance 
126 See, eg, Jennifer Powers, Barbara Magnani and Emily Zimmerman, 'Fonnalizing the Informal 
Insurance Inherent in Migration: Exploring the Potential Links Between Migration, Remittances and 
Micro insurance ' (The International Labour Office, March 2011) vi and Barbara Magnani, Annette 
Lovoi, Julia Brown and Rebecca Thornton, 'Risks Across Borders: A Study of the Potential of 
Microinsurance Products to Help Migrants Cope with Cross Border Risks ' (Inter-American 
Development Bank, September 2010) 2. 
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mechanism would come from those who contribute to climate change, certainly 
above certain thresholds ( e.g. what are currently Annex 1 countries, as suggested in 
the AOSIS proposal). Where contributions are tied to levels of emissions in some 
way, and with it contributions to risk generation, mitigation is, arguably, incentivised 
in order to keep contributions low. 127 Mitigation, on the other hand, is important in 
relation to displacement in the sense that, at least bluntly speaking, it supports the 
possible prevention of impacts that contribute to displacement. The more abatement 
measures are incentivised for those who emit greenhouse gases excessively, in other 
words, the more positive the impact upon preventing people having to move. 
Avoidance 
Of course, insurance could have a more direct impact on displacement. Earlier in the 
chapter it was noted that, according to the IPCC, anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
emissions will lead to changes in precipitation amount, intensity -and frequency, to 
more droughts, floods , heatwaves and storms and to rising seas. Elsewhere, 128 the 
thesis has also noted that there is at least some agreement that the greater occurrence 
of climatic extremes could contribute to increased human mobility. Finally, the fact 
that the impacts of climate change will be felt particularly in poorly-resourced areas 
and nations has been highlighted several times. However, compensation through 
insurance 1night help prevent people movement where this is desired. To illustrate 
how this works in practice, the following study is illuminating: Morsink et al studied 
the impacts of microinsurance upon poor households in typhoon-affected areas of the 
127 See also Penz, above n 6, 169. 
128 Ch 2 of this thesis. 
200 
CHAPTER SIX NO-FAULT CORRECTIVE WSTICE 
Philippines. 129 In particular, the study authors investigated the impact of 
microinsurance upon a variety of coping strategies normally available to poorer 
people in the aftermath of a natural disaster, such as typhoons, amongst which they 
list 'outmigration', which they class as a 'high-stress coping strategy' .130 What the 
authors found was that microinsurance undeniably 'decreas[es] the chance that 
households have to employ stressful coping strategies after a shock' and that it 
reduces post-disaster impoverishment. 131 In other words, microinsurance can prevent 
poverty and enable people to simply move on with their lives without stressful 
disruption. The same would undeniably be true where insurance payouts cover major 
public infrastructure losses; where these are recuperated quickly and damage is 
reversed, destitution and thereby possible outmigration may not have to occur, or be 
only very temporary. An insurance scheme therefore may not only deter emitters 
from creating the conditions that impact negatively upon the likelihood of 
displacement in the first place, but importantly also minimise the effect of those 
impacts where they do arise. 
Coping 
Insurance may also play a part when movement becomes unavoidable. As was noted 
above, people movement can be about countering and managing risks or threats. 132 
129 Karlijn Morsink, Peter Deurts and Annemarije Kooijman-van Dijk, ' Impact of Micro Insurance on 
Vulnerability of Low Income Households in the Philippines: The Case of Typhoon Re-housing 
Insurance ' (Paper Presented at the Second European Research Conference on Microfinance, 17 June 
2011 , Groningen, Netherlands). 
130 Ibid, 10. 
13 1 Ibid, 28. 
132 The iinportant role of remittances is often highlighted. See, eg, Catalina A1nuedo-Dorantes and 
Susan Pozo, 'Remittances as Insurance: Evidence from Mexican Migrants ' (2006) 19 Journal of 
Population Economics 227. In the climate change context, see also, eg, Fanny Thornton, 'Regional 
Labour Migration as Adaptation to Climate Change: Options in the Pacific' (2009) in Michelle 
Leighton, Xiaomeng Chen and Koko Warner (eds), Climate Change and Migration: Rethinking 
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Undoubtedly, however, risks also increase when people move: social safety nets may 
have disappeared, families broken up, financial reserves might be stretched, living 
conditions may be poor, employment unavailable, even though employment may 
have been the impetus to move in the first place, and rights protection limited. 133 
Worse, a landmark report on Migration and Global Environmental Change 
highlighted the possibility of those migrating in response to, or displaced by, 
climatic events moving from vulnerable to even more vulnerable places. 134 Insurance 
therefore might also have to counter some of the risks that arise from moving itself, 
or as part of the migration/displacee experience. 135 Some migration-linked 
microinsurance schemes already seek to do so. 136 For example, 137 SeguraCaixa, 
affiliated with major Spanish insurer La Caixa, has successfully offered an 
affordable (premiums start at Euro 6 per month) insurance scheme to migrants since 
2008. Sixty-six thousand documented migrants, the majority from Africa and Latin 
America, are covered under a policy which pays up to Euro 30,000 to beneficiaries 
where a migrant has died, as well as some repatriation-related expenses. A similar 
scheme, managed by Spanish Seguringreso, covers fourteen thousand migrants and 
pays an instant Euro 6,000 when a migrant has died, as well as continuous monthly 
payments for a specified amount of time. In El Salvador, a local insurer also provides 
migrant-linked insurance which covers repatriation and loss of remittances following 
Policies for Adaptation and Disaster Risk Reduction (United Nations University, Institute for 
Environment and Human Security, 2011) 81. 
133 See, eg, Powers et al, above n 126, vi and 16 and Magnoni et al, above n 126, 2. 
134 Foresight, 'Migration and Global Enviromnental Change: Final Report (Government Science 
Office, UK, 2011). 
135 Also Powers et al, above n 16, vi. 
136 Powers et al, above n 126 and Magnoni et al, above n 126 outline many of these. 
137 The following two are outlined by Powers et al, above n 126, 12. 
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a policy holder's death. 138 In Indonesia statutory obligations mean that migrant 
placement agencies must provide clients with broad insurance, which must cover 
'death, disability, medical expenses, unpaid wages, deportation and physical 
abuse.' 139 
These schemes, few as they are, are very innovative. However, applying them to 
the climate change displacement context raises challenges. 14° First and foremost, 
they cover only one type of migrant: a labour migrant who moves overseas for 
employment purposes. This will hardly be the only type of migrant generated by 
climate change. Secondly, because such schemes operate across borders, and not 
only in domestic settings, they face a host of challenging regulatory and legal 
issues. 141 It is for these reasons that only a broader, perhaps globally-managed 
insurance mechanism could tackle the specific needs of those migrating in response 
to, or displaced by, climate change's detrimental effects. Certainly, existing schemes 
would have to be adapted significantly to suit requirements and priorities which may 
arise in the climate change context. 
Return 
A final area worth contemplating is the role of insurance in facilitating the return of 
migrants or displacees. As was mentioned in Chapter Two, not all climate change 
impacts are such that return is out of the question following displacement. 
Undoubtedly, an interstate-focused insurance scheme could assist authorities in re-
building effo1is following natural disasters, which may encourage return migration. 
138 See International Labour Organisation, The Win-Win Potential of Microinsurance for Migrants 
(2013) <http: //www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/comment-analysis/WCMS _ l 9 l 992/lang--
en/index.htm>. 
139 Ibid. 
140 See Powers et al, above n 126, 26ff. 
141 Ibid, 26. 
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An interesting possibility is also raised in relation to microinsurance and personal 
asset or livelihood protection: 142 as is the case in many poorer parts of the world, 
microinsurance schemes operate also in parts of Kenya, where farmers are 
compensated for farming-related losses resulting from climatic events ( especially 
drought) through an initiative that operates in public/private partnership. Not only is 
this creating certainty for those who farm, thereby possibly impacting on migration 
push factors , but it is also reported that the certainty thus created encourages those 
who have already left to return. 143 Whereas rural-to-urban push factors , related to 
both climatic and other causes, exist in Kenya as they do elsewhere, leaving many 
with little choice but to lead an uncertain existence in the city, the possibility of 
easing farming-related uncertainties through insurance and compensation has meant 
that some have been able to return both to rural life and to a less-precarious 
· 144 existence. 
Final Words 
Insurance 1nay be of direct benefit in the climate change displacement context. It 
could prevent displacement where this is desired, enable movement that is better 
suppo1ied where it takes place, or help those who want to return. Peter Penz has 
argued that insurance-based compensation should also suppo1i hosting communities 
(and states) that shelter migrants or displacees. 145 The refugee literature, certainly, 
supports the sometimes detrimental impacts displaced persons and the camps that 
142 See Kagondu Njagi, 'Kenya' s Urban Poor Feel the Rural Pull as Insurance Makes Farming 
Viable ', AlertNet ( online ), 5 March 2013 <http: //www.trust.org/alertnet/news/kenyas-urban-poor-
feel-the-rural-pull-as-insurance-helps-makes-farming-viable/>. 
143 Ibid. 
144 Ibid. 
14s b f Penz, a oven 6, 170 . 
204 
CHAPTER SIX NO-FAULT CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
house them have on host communities and their environment. 146 Such communities 
must also be supported ( compensated). 
However, it is one thing to say that insurance-based compensation has the 
potential to impact positively in relation to displacement; it is another to ensure that 
it operates correctively, whereby those who play at least a part in increasing risk 
factors with potential displacement consequences are responsible for contributions to 
compensation where risks have turned into actual losses or damage. A final section 
will now consider opportunities to operationalize insurance internationally as a 
compensatory mechanism. 
7. Factors in Operationalizing No-Fault Compensation through Insurance 
Climate change will lead to substantial worldwide damage and losses in future, 
according to a 2012 study totalling USD 1.2 trillion per year. 147 Single climatic 
events, such as Hurricane Sandy, which wreaked havoc (and also compelled 
displacement, at least temporarily) along the United States ' Eastern Seaboard (and 
elsewhere in the region) in 2012, are known to generate significant damage already -
in the case of Sandy, USD 50 billion worth in the US alone. 148 Insurance must 
( does/will) , undoubtedly, play a role in recovering at least some of the losses thus 
created. AOSIS, in particular, has argued that a loss recovery mechanism must also 
urgently be set up internationally and as a matter of compensation. The current 
146 See, eg, Jean-Francois Maystadt and Philip Verwimp, 'Winners and Losers Amongst a Refugee-
Hosting Population' (Discussion Paper No 2009/34, International Association for Research and 
Teaching (ECORE), 2009). 
147 See Climate Vulnerable Forum, 'Climate Vulnerability Monitor: A Guide to the Cold Calculus of a 
Hot Planet' (2012) 17. 
148 Paul Cox, 'World Faces Mounting Damage fr01n Disasters ', AlJazeera (online), 02 June 2013 
<http: //www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/05/20135278951818557 .html>. 
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section will tease out the different key elements that must be integrated or considered 
in such a mechanism: 
Facility 
Naturally, there must be some kind of body or facility which could administer an 
insurance mechanism. Several different options have been proposed: Linneroth-
Bayer and Mechler have argued that either a stand-alone facility could emerge or 
that operationalization of insurance is affected through already existing actors 
(private, public and/or non-governmental, national and international), possibly in 
partnerships. 149 A similar proposal is made by Bals et al. 150 AO SIS' s Multi-Window 
Mechanism would create an integrated three-part system: a) a technical facility, 
which could establish, for example, payout thresholds and advise countries on their 
risk management and compensation options; b) a financial facility, which would 
collect, manage and pay out funds; and c) an administrative body-( operating under 
the auspices of the UNFCCC Secretariat), which would provide oversight and 
general administrative support. 151 Peter Hoppe has also outlined the particular role 
that could be played by an international insurance facility; for example, to collect 
and manage premiums, negotiate reinsurance, and assess and facilitate potential 
payouts. 152 He suggests, however, that risk itself should not, ultimately, be borne by 
such an entity but be diverted to financial and insurance markets. 153 
Source of Funds 
149 Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler, above n 68, 626. 
150 Bals et al, above n 65, 6. 
151 See Alliance of S1nall Island States, above n 85, 4. 
152 Peter Hoppe, ' Climate Risk Insurance: Suggestions for Compensation-Based Climate Risk 
Insurance' (Presentation at the Climate Risk Insurance Side Event, Bonn, 11 June 2008) slide 5. 
153 Ibid. 
206 
CHAPTER SIX NO-FAULT CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 
As was outlined before, many international climate change insurance proposals 
suggest that funds are derived voluntary, through assistance from wealthy 
countries. 154 It is AOSIS that has made a particularly strong case that, given 
responsibilities for climate change, this is not enough and that funding should 
therefore be mandatory for wealthy countries based on emissions and ability to 
pay. 15 5 Hoppe also makes the case that funding international climate change 
insurance is the responsibility of countries who have contributed to emissions above 
certain thresholds and who could, for example, contribute through profits derived 
from emissions trading. 156 However, several difficulties in responsibility allocation 
to countries were raised in the previous chapter (fault-centered corrective justice) 
and would also have to be considered in relation to insurance. Penz also notes rightly 
that, as much as the ethical, and even practical case for mandatory contributions to 
an insurance scheme from high emitters can be made, in practice, ' there is no 
enforcing authority that can compel states to join and submit to such a system.' 157 
Although he notes that this does not diminish their ' ethical responsibilities ', 158 which 
should spur them to partake. 
Macro or Micro 
Any insurance-based mechanism would have to integrate country-level and more 
microinsurance-level compensation. Country-level assistance would help with major 
public infrastructure losses and microinsurance with smaller, personal losses. 
Recuperation of losses in relation to both have consequences for displacement. 
154 See, eg, Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler, above n 68 and Bals et al, above n 65. 155 See, Alliance of Small Island States, above n 85. 
156 Hoppe, above n 152, slides 4 and 5. 
157 Penz, above n 6, 171. 
158 Ibid. 
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Whether the two streams are operated through separate mechanisms would have to 
be agreed. 
Triggers 
Insurance payouts would be triggered by certain events occurring or certain 
thresholds being surpassed (this prevents moral hazard). There are justice 
considerations here as well: insurance is meant to be a compensatory mechanism that 
avoids lengthy and complicated liability claims, giving beneficiaries relatively 
speedy access to compensation. In the climate change context this is important: the 
more rapid the pay out the sooner the detrimental consequences of a calamitous 
event can be countered (and displacement possibly avoided or return enabled faster). 
Several proposals highlight the importance of this and argue that trigger levels must 
be pre-established in order for lengthy payout negotiations to be prevented. 159 To 
devise a fair system, Hoppe also argues that triggers and payouts -.should be linked 
the different economic circumstances prevalent in each country and not some blanket 
or generic assessment of the impact of certain events. 160 He, finally, suggests triggers 
that relate not only to the country context but also to individuals, for example 
homelessness or personal injury, 161 which might be relevant in the displacement 
context and could be compensated through microinsurance. 
Does Causality Matter? 
The chapter has argued that causality matters less in no-fault compensation, as it 
does not rest on establishing fault, or a particular faulty entity, making insurance a 
159 See, eg, Linneroth-Bayer and Mechler, above n 68, 625 and Alliance of Small Island States, above 
n 85 , 4 and Hoppe, above n 152, slide 8. 
160 Hoppe, above n 152, slide 13. 
161 Ibid, slide 16. 
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useful compensatory mechanism to have investigated in the climate change 
displacement context. However, causality is not to be ignored entirely in an 
international no-fault insurance scheme. First, as has been noted, responsibility 
bearers (states) cannot be compelled to partake in a compensatory insurance scheme 
and may wish to 'hide behind' causality issues analysed in the previous chapter to 
argue that they have no mandatory responsibilities towards such a scheme either. 
Secondly, there are the causal issues that remain in relation to climate change itself 
and in relation to displacement. Chapter Two highlighted that it may be possible to 
show how the risk of a ce1iain event having occurred might have been increased by 
climate change. However, absolutely attributing an event to climate change remains 
challenging. Chapter Two also highlighted the complex factors that might interact 
with a climatic event to lead to displacement. Any compensation scheme, even no-
fault insurance, would still have to grapple with such uncertainties and complexities 
to a degree. Although not based on pa1iicularised fault, some kind of link, even if not 
strong, between event and consequence (i.e. emission and harm) may have to be 
establishable. Despite such challenges, the potentially emerging loss and damages 
mechanis1n under the umbrella of the UNFCCC insinuates that the international 
co1mnunity must now take the leap and accept that irreversible loss and damage will 
occur in the climate change context, that this must be compensated and that 
contributions to such a mechanism must come from those who have greater 
responsibility for causing anthropogenic climate change in the first place. 
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8. Conclusion 
Insurance could provide an important mechanism by which climate change-related 
harm, loss or damage is recuperated or reversed across borders. If framed as no-fault 
compensation, insurance would afford a more efficient, fair and realistic 
compensation mechanism than those which may be available in relation to 'purer' 
forms of corrective justice ( e.g. liability claims) - for both affected countries and 
individuals. Because no-fault compensation is premised on the idea that complicated 
causal chains ( or the absence of a clearly-identifiable loss or damage causer) should 
be no hindrance to receiving recompense, it is particularly relevant in the climate 
change displacement context and the nuance and complexity which are inherent to it. 
Importantly, to function in a corrective justice sense, the financial (and other) 
contributions necessary to operationalize a climate change-related insurance scheme 
would have to be derived from those who contribute to anthropogenic climate 
change and its ill effects above a certain threshold (not as a matter of strict or direct 
liability but as an acknowledgement of at least some contribution to harm). Efforts to 
devise such a scheme are underway, although they are hampered by significant 
resistance to the notion that anthropogenic climate change raises the possibility of 
corrective justice and not only some more generalised, voluntary form of assistance. 
Of course, potential contributors are concerned about the financial implications 
of compensation. However, contributions to an insurance/no-fault compensation 
scheme could be minimised by resorting to cost-saving measures such as public-
private partnerships, risk pooling and risk reduction. Financial contributions could 
also be supplemented with contributions for the necessary technical expertise 
required to initiate and manage an insurance scheme. And of course, participants 
could reduce their contributions by curbing greenhouse gas emissions, which would 
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go a long way towards preventing anthropogenic climate change and its effects 
(including those who contribute to displacement), and therefore reduce the need for 
compensation. 
Ultimately, insurance will impact · positively particularly in the context of 
climate change-related people movement. There is the possible mitigation effect just 
mentioned, which might be achieved if insurance is set up as a compensatory 
mechanism and which would allow more people to stay rather than to move. More 
concretely, because insurance usually allows losses to be recuperated relatively 
quickly, livelihoods 1nay well be re-established before moving becomes the only 
response to deal with a climatic event. This would also ensure that more people can 
stay than would otherwise be the case. Even those who cannot stay could be 
incorporated into insurance-based compensation. Basic migration-linked insurance 
schemes already compensate certain categories of migrants ( or their families) for 
certain losses. Other insurance-type schemes have proven to ~ncourage return 
migration. In order to respond to people movement in the climate change context, 
however, isolated schemes that already exist must be broadened and preferably 
operationalized under a single mechanisn1 that would provide more certainty. 
Several important factors in operationalizing an international climate change 
insurance mechanism have been discussed. 
Nevertheless, any kind of compensation remains a politically sensitive notion to 
advance. For the time being, greenhouse gas emitters continue to be able to shirk 
their responsibilities, in part because of the many causal uncertainties which make 
implementation of corrective justice ('pure ' or 'rough' ) in relation to climate change 
harms such as those that arise in relation to displacement difficult to realise. Rougher 
understandings of corrective justice, as the chapter has shown, could certainly 
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overcome some of these hurdles, but corrective justice and compensation 
nonetheless remain a challenge - theoretically, practically, politically and legally. 
The thesis will therefore now tum to a different justice construct, to investigate 
whether displacement in the climate change context may be addressed better via 
distributive justice. Rather than looking at the phenomenon through the lens of harm, 
loss or damage, or compensation, the following two chapters will seek to look at it as 
a possibly disproportionate burden, which requires addressing via a different set of 
mechanisms than is the case under corrective justice. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Distributive Justice: Cost Distribution 
What is just is what is proportional, and what is unjust is what violates the proportional. 1 
(Aristotle) 
1. Introduction 
The previous two chap~ers dealt with the question of responsibilities in relation to 
climate change and displacement from the perspective of corrective justice and with 
it the possibility of correction or compensation of harm, loss and damage. This and 
the following chapter will deal with the question of responsibilities based on the 
notion that costs and burdens emanating from anthropogenic climate change's 
detriinental impacts are unfairly distributed, including in relation to displacement, 
which requires redistribution in favour of those unfairly burdenecl as a matter of 
distributive justice. The present chapter, in particular, will investigate whether the 
uneven distribution of benefits arising from the burning of fossil fuels ( and the 
emission of greenhouse gases as a result of other processes engaged in by humans), 
coupled with the uneven distribution of ill-effects arising from this, raises special 
obligations (both moral and legal) for those who engage in practices that lead to 
significant greenhouse gas emission levels to assist through financial transfers those 
more likely to be ill-affected by it (in particular displacees or those affected by 
displacement). The chapter argues that, essentially, the international climate change 
regime is based on this premise already - that certainly countries with roughly the 
greater responsibility for , and roughly greater benefit from, the processes leading to 
1 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics [trans. David Ross (Oxford University Press, 1998)] bk5, ch3. 
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anthropogenic climate change have a responsibility to assist those that have not 
benefitted and that may be burdened and more vulnerable to climate change impacts, 
in particular through the provision of financial assistance for the purposes of 
adaptation. The responsibility for providing the resources required for adjustment 
measures necessary to cope with detrimental climate change impacts, it has been 
acknowledged, in other words, rests with those who have the greater responsibility 
for global warming and that have benefitted from practices which are causally linked 
to it. This is fundamentally important for displacement, which along with migration 
and relocation has become an issue which has now found some expression within the 
international climate change adaptation regime, making it eligible to attract ( at least 
a limited array) of financial and other resources from distributive mechanisms now 
established to address adaptation needs in less well-off countries. This means that at 
least some of the burdens arising in relation to displacement in the climate change 
context may very well find resolve distributively through the provision of financial 
assistance. 
The chapter opens with a section which highlights the unequal distribution of 
climate change-related burdens and benefits. It will show how this evidences 
distributive injustices in the spatial sense - some will be burdened more than others, 
and in the moral sense - some will be burdened whilst others have contributed to 
those burdens and benefitted from processes that burden others. The chapter will 
then highlight distributional issues in relation to climate change and people 
movement, such as displacement, more specifically. Later sections of the chapter 
will engage with the extent to which international law in general is imbued with 
distributive justice notions and, more particularly, how the international climate 
change regime incorporates distributive justice (the discussion here will also be 
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underpinned by the theoretical analysis provided in Chapter Four). The chapter will 
show how distributive justice indeed underpins that regime and how this is important 
for displacement. A final section will investigate the international adaptation finance 
architecture, through which distributive goals, certainly concerning the costs 
associated with climate change-related burdens, should, arguably, be operationalized. 
The chapter's overarching purpose is to show that the international climate 
change regime, in particular as concerning climate change adaptation, is based 
broadly on distributive justice principles, that displacement ( along with migration 
and relocation) feature within this framework, making some of the costs and burdens 
that arise in relation to it eligible for funding, but that the distributive potential of the 
framework is hampered significantly by the ongoing concerns and uncertainties over 
the operationalizing of the actual funding of the framework. Whether climate change 
and displacement is an issue that will find resolution in distributive fashion through 
financial transfers therefore remains somewhat unclear. 
A final point is important to mention: this chapter will largely be limited to 
discussion of the possibility that distributive justice is enacted in relation to 
displacement through financial transfers within the international adaptation (finance) 
regime. It is important to acknowledge that financial transfers and adaptation 
assistance are not detached fro1n other distributive issues, especially those relating to 
participation. However, the scope of this chapter will not permit their mention more 
than in passing. 
-
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2. The Differentiated Spread of Climate Change Burdens and Benefits 
The fact that climate change burdens and benefits will be spread unevenly is widely 
noted. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has highlighted that 
'those in the weakest economic position are often the most vulnerable to climate 
change and are frequently the most susceptible to climate-related damages, 
especially when they face multiple stresses. ' 2 It also notes certain regions and 
topographical areas as more vulnerable: Africa, mega deltas, small islands, high-
mountain and dry areas. 3 Relying on the IPCC, Maxine Burkett has argued that the 
livelihoods bases of the poor in particular will be impacted by climate change: 
fisheries , coastal systems and dry land agriculture. 4 At the same time, the majority of 
greenhouse gas emissions linked to human activity do not come from poor countries 
but those that are mostly well-off: just seven countries generate about two thirds. 5 
Chapter Five noted that significant lifestyle benefits have emanated from such 
emissions over time for inhabitants of many wealthy countries. Eric Neumayer, for 
example has argued that ' [t]here can be no doubt that the development of the 
'Northern' countries was eased, if not made feasible in the first place, by having had 
the possibility of burning large amounts of fossil fuel with the consequence of an 
accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere ' .6 In the meantime, contributions 
to atmospheric greenhouse gas accumulations by the majority of developing 
countries have been insignificant, yet their vulnerabilities increase on account of the 
2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 'Synthesis Report' in Contribution of Working Group 11 to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007) s 5.2. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Maxine Burkett, 'Cliinate Reparations' (2009) 10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 509, 514; 
relying on the IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report. 5 John H Knox, Climate Change and Human Rights (BePress, 2009) 38. Note that the European Union is counted as one entity here and that China and India are included. 6 Eric Neumayer, ' In Defense of Historical Accountability for Greenhouse Gas Emissions' (2000) 33 Ecological Economics 185, 189. 
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actions of others. 7 The IPCC notes, for example, that 'less than 1 % of global 
greenhouse gases [ stem from] small islands [ and yet they] need to reallocate scarce 
resources away from economic development and poverty alleviation'. 8 Several 
distributional issues arise from this: First, there are inequities simply in the spatial 
distribution of climate change-related burdens; poorer people and their livelihoods 
will be disproportionately affected. Secondly, however, there are distributional issues 
in the ethical sense; only some have disproportionately contributed to creating the 
burdens experienced by others, whilst often enjoying lifestyle benefits that have only 
been derived from activities that create those burdens in the first place. Distributive 
justice may raise demands that such inequities are addressed. Later sections of this 
chapter will discuss how justice theory indeed supports distribution in the climate 
change context, and also analyse opportunities for this under international law. The 
following sub-section first addresses how the displacement burden more specifically 
may be distributed unjustly. 
The Differentiated Spread of the Climate Change and Displacement Burden 
Poorer people and their livelihoods are more likely to be affected by the impacts of 
anthropogenic climate change. The same is to be noted in relation to climate change 
and mobility, including displacement. People movement is often 'a response to 
inequalities in the spatial distribution of opportunities, be they economic, social, 
cultural, political or [indeed] environmental. ' 9 Climate change may magnify such 
7 See, eg, Burkett, above n 4, 514. 
8 Nobuo Mimura, Leonard Nurse, Roger McLean, John Agard, Lino Briguglio, Penehuro Lefale, 
Rolph Pa yet and Graham Sem, 'S1nall Islands ' in Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability: Contribution of Working Group II to 
the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge 
University Press, 2007) 690. 
9 Cecilia Tacoli, 'Migration and Adaptation to Climate Change' (Sustainable Development Opinion, 
International Institute for Environment and Development, 2007) 1. 
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inequalities. A report concerning migration and global environmental change 
published by the United Kingdom's Foresight Programme in 2011 noted the uneven 
spatial distribution of populations vulnerable to climatic, environmental and other 
impacts, and therefore susceptible to migration or displacement. Unsurprisingly, the 
report locates such populations in areas also noted in the previous sub-section for 
their general vulnerability to climate change impacts - drylands, mountain areas and 
low-lying deltas and islands. Concerning drylands, the Report argues that although 
drylands occur also in wealthy countries, they are located disproportionately in 
poorer countries, with one study suggesting that 90 percent of dryland populations 
are located in developing countries. 10 The report then notes that areas prone to 
drought and variable or unpredictable precipitation (drylands) 'frequently experience 
net outmigration' 11 Populations living in mountain areas are also more often the 
inhabitants of countries classed as low-income or emerging and there is significant 
-
evidence of outmigration from such areas for reasons that include environmental 
ones.
12 Finally, regarding low-lying coastal areas and small islands, the report notes 
that poverty and livelihood insecurities drive people movement to and from such 
areas, with climate change increasing the risk that such movement will place people 
in more vulnerable circumstances, which some cannot escape. 13 
Migration responses to, or displacement consequences of, climatic change may 
therefore be borne disproportionately (though not exclusively) by people living in 
poorer areas and developing countries, who may lack the socio-economic resilience 
to stay in the face of changing climatic conditions. Movement may or may not occur, 
1
° Foresight, 'Migration and Global Environmental Change: Final Report ' (Government Science 
Office, UK, 2011) 68; citing Uriel Safriel and Zafar Adeel, 'Dryland Systems' in Rashid Hassan and 
Robert Sholes (eds), The Millenium Ecosystems Assessment: Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: 
Current State and Trends (Island Press, 2005) 623. 
11 Ibid, 70. 
12 Ibid, 91. 
13 Ibid, 80ff. 
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but when people go, this may also be under conditions of further vulnerability. The 
issue is therefore rightly understood as one of distributive (in)justice in the geo-
spatial sense (in addition the differential distribution of benefits and burdens 
considered above), which requires rebalancing in favour of those unfairly burdened. 
The following section will analyse first how and where distributive justice features in 
international law generally, before considering more concretely how and if climate 
change burdens such as displacement may find distributive resolve under 
international law, particularly through the international climate change regime. 
3. Distributive Justice and International Law 
Demands made upon international law for the implementation of _distributive justice 
are not new and have not only arisen in relation to the fairly recent anthropogenic 
climate change phenomenon. 14 John Conybeare has noted three particular contexts in 
which international distributive justice has been demanded: first, in the context of the 
legacy of colonialism and the global inequalities that reverberate from it; secondly, 
in the context of environmental resource scarcity and, thirdly, in the context of 
concern over prevailing 'global poverty and relative inequality' .15 In relation to the 
latter, in particular, important international human rights instruments seek to address 
issues of socio-economic inequality: for example the Universal Declaration states 
' [ e ]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
14 See, eg, Ben Saul, 'Climate Change, Resource Scarcity and Distributive Justice in International 
~aw' (Legal Studies Research Paper No 09/104, University of Sydney, 2009). 
1:> John A C Conybeare, 'Efficiency, Entitlements and Deservingness : Perspectives on International 
Distributive Justice ' (2007) 14 Review of International Political Economy 380, 382. 
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being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood 
in circumstances beyond his control.' 16 The UN Charter demands that ' [ w ]ith a view 
to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being [ ... ]the United Nations shall 
promote [ ... ] higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development.' 17 It is doubtful, however, that 
concrete legal obligations, in particular across borders, arise from this. 18 
Addressing post-colonialism and economic injustices which were thought to 
continue to arise from it, the 1970s saw a significant effort to devise a more just 
post-colonial economic order, driven largely by newly-decolonised and developing 
countries. In 1964, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was 
formed to facilitate this effort. A decade later, the Declaration on the Establishment 
of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) proclaimed a 
united determination to work urgently for the Establishment of a New International 
Econo1nic Order based on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, co1nmon 
interests and cooperation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social 
systen1s which shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, 1nake it 
possible to eliminate the widening gap between developed and developing countries 
and ensure steadily accelerating econmnic and social developinent. 19 
Unfortunately, no legal obligations emerged from this. However, a renewed effort to 
address global socio-economic disparities emerged with the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).20 Although not creating binding legal obligations 
16 Art 25 (1). 
17 Art 56. 
18 Chapter Eight of this thesis will provide a fuller discussion of this matter. The question of extra-
territorial application ofhun1an rights .law was also discussed in Chapter Three. 
19 Declaration of I May 1974 Concerning the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, 
UNGA Res 3201, UN Doc AIRES/S-6 3201 (1 May 1974) para 3. 
20 See United Nations, Background (2013) <http: //www.un.org/rnillenniurngoals/bkgd.shtml>. 
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either, they have eased successfully some of the burdens faced by many of the 
world' s poor.21 
Distributional issues concerning resources, the environment and development 
are tackled by international environmental law. Principle 8 of the Rio Declaration, 
for example, asks that states curb unsustainable production or consumption and do 
not exploit resources without bounds, which would lead to a higher quality of life for 
all. Undoubtedly, this is important also in the context of anthropogenic climate 
change. Distributional issues are further acknowledged by conceding that poorer 
nations have special needs in relation to the environment and to development, which 
might have to be addressed through 'international action' ,22 and that sustainable 
development must depend on poverty eradication, including through inter-state 
cooperation for the benefit of those who cannot achieve this independently.23 Many 
international instruments targeting particular environmental issues incorporate such 
-
notions further and questions of inter-generational distributive justice are also 
addressed in a number of international environmental instruments. 24 As much as 
international environmental law engages with distributive justice notions, however, 
relevant provisions here, too, cannot usually create binding legal obligations. 
Ultimately, calls for international distributive justice are widespread and some of 
international law is undoubtedly underpinned by distributive justice. However, 
because the regimes where distributive justice features are almost exclusively of a 
soft law nature, realisation of it in practice remains a challenge in relation to many 
distributive injustices, an issues which will come up again in later sections of this 
21 See, eg, United Nations, Millenium Development Goals: 2012 Progress Chart (2013) <http: //www. 
un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/2012 _Progress_ E.pdt>. 
22 Principle 6, Rio Declaration 
23 Principle 5, Rio Declaration. 
24 Saul, above n 14, 15, 17. 
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chapter. The chapter will now tum to how distributive issues - the distribution of 
responsibilities, burdens and benefits - are addressed in the climate change regime 
before turning to how this matters specifically in relation to displacement ( and other 
types of people movement). 
4. The International Climate Change Regime and Distribution 
In order to understand how responsibilities, burdens and benefits are allocated or 
distributed in the international climate change regime, and therefore how distributive 
justice features there, two discussions have to precede analysis of the regime: First, a 
discussion of two types of responsibilities and, secondly, a discussion of two types of 
vulnerability. 
Two Types of Responsibility 
The international climate change regime revolves around two notions of 
responsibility, although a third one may now be emerging.25 The first type refers to 
responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions that propel anthropogenic climate 
change. As has been noted, some nations emit significantly more than others. For the 
majority of them, responsibilities are engaged to conduct abatement measures that 
curb greenhouse gas emitting human activities, certainly beyond ce1iain thresholds. 
A second type of responsibility refers to the responsibility to counter the damaging 
impacts that are known and anticipated to arise in connection with anthropogenic 
25 This refers to the responsibility for loss and damage discussed in the previous chapter. 
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climate change through adaptation measures.26 Again, some nations are thought to 
carry greater responsibilities in this context than others. For some time after its 
establishment, the international climate change regime emphasised responsibilities in 
relation to the first matter over the second - that is mitigation over adaptation. Some 
note that the lesser attention on adaptation was long underpinned by concerns that 
nothing should divert attention away from mitigation, considered more vital.27 
Marco Grasso has argued instead that mitigation dominated because of the 'natural 
science approach' long prevalent in debates and negotiations concerning climate 
change, which neglected other (more human) dimensions: 
On this view, mitigation has mainly to do with energy issues, which seemingly offer a 
more straightforward solution to climate change, according to the ultimate objective 
of the UNFCCC ( article 2) to stabilize GHG in the atmosphere at a non-dangerous 
level, and are more tractable than the 1nultiple issues entailed by adaptation policies 
and practices, which, furthermore, can on the contrary be perceived si1nply as 
strategies to .coexist with climate change.28 
This arguably unfair balance has been rectified to a degree in recent years, with 
UNFCCC parties agreeing to 'enhanced action on adaptation' in addition to 
mitigation at their 13th Conference of the Parties (COP) in Bali in 2007,29 following 
which at least some concrete steps have been taken to implement this. Vulnerable 
countries have thereby gained some certainty that there will be assistance for them to 
counter climate change-related burdens which they did not create. 
26 Simon Caney, amongst others, 1nakes this distinction; see Simon Caney, 'Cosmopolitan Justice, 
Responsibility, and Global Climate Change' (2005) 18 Leiden Journal of International Law 747, 
751f. 
27 Jouni Paavola and W Neil Adger, 'Fair Adaptation to Cli1n ate Change' (2006) 56 Ecological 
Economics 594, 595. 
28 Marco Grasso, Justice in Funding Adaptation Under the International Climate Change Regime (Springer, 2010), 12. 
29 See United Nations Framework Convention on Cliln ate Change, Revised Draft Decision -ICP.13 : 
Ad How Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention: Prop osal by the 
President, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/L.7/Rev.1 (14 December 2007) para l (c)(ii). 
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Two Types of Vulnerability 
Responsibilities for assisting with vulnerabilities and adaptation needs in some 
countries have generally come to be accepted in recent years. Grasso has noted, 
however, that the needs which arise in relation to vulnerability and adaptation are 
complex: On the one hand, vulnerability is created, and adaptation necessitated, 
simply because of the impacts of climate change upon certain locations. 30 In such a 
context, the IPCC has described the role of adaptation to be about 'adjustments in 
natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their 
effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities. ' 31 In other words, 
a climatic stimulus presents the vulnerability in a particular location which is to be 
countered by an adaptive response ( either proactively or reactively32). However, 
Grasso also suggests a different view of vulnerability and of adaptation: Here what 
matters is not the climatic stimulus but the conditions - social, political, cultural, etc. 
-
- which exist for individuals or in communities ( or states) at the time the stimulus 
occurs.
33 Grasso argues that one view of vulnerability is 'biophysical, where the 
vulnerability of a system depends on its physical exposure to climate impacts [ ... ], 
and the other social, where what matters is the ability of individuals and groups to 
deal with clin1ate hazards'. 34 The IPCC also acknowledges this: '[w]hile physical 
exposure can significantly influence vulnerability for both human populations and 
~o 
., Grasso, above n 28, 16ff and 20ff. 
31 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 'Definition of Key Terms' in Contributions of 
Working Group 11 to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 6 . 
32 Jouni Paavola and Neil Adger draw this distinction, eg, Jouni Paavola and W Neil Adger, 'Justice 
and Adaptation to Climate Change ' (Working Paper 23, Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, 
University of East Anglia, 2002) 9 . 
3~ 
., Grosso, above n 28, 20f. 
34 Ibid, 17. The environmental justice literature also often makes this point; see, eg, David Schlosberg, 
Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and lvature (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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natural systems, a lack of adaptive capacity is often the most important factor that 
creates a hotspot of human vulnerability.' 35 It has also noted that: 
The array of potential adaptive responses available to human societies is very large, 
ranging from purely technological { e.g., sea defences), through behavioural ( e.g., 
altered food and recreational choices), to managerial ( e.g., altered farming practices), 
to policy ( e.g., planning regulations). Whilst most technologies and strategies are 
known and developed in some countries, the assessed literature does not indicate how 
effective various options are to fully reduce risks, particularly at higher levels of 
wanning and related impacts, and for vulnerable groups. In addition, there are 
fonnidable environmental, econo1nic, informational, social, attitudinal and 
behavioural barriers to iinplementation of adaptation. For developing countries, 
availability of resources and building adaptive capacity are particularly impoiiant.36 
The importance of bio-physical versus other, pre-existing vulnerabilities was also 
drawn in Chapter Two in relation to the factors which compel people movement in 
the climate change context. As will be shown, the international climate change 
regime recognizes that both types of vulnerability raise special obligations to assist 
affected countries in the climate change context. 
Aristotle, Utilitarians, Rawls or Sen? 
It is now possible to connect the discussion back to some of the key distributive 
justice theories explored in Chapter Four. Aristotle noted that distributive justice is 
about proportionality between separate entities. However, he envisioned proportion 
between deserving parties and not a broader scope, which makes his notion of 
distributive justice (and those that are strongly founded in it; i.e., Aquinas) not 
particularly helpful to think about the distribution of benefits, burdens and 
responsibilities in the climate change context ( an exception is provided in the 
following thesis chapter). Utilitarian emphasis on the greatest good for the greatest 
number of people· would also not necessarily address the injustices of benefit and 
35 Intergoverrunental Panel on Climate Change, Contributions of Working Group 11 to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 
2007) 317. 
36 Ib"d ,.,8 1 ' .J . 
225 
CHAPTER SEVEN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - DISTRIBUTING COSTS 
burden distribution in that context. The greatest benefit from assistance provision 
may not be derived through channelling it to those who most need it, or assistance 
provision may altogether not be considered to provide the greatest benefit, as 
opposed to mitigation, for example, an issue which has already been raised. John 
Rawls provides more opportunities to analyse distributive justice responsibilities in 
the climate change context, given that he argued that distribution should occur in 
favour of the least well-off members of society. The extension of his theories by 
cosn1opolitans such as Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge and others to 'international 
society' was outlined in Chapter Four, which makes it particularly appealing in the 
climate change context. In that context, then, it could be argued that distribution 
should occur towards those likely to be most burdened by climate change and its 
impacts.37 It was noted in a prior section of this chapter that this will, more often 
than not, be the inhabitants of poorer states. The following section will show how the 
-climate change regime indeed envisions resource distribution, certainly amongst 
states, on this basis. However, Grasso, relying on his discussion concerning 
vulnerability presented in the previous sub-section, has shown how Amartya Sen's 
conceptualisation of distributive justice would stipulate that amongst the most 
burdened must especially be counted those with the fewest 'capabilities' to counter 
climate change impacts.38 Certainly at the inter-state level, this is acknowledged in 
the international climate change regime. The following section will now engage in 
greater detail with how the international climate change regime conceptualises the 
two types of responsibilities outlined, as well as differentiated access to assistance in 
accordance with the two types of vulnerability presented - before, in later sections, 
37 For a similar line of argument connecting Rawls to responsibilities for adaptation burdens, see 
Grasso, above n 28, 63ff. 
38 Ibid, 66f. 
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investigating how displacement and other types of climate change change-related 
people movement more particularly are addressed in, and may find resolve through, 
the regime. 
Allocation of Responsibilities . and Burdens in the International Climate Change 
Regime 
Henry Shue has noted how debates about justice are dominated by questions of 
responsibility allocation 'to whom', paying lesser attention to the question of 'from 
whom' .39 The following sub-section, in exploring responsibilities and burdens as 
they arise out of the international climate change regime, and therefore the extent to 
which distributive justice is a feature of the regime, will address both. The sub-
section will in particular look at relevant provisions in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol.40 
From Whom? 
A previous sub-section of this chapter noted varying responsibilities related to 
climate change. It argued, first, that responsibilities accrue for those who emit 
greenhouse gases which propel anthropogenic climate change. The UNFCCC 
Prea1nble recognises that 
human activities have been substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases, that these increases enhance the natural greenhouse effect, and that 
this will result on average in an additional wanning of the Earth's surface and 
atn1osphere and may adversely affect natural ecosyste1ns and humankind.41 
39 Henry Shue, 'Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions' (1993) 15 Lmv and Policy 39, 50. 40 The first c01mnihnent period under the Protocol ended in 2012; however, a new commitment period 
has, in principle, been agreed, although it is not yet in force ; see, eg, United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Doha Amendment (2013) <http: //unfccc.int/kyoto_proto 
co 1/ doh a_ amendinent/items/7 3 62. php>. 
41 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Preamble, para 2. 
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The international climate change regime therefore places upon emitters the 
fundamental responsibility 'to achieve [the] stabilization of greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous 
interference with the climate system' .42 Mitigation duties this implies arise on the 
basis of 'common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities ' , which 
leaves little doubt that it is developed countries which 'should take the lead in 
combating climate change ' .43 The UNFCCC Preamble notes in particular that 'the 
largest share of historical and current global emissions of greenhouse gases has 
originated in developed countries,' which engages their greater responsibility.44 
Scientific uncertainty, furthermore, should not be an excuse not to act with 
precaution. 45 Therefore, developed countries are to implement policies and take 
measures that would 'limit emissions' and 'protect and enhance greenhouse gas 
sinks and reservoirs. ' 46 On this basis, the Kyoto Protocol outlines specific mitigation 
responsibilities for developed countries, with the aim to stab{iize, even reduce, 
greenhouse gas emissions.47 
In addition to responsibilities in connection to emissions and their abatement, 
responsibilities also arise in relation to the detrimental consequences of climate 
change. The 'co1nmon but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities ' 
notion here expands to include the responsibility of developed countries to take the 
lead also in countering the adverse effects of climate change. 48 They are to cooperate 
with developing countries 'to better address the problems of climate change' .49 More 
42 Ibid, art 2. 
43 Ibid, art 3 .1. 
44 Ibid, Preamble, para 3. 
45 Ibid, art 3 .3. 
46 Ibid, art 4.2(a). 
47 Kyoto Protocol, eg, art 3 .1. 
48 United Nations Framework Convention on Clilnate Change, art 3.1. 
49 Ibid, art 3.5. 
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particularly, developed countries are to 'assist the developing country Parties [ ... ] in 
meeting the costs of adaptation to [the] adverse effects of climate change. ' 50 Philippe 
Sands has argued that this 'amounts to an implicit acceptance of responsibility for 
causing climate change' .51 Technology transfer is also considered an important 
responsibility of developed countries to address the adverse impacts of climate 
change elsewhere. 52 
To Whom? 
A second, equally important, question which arises concerns whom responsibilities 
are to benefit. Here, the international climate change regime has developed a 
differentiated system: It recognises, first of all, that 
[t]he specific needs and special circumstances of developing country Parties, 
especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change, and of those Parties, especially developing country Parties, that would have to 
bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the Convention, should be given 
full consideration.53 
Several types of vulnerable countries are named. The UNFCCC Preamble notes that 
'low-lying and other small island countries, countries with- low-lying coastal, arid 
and semi-arid areas or areas liable to floods, drought and dese1iification, and 
developing countries with fragile mountainous ecosystems' may be particularly 
vulnerable. Article 4.8 notes such countries again but adds that countries which 
warrant a particular response also include 'countries prone to natural disasters' , 
' countries with high urban atmospheric pollution' and land-locked and transit 
countries'. However, the climate change regime also acknowledges that vulnerability 
and exposure to risk is not just a matter of pre-existing geographical or topographical 
50 Ibid, art 4.4. 
51 Philippe Sands, 'The United Nations Frainework Convention on Climate Change ' (2006) 1 Review 
of European, Comparative and International Environmental Law 270, 275. 
52 See, eg, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art 4.5. 
53 Ibid, art 3(2). 
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features (the bio-physical world). A previous sub-section discussed that vulnerability 
also arises in relation to social and economic factors. Addressing this, the UNFCCC 
therefore acknowledges that it is 'economic development [which] is essential for 
adopting measures to address . climate change' 54 and that 'economic and social 
development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the 
developing country Parties.' 55 A whole separate paragraph is dedicated to 
acknowledging, 'the special needs and special situation of the least developed 
countries'. 56 What, then, can vulnerable countries expect from developed countries? 
Having met their adaptation costs has already been mentioned. Article 4.8 of the 
UNFCCC also stipulates commitments to 'funding, insurance and the transfer of 
technology, to meet the specific needs and concerns of developing country Parties 
arising from the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impact of the 
implementation of response measures'. Article 1.1 defines 'adverse effects' as 
'deleterious effects on the composition, resilience, or productiv1ty of natural and 
managed ecosystems or on the operation of socio-economic systems or on human 
health and welfare.' A broad range of assistance measures are therefore fore seen in 
response to a broad range of detrimental climate change impacts. 
The international climate change regime frames a number of responsibilities 
which relate to both mitigation and adaptation. In general, it makes most developed 
nations responsible for not only the financing and implementation of abatement 
measures but also the resourcing of measures by which poorer countries could adapt 
to the detrimental impacts of cli1nate change. However, as has been noted elsewhere, 
the regime's primary instrument, the United Nations Framework Convention on 
54 Ib.d ,.., 4 1 ,art.:, .. 
55 Ibid, art 4.7. 
56 Ibid, art 4.9. 
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Climate Change, is a framework instrument, which does not outline concrete 
obligations. Regarding adaptation, then, the UNFCCC notes only that developed 
countries shall assist developing countries57 and that they shall consider the 
provision of funding, insurance and the transfer of technology. 58 None of this binds 
states to concrete commitments. It is not outlined specifically how such assistance is 
to be sourced, to what extent and how or when it is to be disbursed. The Convention 
envisions that this was to be subject to further negotiations by the states parties. 
Some progress has been made in this regard: the Bali COP in 2007 resulted in a 
greater overall commitment towards adaptation assistance and significant financial 
corrunitments to international adaptation finance were declared at COP 16 in 
Cancun. 59 Nevertheless, none of these commitments are anchored in concrete 
obligations; they are voluntarily adhered to, or not. Turning responsibilities in 
principle into responsibilities in practice has therefore remained a significant 
challenge, an issue a later section of this chapter, which discusses adaptation finance, 
will turn to in more detail. 
A Short Note on Participatory Justice 
The fact that the international climate change regime does not frame responsibilities 
as legally binding is one obstacle to distributive justice (and, as was argued in 
Chapter Five, an obstacle to a state responsibility claim and therefore corrective 
justice as well) in relation to climate change burdens. Before turning to how the 
regime nevertheless enables the addressing of mobility-related issues, the chapter 
57 Ibid, art 4.4. 
58 Ibid, art 4.8. 
59 More about this ins 8 of this chapter. 
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will briefly discuss another obstacle to distributive justice (although it matters also in 
relation to corrective justice), namely participatory justice. 
First, it is important to remember that the international climate change regime is 
about allocating responsibilities between states. That means assistance obligations 
are largely conceptualised in relation to vulnerable states (low-lying island states, 
disaster prone states, etc.). Many such states will hopefully ensure that any 
adaptation assistance allocated them is channelled to those who most need it 
( communities, individuals). In fact, at least one international adaptation assistance 
mechanism (national adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs)) proactively 
envisions grassroots and community involvement to ensure this. 60 However, 
involvement at that level is not generally fostered by the international climate change 
regime. As Jouni Paavola and Neil Adger note: 'There has to be a way to elicit 
inforn1ation on local interests and circumstances as well as to enable meaningful 
participation of representatives of the local in internationally coordinated adaptation 
1neasures', particularly because ' [ m ]any adaptation measures will take place at the 
local level and all of them will have local impacts. ' 61 Much more could be done to 
achieve this. 
An additional procedural matter - or issue of participatory justice - arises in 
relation to the unequal ability of states parties to participate in the international 
climate change negotiations. As Paavola and Adger have noted, ' [ d]eveloping 
countries do not have the same possibilities for effective participation as developed 
countries' because of their 'small delegations' and sometimes also because of 
language barriers. 62 With the UNFCCC a framework agreement subject to further 
60 Section Seven of this chapter will engage with this in greater detail. 
61 Paavola and Adger, above n 32, 15. 
62 Paavola and Adger, above n 27, 600. 
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negotiation to implement its provisions, poorer states often find their ability to 
partake in this process hampered. Rawls, in a lengthy article dealing with Jurgen 
Habermas' s critique of his theory of justice, including on procedural grounds, once 
stated that substantive and procedural aspects of justice are not isolated from each 
other - they 'are connected and not separate. 63 In other words, distributive justice 
must inevitably also be about process and about participation. At the moment, the 
latter is often not equal in relation to the international climate change negotiations. 
Final Words 
The international climate change regime is undoubtedly underpinned by distributive 
justice, both in the Rawlsian and Senian (and also Martha Nussbaum) sense. 
Distribution and expenditure of resources (money, technology, expertise) is 
envisioned for the benefit of those considered most in need and least well-off, both 
because of their exposure to climate change impacts and vulnerabilities which relate 
to social, economic or cultural conditions that prevail in some countries. In principle, 
the distributive justice issues raised by climate change are therefore well placed to 
find distributive resolve through this regime. However, several matters stand in the 
way of distributive justice in practice: the regime does not create concrete, 
enforceable legal obligations but has left many matters of distribution vague - the 
how, when, who or what of distribution are not specifically addressed. Secondly, the 
regime does not foster equal participation, neither of those who will ultimately be 
affected by climate change - individuals - or of national decision-makers. 
Distributive justice is therefore not always ensured at the participatory level, an 
injustice given a regime which purposely left vague, and subject to further 
63 See, John Rawls, 'Political Liberalism: Reply to Habennas' (1995) 92 Journal of Philosophy 132, 
170. 
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negotiation, many of its provisions. Nevertheless, given that the international climate 
change regime is underpinned by distributive justice, the following section will now 
explore whether the particular burden of displacement may find distributive resolve 
in that regime. 
5. The Potential of Adaptation in Relation to Climate Change and Human 
Mobility 
The previous section outlined how distributive justice in relation to the detrimental 
consequences of climate change is addressed by the international climate change 
regime through commitments to the provision of adaptation assistance to those 
burdened by the impacts of climate change and by those who, overwhelmingly, have 
contributed most to greenhouse gas emissions and benefitted the most from emitting 
activities. The chapter now turns to how any of this matters to climate change-
induced 1nobility, including displacement. Can adaptation, including the 
international financial assistance available through international adaptation 
channels, 64 make a difference to relieving the displacement burden distributively? 
Before outlining opportunities for affected countries to seek climate change 
adaptation assistance in relation to people movement, the following brief section will 
first engage with the connection between adaptation and such movement. 
Fundamentally, adaptation is connected to people movement in two ways: First, 
people movement itself is an adaptation strategy, which means that adaptation 
assistance should be channelled to enabling such movement where it is necessary or 
64 These channels will be discussed in s 7 of this chapter. 
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desired. Secondly, adaptive measures may well be sufficient to prevent people 
movement where it is not desired and adaptation assistance could therefore prevent 
displacement. 65 Both opportunities will now be discussed in greater detail: Jon 
Barnett and Michael Webber have highlighted that people movement in the climate 
change context may be a desirable adaptation response that could lead to greater 
livelihood security for those moving and for those left behind, especially where new 
livelihoods can be established in the new place and remittances sent back to the place 
of origin. 66 On this view, then, adaptation assistance should help people move, 
thereby increasing their personal safety and their livelihood opportunities. Several 
adaptation projects submitted under existing international adaptation channels 
incorporate this view. For example, the Maldives, a low-lying island nation in the 
Indian Ocean, has requested international adaptation assistance for a project which 
would enable it to implement better its 'Safer Island Strategy', tasked, in part, with 
the resettlement of individuals and communities from vulnerable -to less vulnerable 
islands. 67 The project, in other words, views people movement itself as a necessary 
adaptive strategy. 
On the other hand, migration, displacement and relocation create vulnerabilities. 
The previous chapter stressed this in connection with insurance programmes that 
target migrants. Michael Cernea68 has also highlighted a multitude of vulnerabilities 
and ill effects which arise in connection with involuntary people movement 
( development-induced), for example, 'landlessness', 'joblessness' , 'homelessness', 
65 See, eg, Soumyadeep Banerjee, Richard Black and Dominic Kniveton, 'Migration as an Effective 
Mode of Adaptation to Climate Change' (Foresight, 2011). 
66 Jon Barnett and Michael Webber, 'Acconunodating Migration to Promote Adaptation to Climate 
Change' (Policy Research Working Paper 5270, The World Bank, 2010) eg, 24ff. 
67 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, NAPA Project Profile, 2 <http:// 
unfccc.int/files/adaptation/napas/application/pdf/23 _1nald __pp.pdf>. 
68 Michael Cemea, 'The Risks and Reconstruction Models for Resettling Displaced Populations' 
(1997) 25 World Development 1569, 1569. 
235 
CHAPTER SEVEN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - DISTRIBUTING COSTS 
'marginalisation', ' food insecurity', 'loss of access to common property resources', 
' increased morbidity' and 'community disarticulation' . The particular issues faced 
especially by women migrants and displacees have also been widely highlighted in 
the literature. 69 On this view, then, adaptation assistance should play its part to 
prevent a climate change-induced phenomenon that is likely not desired. 70 Looking 
at the Maldives again, although it realises the value of people moving as an 
adaptation strategy, it equally acknowledges implicitly that it is important to enable 
people to stay as long as they can. Several of the projects it has applied funding for 
reference a desire to implement measures to ensure the continued viable habitation of 
communities and islands, for example through the installation of water storage 
facilities, improved building design and the strengthening of coastal defences. 71 
A dual role for adaptation is evidenced in the climate change-induced mobility 
context. On the one hand, moving itself may be an adaptation strategy; on the other 
hand, implementation of adaptation strategies should preferably prevent movement. 
In one case, moving may ease burdens; in the other, easing burdens is meant to 
prevent movement. What remains to be discussed now is whether the international 
adaptation framework presents oppo1iunities to alleviate either kind of burden in 
distributive fashion. 
69 See, eg, Susie Jolly and Hazel Reeves, ' Gender and Migration: Overview Report' (Institute of 
Development Studies, Sussex University, 2005). 
7
° Colette Mortreux and Jon Barnett note the undesirability of movement in Tuvalu; see Colette 
Mortreux and Jon Barnett, 'Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation to Climate Change in 
Funafuti, Tuvalu' (2009) 19 Global Environmental Change 105. 
71 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 67. 
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6. Opportunities in the International Adaptation Framework 
The issue of mobility, particularly migration, displacement and planned relocation, 
has in recent years indeed emerged within the international climate change regime in 
the adaptation context. A connection between climate change and human mobility 
has thereby formally been made and the issue 'has been brought to an international 
policy arena' .72 Koko Warner has outlined the emergence of mobility as a topic 
within the climate change negotiations and its emergence within various adaptation 
· 73 instruments. 
Emergence of the International Adaptation Framework and of Migration, 
Displacement and Relocation within the Framework 
A previous section noted that it was only with the Bali Action Plan in 2007 that 
states parties to the UNFCCC made a greater commitment to 'enhanced action on 
adaptation' in addition to mitigation.74 To facilitate this, the Ad H<?_c Working Group 
on Long-Term Cooperative Action (A WG-LCA) was formed, which, for a brief time 
following its formation, sought guidance and submissions to consider in future 
negotiating texts not only from states parties but also observer bodies. 75 Warner 
notes how this meant that not only states but various organisations were able to 
inform the international climate change negotiations: 'the wider humanitarian 
community - including UN agencies, research and civil society - massively 
72 See Koko Warner, 'Migration and Displacement in the Context of Adaptation to Climate Change: 
Developments in the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations and Potential for Future Action' (Foresight, 
2011) 1 and Koko Warner, ' Clirnate Change Induced Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the Context 
of the UNFCCC Clilnate Negotiations' (Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Office of the 
United Nations High Cormnissioner for Refugees, 2011). 
73 Ibid [both]. 
74 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Revised Draft Decision -/CP.13: 
Ad How Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action Under the Convention: Prop osal by the 
President, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2007/L.7/Rev.l (14 December 2007) para l(c)(ii) 
75 Warner, 'Migration and Displacement' , above n 72, 5 and Warner, ' Climate Change Induced 
Displacement' , above n 72, 7. 
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mobilized in the period from 2008 to 2009 to ensure that the human face of climate 
change would be duly represented', including the p~ssibility of displacement. 76 It is 
through such efforts that climate change-related mobility was first reflected in the 
assembly document compiled for COP14 in Poznan in 2008.77 More than just a 
mention, it soon found firmer acknowledgement as an adaptation issue at COP 15 in 
Copenhagen in 2009, where the COP 
4. Invite[ d] all Parties to enhance adaptation action under the Copenhagen Adaptation 
Framework taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, and specific national and regional development priorities, 
objectives and circumstances ... to undertake, inter alia: 
[ ... ] 
(f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation related to 
national, regional and international climate change induced displacement, migration 
and planned relocation, where appropriate.78 
Activities related to displacement, migration and planned relocation thereby became 
formally recognised as an adaptation concern, important, as it made such activities at 
least in theory also eligible for emerging adaptation funding. 79 
Further discussions concerning climate change-related mobility led to the 
eventual inclusion of an only marginally-different Article 14(f) in the Cancun 
Adaptation Framework in 2010, which 
14. Invites all Parties to enhance action on adaptation under the Cancun Adaptation 
Framework, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities, and specific national and regional development priorities, 
objectives and circun1stances, by unde1iaking, inter alia, the following 
[ ... ] 
76 Warner, 'Migration and Displacement', above n 72, 5 and Warner, 'Climate Change Induced 
Displacement', above n 72, 7. 
77 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), Ideas and Proposals on Paragraph I of the 
Bali Action Plan, UN Doc FCCC/A WGLCA/2008/16/Revl (15 January 200), para 63(g), para 112(f) 
and 112 (h); noted in Warner, 'Migration and Displacement', above n 72, 8f and Warner, 'Climate 
Change Induced Displacement', above n 72, 8. 
78 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Work Undertaken by the Conference of 
the Parties at its Fifteenth Session on the Basis of the Report by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-
term Cooperative Action under the Convention, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/2 (11 February 2010). 79 Warner, 'Migration and Displacement', above n 72, 10, 13. 
238 
CHAPTER SEVEN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - DISTRIBUTING COSTS 
(f) Measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation with regard to 
climate change induced displacement, migration and planned relocation, where 
appropriate, at national, regional and international levels. 80 
Warner notes how this accounts for 'different levels of mobility' , ' different types of 
mobility' and 'different kinds of measures ' that could be taken by states parties. 81 
Distributive Justice? 
Before evaluating how migration, displacement and relocation appear in the 
international adaptation framework in light of distributive justice principles, it is 
important to consider some of the debates that informed, in the background, how the 
issue should be framed. Warner notes that throughout the negotiations leading up to 
the eventual inclusion of Paragraph 4(f) in the Copenhagen outcome text, 'some 
Parties suggested that an array of themes be added in to [the] paragraph, [including] 
human rights, mother earth, justice, compensation to vulnerable people, and other 
items of importance to particular parties.' 82 Warner highlights how this quickly 
jeopardised having any mention of human mobility included in the text at all. 
Instead, she argues, mention of mobility in that outcome text and the Cancun 
Adaptation Framework was highly dependent on the issue being ' couched in 
pragmatic, solution-oriented terms ', framed as a ' technical issue' 83 and, importantly 
as a 'politically feasible option' that does not require of states parties the 
implementation of ' overly complex arrangements ' or too much 'political capital. 84 
The result is paragraph that asks states parties to support a limited array of measures 
80 United Nations Framework Convention on Cliinate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties 
on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010 - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties - Decisions Adopted by the Conference of the Parties, UN 
Doc FCCC/CP/2010 /7/Add. l (15 March 2011). 
81 Warner, ' Climate Change Induced Displacement', above n 72, 12. 
82 Warner, 'Migration and Displacement' above n 72, 10. 
83 Warner, 'Climate Change Induced Displacement', above n 72, 4. 
84 Warner, 'Migration and Displacement' above n 72, 14. 
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which increase the knowledge base surrounding climate change-related mobility or 
which enhance cooperation or coordination. 
What does this mean for distributive justice? It is a positive development that 
mobility-related issues have found some expression within an overall framework that 
is underpinned by distributive justice. In fact, its emergence in that context is hailed 
as a success by those who work on climate change-related mobility issues, 85 and 
Warner herself deserves credit for getting human mobility formally acknowledged as 
an adaptation matter within the international negotiations. By finding expression in 
the international adaptation framework, displacement and other types of people 
movement that arise in connection with climate change are placed within the context 
of instruments through which wealthier countries have acknowledged that the 
burdens their activities are placing on poorer countries warrant support to counter 
such burdens. However, the current framing of mobility within the international 
-
adaptation framework raises other questions concerning distributive justice: political 
sensitivities concerning migration and displacement meant that mobility arises in the 
adaptation framework in somewhat curtailed fashion. Only certain activities, 
particularly concerning knowledge, coordination and cooperation, were agreed upon 
by states parties to be measures that should be supported within the adaptation 
context. What this inevitably means is that the distributive justice potential of the 
international adaptation framework does not extend to those who are directly 
affected by displacement or those who wish to implement adaptation measures 
which could prevent displacement (unless this occurs in the context of coordination 
and cooperation, but it is not clear what this means). Their burden can likely not, for 
85 See, eg, Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 232. 
240 
CHAPTER SEVEN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - DISTRIBUTING COSTS 
the time being, be relieved through application of Article 14(f) of the Cancun 
Adaptation Framework. 
Still, it is vital that some mention of human mobility has been made in that 
Framework. Jane McAdam has argued that this 'provides an important recognition of 
the impacts of climate change on human movement, and the need for states to 
address this. ' 86 Warner argues that ' [ e ]xpert-supported processes or other fora for 
exploring a topic like migration and displacement in more depth and focus can bring 
additional insights and momentum to the UNFCCC process ' .87 On the other hand, 
there are those who think that 'advocacy [ concerning climate change-related people 
movement] within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) may well have run its race. ' 88 Time will tell whether human mobility as 
an adaptation concern in the international negotiations will be able to move beyond 
the scope of Article 14(f). The following section will now detail how displacement, 
migration and relocation have emerged as an adaptation and i ssistance issue in 
another context. 
7. Opportunities in National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAP As) 
Human mobility - displacement, migration, relocation - induced by, or related to, 
climate change as an issue of adaptation has found perhaps more significant, detailed 
and longer-standing expression in various national adaptation programmes of action 
(NAP As). It is important to recall here that Article 4.9 of the UNFCCC stipulates 
86 Ibid. 
87 Warner, 'Migration and Displacement', above n 72, 13. 
88 Jean-Frarn;ois Durieux 'Book Review: Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law 
' (2013) 25 International Journal of Refugee Law 187, 189. 
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that 'Parties shall take full account of the specific needs and special situations of the 
Least Developed Countries in their actions with regard to funding and transfer of 
technology.' From this basis, the COP decided in 2001 to adopt guidelines that 
would allow least developed countries (LDCs) to submit national adaptation 
programmes of action. 89 The COP argued that 'the rationale for developing NAP As 
rests on the low adaptive capacity of LDCs, which renders them in need of 
immediate and urgent support to start adapting to current and projected adverse 
effects of climate change. ' 90 It acknowledged that LDCs may not themselves have 
the 'capacity to [ ... ] convey their urgent and immediate needs in respect of their 
vulnerability and adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change. ' 91 According to 
the UNFCCC: 
To address the urgent adaptation needs of the LDCs, a new approach was needed that 
would focus on enhancing adaptive capacity to climate variability, which itself would 
help address the adverse effects of climate change. The NAP A takes into account 
existing coping strategies at the grassroots level, and builds upon that to identify 
priority activities, rather than focusing on scenario-based modelling to assess future 
vulnerability and long-tenn policy at state level. In the NAP A process, prominence is 
given to community-level input as an important source of information, recognizing 
that grassroots co1n1nunities are the 1nain stakeholders.92 
In other words, NAP As would provide a means by which least developed countries, 
through community consultation, would develop a suit of adaptation activities by 
which at least their most 'urgent and immediate needs' in the climate change context 
could be addressed, 'those for which further delay could increase vulnerability or 
lead to increased costs at a later stage' .93 NAP As were to contain a variety of 
89 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Decision 28/CP. 7: Guidelines for 
the Preparation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.4 (21 January 2002). 
90 Ibid, Annex, para 2. 
91 Ibid. 
92 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, The National Adaptation Programme 
of Action (NAP A) (March 2013) <http: //unfccc.int/cooperation _ support/least_ developed_ count 
ries _portal/ldc _ work _programme_ and_ napa/items/4 722.php. 
93 Ibid. 
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adaptation activities for each country, ranked by priority from most urgent.94 Once a 
NAP A was finalised, the country concerned was to work with the Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) and its implementing agencies to develop specific 
projects for funding under the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF), operated by 
the GEF.95 Forty nine NAPAs have been received by the UNFCCC in the last ten 
years or so, the great majority from Africa, with Somalia and Myanmar being the 
latest submissions in early 2013.96 They include a total number of over 450 
projects,97 of which over 80 have now moved to approval stage.98 
Human Mobility in NAP As 
Why are NAP As important in the context of climate change and displacement? The 
answer to this question lies in the fact that a significant number of them make at least 
some mention of displacement, migration or relocation. Some include potential 
activities that would either foster movement where this is desired or necessary, 
others seek to prevent it where it is not. In a 2012 study of how migration, 
displacement, relocation or other mobility issues find mention in forty-five of the 
submitted NAPAs, Jon Sward and Samuel Codjoe show that ten NAPAs make at 
least cursory mention of such issues more than twenty times (Solomon Islands tops 
this list at over 40 mentions); fourteen NAPAs make mention of these issues 
between ten and nineteen times and twenty-one Programmes mention them nine 
94 Ibid. 
95 See, eg, Global Enviromnent Facility, 'Note on GEF Support for National Adaptation Plans of 
Action' (2002). 
96 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, NAP As Received by Secretariat (2013) 
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation _ support/least_ developed_ countries _portal/submitted_ napas/items/45 8 
5.php>. 
97 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, NAPA Priorities Database (29 March 
2012) <http: //unfccc.int/ cooperation_ support/least_ developed_ countries _portal/nap a _priorities_ data 
base/items/4583 .php>. 
98 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Status of NAPA Implementation under 
the LDCF (28 January 2013) <http:/ /unfccc.int/ cooperation_ support/least_ developed_ countries_ 
portal_/ldcf_ napa _projects/items/5632.php>. 
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times or less (Laos, Nepal and Yemen appear to make the scantest mention - just 
once).99 Overall, several features are to be noted: where mobility is mentioned or 
engaged with, this is usually in the internal context. 100 Tuvalu's NAPA is a rare 
exception; it at least mentions briefly a history of Tuvaluans migrating internally as 
well as externally in the context of overall livelihoods insecurity in the island 
nation. 101 Sward and Codjoe also note that many NAP As frame people movement as 
something negative and to be prevented. 102 Perhaps this explains why Susan Martin, 
who has also surveyed NAP As, highlights a tendency to propose 'policies and 
programmes that would have the effect of stabilising populations in areas that might 
experience large-scale out-migration in the absence of such measures.' 103 Otherwise, 
discussion of displacement, migration or relocation varies in the different NAP As. 
The following selection will give a flavour of how they occur: 
• Bangladesh' s NAPA104 expects that its project entitled 'Promoting Adaptation 
to Coastal Crop and Agriculture to Combat Salinization' w~uld halt ' [ s ]ocial 
consequences of mass scale migration to cities [ ... ] to some extent.' Similarly, 
through its project entitled 'Adaptation to agriculture Systems in Areas Prone 
to Enhanced Flash Flooding - North East and Central Region', Bangladesh 
hopes '[i]n the long-term people might get a means to continue with farming 
instead of migrating to cities after the flood. This would to some extent reduce 
social problems of migration of the distressed community to cities.' 
99 See Jon Sward and Samuel Codjoe, 'Human Mobility and Climate Change Adaptation Policy: A 
Review of Migration in National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs)' (Working Paper 6, 
Migrating out of Poverty, University of Sussex, 2012) 15ff. Thirteen countries make no mention of 
mobility-related issues at all; ibid. Jane McAdam also surveyed all NAP As submitted up to 2012 for 
mention ofhmnan mobility; see McAdam, above n 85, Appendix, 27lff. 
100 Sward and Codjoe, above n 98, 14. 
10 1 Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment, Agriculture and Lands, Government of Tuvalu, 
Tuvalu 's National Adaptation Programme of Action (May 2007), 16 <http: //unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/napa/tuv0 1.pdf> 
102 See Sward and Codjoe, above n 99, 14. 
103 Susan F Martin, 'Climate Change, Migration and Adaptation' (GMF Background Paper on 
Climate Change and Migration' (The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2010) 6-7. 
104 Ministry of Environment and Forest Government of the People ' s Republic of Bangladesh, 
National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) - Final Report (November 2005), 35f <http: // 
unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/ban0 l .pdf>. 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Bhutan's NAPA105 notes that several of its projects must also include 
'[i]dentification of potential areas for resettlement of villages'. 
Guinea-Bissau's NAP A 106 notes how various environmental and climatic 
factors are 'leading to the displacement of whole villages'. 
Kiribati's NAPA 107 cites instances of past relocation, 'with implications on the 
uses and sometimes conflicting claims over resettled land'. 
The Maldives' NAP A 108 notes the vulnerability of all of its islands to climate 
change-associated sea-level rise and has proposed a project in relation to its 
'Safer Island Strategy' , 'developed by the government to resettle communities 
from the smaller, more vulnerable islands into larger, better protected ones.' 
Mauritania's NAP A 109 highlights how drought and desertification have led 
people to partake 'in a massive rural exodus'. 
Samoa's NAPA110 mentions under 'key adaptation needs' ' [a]ssistance for 
relocation of communities inland'. 
• Sao Tome and Principe's NAPA111 includes a project entitled 'Displacement of 
Local Communities' for select coastal communities. Proposed activities 
include construction of new houses elsewhere for such communities, supplying 
water and energy and relocating populations there. 
• Solomon Islands' NAP A 112 is concerned about populations on low-lying or 
artificial islands. It argues that ' [ ±]or most of these communities relocation is a 
potential adaptation measure. However, relocation is problematic when they do 
not own land resources on nearby islands thus land tenure and land 
105 National Enviromnent Commission, Royal Government of Bhutan, Bhutan National Adaptation 
Programme of Action (May 2006), eg 30 <http ://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/btnOl.pdf>. 
106 Ministry of Natural Resources and Enviromnent, Government of Guinea-Bissau, National 
Programme of Action of Adaptation to Climate Change (December 2006), 15 <http ://www.prevention 
web.net/files/8525 _gnb0 1.pdf>. 
107 Ministry of Environment, Land and Agricultural Development, Government of Kiribati, Republic 
or Kiribati, National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) (January 2007), 11 <http: //unfccc.int/ 
resource/docs/napa/kir0 1.pdf>. 
108 Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water, Government, Republic of Maldives, National 
Adaptation Program of Action - Republic of Maldives (2007), 47f <http: //unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
napa/mdv0l.pdf>. 
109 Ministry of Rural Development and of Environment, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, National 
Adaptation Programme of Action to Climate Change (November 2004), 11 <http: //unfccc.int/re 
source/docs/napa/mau0l e.pdf>. 
110 Ministry of Natural Resow·ces, Environment and Meteorology, Government of Samoa, National 
Adaptation Programme of Action - Samoa (December 2005), 17, 18 <http: //unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
napa/sam0 l .pdf>. 
111 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Government of Sao Tome and Principe, National 
Adaptation Programmes of Action on Climate Change (December 2006), 48 <http://www.prevention 
web.net/files/8567 _ stp0 1.pdf>. 
112 Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Meteorology, Government of Solomon Islands, 
Solomon Islands - National Adaptation Programmes of Action (November 2008), 86 <http://unfccc. 
int/resource/docs/napa/slb0 1.pdf>. 
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management systems prohibit any discussion let alone relocate to nearby 
islands. For example, Langalanga people cannot move to nearby island where 
they do not own land and its resources. ' It notes that ' it will require legislative 
and structural changes to the land tenure and land management systems in the 
country to facilitate [ relocation and resettlement]. ' 113 It fears that ' [ t ]he biggest 
risk is that land owners and resource owners may not agree to the terms and 
conditions of relocation and also may claim compensation to the amounts that 
could be prohibitive for the government. It is therefore imperative to engage 
the relocating people and the resource owners at the very early stage of 
1 · ,114 p ann1ng. 
• Sudan's NAP A notes how 'past climatic shocks such as drought [have led to] 
large-scale human suffering from hunger among [ affected] groups, including 
.c d . . f 1 ' 115 1orce out migration rom rura areas . 
• Tanzania' s NAPA116 counts amongst its 'selected projects activities' the 
'relocation of vulnerable communities from low-lying areas ' . 
• Tuvalu's NAP A 117 raises concerns that 'increasing population and internal 
migration to urban areas and the increasing changes in climate and variability 
resulting in e1Tatic rainfall pattern changes [are causing] water problem[s] in 
Tuvalu' . 
• Uganda's NAP A 118 engages with migration in lengthier fashion: 'If affected 
con1Illunities have no option for coping with climate-induced stress, especially 
in drought-prone areas then, victims migrate to urban a.reas or resource-
endowed neighbourhoods. In the lakeside communities e.g. Nakasongola, 
migration includes settling on suds (floating islands). This strategy causes 
social and economic conflicts, which may lead to instability, family 
disintegration and related conflicts. The movement of livestock and wildlife 
often ensures their survival. Ho,vever, it is one of the biggest modes of disease 
spread. Migrating animals also suffer physical injuries and death. In the 
protected areas such as the national parks and game reserves, these negative 
aspects of the strategy are more pronounced. In the pastoral communities 
where livestock is the major source of _food, migration of the men (family 
leaders) with the livestock herds in search of water and pasture often leaves the 
family behind more vulnerable to famine.' Uganda also mentions relocation of 
communities ' to safer areas/districts ' in relation to one of its project. 11 9 
113 Ib'd 4? 
1 ' -· 114 Ibid, 87. 
115 Ministry of Environment and Physical Development, Republic of Sudan, National Adaptation 
Programme of Action (July 2007), 9 <http: //unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/sdnO 1.pdf 
116 Vice President's Office, Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, United Republic of 
Tanzania - ·National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAP A) (January 2007), ix 
<http: //unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/tzaO 1.pdf>. 
117 Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment, Agriculture and Lands, Government of Tuvalu, 
above n 101 , 45. 
118 The Republic of Uganda, Uganda National Adaptation Programmes of Action (2007), 44 <http:// 
unfccc.int/ resource/docs/napa/uga0 l .pdf>. 
119 Ibid, 56. 
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Different themes emerge: Several NAP As acknowledge that migration or 
displacement have historically occurred in relation to environmental factors but 
suspect that climate change may add to pre-existing pressures 120 which may compel 
people movement further. As has been noted before, people movement is considered 
d . bl . NAPA . . . 1 nfl' 121 . b·1· 122 un esira e 1n many s: 1t can cause soc1a co 1ct or 1nsta 1 1ty, 
. h d hi 123 l d d' 124 12s d d' .c economic ar s p, an 1sputes, resource pressures an 1sease, 1or 
example when livestock move with people. 126 Rural to urban migration, in particular, 
is something that many NAP As want to prevent. 127 On the other hand, many NAP As 
do acknowledge that some people movement is likely and necessary. However, such 
NAP As envision that movement is facilitated by the state through planned and 
orderly relocation. 128 One final caveat to note is that although this chapter is no 
longer concerned with the idea of compensation, it is Gambia's NAP A 129 which, in a 
project entitled 'Restoration/Protection of Coastal Environments', explicitly 
envisions not only resettlement in relation to the project but also that 'compensation 
120 See, eg, Ministry of Environment and Forest Government of the People 's Republic of Bangladesh, 
above n 104, 35. 
121 Eg, ibid and The Republic of Uganda, above n 118 . 
122 Eg, The Republic of Uganda, above n 118. 
123 Eg, ibid. 
124 Eg, Ministry of Environment, Land and Agricultural Development, Government of Kiribati, 
Republic or Kiribati, above n 107 and Ministry of Environment, Conservation and Meteorology, 
Government of Solomon Islands, above n 112. 
125 Eg, Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment, Agriculture and Lands, Government of Tuvalu, 
above n 101. 
126 Eg, The Republic of Uganda, above n 118. 
127 Eg, Ministry of Environment and Forest Government of the People 's Republic of Bangladesh, 
above n 104 and Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment, Agriculture and Lands, Government of 
Tuvalu, above n 101. 
128 Eg, Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment and Meteorology, Government of Samoa, above 
n 110, Vice President' s Office, Government of the United Republic of Tanzania, above n 116 and 
Ministry of Environment, Energy and Water, Republic of Maldives, above n 108; also Martin, above 
n 103, 3. 
129 Department of State for Forestry and Environment, Government of Gambia, Gambia National 
Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) on Climate Change (November 2007), 82 <http ://unfccc. 
int/resource/docs /napa/gmb0 l .pdf>. 
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will have to be considered'. That said, Sao Tome and Principe's NAPA also makes a 
veiled reference to compensation in connection with relocation. 130 
Project Implementation 
According to the UNFCCC website, over eighty projects contained in NAPAs have 
now advanced to approval and implementation stage. 131 More than half (56.1 
percent) of the approved funds have been dedicated to projects in Africa ( the 
majority of NAPAs originate from that continent), nearly a quarter to projects in 
Small Island Developing States (SIDS) (24.5 percent) and nearly a fifth to projects in 
Asia (19.1 percent), with the remaining funding going to other regions. 132 Several of 
the projects underway deal with issues that are, at least inadvertently, connected to 
displacement, migration or relocation: Tuvalu, for example, which views migration 
and resettlement as a 'last resort to adaptation . . . should the wars [ t] case scenario 
occur', 133 has seen its 'Increasing Resilience of Coastal Areas and Community 
Settlement to Climate Change' project endorsed, implementation costs of which are 
USD 8.2 million (not all the funds come from the LDCF). 134 Amongst other things, 
the project's goal, according to Tuvalu's NAP A, is to enhance the protection of 
coastal communities from erosion, tidal surges and other phenomena through ' the 
construction of coastal defences and the planting of green belts along the 
coastline', 135 thereby enabling continued habitation of such communities. Other 
130 Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, Government of Sao Tome and Principe, above n 
111,48. 
131 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 98. 132 Global Environment Facility, Least Developed Country Fund (2013) <http: //www.thegef.org/gef/ 
LDCF. 
133 Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment, Agriculture and Lands, Government of Tuvalu, 
above n 101, 25. 
134 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 98. 
135 Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment, Agriculture and Lands, Government of Tuvalu, 
above n 101, 41. 
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projects approved also deal with human habitation, livelihoods and the possibility of 
dislocation. These include Nepal's ' Community-based Flood and Glacial Lake 
Outburst Risk Reduction' project (USD 25 million total cost)136 and the afore-
mentioned Maldives ' project on 'Integration of Climate Change Risks into the 
Maldives Safer Island Development Programme' (USD 9 .9 million total cost). 137 
Evaluating the success and impact of such projects, however, is difficult for the time 
being, as none are completed. 
Final Words 
NAP As are an important tool by which at least LDCs have been able to raise climate 
change-induced or related human mobility as an adaptation concern. This is 
important because NAP As have permitted that such concerns are not only voiced but 
addressed on a project basis. Several NAP As include projects whereby mobility is 
either fostered (i .e. through relocation) or where it is prevented where so desired (i.e. 
through addressing climate change-related community vulnerabilities). Importantly 
for distributive justice, least developed countries are able to seek funding for such 
projects from a special fund set up exclusively to address their particular 
vulnerabilities and funded by those who contribute to climate change and its effects. 
Neve1iheless, NAP As are project-oriented and can address vulnerabilities only 
in piece-meal fashion. The 2007 /2008 Human Development Report highlighted this 
problem: 
First, they provide a very limited response to adaptation challenges, focusing 
primarily on ' climate proofing' through small-scale projects .... Second, the NAP As 
have, in 1nost countries, been developed outside of the institutional framework for 
national planning on pove1iy reduction. The upshot is a project-based response that 
136 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 98 . 
137 Ibid. 
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fails to integrate adaptation planning into the development of wider policies for 
overco1ning vulnerability and inarginalization. 138 
Others have questioned whether the community involvement envisioned by NAP As 
was sufficiently addressed: Saleemul Huq and Mizan Khan for example argue that 
if procedural justice, meaning fairness of the process used to prioritize the activities, 
can be ensured in the NAP A process, considerations of equity in outco1ne can be 
addressed. This requires a bottom-up approach to each step of the NAPA, so that the 
i1nmediate needs and concerns of the 1nost affected communities are included in the 
list of projects for funding under NAP As. 139 
They show how, certainly in relation to Bangladesh's NAP A, this was not always 
done. 140 
Ultimately, NAPAs represent a valuable but not a comprehensive approach by 
which climate change-induced or related mobility may be tackled. Martin argues that 
they do not present a 'coherent framework' .141 Huq and Khan critique their sector-
based, non-holistic approach. 142 Importantly, the great majority of projects proposed 
in NAP As have remained un-approved or un-funded and future funding is far from 
certain (the following section will outline this in greater detail). A vast discrepancy 
has emerged, in other words, between the priorities identified in NAP As and the 
availability of funds to support them. From a distributive justice angle, NAP As have 
therefore ren1ained an elusive success story, despite the fact that they explicitly 
target those who, certainly in the Senian (and Nussbaum), capability-centred view of 
distributive justice, have been acknowledged to be most in need of assistance on 
account of pa1iicular, pre-existing vulnerabilities. The final section of this chapter 
138 Cited in Susan F Martin, 'Climate Change, Migration and Governance' (2010) 16 Global 
Governance 397, 401. 
139 Saleemul Huq and Mizan R Khan, 'Equity in National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAP As: 
The Case of Bangladesh' in W Neil Adger, Jouni Paavola, Saleemul Huq and M J Mace (eds), 
Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change (MIT Press, 2006) 181 , 18lf. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Martin, above n 103 , 7. 
14? 
- Huq and Khan, above n 139, eg 196. 
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will discuss in further detail adaptation financing issues, including the financing of 
NAP As, and critique this from a distributive justice and a displacement angle. 
8. Climate Change Adaptation Funding and Distributive Justice 
The chapter has covered much ground: it has argued that climate change burdens 
(and benefits) will be distributed unevenly. This is as true for the burdens which will 
arise in relation to displacement, as it is for many other detrimental climate change 
effects. Distributive justice demands that something is done to re-balance this 
inequity and the chapter has shown that the international regime tasked with 
addressing climate change is underpinned by this notion. Within the regime, human 
-
mobility-related 1natters such as displacement have begun to be identified as a 
particular issue that may be eligible for, and require, adaptation assistance. At least 
in theory, then, the issue is well situated to find at least some resolve through the 
commitments made by those thought to largely have caused climate change. 
However, in practice distributive resolution of climate change burdens such as 
displacement of course depends not only on theoretical commitments made but their 
matching with the actual transfer of assistance, for the most part monetary funding. 
The final section of this chapter will reveal a narrative of mixed successes and 
uncertain prospects with regards to this aspect of distribution. 
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Emergence of the Adaptation Funding Architecture 
Responsibilities for funding adaptation measures and eligibility to receive funding 
for such measures, is differentiated. 143 Article 4.3 of the UNFCCC provides that 
developed country parties (Annex II) shall 'provide such financial resources, 
including through the transfer of technology, needed by developing country Parties 
to meet the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures covered by 
paragraph 1 of this Article'. Paragraph 1 lists a host of measures, including the 
promotion of sustainable development ( d) and cooperation in the preparation for 
adaptation ( e ). Article 4.3 also stipulates that financial resources provided to 
developing countries must be 'new and additional'. Article 4.4 further stipulates that 
'developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II shall 
also assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse 
-
effects.' Article 4.9 notes that with regards to funding and other measures particular 
attention must be paid to 'the specific needs and special situation of the least 
developed countries'. Article 4.7 highlights that implementation of developing 
country commitments under the UNFCCC 'will depend on the effective 
implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the 
Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology'. Article 11 
establishes the overall financial mechanism of the UNFCCC: 'A mechanism for the 
provision of financial resources [ ... ] is hereby defined.' As an interim arrangement, 
Article 21(3) nominated the Global Environment Facility as 'the international entity 
entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism referred to in Article 11 ', 
143 M J Mace, 'Adaptation under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: The 
International Legal Framework' in W Neil Adger et al, above n 139, 53 , 53f ; see also the prior 
discussion in this chapter. 
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although the financing of adaptation activities, as the following pages will show, has 
become more intricate and dispersed since. 
At its first session in 1995, the COP decided that 
[a] daptation to the adverse effects of climate change, as defined by the Convention, 
will require short, medium and long term strategies which should be cost effective, 
take into account important socio-economic implications, and should be implemented 
on a stage-by-stage basis in developing countries that are Parties to the 
C · 144 onvention .. 
The COP envisioned three stages: Stage I was to be about planning for adaptation 
and should start immediately. Stages II and III were envisioned as medium- to long-
term measures, and were to include capacity-building and eventually the 
implementation of adaptation measures, including insurance. 145 Various schemes 
have emerged since to operationalize this, and Stages II and III are well underway. 146 
The Least Developed Countries Fund for the establishment and implementation 
of NAP As has already been mentioned. It was set up in 2002 and supports the 
preparation of NAP As and the implementation of specific projects enclosed therein. 
It is operated by the Global Environment Facility and its implementing agencies: the 
Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Inter-
American Development Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development, 
the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Environment 
Programme, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization and the World 
Bank. The Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), also established in 2002 and run 
under the auspices of the GEF, was set up to climate-proof national development 
144 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its First Session, Held at Berlin from 28 March to 7 April 1995 - Part Two: Action Taken 
by the Conference of the Parties at its First Session, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1995/Add.l (6 June 1995) 
36. 
145 Ib'd ,..,7 1 ' .) . 
146 For a full list see Climate Funds Update, Climate Fund Profiles (2013) <http://www.climatefunds 
update.org/listing>. The following outline of various adaptation funds is based on this. 
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sectors. The Strategic Priority on Adaptation (SPA) was established in 2003 and for 
three years enabled the GEF to test how full-fledged adaptation projects could best 
be developed. The Adaptation Fund (AF), established under the Kyoto Protocol 147 
and operational only for a few years, provides adaptation funding for projects in 
developing countries. It is funded in part through earnings from the clean 
development mechanism (CDM), as well developed country contributions, like the 
other two funds. Two further mechanisms have global reach: first, the World Bank 
operates a Pilot Program for Climate Resilience, administered under its Climate 
Investment Funds and set up to improve climate resilience in vulnerable countries. 148 
Secondly, the European Union's Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA) initiative 
is conceptualised as a 'platform for dialogue and exchange as well as practical 
cooperation' but is also 'backed by strong commitment from the EU to increase 
financial support for adaptation measures in LDCs and SIDS' .149 The EU' s initiative 
-does not set up a new funding mechanism. Controversially, the World Bank's 
scheme is funded in the form of grants or 'highly concessional financing' that has to 
be paid back. 150 
A complex system has evolved, which 'raises many governance questions ', 
including about 'fragmentation, inconsistencies and duplication' .151 Tom Mitchell et 
al note several concerns which have been raised in particular by developing 
countries: 'governance structures are seen by developing countries as complex and 
147 Under art 12.8. 
148 See, eg, Climate Investment Funds, Pilot Program for Climate Resilience (2013) <https ://www.cli 
mateinvestmentfunds. org/ cif/node/ 4>. 
149 See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: Building a Global Climate Change Alliance between the 
European Union and Poor Developing Countries Most Vulnerable to Climate Change, COM(2007) 
540final, 18 September 2007, 2f. 
150 See Climate Investment Funds, above n 148, 2. 
151 See, eg, Asa Persson, ' Institutionalising Climate Adaptation Financing Under the UNFCCC and 
Beyond: Could an Adaptation "Market" Emerge? ' (Working Paper No 2011-03, Stockholm 
Environment Institute, 2011) 5. 
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weighted in favour or donor countries' and 'rules and structures make accessing 
funding difficult and time-consuming'. Finally, there is thought to be a 'lack of 
transparency in decision making' processes, with not enough consideration given to 
poorer country perspectives. 152 Some have been concerned that although most 
adaptation finance schemes are set up to serve developing and particularly 
vulnerable countries, actual projects have sometimes been funded in countries that 
cannot be said to fall in this category. 153 For these and other reasons a new 
mechanism has been initiated, into which the other funds may eventually be 
merged 154 and, it is hoped, which would simplify procedures. 155 
The Green Climate Fund 
The latest mechanism to join international climate change finance, including the 
financing of adaptation, is the Green Climate Fund (GCF), agreed upon by UNFCCC 
states parties at COPl 7 in Durban in 2011. The GCF is 'to support projects, 
programmes, policies and other activities in developing country Parties ' .156 It is not 
entirely clear where funding for the GCF would come from: the COP 16 outcome text 
in 2010 'took note' of 'relevant reports on the financing needs and options for 
152 Tom Mitchell, Simon Anderson and Saleemul Huq, 'Principles for Delivering Adaptation Finance' 
(Briefing, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, 2008) 2. 
153 Annett Mohner and Richard J T Klein, 'The Global Enviromnent Facility: Funding for Adaptation 
or Adapting to Funds?' (Working Paper, Climate and Energy Programme, Stockholm Environment 
Institute, 2007) 13. The authors cite a project in Hungary as an example. 
154 Although it has been stated that the Fund would 'operate in the context of appropriate 
arrangements between itself and other existing funds under the Convention, and between itself and 
other funds, entities, and channels of climate change financing outside the Fund.'; see United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 
Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011 - Part Two: Action 
Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Seventeenth Session, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2011 /9/Add.1 
(15 March 2012) Annex, para 33. 
155 Richard K Lattanzio, 'International Climate Change Financing: The Green Climate Fund' 
(Congressional Research Service, United States Government, 2013) 1, 9. 
156 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 154, para 3. Note that this is 
to cover both mitigation and adaptation related activities; see United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, above n 154, Annex, para 2. 
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mobilization of resources to address the needs of developing countries Parties with 
regard to climate change adaptation and mitigation. ' 157 The Durban text stipulated 
somewhat more specifically that the Fund 'would receive financial inputs from 
developed country Parties to the Convention' and that it 'may also receive financial 
inputs from a variety of other sources, public and private, including alternative 
sources.' 158 In the meantime, Korea has agreed to be host to the Fund and operation 
is expected to begin in 2014. Yet, many challenges remain. Richard Lattanzio notes 
that there are uncertainties especially about the fit of the Fund with other climate 
finance mechanisms, as well as about how to operationalize both the sourcing and 
disbursal of funding. 159 Transparency and participatory issues have also been noted, 
with meeting minutes not necessarily published and observer participation 
restricted. 160 This has raised concerns especially because developed and developing 
country states parties cannot agree on the future direction of the Fund, with the 
former envisioning a scheme largely detached from the UNFCC and supported by 
the private sector, and the latter insisting on UNFCCC primary involvement and the 
responsibility of certain states to fund the GFC (the distributive justice option). 161 
However, these are not the orJy issues plaguing the Fund. Even where it was to be 
successful in being set up as a largely distributive body under the umbrella of the 
UNFCCC, what plagues the whole adaptation architecture, including the GCF as it is 
now being set up, is a significant disjuncture between identified adaptation needs and 
157 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the 
Parties on its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010 - Part 
Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Sixteenth Session, UN Doc FCCC/CP/2010/ 
7/Add.l (15 March 2011) para 95. 
158 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 154, Annex, para 29 and para 
30. 
159 Lattanzio, above n 155, 2. 
160 Alex Lenfema, COP 18: Negotiating the Green Climate Fund or the Green Corporate Fund' (19 
November 2012) <http: //thinkafricapress.com/environment/global-climate-financing-losing-its-way-
cop 18-gcf. 
16 1 Ibid. 
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the funding inputs provided by those responsible for creating those needs in the first 
place. Thus, the Green Climate Fund, for example, expected to become operational 
shortly, has been the subject of pledges totalling only USD 6 million, with 
approximately USD 3 million deposited. 162 Adaptation funding issues and their 
relationship to distributive justice and to climate change and displacement will be 
discussed in the following sub-section. 
Adaptation Costs, Pledges and Contributions 
Many estimates of the costs of climate change adaptation have been put forward. 
The Stern Review of Economics of Climate Change, relying on World Bank 
estimates, noted that soon 'additional costs of adaptation alone [ will be] $4-3 7 
billion each year.' 163 Oxfam has 'estimate[ d] that adaptation will cost at least $50bn 
each year, and far more if global emissions are not cut rapidly.' 164 Some of these 
estimates have been criticised for not being 'substantive' or methodologically 
sound, 165 and for likely being based on 'substantial under-estimates' .166 More 
recently, studies have presented larger estimates of global adaptation costs. In 2010, 
the World Bank, for example, 'estimate[d] that the price tag between 2010 and 2050 
for adapting to an approximately 2 degrees warmer world by 2050 will be in the 
range of $70 to $100 billion a year. ' 167 The International Climate Action Network 
has suggested developed countries need to provide [ ... ] at least US$100 billion per 
162 Climate Funds Updates, Green Climate Fund (2013) <http ://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/ 
green-climate-fund>. 
163 Nicholas Stem, The Stern Review of Economics of Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, 
2006) 502. 
164 Oxfam, 'Adapting to Climate Change: What is the Need in Poor Countries and Who Should Pay?' 
(Oxfam Briefing Paper 104, 2007) 1. 
165 Martin Parry et al, 'Assessing the Costs of Adaptation to Climate Change: A Review of the 
UNFCCC and Other Recent Estimates' (Grantham Institute of Climate Change, Imperial College, 
2009) 8. 
166 Ibid, 7. 
167 The World Bank, 'Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change: Global Cost Estimate ' (2010) xvi. 
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year in grants for adaptation in developing countries' alone. 168 Although such figures 
remain contested, 169 it is beyond doubt that climate change adaptation involves 
significant costs and that developing countries, in particular, cannot meet these 
themselves. 170 Nor should they: as a matter of distributive justice such costs should 
be the responsibility of those who have contributed to making their expenditure 
necessary in the first place (and who have benefitted). Evidence of whether such 
responsibilities are being taken seriously will now be presented. 
Comparing the staggering adaptation cost figures just cited to the inputs 
received by each adaptation fund reveals a significant gap between demand and 
actual contributions to adaptation needs on the ground. The aforementioned NAP As, 
concerning only the most urgent and immediate adaptation needs of least developed 
countries (including those related to human mobility), include a total of over 450 
projects. In 2009, the Least Developed Countries Expe1i Group noted that the 42 
NAP As submitted by then (there are 49 now) included 433 projects at a total cost of 
'at least USD 2 billion', 171 and an average requested expenditure of USD 40 million 
per country. 172 As of April 2013, however, a total of only USD 600 million had been 
pledged to the Least Developed Countries Fund, most of which has been 
deposited 173 and allocated to proj ects. 174 This represents less than thirty percent of 
168 Climate Action Network International, 'Fair, Alnbitious and Binding: Essential for a Successful 
Climate Deal ' (2009) 4. 
169 See, eg, Smita N akhooda, Alice Caravani, Neil Bird and Liane Schalatek, 'Climate Finance 
Fundamentals ' (Brief 3, Heinrich Boll Stiftung [Foundation] North America, 2011) 2. 
170 Ibid. 
171 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Least Developed Countries Expert 
Group, 'Support Needed to Fully Implement Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAP As)' (2009) 17. 
172 Ibid, 7. 
173 Climate Funds Update, Least Developed Countries Fund (2013) <http ://www.climatefundsupdate. 
org/listing/least-developed-countries-fund>. 
174 Global Environment Facility, LDCF/SCCF Council, Progress Report on the Least Developed 
Countries Fund and the Special Climate Change Fund (20 June 2013), iii <http: //www.thegef.org/gef/ 
sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF-LDCF .SCCF _.14-03 .%20Progress%20Report%20on%20the 
%20Least%20Developed%20Countries%20Fund%20and%20Special%20Climate%20Change%20Fu 
nd,%202013-05-23 _ l .pdf>. 
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the figure noted by the Least Developed Countries Expert Group as necessary to 
cover all projects. Worse, project implementation has turned out to be more costly 
than anticipated by many least developed countries. Tuvalu's NAPA, for example, 
offers a budget breakdown of its aforementioned 'Increasing Resilience of Coastal 
Areas and Community Settlement to Climate Change' project, which it anticipated 
would cost USD 1.9 million to implement. 175 However, total project costs are 
currently listed as USD 8.2 million on the UNFCCC's website, 176 so four times more 
than originally expected. 
The Global Environment Facility has also acknowledged that demand exceeds 
significantly supply into its Special Climate Change Fund. 177 A total of over USD 
259 million had been pledged by donors for its Phase 5 (2010 - 2014) by April 
2013, of which USD 240 million have been deposited178 and 220 million spent on 53 
projects (an average of USD 4 million per project). 179 The Adaptation Fund, finally, 
though funded automatically through the Clean Development Mechanism, is 
supplemented by developed country contributions: by April 2013, USD 166 million 
had been pledged for this Fund, most of which had been deposited. 180 
The sum of all inputs to the adaptation funds just discussed total about USD 1 
billion. Even though the CDM would have generated additional adaptation funding 
and financial inputs have also been made into the other adaptation funds or 
mechanisms mentioned (the EU's and the World Bank's), this is nowhere near the 
175 Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment, Agriculture and Lands, Government of Tuvalu, 
above n 101 , 42. 
176 See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 98. 
177 Global Environment Facility, LDCF/SCCF Council, Progress Report on the Least Developed 
Countries Fund (LDCF) and Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF) (28 October 2011), 11 <http: // 
www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Progress%20Report%20on%20LDCF%20SCCF 
%20formatted%20final _ Oct27_2011.pdf>. 
178 Climate Funds Update, Special Climate Change Fund (2013) <http ://www.climatefundsupdate. 
org/listing/special-climate-change-fund>. 
179 Global Environment Facility, LDCF/SCCF Council, above n 174, iii. 
18
° Climate Funds Update, Adaptation Fund (2013) <http ://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/ 
adaptation-fund>. 
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adaptation cost figures mentioned in the studies and reports noted earlier (up to USD 
100 billion per year for developing countries alone). In the context of such shortfalls, 
financial commitments made to both adaptation and mitigation financing at COP 16 
in Cancun seem more promising: 'new and additional resources [ ... ] approaching 
USD 30 billion for the period 2010-2012' were to be made available for both 
adaptation and mitigation activities. 181 Furthermore, developed country parties were 
to 'commit[ ... ] to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion per year by 2020 to 
address the needs of developing countries.' 182 The latter is an astonishing figure. The 
mobilisation of the 'fast- start' pledge to 2012 might give an idea as to developed 
country commitment to achieving the targets set at Cancun: pledges that soon 
emerged totalled USD 34 billion, seemingly surpassing the Cancun goal. 183 
However, the World Resources Institute notes several issues: First, mitigation and 
adaptation are not equally addressed; for example, Germany's 'fast-start' pledge 
dedicated almost twice as much funding to mitigation as adaptation. 184 Secondly, 
there are concerns that not all pledges fulfil the 'new and additional' requirement of 
'fast-start' funding and that some countries simply 're-packaged' . pnor 
commitments. 185 Lisa Junghans and Sven Harmeling, in a study of the OECD 
'Adaptation Marker', note that 'far less projects than the donor countries reported 
are in fact relevant to what can be considered climate change adaptation.' 186 In the 
meantime, no further agreement on how to reach USD 100 billion for adaptation 
assistance to developing countries by 2020 has been reached. 
181 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, above n 157, para 95. 182 Ibid, para 98. 
183 World Resources Institute, Summary of Developed Country 'Fast-Start ' Climate Finance Pledges (November 2012) <http: //www.wri.org/publication/smnmary-of-developed-country-fast-start-climate-
finance-pledges#qanda>. 
184 Ibid. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Lisa Junghans and Sven Harmeling, 'Different Tales from Different Countries: A First Assessment 
of the OECD "Adaptation Marker"' (Germanwatch, 2012) 4. 
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What Does This Mean for Distributive Justice and for Displacement? 
What does all this mean for distributive justice? On a structural level, the 
international regime for adaptation assistance is based on notions of distributive 
justice ( despite some efforts to remove it from this realm, for example, in relation to 
the GCF), with important instruments and documents leaving little doubt that 
wealthier, high-emitting countries are responsible for assisting with adaptation needs 
generated in vulnerable places elsewhere. However, concretely this raises few 
obligations and international financing of adaptation has remained underfunded. For 
displacement this has two consequences: First, the one mechanism through which 
mobility-related issues, including displacement, can expressly be addressed in the 
international climate change regime, NAPAs, has been the subject of limited 
contributions, casting doubt on such issues finding significant resolve through this 
channel. Secondly, because it is the implementation of adaptation measures as a 
whole which may contribute to the prevention of displacement, an international 
adaptation funding architecture significantly lacking in financial inputs prevents 
adaptation playing this role in significant ways. 
9. Conclusion 
The chapter analysed whether displacement in the climate change context could be 
considered a disproportionate burden, one which should or could find relief through 
I 
the application of international assistance norms grounded in distributive justice. 
Unlike earlier chapters, which focused on the notion of responsibility for 
compensation, the current chapter focused on the notion of responsibility in 
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particular for financial assistance - assistance from those arguably responsible for 
climate change and its ill effects to those with little responsibility, from those with 
the means to assist to those without, from those who have benefitted from processes 
that contribute to climate change to those who have not. 
The chapter, first, set up climate change and displacement as an issue of 
distributive (in)justice. It argued that, like other climate change burdens, the 
displacement burden will be distributed unevenly, in the spatial and moral sense. 
The chapter then investigated how distributive justice features in international law, 
showing that it underpins several of international law's regimes, albeit not usually in 
ways that are enforceable. The chapter then turned to a more detailed analysis of the 
distributive justice underpinnings of the international climate change regime. The 
chapter noted that the regime has strong distributive justice foundations, making 
high-emitting countries responsible for distributing resources to poorer (usually low-
emitting countries) in order for the latter to be able to implement climate change 
adaptation measures. The chapter also briefly related this responsibility regime back 
to various justice theories explored in Chapter Four. 
The chapter argued that the distributive justice aspirations of the international 
climate change regime, in particular in relation to adaptation, provide an important 
background by which to consider assistance through (re )-distribution in relation to 
climate change-induced or related people movement. Because such movement can 
be conceptualised as an adaptive response to changing circumstances ( as well as to 
persistent inequalities), including climatic conditions, adaptation assistance could 
and should logically be channelled towards supporting it, and towards diminishing 
the negative consequences that may arise from movement. Equally, adaptation 
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assistance may well prevent movement where this is desired, where adaptation 
assistance is channelled towards decreasing vulnerabilities. 
The chapter showed that, in fact, issues of human mobility have already 
emerged within the international adaptation assistance regime, both in the general 
adaptation framework and the one concerning least developed countries in 
particular. Although mention of migration, displacement and relocation in the 
general framework does not yet permit the distribution of assistance to those directly 
affected (those most in need), their inclusion in a document committing developed 
nations to adaptation assistance is nevertheless important. The regime for adaptation 
assistance for least developed countries has permitted more explicit mention of 
concerns about human mobility resulting from changing climatic conditions; several 
national adaptation programmes of action submitted by least developed countries 
include projects concerning prevention, as well as the facilitation of movement 
where necessary. Some projects including aspects related to migration, displacement 
or relocation have now secured funding. 
A more detailed discussion of adaptation funding comprised the final section of 
this chapter, which argued that theoretical commitments to distributive justice in the 
international climate change regime are ill-matched by its implementation in 
practice. Although fundamental commitments to adaptation assistance ( and thereby 
to distributive justice) have been made by developing countries, the regime does not 
insist that such commitments must be complied with in practice. Could this be, as 
Shue has argued, because ' [i]f one is profiting from injustice, it is hardly going to be 
in one' s interest to pursue justice. ' 187 
187 Henry Shue, 'The Unavoidability of Justice ' in A Hurrell and B Kingsbury ( eds), The 
International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests, and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 
1992) 373 , 376. 
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Ultimately, this has implications also for displacement in the climate change 
context: specifically, with adaptation funds seeing no more than a trickle of what has 
been promised or what is needed, adaptation projects that expressly target issues of 
mobility ( e.g., in NAP As) will remain unfunded. More generally, because the extent 
of adaptation activities implemented may impact on the extent of climate change-
induced displacement, underfunding adaptation as a whole may influence the extent 
of people movement. Resolving the displacement dilemma in distributive fashion 
through adaptation funding assistance therefore remains somewhat doubtful. 
Whereas this chapter has sought to dissect opportunities for distributive justice 
1n the climate change displacement context through financial alleviation of the 
burden of movement where it happens, or its prevention where this is sought, in 
other words in the climate change adaptation context, the following chapter will seek 
to discuss distributive issues concerning the burden of displacement if viewed from 
the perspective of the concept of international burden-sharing. If will therefore shift 
the analysis to distributional issues concerning more expressly those who may have 
to shelter displacees. 
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CHAPTERS 
Distributive Justice: Burden-Sharing 
Global challenges must be managed in a way that distributes the costs and burdens fairly in 
accordance with basic principles of equity and social justice. 1 
(United Nations Millennium Declaration, 2010) 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter focused on opportunities for distributive justice in relation to 
displacement in the climate change context through financial assistance, particularly 
in the adaptation context. This concerned, largely, the channelling of the financial 
resources required to meet the burdens associated with movement, but also its 
prevention, from those who have contributed overwhelmingly to climate change and 
its ill-effects to those who have contributed little and who with-out such assistance 
have limited opportunities to counter the detrimental impacts of climate change, 
including those arising in relation to displacement (the least well-off). In other 
words, the chapter concerned the burdens, and their alleviation, of individuals, 
communities and states faced with the possibility of displacement. The current 
chapter will again rely on distributive justice notions, this time to explore 
opportunities to distribute the burden that, arguably, are displacees - that is, in the 
context where prevention of displacement has failed - through mechanisms 
revolving around the construct of international burden-sharing. As a concept, 
international burden-sharing has its roots in the development of contribution models 
for NATO members in the 1950s, though it has emerged more notably in relation to 
1 United Nations General Assembly, United 1',Tations Millennium Declaration (2000), para 6 <http: // 
\¥WW.un. org/millennium/declaration/ares 552e.htm>. 
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both regional and global responsibilities (held by states) concerning displacees. 2 It 
frequently arises in discussion, both theoretical and applied, about alleged 
inequalities in the distribution of duties of reception, processing, care and integration 
of displaced persons, in particular refugees, in hosting states. 3 The Preamble of the 
1951 Refugee Convention mentions explicitly the possibility of 'international 
cooperation' in sharing the 'burdens' created by refugee arrivals,4 though agreement 
about what burden-sharing precisely is, or how it could be achieved, enforced or 
operationalised, has been difficult to attain. 5 Gregor Noll argues that, in fact, the 
concept is '[a]ttractively void of precise meaning' 6 and problematic in that '[i]t 
appears to suggest that [ ... ] protection is necessarily burdensome. ' 7 
Nevertheless, limited burden-sharing has been engaged in (and certainly called 
for) in the displacement context in the last several decades. Investigating the extent 
of such sharing, its motivations and impact may therefore be useful when 
contemplating the possibility of inter-state sharing responsibilities in the climate 
change displacement context and therefore distributive justice amongst states 
concerning the sheltering 'burden'. The chapter will, firstly, seek to outline the 
relationship between burden-sharing and distributive justice, arguing that though 
certainly (re )distributive, sharing in the inter-state context is motivated by complex 
nonnative considerations, which differ from what may motivate distribution in the 
adaptation context. The chapter will then place the notion of burden-sharing within a 
2 See Eiko Thielemann, 'Editorial' (2003) 16 Journal of Refugee Studies 225, 225 . 
3 See Matrix Insight, Eiko Thielemann, Richard Williams and Christina Boswell, 'What System of 
Burden-Sharing Between Member States for the Reception of Asylum Seekers?' (Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice and Ho1ne Affairs, European Parliament, 2010) 26. 
4 It does not establish binding legal obligations. 
5 See Benjamin Cook, 'Method in its Madness: The Endowment Effect in an Analysis of Refugee 
Burden-Sharing and a Proposed Refugee Market ' (2004-2005) 19 Georgetown Immigration Law 
Journal 333, 334f. 
6 Gregor Noll, 'Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden-Sharing in the Asylum Field' 
(2003) 16 Journal of Refugee Studies 236. 
7 Ibid, 237. 
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wider context of commitments to cooperation and solidarity under international law, 
highlighting in particular the legal character and validity of such principles. The 
chapter then moves on to outline more explicitly how burden-sharing features in 
relation to displacement, showing both how it is enshrined in the regimes concerning 
displaced persons (largely refugees) and how it has featured in a series of actual 
displacement scenarios (largely mass influx). Another section will consider a variety 
of concrete burden-sharing proposals (in the displacement context), evaluating their 
merit in relation to distributive justice and in relation to displacement in the climate 
change context. Conclusions as to the relevance of burden-sharing to climate change 
displacement will be drawn where possible in all sections outlined so far. However, 
before concluding the chapter, a penultimate section will consider in some detail the 
few burden-sharing proposals already made specifically in the climate change 
displacement context, arguing that most lack detail or an awareness of the short-
comings of existing burden-sharing arrangements concerning displacees. 
2. Burden-Sharing and Distributive Justice 
(Re )distribution - of burdens, costs, benefits - is fundamental to the concept of 
(inte1national) burden-sharing. Motivations for participating in this form of 
(re )distribution vary, however, and how they may be connected to justice is complex. 
Essentially, incentives to pa1iicipate in international burden-sharing are thought to 
revolve around two key considerations. Jean-Pierre Fonteyne, for example, argues 
that what motivates states can be both their functional and moral concerns. 8 Two 
8 J-P L Fonteyne, 'Burden-Sharing: An Analysis of the Nature and Function of International 
Solidarity in Cases of Mass Influx of Refugees ' (1980) 6 Australian Yearbook of International Law 
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particular schools of thought are highlighted by Eiko Thielemann:9 First, cost-benefit 
approaches to burden-sharing stipulate that it is principally driven by rational 
consideration, whereby costs and benefits of unilateral versus cooperative action are 
evaluated and balanced against each other by an actor. 10 Thielemann argues that 
public goods theory, in particular, underlines that collective action can generate 
'positive-sum benefits' (including across borders), which can outweigh any negative 
consequences (i.e. costs) that may be accrued and which in turn propels individual 
actors ( e.g. states) to participate in sharing regimes, thereby fostering a greater public 
good ( e.g. stability, etc.). 11 Relying on Noll, he argues it is also possible to view this 
dynamic through analogy with the rationale supporting insurance: Chapter Six of this 
thesis outlined how insurance may be motivated by a desire to implement no-fault 
compensation. However, the chapter also noted the risk pooling or management 
potential of insurance schemes. Thielemann argues that, when it comes to burden-
sharing, individual actors may engage in it because they may -have a comparable 
perception or expectation of the occurrence of a 'negative shock', and therefore may 
well be willing to pool resources, and thereby to share or disperse the (potential) 
burden, even where they are not themselves imminently faced with the 'shock' in 
question, with the expectation, however, that they are assisted should the 'shock' 
occur to them. 12 John Rawls' concept of the 'veil of ignorance' is important here: 
162. Note in this context also the discussion concerning 'apology' and 'utopia' in international law 
provided in ch 4 of this thesis. 
9 Biko Thielemann, 'Between Interests and Norms: Explaining Burden-Sharing in the European 
Union' (2003) 16 Journal of Refugee Studies 253, 254ff. 
10 Ibid, 255f. 
11 Ibid, 256; he cites Mancw· Olsen, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups (Harvard University Press, 1965). See also Astri Suhrke, Burden-Sharing During Refugee 
Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus National Action' (1998) 11 Journal of Refitgee Studies 
396, 402. 
12 See, eg, Thielemann, 'Between Interests and Norms", above n 9, 256, and Eiko Thielemann, 
'Symbolic Politics or Effective Sharing? Redistribution, Side-Payments and the European Refugee 
Fund' (2005) 43 Journal of Common Market Studies 807, 809 and Eiko Thielemann, 'Burden 
Sharing: The International Politics of Refugee Protection' (Working Paper 134, Center for 
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because at least some degree of uncertainty ('ignorance') about the magnitude or 
timing of future 'burdens', 'costs' or 'shocks' may exist, individual actors pursue 
distribution, accepting implicitly that the 'burden' thereby created might be greater, 
but hopefully lesser, than the one an actor might otherwise face individually and by 
chance. 13 
But actors such as states may also desire to act 'morally' 14 or 'appropriately' 15 -
in other words, in light of more normative considerations: Thielemann focuses in 
particular on the concept or principle of solidarity also known to international law, 
which promotes 'special obligations', particularly amongst those who share the 
characteristics of a group. He argues more specifically that ' [ s ]olidarity can be 
understood as a concern for other members of a group, which may be expressed by 
an unwillingness to receive a benefit unless the others do, or an unwillingness to 
receive a benefit when this will harm them.' 16 The Marxian undercurrents of such 
thinking were highlighted in Chapter Four. What this also -seemingly implies, 
however, is that commitments to burden-sharing are possible only amongst 
individual actors which are already bound and committed to each other on some 
level17 (perhaps beyond the UN Charter, for example, which binds all states) . Philipp 
Dann therefore argues that concepts invoking collectivity - e.g. solidarity, sharing -
are fundamentally different and more exclusionary from concepts of justice, which 
Comparative Immigration Studies, University of California, 2006) 15; relying on Noll, above n 6, 
241. 
13 Eg, Thielemann, ·' Symbolic Politics ', above n 12, 809 and Thielemann, 'Burden Sharing', above n 
12, 15 . See also John Rawls, A The01y of Justice (Oxford University Press, revised ed, 1999); more 
concerning Rawls also in ch 4 and ch 7 of this thesis. 
14 Fonteyne, above n 8. 
15 Thielemann, 'Between Interests and Norms ', above n 9, 254. 
16 Ibid, 257. 
17 Ibid, 258. 
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aim to be more truly universal and applicable universally. 18 But this, of course, 
depends on which justice paradigm or construct one subscribes to . Certainly, the 
original Aristotelian construction of distributive justice ( and those that flowed from 
it in the centuries thereafter) was premised precisely on the notion that it is about 
merit and desert, and access to benefits and sharing of burdens, arising in relation to 
membership in politically ( or otherwise) bound communities. 19 
The justice foundations of burden-sharing are thus subtly different from those 
discussed in the previous chapter. From a justice perspective, the basis for 
distribution in burden-sharing arrangements is not so much that something is owed 
because one pa1iy has contributed to creating the burden another is faced with, or has 
benefitted unjustly from processes that create burdens for others; in other words, a 
dispropo1iionality between benefits and burdens which is causally linked ( as is 
ce1iainly the case in the climate change context). Rather, something is owed because 
a dispropo1iionality simply exists between two parties, without the causal link 
betv.reen the generation of burdens and benefits. Sharing ( distribution) here, then, 
occurs because of relations of reciprocity (the links between separate entities, not 
between cause and effect), either conce1ning those who co-exist in bound 
communities where separate entities also exist as some kind of ' us ', and where 
disproportionality of burdens and benefits is addressed on account of that 
boundedness (roughly the Aristotelian notion of distributive justice), or because of 
the possibility that another ' s disproportionate burden may someday become 'mine ', 
in which instance 'I' would require assistance to the same degree ' I' offer it (roughly 
the Rawlsian notion of distributive justice, whereby action is premised on the 
18 Philipp Dann, ' Solidarity and the Law of Development Cooperation~ in Rudiger Wolfrum and Chie 
Kojima (eds), Solidarity: A Structural Principle of International Law (Springer, 201 0) 55, 58. 
19 See ch 4 of this thesis. 
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possibility that the most burdened actor may someday be 'me ', a notion akin to what 
is known in philosophy and ethics more generally as ' enlightened self-interest' 20). 
Later sections of this chapter will highlight how such motivations to share 
(distribute) have played out in relation to displacement. 
Questions as to 'why' sharing through burden-sharing regimes or relations is 
engaged in by individual actors such as states must also be coupled with questions as 
to 'what' is commonly shared or (re)distributed. Here, Noll stresses three 
fundamental categories typically highlighted by states, or evidenced in their 
behaviour, in the displacement context: a) sometimes the 'sharing of the burden of 
preventing and resolving displacement crises' ;21 b) sometimes the ' sharing of the 
burden of preventing and deflecting arrivals'; or c) sometimes actually 'sharing the 
burden of reception' .22 Within these categories three types of sharing are usually 
engaged in to affect the desired ends: a) norm sharing; b) fiscal sharing; and c) the 
actual sharing of protection/assistance seekers.23 All three have been utilised by 
states to impact the aforementioned categories:24 Noll explains that norm sharing, for 
example, is about policy harmonisation to ensure a similar level of protection and 
assistance is available to arrivals amongst sharers. He shows how this has occurred 
pa1iicularly in the context of the European Union. Someti1nes norm sharing is about 
implementing common minimum standards, sometimes about the even distribution 
of arrivals, sometimes about the common goal to return arrivals or prevent their 
arrival in the first place (naturally the least 'just' option, as this ignores those Rawls 
would likely class as most in need or least-well off). Fiscal sharing, he argues, 
20 See, eg, Samuel Scheffler, Human Morality (Oxford University Press, 1993). 
2 1 In the cliinate change displacement context, this is arguably tied to states' willingness to engage in 
cliinate change mitigation and adaptation measures, the subj ect of the previous chapter. 
22 Noll, above n 6, 242 
23 Ibid, 243. 
24 Ibid, 243f; also Thielemann, above n 2, 230ff 
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accepts that protection/assistance burdens may physically be unevenly distributed, 
which is countered, however, through financial support from other group members. 
Noll highlights that the difficulty raised, of course, is that it is often challenging to 
calculate exactly the full cost of reception and integration (monetarily or otherwise), 
or post-integration benefits, which is why the sharing of actual persons (displacees) 
is sometimes thought more fair and balanced, though not necessarily for the 
individuals concerned, who are turned into commodities in such processes.25 
To conclude, burden-sharing is imbued with the notion of distribution, though 
justice features in this in sometimes ambiguous ways. On the one hand, individual 
actors such as states may decide to share because they operate from behind a 'veil of 
ignorance' which encourages sharing because each individual state cannot fully 
anticipate future burdens and their ability to cope with such burdens independently. 
On the other hand, states may share because they perceive themselves to be a 
member of a group which warrants sharing out a sense of solidarity and belonging 
(Aristotle, but also Marx, are important here). Sharing operates in different ways and 
to affect different outcomes in the displacement context. This may include actual 
sharing - of costs, burdens, resources, persons - as much as the deflection of burdens 
(the Fortress Europe dynamic, for example). Section Four will further explore how 
these motivations and dynamics have played out in practice, in particular during a 
series of prominent displacement scenarios. The following section, however, will 
first seek to position the idea of international burden-sharing in a wider context of 
support for cooperation and solidarity in international law. 
25 Ibid, 244. 
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3. Sharing, Cooperation and Solidarity in International Law 
The notion of sharing permeates international law and relations beyond the 
displacement context26 and is reflected in recognised principles such as cooperation 
and solidarity, which encourage a commitment to support and assist one another 
across borders, and which, arguably, have been 'gaining both recognition and 
importance in the structure of the contemporary international legal order. ' 27 
Referring specifically to the principle of solidarity, Dutch legal scholar Karel 
Wellens maintains that '[b ]ecause [it] is operating across various branches of 
international law and it has permeated both primary and secondary rules, thereby 
protecting fundamental values of the international community, it is endowed with 
constitutional status ' 28 and thus more than inspirational. 29 German scholar Rudiger 
Wolfrum further highlights the transformative power of the solidarity principle: '[it] 
reflects the transformation of international law into a value based international legal 
order' .30 Thomas Pogge and Charles Beitz might argue that this provides some 
support for the existence of a 'basic structure of society' across borders. 
26 Note also the previous chapter, which contained a section on how distributive justice, more 
generally, features in international law. 
27 See R St J MacDonald, 'Solidarity in the Practice and Discourse of Public International Law' 
(1996) 8 Pace International Law Review 259, 259. The Declaration on Principles of International 
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Amongst States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations stipulates: 'States have the duty to cooperate with one another, irrespective of 
the differences in their political, economic and social systems, in the various spheres of international 
relations, in order to maintain international peace and stability and to promote international economic 
stability and progress, the general welfare of nations and international cooperation free from 
discrimination [ ... ] ' . UNGA Res 2652(:XXV) (24 October 1970). 
28 Karel Wellens, 'Revisiting Solidarity as a (Re-)Emerging Constitutional Principle: Some Further 
Reflections ' in Wolfrum and Kojima, above n 18, 3, 5. 
29 Ibid, 30. 
30 Rudiger Wolfrum, ' Solidarity amongst States: An Emerging Structural Principle of Inteniational 
Law' in Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Bardo Fassbender, Malcolm N Shaw and Karl-Peter Sommermann 
(eds), Common Values in International Law - Essays in Honour of Christian Tomuchat (Engel 
Verlag, 2006) 1087, 1087. Though many would argue that international law, as a discipline, has long 
been underpinned by a value-driven approach, even idealism; see, eg, C G Weeramantry, 
Universalising International Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004); see also the debate concerning 
NAIL outlined in ch 4 of this thesis. 
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As is the case with burden-sharing, the premise underpinning principles such as 
solidarity and cooperation is that states do ( or should) act jointly and cooperatively 
in the pursuit of a ' greater public good' 31 (the aforementioned 'enlightened self-
interest' idea), including through (re)distribution, for example of goods, money, 
expertise or, indeed, responsibilities.32 Ronald MacDonald notes how scholars have 
long argued for the fundamental importance of such norms: Eighteenth century 
German philosopher Christian Wolff, for example, contended that states have an 
obligation to work together to enhance their individual and collective condition.33 
Wolffs contemporary, Swiss legal scholar Erner de Vattel, on the other hand, argued 
that solidarity is so foundational to an international society that it is not unlike a jus 
cogens norm, though he admits that there are doubts about its legal character.34 
Steinar Stjerno sketches more extensively the long history of the solidarity concept.35 
MacDonald notes how three schools of thought, in particular, began to crystallise 
over time in relation to the international legal character of the -solidarity principle: 
One contended that solidarity creates obligations only where states expressly create 
such obligations for themselves, for example by signing a treaty which binds them. 
A second contended that even where the concept cannot create legal obligations, it 
nevertheless implies that rich countries must support poorer countries. A third, 
echoing de Vattle' s natural law tradition, contended that the principle is not a 
31 States, in fact, arguably make this commitment through their membership in the United Nations, 
whose constitutive instrument, the UN Charter, which binds all UN 1nembers, requires that states take 
'joint and separate action' for the achievement of an array of purposes, including, 'the creation of 
conditions of stability and well-being [ ... ] necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among 
nations', in particular through the promotion of 'higher standards of living', 'conditions of economic 
and social progress and development ', etc. See art 55 and art 56. 
32 See, eg, Angela Williams, 'Solidarity, Justice and Climate Change Law' (2009) 10 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 493, 498. 
33 Christian Wolff, Jus Gentium Methodo Scientifica Pertractatum [trans. Joseph H Drake (Clarendon 
Press, 1934)] [1764] 156-172, in McDonald, above 27, 260. 
34 Erner de Vattel, Le Droit des Gens ou Principes de la Souverainete (1758) Preliminaires ss 13 ; in 
MacDonald, above n 27, 2f. 
35 Steinar Stjemo, Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea (Cambride University Press, 2005). 
274 
CHAPTER EIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - BURDEN-SHARING 
separate ( or separable) commitment but a norm permeating and inspiring the entire 
international legal order. 36 In practice, the norms have struggled to conform to the 
demands of the first and second school, though they have found expression in a 
multitude of instruments and in a multitude of international law's arenas. Dann 
argues that they are ' easily invoked as ideal but as easily used as a smokescreen for 
inaction or to dilute clear responsibilities. ' 37 
A general commitment to cooperation, at least, is, of course, expressed in some 
of modem international law's primary instruments, including the UN Charter38 and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.39 Beyond this, in relation to the 
international economic order, principles of cooperation and solidarity indeed 
underpinned calls for the establishment of the New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) in the 1970s,40 discussed already in the previous chapter,41 which expressly 
called for greater justice and equity in global economic relations through the 
'promotion of international social justice' and ' international cooperation for 
development' .42 However, the 'one-sidedness' of obligations arguably raised in the 
NIEO push may have contributed to its failure. 43 No more than non-binding 
declarations resulted from the NIEO effort and principles of solidarity and 
cooperation ( or distributive justice, for that matter) can hardly be said to inform in 
36 MacDonald, above n 27, 262. 
"7 
J Dann, above n 18, 55. 
38 Charter of the United Nations, eg, art 55 and aii 56. Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam note that 
'States are under a duty to co-operate with one another in accordance with the UN Charter' and that 
'States are bound by a general principle [ ... ] to cooperate with other States in the resolution of such 
problems as emerge' [refugee flows, for example]. See Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The 
Refugee in International Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2007) 2, also 502f. 
"9 
J Eg, aii 22. 
40 See, eg, Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, GA Res 3281, UN Doc A/3281 (1974) 
and Declaration of I May 1974 Concerning the Establishment of a New International Economic 
Order, UNGA Res 3201 , UN Doc A/RES/S-6 3201 (1 May 1974); henceforth also 'NIEO 
Declaration'. 
41 Ch 7 of this thesis. 
42 See NIEO Declaration, above n 40, Preamble, p 3 and ch 1 (m) and 1 (n). 
43 MacDonald, above n 27,265,280. 
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significant ways the current international economic order. Although institutions such 
as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) are ' engines for creating global wealth' , 
they have hardly ' confronted directly questions regarding the global distribution of 
its benefits. ' 44 
Somewhat more successfully, notions of cooperation and solidarity underpin 
international environmental law,45 albeit also usually in soft law form: decades ago 
already, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration highlighted that there is a need 'for a 
common outlook and for common principles to inspire and guide the peoples of the 
world' .46 Resulting from the Declaration, the Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development's Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution were 
developed, its non-binding Preamble states that ' the common interests of countries 
concerned by transfrontier pollution should induce them to cooperate more closely in 
a spirit of international solidarity [ ... ]'. 47 The Rio Declaration, adopted at the 1992 
-UN Conference on Environment and Development, emphasised the importance of 
cooperation in order to achieve sustainable development, poverty eradication and 
more equitable living standards,48 to be realised, amongst other things, through 
cooperation in science and technology and ecosystems protection, in particular with 
reference to states' common but differentiated responsibilities.49 Similar goals also 
underpin the United Nations Framework Convention (UNFCCC), adopted at the 
same gathering. 50 
44 Joel P Trachhnan, 'The Constitutions of the WTO ' (2006) 17 Europ ean Journal of International 
Law 623 , 641. 
45 International environmental law was also investigated in the previous chapter for its incorporation 
of distributive justic~, more generally. 
46 Preamble. 
47 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 'Recommendation of the Council 
on Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution' (1975) I4 ILM 242 ; in McDonald, above n 27, 25. 
48 Especially Principle 5. 
49 See, eg, Principle 7 and Principle 9. 
50 The previous thesis chapter outlined this in relation to the UNFCCC in greater detail. 
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International human rights law is a further arena where international cooperation 
and solidarity feature, and perhaps most prominently. 51 In addition to the 
aforementioned Universal Declaration, they are expressed, for example, in the 
International Covenant on Social1 Economic and Cultural Rights, 52 the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child53 and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities1 54 all of which leave little doubt that enjoyment of the economic, social 
or cultural rights they enshrine may depend on international cooperation, solidarity 
and assistance, given the prevailing socio-economic disparities amongst the various 
signatories, enabling some, more than others, to guarantee the enjoyment of such 
rights independently. The nature or scope of the obligations enshrined in such 
instruments is debated: in a General Comment concerning Article 2(1) of the 
International Covenant on Economic1 Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), for 
example, which asks states parties 'to take steps, individually and through 
-inten1ational assistance, solidarity and cooperation, especially economic and 
technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the [ .. . ] Covenant' , the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has stipulated 'that 
the phrase "to the maximum of its available resources" was intended [ ... ] to refer to 
both the resources existing within a State and those available from the international 
community through international cooperation and assistance ' . 55 More explicitly 
51 Though note that cooperation, solidarity, assistance and sharing find mention in many other 
international law regilnes, including those concerning humanitarian assistance and international 
development; see the various perspectives in Wolfrum and Kojima, above n 18. 
52 Eg, Art 2 [cooperation]. 
53 Eg, Preamble and art 4 [ cooperation and solidarity] . 
54 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 March 2007, 2515 
UNTS 3 (entry into force 3 May 2008) Preamble and art 2 [cooperation]. 
55 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 'The Nature of States Parties 
Obligations (Art. 2, par. 1, of the Covenant) ', General Comment 3, 14 December 1990, para 13 . 
[italics added by thesis author]. Note that, however, that Asticle 2(3) of the ICSECR provides an opt 
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addressing the scope of the obligation to assist and to cooperate, the same Comment 
emphasises that 
in accordance with Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the United Nations, with well-
established principles of international law, and with the provisions of the Covenant 
[ICES CR] itself, international cooperation for development and thus for the 
realization of economic, social and cultural rights is an obligation of all States.56 
The United Nations Social and Economic Council has further argued that certain 
core rights 'give rise to national responsibilities_ for all States and international 
responsibilities for developed States, as well as others that are "in a position to 
assist"'. 57 In essence, such statements also involve an obligation that states without 
the 1neans to guarantee economic, social or cultural rights must seek the assistance of 
the international community. 58 CESCR has also specifically confirmed duties of 
cooperation and assistance in relation to both refugees and internally displaced 
persons (IDPs ): 'States have joint and individual responsibility [ ... ] to cooperate in 
providing disaster relief and humanitarian assistance in times of emergency, 
including to refugees and internally displaced persons. Each State should contribute 
to this task in accordance with its ability. ' 59 The latter ('in accordance with ability') 
presents an important 'out-clause' . Other restrictions upon the scope of cooperation 
and assistance duties in the human rights context include that they are construed to 
out clause of sorts which pe1mits that developing countries may deteimine separately to what extent 
they would guarantee economic rights to aliens. 
56 Ibid, para 14. 
57 United Nations Social and Econmnic Council, Poverty and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Doc E/C12/2001/10 (10 May 2001) para 16. 
58 See Margit Ammer, 'Klimawandelinduzierte Umweltveranderungen als Ursache fur unfreiwillige 
Binnenmigration: Ist Europa Verpflichtet zu Helfen? ' [Climate Change-Induced Environmental 
Change as Cause of Forced Migration: Is Europe Obligated to Assist?] (2010) 4 Zeitschrift fur 
Menschenrechte 48, 65. 
59 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'The Right to Food', General Comment 12, 12 
May 1999, para 38. The duty to cooperate in the event of disasters is also reiterated by the 
International Law Cmmnission, 'Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters: Texts of Draft 
Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 as Provisionally Adopted by Drafting Committee', UN Doc A/CN.4/L 758 (24 
July 2009) art 5. 
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relate only to a limited array of core rights, referred to also as the 'minimum core' .60 
Finally, it is important to note that CESCR Comments or Social and Economic 
Council Statements, though vital in delineating obligations, cannot create binding 
legal obligations. 
Final Words 
International cooperation and solidarity do exist as general principles of international 
law. Some ascribe constitutional character, particularly to solidarity. Others disagree, 
arguing that although the principles underpin modern international law, they are little 
more than inspirational and guiding and are easily ignored in practice. 61 In principle, 
it is acknowledged that acting with solidarity and in cooperation fosters a greater 
cormnon global good and greater equity amongst states and their inhabitants. l;'he 
principles have emerged in varying contexts and with varying degrees of success: in 
-
attempts to imbue the international economic order with greater equity and justice, 
solidarity and cooperation were evoked to permit fairer participation in and access to 
global economic relations. However, no binding obligations emerged. In the 
international environmental order, soft law norms such as sustainable development 
and co1nmon but differentiated responsibilities are more expressly underpinned by 
the principles of solidarity and cooperation ( and of justice, as the previous thesis 
chapter argued), although they too cannot bind states to specific commitments. 
Promisingly, although wealthy states have rejected a duty of solidarity and 
cooperation in relation to the global economic order, international human rights law 
60 See, eg, Wouter Vandenhole, 'EU and Develop1nent: Extraterritorial Obligations under the 
ICESCR' in Margot E Salomon, Arne Tostensen and Wouter Vandenhole (eds), Casting the Net 
Wider: Human Rights, Development and New Duty-Bearers (Intersentia, 2007) 85 , 95. Concerning 
the 'minimum core' see Katherine G Young, 'The Minilnum Core of Economic and Social Rights: A 
Concept in Search of Content' (2008) 33 The Yale Journal of International Law 113. 
61 See, eg, 'Discussion Following the Presentation by Karel Wellens' in Wolfrum and Kojima, above 
n 18, 39ff. 
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nevertheless stipulates that states ought to comply with a duty of assistance, support 
and cooperation where other states are unable to provide for the enjoyment at least of 
a core array of rights independently. 
The following section will seek to investigate more explicitly how sharing and 
cooperation have played out in relation to displaced persons. It will explore the 
extent to which the particular concept of burden-sharing has emerged within 
international legal instruments, at least as an aspiration, especially in the refugee 
context, as well as the extent to which it has been engaged in, especially during a 
series of prominent instances of mass influx. 62 
4. Burden-Sharing and Displacement: How, When and Why? 
-Uncertainties and unenforceability plaguing the principles of solidarity and 
cooperation also dog the related concept of burden-sharing63 in the regimes dealing 
with displaced persons. Two things are worth noting from the outset: First, as the 
following sub-section will show, the concept appears widely in international 
instruments concerning displaced persons, in particular refugees. Mention of it 
precedes even the contemporary refugee regime. Secondly, however, although 
widely incorporated in important protection instruments, specific commitments do 
not usually arise and are left subject to discretionary decision-making. Burden-
sharing is encouraged and desired but coupled with a hesitancy to commit to sharing 
concrete I y. 
62 Justifying the relevance of burden-sharing particularly in instances of mass influx is Fonteyne, 
above n 8. 
63 Karel Well ens refers to burden-sharing in the refugee context as, in part, 'solidaristic '; see Well ens, 
above n 28, 33. 
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Even prior to the emergence of the contemporary refugee protection regime, the 
UN General Assembly urged its members at its first session in 1946 ' to give the 
most favourable consideration to receiving each [ ... ] its fair share of the non-
repatriable persons who are the concern of the International Refugee Organisation' .64 
The non-binding Paragraph 4 of the Preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention then 
underscored 'that the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain 
countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a problem of which the United Nations 
has recognized the international scope and nature cannot therefore be achieved 
without international cooperation'. The 1969 OAU Convention Governing the 
Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa also contains a burden-sharing 
provision in Article 11 ( 4): 
Where a Me1nber State finds difficulty in continuing to grant asylum to refugees, such 
Member State may appeal directly to other Member States and through the OAU, and 
such other Member States shall in the spirit of African solidarity and international 
cooperation take appropriate 1neasures to lighten the burden of the Me1nber State 
granting asylum [ .. . ]. 
Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam note a 'striking instance of a formal 
obligation to assist' 65 in the 1989 inter-regional Lome IV Convention (binding the 
European Communities ( at the time) and several African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries), which provided for inter-country assistance in response to refugee or 
returnee intakes in the following context: 
254( 1) En1ergency assistance shall be accorded to ACP States faced with serious 
econo1nic and social difficulties of an exceptional nature resulting from natural 
disasters or extra-ordinary circun1stances having c01npatible effects ... 
254(2) The Co1nn1unity shall take adequate steps to facilitate speedy action which is 
required to meet im1nediate needs for which e1nergency assistance is intended. 
225(1) Assistance 1nay be granted to ACP States taking in refugees or returnees ... 66 
64 United Nations, 'Refugees and Displaced Persons' , UNGA Res 61(1), 6i11 Plenary Meeting, 15 
December 1946, para e. 
65 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 38, 503 . 
66 Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, signed 15 December 1989. 
281 
CHAPTER EIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - BURDEN-SHARING 
The Convention was succeeded by the Cotonou Agreement in 2003, which again 
provides that ' [a] ssistance may be granted to [ .. . ] States or regions taking in refugees 
or returnees to meet acute needs not covered by emergency assistance.' 67 
A particular and important debate concerning burden-sharing in the refugee 
context has emerged in relation to states' non-refoulement obligations. To 
understand it, it is important to underscore further the context in which burden-
sharing is most often highlighted. The Preamble to the Refugee Convention already 
noted that burden-sharing is vital where an 'unduly heavy burden' would otherwise 
be placed upon a receiving state. Such an understanding was also enshrined in the 
UN General Assembly Declaration on Territorial Asylum of 1967, which stipulated 
that ' [ w ]here a State finds difficulty in granting or continuing to grant asylum, States 
individually or jointly or through the United Nations, shall consider, in a spirit of 
international solidarity, taking appropriate measures to lighten the burden on that 
State. ' 68 UNHCR (itself described as 'the fulcrum of the syste~ of burden-sharing, 
co-ordinating, monitoring and supervising the equitable distribution of the burden of 
responsibility' 69) has highlighted sharing duties where receiving states are under 
duress more strongly, particularly in the mass influx context, in EXCOM Conclusion 
22: 
[a] mass influx [which] may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries; a 
satisfactory solution of a problem, international in scope and nature, cannot be 
achieved without international cooperation. States shall, within the framework of 
international solidarity and burden-sharing, take all necessary measures to assist, at 
their request, States which have admitted asylum seekers in large-scale influx.70 
67 The Cotonou Agreement, signed 23 June 2000, OJ L 287 (4 November 2010) (entry into force 1 
April 2003) art 72(A)(2). 
68 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on Territorial Asylum, Resolution 
2312 (XXII), 14 December 1967, art 2(2). 
69 Chaloka Beyani, 'Refugee Protection and Burden Sharing in the Context of International 
Cooperation Between States ' (Briefing Paper, GAP Consultations on the International Protection of 
Refugees, 1997) 3. 
70 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee, 'Conclusion 
22 - Protection of Asylum Seekers in Situations of Large-Scale Influx ' (1981) para IV(l). 
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The debate which has erupted concerns whether states ' non-refoulement obligations 
apply, particularly in mass influx situations, only where they can rely upon the 
assistance of third states. Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, though arguing that 
refoulement is not permissible even under the most trying circumstances, 71 for 
example, cite multiple instances where only substantial financial and other 
commitments by third-party states ensured adherence to non-refoulement obligations 
by receiving states. 72 James Hathaway, relying on EXCOM Conclusion 22, argues 
more strongly that the duty of non-refoulement may indeed only apply 'so long as 
there is reason to believe that the risk to [ a state ' s] critical national interests 
occasioned by the mass influx will be countered by timely assistance from other 
states', though this should be an option only where a state 'might otherwise be 
overwhelmed and unable to protect its most basic national interests. ' 73 However, a 
1998 EXCOM Conclusion, which followed one of the more sig~ficant instances of 
refugee burden-sharing in recent history (the subject of greater discussion in the 
following sub-section), stated that although ' international solidarity and burden-
sharing are of direct importance to the satisfactory implementation of refugee 
protection principles; access to asylum and the meeting by States of their protection 
obligations should not be dependent on burden-sharing arrangements first being in 
place' ,74 thus emphasising that non-refoulen1ent and protection remain a duty 
independent of collective action. 
1 Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 38, 335. 
72 Ibid, 336ff. 
73 James C Hathaway, The Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2005) 359, 360 [italics in original]. 
74 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Executive Committee, 'Conclusion 
85 - Conclusion on International Protection' (1998) para p [italics by thesis author]. Note Durieux 
and McAdam who argue that because ' the bulk of Convention guarantees are simply ignored in 
situations of mass influx ', the inclusion of a derogation clause to the Refugee Convention would also 
provide ' States [with] "valuable breathing space'' during the emergency phase '. See J ean-Franc;ois 
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The scope of legal obligations to international burden-sharing in the 
displacement context remains uncertain. In the meantime, the debate concerning 
mass influx, non-refoulement and burden-sharing is not only theoretically or 
academically relevant, as the following sub-sections will show. The goal of the pages 
to follow is to detail how burden-sharing has taken place in practice. The sub-
sections will analyse the nature · and scope of sharing, how this relates to justice and 
how this may, in turn, be relevant to sharing in the context of climate change and 
displacement. 
Origins 
Agnes Hurwitz locates the emergence of displacement and refugeehood as issues 
subject to international legal attention and interaction in the nineteenth century, 
especially in the context of extradition.75 Astri Suhrke notes that the issue of 
-disproportionalities between states in receiving and caring for displaced persons first 
notably arose at an inter-state conference held in 193 8 in France, 76 where an 
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees was sought, but failed, to be created to 
provide assistance in particular in the context of Jewish flight from Nazi Germany. 77 
The aforementioned conditions conducive to sharing - boundedness, adherence to 
enlightened self-interest - did not exist at a time of impending war and economic 
depression, with most states simply resorting to the default 'self-interest' option.78 
Dtu-ieux and Jane McAdam, 'Non-Refoulement through Time: The Case for a Derogation Clause to 
the Refugee Convention in Mass Influx Emergencies' (2004) 16 International Journal of Refugee 
Law 4, 23. 
75 See Agnes Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees (Oxford University 
Press, 2009) 10. 
76 Astri Suhrke, 'Burden-Sharing During Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective versus 
National Action' (1998) 11 Journal of Refitgee Studies 396, 403. 
77 Also Hurwitz, above n 7 5, 11. 
78 Suhrke, above n 11, 403. 
284 
CHAPTER EIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - BURDEN-SHARING 
Concerted cooperation in assisting displaced persons emerged after the War, 
even though the numbers concerned were much greater and little hope could be 
placed on repatriation in most cases. 79 Under the auspices of the newly-created 
International Refugee Organization (IRO), over a million refugees and other 
displaced persons were therefore resettled in the years following the war, largely in 
Europe and the North Atlantic. 8° Commitment to such a large-scale operation 
originated in the fact that the burden-sharing it entailed was, relatively speaking, an 
'internal affair': the war itself, displacees, as well as resettlement countries were all 
tied to Europe in some form. 81 What was shared, in other words, was not only the 
'burden' but, in the words of Astri Suhrke, also 'a sense of belonging to a larger 
community which carried associated obligations. ' 82 The sense of boundedness 
alleged to be necessary for acting in concert (Aristotle's merit or desert essential to 
distributive justice), in other words, seemingly existed. Suhrke, amongst others, also 
-points to resettlement countries ' economic priorities - e.g. , post-war reconstruction 
and nation building - and the fact that resettlement, though significant, was 
considered a 'one-time affair' as factors which contributed to burden-sharing 
efforts. 83 Ultimately, no lasting burden-sharing mechanism emerged but enough 
countries were motivated - whether by macro-economic urgency (self-interest, 
enlightened or not), a sense of historical and cultural responsibility (boundedness) or 
even humanitarianism ( enlightened self-interest, boundedness) - to affect 
cooperation. And the notion of burden-sharing did soon appear in the Final Act of 
the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 
79 Ibid, 404. 
80 Ibid. Though countries further afield, such as Australia and several South American countries, also 
resettled a sizeable number, largely a result of 'hungry' labour markets in such places. 
81 Ibid, 404. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid, 404 f. 
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Stateless Persons, which advocated that: 'governments continue to receive refugees 
in their territories and that they act in concert in a true spirit of international 
cooperation in order that these refugees might find asylum and the possibility of 
resettlement'. 84 
Southeast Asia - Post-197 5: Merit or Enlightened Self-Interest? 
Commitment to burden-sharing was next tested most severely in connection with the 
significant flow of displaced persons in Southeast Asia from the mid-l 970s. In 
particular, years of wide-spread human rights abuses, political persecution and 
increasingly poor living conditions following the surrender of South Vietnam 
resulted in 600,000 Vietnamese displacees by 1979. 85 Wider regional instability also 
led to 350,000 Vietnamese and Laotian refugees languishing in regional camps, with 
over 500,000 Cambodians dispersed at the Thai border, often forcibly returned when 
they did cross the border. 86 Lending the phenomenon its name, -thousands of 'boat 
people' were also scattered in regional waters, many refused disembarkation by 
potential receiving states, thereby facing destitution and death at sea. 87 Sharing 
amounted to little more than a shared refusal to protect. 88 
The gravity and visibility of the situation soon led to an international conference 
convened in Geneva in 1979, attended by delegations from 65 states, which sought 
to devise a regional, even inter-regional responsibility- or burden-sharing 
84 United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 
Final Act of the UN Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 
UN Doc A/CON.2/108/Rev.1 (25 July 1951) Recommendation D (International Cooperation in the 
Field of Asylum and Resettlement). 
85 See Arthur C Helton, 'The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Inda-Chinese Refugees: An 
Experiment in Refugee Protection and Control' (1990-1991) 8 New York Law School Journal of 
Human Rights 111, 112 and Suhrke, above n 11 , 405. 
86 W Courtland Robinson, 'The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees, 1989-1997: 
Sharing the Burden and Passing the Buck' (2004) 17 Journal of Refugee Studies 319, 319. 87 Ibid; also Ceclia Bailliet, 'The Tampa Case and its Impact on Burden-Sharing at Sea' (2003) 25 
Human Rights Quarterly 7 41. 
88 Robinson, above n 86, 322. 
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mechanism. Although the conference underlined that adherence to the joint 
principles of 'first asylum' and 'non-refoulement' remained vital, commitment to 
these principles was to be fostered through international monetary and resettlement 
pledges by third states, 89 therefore effectively asking for no more than the provision 
of very temporary protection of receiving countries, thereby relieving such states of 
their 'burden' , an understanding referred to sometimes cynically 'an open shore for 
an open door' .90 And although no formal mechanism emerged, global resettlement 
and monetary pledges to UNHCR grew immediately and significantly.91 A 
staggering 700,000 persons were resettled in a relatively short timeframe, many in 
Western countries, especially to the United States, still reeling from the trauma of the 
V. W 92 1etnam ar. 
Two things are important to note: First, the scheme evidences the international 
community's willingness to cooperate and share in particular where the mass influx 
-
of displaced persons is concerned, which, as was highlighted in the previous section, 
provides a particularly compelling impetus to share. Furthermore, the influx, too, 
occurred within the particular ideological environment of the Cold War. As Suhrke 
has argued, ' [ e ]ven with the widely publicised plight of the "boat people", it is 
doubtful that humanitarian imperatives alone would have sufficed to sustain a 
refugee programme of this magnitude. ' 93 Is it possible to locate justice aspects in 
this? In the Rawlsian enlightened self-interest sense, the sheer magnitude of 
displacement seemed to warrant action that was acknowledged to be for the greater 
good (i.e. a less unstable region, enhanced protection for protection seekers). In the 
89 See Helton, above n 85 , 113. See also the discussion in the preceding sub-section. 90 See Robinson, above n 86, 320 
91 Ibid, 3 l 9f. 
9? 
- See Suhrke, above n 11, 405f. 
93 Ibid, 406. 
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Aristotelian sense, it may be possible to argue that sharing was merited because 
sharers and sharees allegedly occupied overlapping political and ideological ground. 
Over time, the scheme began to fail. A new, more comprehensive and more 
formal mechanism was therefore devised in 1989 (this time at a gathering comprised 
of over 70 delegations), known as the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA), which 
brought to an end large-scale resettlement94 and instituted systematic screening ( out) 
and repatriation instead.95 Supporters of this scheme have emphasised its 
responsibility-sharing components: '[it provided] the first attempt to implicate all 
concerned parties - countries of asylum, of origin, and of resettlement - as well as 
the donor community in a co-ordinated, solution-oriented set of an·angen1ents for the 
sharing of responsibilities for [a] refugee population' .96 Others have called it a 
' remarkable instrument of burden-sharing', which demonstrates 'the value of a 
multi-lateral framework, supported by the United Nations, in marshalling the 
political capital and resources needed to address issues as diverse as mass human 
displacement, security and development across and within regions. ' 97 In other words, 
it has been noted that the scheme was able to respond to a complex set of 
circumstances and to the varying interests of an array of actors. 
Nevertheless, it also raised the possibility of forced return of those screened-
out.98 And by the mid-1990s states in the region argued that providing even 
temporary asylum to regional displacees had become a burden ' intolerable and 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid; also Robinson, above n 86, 320 and Helton, above n 85 , 111. 
96 Erica Feller, 'The UN and the Protection of Human Rights: The Evolution of the International 
Refugee Protection Regime ' (2001) 5 Washington Journal of Law and Policy 129, 133. 
97 Richard Towle, 'Processes and Critiques of the Indo-Chinese Comprehensive Plan of Action: An 
Instrument of International Burden-Sharing?' (2006) 18 International Journal of Refitgee Law 537, 
569. 
98 Robinson, above n 86, 321 f. 
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[which] cannot continue'. 99 The Southeast Asian refugee calamity, in other words, 
did not ultimately lead to continuous regional or inter-regional burden-sharing. 
What does this mean for justice and for climate change-induced displacement? 
First, that burden-sharing is seemingly engaged in only in response to the mass 
influx of one type of displaced persons - refugees. That this presents a significant 
hurdle for those displaced by the effects of climate change is an issue already 
discussed in Chapters Two and Three. Climate change effects are not usually capable 
of turning people into legally recognised refugee; and not all those who have to 
move will do so en masse, especially where gradual, slow-onset changes are 
concerned. Secondly, distributive justice operates at times in both the Aristotelian 
and Rawlsian sense - sharing is engaged in where it is possible to locate shared 
political ground (the Aristotelian merit) or opportunities for fostering the greater 
good through the prevention of spreading instability (Rawls and enlightened self-
interest). When these conditions subside, or fail to materialise in the first place, 
however, sharing is ceded or is doubtful. 
Europe in the 1990s: Reciprocity and Enlightened Self-Interest? 
Conditions for at least the contemplation of burden-sharing in the displacement 
context have existed promisingly and prominently in the more tightly-bound setting 
of the European Union (EU). Calls for a Common European Asylum System 
(CEAS) grew over the years in what has become the EU. 100 Vital to such a system 
was to be an inter-country burden-sharing mechanism founded in common norms 
99 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), ' Joint Statement - The ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers on the Problem of Vietnamese Boat People' (24 July 1990), para 1 <http: //www. 
aseansec.org/1060 .hhn>. 
100 See, eg, Mathias Czaika, 'Asylum Cooperation Among Asymmetric Countries: The Case of the 
European Union' (2009) 10 European Union Politics 89, 90; also Europa, Green Paper on the Future 
Common European Asylum System (2007) <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference 
=MEMO/07 /229>. 
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and binding commitinents. 101 Decision-making procedures within the Union have 
held back the full-fledged establishment of such a system, 102 however, despite 
repeated experience of, and participation in, burden-sharing on the continent. 
Following on from the distribution of refugees after World War II, in the context of 
the Cold War, this has also included joint participation in resettlement programmes 
for Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, Polish or other Eastern European refugees reaching 
various Western European countries from the 1950s to 1980s, sometimes in 
significant numbers. 103 Whilst cooperation and burden-sharing were principally 
motivated by Cold War ideology in many of these instances (Aristotle's 
boundedness), a more significant test to European commitment to burden-sharing 
occurred when Cold War dogma had all but disappeared and conflict emerging from 
the break-up of the former Yugoslavia generated significant (mass) displacement in 
the region. Over half a million people had arrived in various EU (and other) 
countries by 1993 and calls for burden-sharing quickly arose~ driven, as Suhrke 
argues, by displacees' 'uneven distribution' and the fear that even more would 
follow. 104 Several develop1nents arose in this context. 
Initial proposals were focused on the idea of quota-based sharing within the EU, 
linked to each country's economic prowess and alleged 'absorption capacity\ 105 a 
sort of 'cormnon but differentiated responsibilities idea'. Non-EU states (at the time) 
such as Austria and Sweden envisioned a global scheme and called on 'all states of 
the world to offer shelter and to host, on a more equitable basis, in particular 
tot Czaika, above n 100. 
102 Ibid. 
103 European Commission, Directorate-General Home Affairs, Study on the Feasibility of Establishing 
A Mechanism for the Relocation of Beneficiaries of the International Protection (2010), 4 <http ://ec. 
~~ropa. eu/home-affairs/ doc_ centre/asylum/ docs/final_report _relocation_ of _refugees. pdf>. 
See Suhrke, above n 11, 407. 
ios European Coilllnission, above n 103, 4. 
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displaced persons and war refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina.' 106 Eventually, 
cooperation and sharing was agreed upon in principle amongst EU member states, 
though only temporary protection was the mechanism by which this was to be 
operationalised. 107 
Subsequent documents and debates have tried to flesh out cooperation and 
burden-sharing: In early 1994, the European Parliament urged the European 
Commission to ' draw up plans for a European Fund for Refugees108 and [ ... ] an 
emergency plan for the reception of refugees which provides for them to be 
distributed evenly among the countries of the Community' .109 Later that year, a 
Communication from the European Commission sought to clarify that although 'the 
Union could try to establish some matching of national absorption capacities', this 
would 
not necessarily have to amount to a formal arrange1nent for burden-sharing, but 
[ offering] reciprocal assurance among Me1nber States that, when they are confronted 
with serious problems in iinple1nenting their reception policies; that they would not 
stand alone, but could reckon with active support fr01n other Member States and from 
l U . . lf 110 . t 1e n1on 1tse . 
Not satisfied, and impacted by the lion's share of influx fro1n the former Yugoslavia, 
Germany soon followed this up with a more concrete proposal that would see 
displacees distributed according to a) size of population; b) size of national territory 
106 See Migration Policy Group, 'News Sheet 1993' (1993 ); cited in European Com1nission, above n 
103 [italics by thesis author]. 
107 See, eg, Joanne Thorburn, 'Te1nporary Protection and Burden-Sharing in Europe' (1995) 7 
International Journal of Refugee Law 459. Also Council of the European Union, Council Directive 
2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary Protection in the Event of 
a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts Between 
Member States in Receiving Such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof, [2001] OJ L 
212/12. 
108 Which has since emerged; see European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union, 
Decision 573/2007/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 May 2007 Establishing 
the European Refugee Fund for the Period 2008 to 2013 as Part of the General Programme 
'Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows' and Repealing Council Decision 2004/904/EC, 
[2007] OJL144/l. 
109 European Parliament, Resolution on the General Principles of a European Refugee Policy, A3-
0402/93, [1994] OJ C44/109, 16. 
110 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Immigration and Asylum Policies, COM(94)23 final, 23 February 1994, para 98f. 
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and c) size of gross domestic product in the Union, which would have seen its own 
share reduced from 63 percent111 to 21.6 percent in the context of displacement from 
the former Yugoslavia. 112 The final Resolution which emerged a year later (1995) 
was far less inspired, offering little more than general principles that would 
encourage states to act in a 'spirit of solidarity' and to achieve 'even distribution' 
and 'harmonized action', without outlining specifically how and under what 
circumstances sharing was to be operationalized in future. 113 Evidently, no more than 
general commitments to reactive sharing were possible - not even amongst states as 
closely bound as those belonging to the European Union. 
The European burden-sharing 'experiment' has continued, though some accuse 
it of doing little more than reducing rights and benefits to their lowest common 
denominator (a 'race to the bottom'), with detrimental consequences for protection 
seekers. 114 The afore-mentioned European Refugee Fund has become operational 
and in its current operating period has been allocated Euro 628 -million. 115 Through 
the Fund, EU member states (with the exception of Demnark) 'share the costs of 
reception, integration and voluntary repatriation' of international protection seekers 
(fiscal sharing). 116 Despite the aforementioned challenges, at least some progress has 
also been made in relation to the desired Common European Asylum System, from 
which a number of instruments that include the idea of sharing have emerged: a) the 
111 See Suhrke, above n 11 , 408. 
112 See European Commission, above n 103, 5. 
113 See European Council, Resolution on Burden-Sharing with Regard to the Admission and 
Residence of Displaced Persons on a Temporary Basis, 95/C/26201, [1995] OJC262 vol 38. 
114 See, eg, A Bloch, T Galvin and L Schuster (eds), Changing Asylum Policies in Europe (2000) 13 
Journal of Refugee Studies 9; also Eiko Thiele1nann, 'Why Asylum Hamonisation Undermines 
Refugee Burden-Sharing' (2004) 6 European Journal of Migration and Law 47. 
115 See, eg, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, European Refugee Fund 
(2013) <http: //www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c305 .html>. 
116 S Ib"d ee 1 . 
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Directive on Reception Conditions for Asylum-Seekers, 117 which is about norm-
sharing in reception conditions EU-wide; b) the Directive on Qualifications for 
Becoming a Refugee or a Beneficiary of Subsidiary Protection Status,118 which is 
also about norm-sharing in relation to how one becomes a refugee or eligible for 
complementary protection; c) the Asylum Procedures Directive, 119 about norm-
sharing in asylum procedures; and, finally, the Dublin Regulation, 120 which, to a 
degree, is arguably about the actual sharing ( or rather distribution) of protection 
seekers. 
What does this mean for climate change, displacement and for justice? Burden-
sharing rhetoric, at least, is strong where potential sharers are historically, culturally 
or politically bound. Appeals that sharing is owed in such settings and that it fosters 
the common good are readily made. However, self-interest often prevails and group 
members even in tightly bound settings such as the EU try to shirk sharing or offer 
only a reduced quality of protection or assistance. Even where quantitative 
commitments to sharing may be increased, the quality is reduced, for example, by 
offering temporary instead of permanent shelter. Furthermore, firm and prolonged 
commitments revolve most commonly around norm or fiscal sharing, with greater 
117 Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 Laying Down 
Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum Seekers, [2003] OL L3 l/l 8. 
118 European Parliament and European Council, Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on Standards for the Qualification of Third-Country 
Nationals or Stateless Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform Status for 
Refugees or for Persons Eligible for Subsidia,y Protection, and for the Content of the Protection 
Granted, [2001] OJ L 337/9. 
11 9 Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on Minimum 
Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawzng Refitgee Status, [2005] OJ 
L 326/13. 
12
° Council of the European Union, Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 
Establishing the Criteria and Mechanism for Determining the Member State Responsible for 
Examining an Asylum Application lodged in one of the Member States by a Third-Country National, 
[2003] OJ L50/l. Note that the Temporary Protection Directive is also part of the CEAS, Council of 
the European Union, Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for 
Giving Tempora,y Protection in the Event of Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures 
Promoting a Balance of Efforts Between Member States in Receiving such Persons and Bearing the 
Consequences Thereof, [2001] OJ L212/12, art 2(c). 
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hesitance to share actual displacees. Mostly, burden-sharing is ad-hoc and 
commitment to specific criteria by which sharing ( especially of displacees 
themselves) is to be operationalised, or distribution affected, is often avoided. So 
even where strong group dynamics exist amongst states (Aristotle's boundedness), 
burden-sharing is resisted or engaged in only within limits. 
Internally Displaced Persons 
The chapter has considered so far largely commitments to sharing ( or shifting?) the 
burden allegedly iinposed by an influx of refugees, or de facto refugees. Burden-
sharing debates, in general, tend to be mainly limited to this category of displaced 
persons. This ignores, however, questions of distribution ( and therefore of justice), 
including spatially, which otherwise arise in the displacement context. By the end of 
2012, for example, refugees 1nade up less than one third (10.5 million) of the total 
population of concern to UNHCR (35.8 million) - but the internally displaced nearly 
half (17.7 million, a record). 121 A map in UNHCR's Statistical Yearbook of the same 
year leaves little doubt that the latter are nearly exclusively located in developing 
countries, 122 as are 81 percent of refugees. 123 Yet, categories of displaced persons 
other than refugees are not usually included in international burden-sharing debates 
or practice, equalling the lack of appetite for relieving the burden that is the uneven 
global spatial distribution of refugees (more on this in the following section). UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, urged in 2010 that 'we really 
need a new deal on burden sharing', which would extend international solidarity to 
include the internally displaced and the disproportionately heavy burden of 
121 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statistical Yearbo ok 2012 (2013) 
6; figures for 2013 were not available at the time of thesis submission. 
122 Ibid, 32. 
123 Ibid, 8. 
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displacement prevalent in developing countries. 124 Neve1iheless, such calls tend to be 
rhetorical for now and models of how to share non-refugees, or address 
disproportionalities in the refugee protection burden, either through reconsidering the 
distribution of funds or displacees, have been confined largely to the realm of theory. 
This reluctance is important when considering the relevance of burden-sharing in the 
climate change context: the fact that most of those affected will not be recognised as 
refugees has already been considered in some detail. 125 Emulating current global 
trends, there is an expectation that, more often than not, those who move will do so 
without crossing a border. 126 Even where a border may have been crossed, such 
movement may not cover long distances. What this would likely mean in turn is that 
the lion's share of displacees moving in response to climatic change could be hosted 
in regions already struggling, physically and financially, with large displacee 
populations. That this may not be just, given the responsibilities for displacement in 
the climate change context outlined in prior chapters, is indisputable. But whether a 
burden-sharing 1nechanism could relieve this injustice is undoubtedly less so. Prior 
sections have shoVlrn that sharing does occur, but that commitn1ents to it are fostered 
by a variety of factors which include boundedness (as, for example, is the case in the 
EU) and merit (the ideological value of 'boat people'), factors which may or may not 
exist in relation to climate change-induced displacement, depending on how and 
where it occurs. 
124 Antonio Guterres, in ' Senior UN Official Urges "Burden Sharing in Caring for the Internally 
Displaced', UN Nev,;s Centre (on.line), 8 October 2010 <http: //www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? 
NewsID=36385&Cr=idps&Crl=>. 
125 Esp in ch 3 of this thesis. 
126 See, eg, United Framework Convention on Climate Change, 'Climate Change, Migration and 
Displacement: Who Will Be Affected?' (Working Paper Submitted by the Informal Group on 
Migration/Displacement and Climate Change of the IASC) (31 October 2008), 1 <http://unfccc. 
int/resource/docs/2008/smsn/igo/022.pdf>. 
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Final Words 
International burden-sharing has been resorted to amongst individual nation states in 
the displacement context, 127 particularly in times of mass influx of refugees over the 
past sixty years. Where sharing occurs it arises from a number of motivations, 
amongst them historical responsibility, political expediency, sometimes a sense of 
solidarity or boundedness. Equally, the mass arrival of displacees is considered a 
burden: shifting it from one to the many is seen to generate some greater good (i .e. 
regional stability, no over-burdened states). 128 However, despite such motivations, 
fev.r states make proactive, prolonged or concrete commitments to sharing, either of 
protection seekers or hosting costs. 129 Because displacee arrivals are viewed as an 
affliction, burden-sharing initiatives and commitments are sometimes coupled with 
exclusionary practices that curtail the extent of protection, rights or assistance 
afforded to displaces. 130 
The ,villingness to cooperate and share depends on several factors , including the 
size of an influx, the proximity of an influx, ideology, prevailing economic and 
political conditions and priorities at the time of influx, and sometimes humanitarian 
concern (a sense of responsibility). A degree of existing inter-connectedness (the 
boundedness so important in the Aristotelian construct of distributive justice) ma) 
further influence at least the desire to engage in discussions about sharing, though 
the example of the European Union shov.,rs that sharing regimes are not alv.rays easy 
to negotiate even in the face of political and economic connectivity. Inevitably, 
12
' N ote that sharing and cooperation also feature as part of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, 
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime, established in 2002, \Yhich seeks to devise 
shared strategies and practical cooperation, including around a.sylum management; see, eg, The Bali 
Process, About the Bali Process (2013) <http ://wv,n.v.baliprocess.ne 
P8 
- Also Suhrke, above n 11 , 4L.., . 
129 Also ibid, 40~. 
l30 A11 'b 'd 4 l?f ' so ]I , ]l • -
296 
CHAPTER EIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - BURDEN-SHARING 
visibility and proximity are important factors, which explains in part why the notion 
of sharing rarely extends to the multitudes displaced especially in the global South, 
or in conditions of internal displacement. 
What does this mean for climate change and displacement? If burden-sharing is 
to develop as a response mechanism, it will likely be reactive in situations of mass 
influx, with little hope of a proactive regime emerging. Sharing will be somewhat 
more likely at the regional level, or, more generally, amongst individual states with a 
history of sharing on other or similar matters. 131 Sharing will likely concern only 
those displaced persons who have crossed a border. If sharing includes protection, 
then this will be limited, where at all possible, to temporary protection. More likely, 
sharing regimes will amount to fiscal sharing with the actual protection burden 
unevenly borne by different countries (as is the case in the EU, for example, with the 
establishment of its Refugee Fund) or the sharing of (sometimes very low) standards 
of treatment (norm sharing). Anticipating how burden-sharing could remedy 
displacement inequities which will likely arise under climate change is therefore 
complex. Before considering proposed burden-sharing mechanisms for climate 
change displacement in greater detail, the following section will consider proposals 
which have nevertheless been put forward to resolve the mounting global inequities 
in displacee distribution. 
131 Also ibid, 413. 
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5. Sharing, Shifting or Trading? Prominent Proposals 
Despite a mixed history of inter-state burden-sharing in response to displacement in 
the second half of the twentieth century, interest in the idea remains. The previous 
section noted that UNHCR has called for a 'new deal on burden-sharing', which 
would address distributional issues in refugee protection, as well as the internal 
displacement burden. 132 Although such calls have not generated significant concrete 
action, a host of academic and policy proposals have neve1iheless sought to revive 
interest in burden-sharing. Most acknowledge protection inequities but argue that 
international burden-sharing, especially through the large-scale transfer of money, 
could counter such inequities and should be in the interest of most states. The 
proposals concerned will be discussed and evaluated in light of the purposes of this 
chapter and thesis in the following sub-sections. 
The Hathaway/Neve Proposal - Interest Convergence 
Following years of consultation with various stakeholders throughout much of the 
early 1990s, James Hathaway and Alexander Neve prominently proposed sweeping 
changes to the contemporary refugee regime that would address on-going global 
inequities in refugee protection. 133 Acknowledging fundamental imbalances in global 
protection efforts and commitments, they proposed a system that was to benefit all 
stakeholders: Northen1 states, increasingly reluctant to accept refugees; Southern 
states increasingly faced with protection burdens; and, implicitly, protection seekers 
themselves who would benefit from a system at least fiscally better supported. 
Essentially, the system was to revolve around formal commitments to at least 
l " ? 
.,_ See, eg, Guterres, above n 124. 
133 See Jaines C Hathaway and Alexander Neve, 'Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: 
A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection' (1997) 10 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 115. 
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temporary protection 134 by Southern states and significant increases in particular of 
financial support by Northern states. In other words, inequities in the physical 
protection burden would remain but would be alleviated by financial sharing. 
Sharing was to be operationalised through the formation of 'interest 
convergence groups', made up of hosting 'inner core' members of the Global South 
which could rely on the fiscal and other support of 'outer core' member from the 
Global North. 135 The alleged benefits to both entities have already been highlighted: 
relief from the fiscal burden of protection would be generated for one, relief from 
asylum seeker arrivals for the other. Because both groups would allegedly benefit, 
commitment to forming interest convergence groups was anticipated (it did not 
materialise). The fiscal burden for Northern participants was to be derived based on 
each country's gross national product (GNP)136 and application of the 'common-but-
differentiated' responsibilities notion was to ensure fairness in the process. 137 
The Schuck Proposal -Trading Refugees 
Peter Schuck, writing from the 'premise [ ... ] that the current refugee regime is broke 
[ ... ] and that it needs fixing' , 138 joins Hathaway and Neve in the late 1990s in 
proposing substantial reforms incorporating 'burden-sharing'. In an opinion piece for 
the New York Times in 1994, he initially mused on the advantages of thinking about 
refugees as a tradeable cormnodity: 
When a buyer values a car more than cash, and a seller prefers cash to her car, they 
cut a deal and both benefit. Now apply the principle to refugees. 139 
134 Ibid, 156f. . 
135 Ibid, 189f. 
136 Ibid 203ff. 
137 Ibid, 118, 202ff. 
138 Peter H Schuck, 'Refugee Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal ' (1997) 22 Yale Journal of 
International Law 243,247. 
139 Peter H Schuck, 'Share the Refugees ' The New York Times, 13 August 1994, A21. 
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He later outlines in more detail the 'novel' but 'modest ' idea of a market-like system 
by which an international agency would allocate refugee quotas based on national 
wealth and absorption capacities amongst various regions (he echoes Hathaway and 
Neve's interest convergence group idea). 140 States would then be free to either 
themselves fulfil their protection obligations in relation to those refugees 'assigned' 
to them or to trade their obligations in a market like system. 141 Arguing that states 
would likely be interested in such a system because many already helped to pay for 
protection efforts elsewhere, a process too informal and which suffers from serious 
limitations, however, Schuck argued that only a small further step was necessary to 
implement a more formal refugee market system 'properly' .142 
The Betts Proposal - A Refugee Market 
UK academic Alexander Betts, finally, supporting a UK government proposal of the 
sa1ne year, 143 also suggested 'burden-sharing' under a market mechanism in 2003. 144 
Both were premised on the notion that the current asylum system (in Europe) was 
failing, though the government proposal, cynically, coincided with an announce1nent 
that protection seeker arrivals were to be halved, casting a shadow over its likely 
motivation for publishing its proposal. It emphasised the importance of burden-
sharing and interestingly stipulated that this could best be implemented through the 
establishment of regional (off-shore) processing and protection centres, operating 
costs for which would be borne by Western European states. Four principles were to 
140 Schuck, above n 138, 277ff. 
141 Ibid, 283. 
142 Ibid, 282f [italics by thesis author] 
143 Home Office, Concept Paper Presented by the Home Secretary to the EU Justice and Home 
Affairs Council Meeting: UK Proposals on Zones of Protection: New International Approaches to 
Asylum Processing and Protection (2003). 
144 Alexander Betts, 'The Political Economy of Extra-Ten-itorial Processing: Separating 'Purchaser' 
from 'Provider' in Asylum Policy ' (Working Paper No 91 , Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 2003). 
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achieve burden-sharing more specifically: a) increases in development aid; 145 b) 
enhanced protection in the place of origin or close to it (in said centres); 146 c) claims 
processing overseas and only limited, quota-based admission under burden-sharing 
rules into Europe; 147 d) an emphasis on repatriation. 148 In other words, much like the 
other proposals so far discussed, the UK government envisioned that the actual 
processing and hosting burden would be borne by poorer countries and the fiscal 
burden by those more wealthy. 
Betts takes these suggestions a step further when he argues that 'providers' or 
'suppliers' of protection should blatantly be separated from 'purchasers', which 
would lead to 'efficiencies in the system' .149 The 'refugee market' thereby created 
would mean that rational decisions could be made on both sides about the extent of 
desired participation ('willingness to pay' versus 'willingness to receive'). 150 He 
concludes that such a system could help to overcome the 'collective action failure 
associated with the burden-sharing debate' .151 
Critiquing the Proposals 
Critiques of the proposals have been numerous and have covered legal, practical and 
moral flaws. 152 Deborah Anker, Joan Fitzpatrick and Andrew Shacknove have 
prominently highlighted the following: First, they fear that most burden-sharing 
proposals seemingly leave too much discretion as to how Northern states' 
14-) Home Office, above n 142, 2. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid, 2-3. 
14s Ib"d ,., 1 ' .) . 
149 b Betts, a oven 144, 9, 15f. 
150 Ibid, 15. 
151 Ib"d ?? 
1 ' --· 152 See, eg, Deborah Anker, Joan Fitzpatrick and Andrew Shacknove, ' Crisis and Cure: A Reply to 
Hathaway/Neve and Schuck' (1998) 11 Harvard Human Rights Journal 295 and Ronald C Smith, 
'Outsourcing Refugee Protection Responsibilities : The Second Life of an Unconscionable Idea ' 
(2004) 14 Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 147. 
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obligations, in particular, must be fulfilled. They are concerned about 'cherry-
picking' amongst the more palatable options of the proposals (none, of course, have 
ever been implemented), with others ignored, which might lead to forced removals in 
the South when that region finds itself ill-supported, 153 thereby calling into question 
the triple-benefits often alleged in the proposals. Secondly, they note that under most 
burden-sharing proposals affected persons would likely have little or no recourse to 
the law. 154 Thirdly, they challenge the commodification of asylum seekers involved 
in market-like approaches to burden-sharing and that they could become 'an object 
for bargaining' .155 Finally, they challenge the concept of 'absorptive capacities' 
implicit in most of the proposals, which many N orthem states argue they have long 
surpassed, even though 'no quantifiable and morally valid indicators of such 
capacities exist.' 156 Other authors have pointed to the near- likeness to trafficking of 
some of the schemes. 157 Schuck's proposal, incredulously, includes a suggestion that 
payment to receiving states in the South could be made, amongst other things, 
through the transfer of weapons. 158 
Considering the proposals' relevance for climate change displacement and for 
justice brings up other issues: First, most support temporary over permanent 
protection and emphasise repatriation, which makes them difficult to apply in 
situations where environmental change has led to permanent damage. Secondly, with 
protection or processing centres and protection obligations physically expected to be 
located in poorer countries, whose vulnerabilities to climate change have already 
been addressed in previous chapters, protection seekers might find themselves 
153 Anker et al, above n 152, 304f. 
154 Ibid, 305. 
155 Ibid, 304f. 
156 Ibid, 306. 
157 Smith, above n 152, 150. 
158 Schuck, above n 138, 284 (a 'modest' proposal?). 
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located in situations of particular vulnerabilities, even after they have sought to 
escape vulnerable circumstances. Thirdly, the proposals imply that savings must be 
achieved for Northern states to warrant cost transfers to the South, for example, by 
removing newly-unnecessary asylum systems, as envisioned by Hathaway and 
Neve. 159 Why a double-benefit (less protection duties and savings) should accrue to 
the North is never made entirely clear. In the end, the proposals are lacking from a 
justice perspective. They are founded in little more than cost-benefit analysis, with 
many of the benefits and few actual obligations to accrue to states geopolitically 
located in the North. Although the Hathaway/Neve proposal highlights 'common but 
differentiated responsibilities' and relies on the notion of boundedness (interest 
convergence groups) known to foster sharing and just distribution, mostly the 
proposals aim to prioritise the interests of geo-politically more powerful international 
actors, not balance responsibilities. 
Convention Plus and Beyond 
The 50th anniversary of the 1951 Refugee Convention provided the most recent 
notable impetus supporting discussions about burden-sharing, this time backed by an 
important international organisation. Between 2000 and 2002, 'Global 
Consultations' were facilitated by UNHCR, presenting an opportunity for various 
stakeholders to discuss shortfalls and opportunities for improvement in the existing 
refugee regime. An 'Agenda for Protection' emerged from this process, from which 
eventually materialised the 'Convention Plus ' initiative. 160 An integral part of the 
1-9 
:i See also Anker et al, above n 152, 301. 
160 See Alexander Betts and Jean-Franc;ois Durieux, 'Convention Plus as a Norm-Setting Exercise' 
(2007) 20 Journal of Refugee Studies 509, 511 and Erica Feller, Volker Turk and Frances Nicholson 
(eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR 's Global Consultations on International 
Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003) for an outline of the origins of the initiative. 
') o') 
.J .J 
CHAPTER EIGHT DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE - BURDEN-SHARING 
discussion was how to enhance global commitments, fiscal or otherwise, to burden-
sharing, 161 especially as concerning between North and South. According to 
UNHCR, Convention Plus was 'to clarify the apportioning of responsibility and 
promote a better sharing of responsibilities by states, notably in the context of mass 
influxes and mixed migratory flows, as well as for durable solutions.' 162 
The process soon focused on the development of overarching normative 
agreements, which could form the basis of Comprehensive Plans of Action as needed 
in future. 163 Agreements were to be developed in relation to three 'priority 
challenges': a) strategic resettlement; b) targeting of development assistance; and c) 
responsibilities in the event of irregular movement. 164 The goal was that for each of 
these priorities a 'special agreement' was developed 'between UNHCR and 
Governments, intended [ . .. ] either to be legally binding or to reflect an important 
degree of political commitment.' 165 Whether agreements turned out 'hard' or 'soft' 
-
was not important, as long as they presented more than 'vague declarations ' or 'lofty 
exhortations'. 166 
Ultimately, Convention Plus failed to arrive at anything other than vague 
declarations or statements; no new norms emerged and the process may even have 
fostered geo-political animosity, 167 not helped by the UKs efforts to associate its 
aforementioned offshore processing proposal with Convention Plus, which raised 
161 Betts and Durieux, above n 160, 512. 
162 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention Plus: Questions and 
Answers (2003), 1 <http: //www.unhcr.org/3e4b7c4b4.pdf>. 
163 These were envisioned to be similar to the Inda-Chinese CPA discussed above; see Betts and 
Durieux, above n 160, 512; and for more details Alexander Betts, ' Comprehensive Plans of Action: 
Insights from CIREFCA and the Indochinese CPA' (Working Paper No 20, Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2006). 
164 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Convention Plus at a Glance 
(2003), 1 <http: //www.unhcr.org/403b30684.pdf>. 
165 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, above n 162, 3. 
166 Ruud Lubbers, in Betts and Durieux, above n 160, 514. 
167 See Marjoleine Zieck, 'Doomed to Fail from the Outset? UNHCR's Convention Plus Initiative 
Revisited ' (2009) 21 Journal of International Refugee Law 387 and Betts and Durieux, above n 160, 
514f. 
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reservations for many participants. 168 Few new commitments were made to UNHCR 
and the world's refugees, whilst equity issues in refugee protection remain 
unaddressed. 
This does not mean the issue is off the agenda. Marking the 60th anniversary of 
the Refugee Convention in 2011, UNHCR-hosted an expert meeting on international 
cooperation and burden- and responsibility-sharing (in Amman), 169 which although 
reiterating the sovereign responsibility to protect refugees, noted that collective 
action and international cooperation are desirable. Acknowledging the failures and 
limitations of previous burden-sharing models and proposals, the expert group re-
iterated also that cooperation does not mean simply shifting burdens and 
responsibilities between states, or the devolving of states' responsibilities to 
international or other organisations. However, beyond recommending the 
development of an 'operational toolbox', which 'would provide a set of templates, 
-
actions and instruments that may be drawn on to develop cooperative arrangements', 
no concrete proposals emerged. 170 
Final Words 
Burden-sharing is an issue which remains of strong interest to both scholars and 
policy-makers in the displacement context despite the apparent failures or 
sho1icomings of a variety of schemes proposed at least in the refugee context in 
recent years. The dialogue which has been generated evidences a strong awareness 
of distributional inequities su1Tounding global displacee populations, particularly 
168 Betts and Durieux, above n 160, 512, 514. 
169 The details are outlined in Anja Klug and Claire Inder, ' Introductory Note to the Amman 
Summary Conclusions on International Cooperation to Share Burdens and Responsibilities' (2012) 24 
International Journal of Refugee Law 468, 470 and Anonymous, 'Expert Meeting on International 
Cooperation to Share Burdens and Responsibilities' (2012) 24 International Journal of Refugee Law 
4 71. The points to follow are outlined in particular in Klug and Ind er. 
170 1 K ug and Inder, above n 169,470. 
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refugees. In that sense, burden-sharing is conceptually a worthwhile mechanism to at 
least contemplate in the climate change displacement context and the distributional 
issues it raises: not because climate change will necessarily contribute to generating 
refugees, but because it will further contribute to inequities concerning persons who 
have been displaced and those who have to respond to this, 171 with some 
geographical locations being impacted more than others ( often those whose 
inhabitants may have contributed little to climate change itself), by displacement and 
reception. Proposals which exist around inequities concerning global refugee 
populations evidence a number of limitations, however, which significantly curtail 
an overly optimistic expectation for the development of burden-sharing in the 
climate change displacement context: First, burden-sharing is overwhelmingly 
contemplated in relation to refugee populations and not in relation to other types of 
displacees, which makes it difficult to see a relevant scheme emerging in relation to 
clin1ate change displacement. Secondly, even where a burden-sharing regime 
emerges around displacees other than refugees, what will more likely be shared may 
not be the safeguarding of displacees per se but the financial costs involved in such 
an endeavour. In other words, there would be little hope of the distribution of 
displaced persons themselves; only the hope that displacees would benefit through a 
system (hopefully) 'awash' in money. Otherwise, persons concerned will likely 
overwhelmingly languish in what are poorer regions of the world but hopefully find 
themselves better-supported by injections of money into such regions (which does 
involve a sense of distributive justice; the least well-off are supported in some way) . 
Finally, although the moral obligations to participate in such a scheme may be strong 
in the climate change context, in particular for many developed countries, this would 
171 Several distributional inequities ( especially in the spatial sense) were also discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
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likely be ill-matched by legal obligations, or, if the past is to be instructive, by 
political will. Despite such obstacles, burden-sharing has nevertheless been 
suggested in the climate change displacement context, an issue investigated in 
greater depth in the following section. 
6. Burden-Sharing and Climate Change Displacement 
The idea of burden-sharing in the context of climate change and displacement has 
cropped up periodically, though many proposals lack specificity, or, seemingly, an 
understanding of the chequered history of burden-sharing in response to 
displacement. In a 2006 article, Sujatha Byravan and Sudhir Rajan suggest a 
1nechanism by which the displacement burden ( actual displacees) would be shared in 
relation to historic responsibility for emissions. 172 The mod~l proposed would 
concern only displacees from coastal areas or small islands. In other words, those 
subject to the ill-effects of sea level rise and with it the possibility of permanent 
displacement. Considering that a possible one-metre rise in sea levels would generate 
between 50 and 200 million displacees in total, the authors raise the possibility that 
historically high-emitting countries would have to partake in hosting responsibilities 
of such persons: under the authors' model, Italy, the lowest-emitting country 
considered in the study, would become responsible for hosting at least 8,600 
displacees, the United States, the highest emitter, up to 860,000. 173 The authors argue 
that such a scheme would be palatable to host nations because of the inherent 
172 Sujatha Byravan and Sudhir Chella Rajan, 'Providing New Homes for Climate Change Exile' 
(2006) 6 Climate Change Policy 24 7, 251; essentially, this arguably amounts to a hybrid of corrective 
and distributory approaches. 
173 Ibid, 250. 
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economic benefits involved in the face of 'economic crisis ', including the 'topping 
up' of labour markets in the face of greying and shrinking populations. 174 
In 2009, Margit Ammer175 of the Austrian Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of 
Human Rights pointed to the significant inequities between those who have emitted 
greenhouse gases and those who will likely be harmed by the effects unleashed by 
such emissions, including through displacement. Acknowledging that, under 
international law, there is no binding obligation to alleviate this inequity, she argues 
that international human rights law, especially concerning economic, social and 
cultural rights, nevertheless stipulates international responsibilities to facilitate the 
fulfilment of such rights, including through burden-sharing between wealthier and 
poorer states, and including through assistance to refugees and displacees.176 She 
then points to provisions regarding common but differentiated responsibilities and 
equity, as contained in the UNFCCC, which provide differentiated allocation of 
-
responsibilities, though not, currently, as regarding the consequences of climate 
change on the individual. 177 She therefore envisions a new rights-oriented instrument 
on climate change displacement, founded in both international human rights and 
international environmental law, but located under the umbrella of the UNFCCC, 
which would also contain obligations to share the displacement burden based on the 
availability of resources in individual states and their contributions to emissions. 178 
Ammer argues that the 'form of burden- and responsibility-sharing in relation to 
protection obligations could be similar to those that have arisen in the refugee 
174 Ibid, 251 . 
175 Margit Ammer, ' Climate Change and Human Rights: The Status of Climate Refugees in Europe ' 
(Swiss Initiative to Commemorate the 60 th Anniversary of the UDHR, 2009). 
176 Ibid, 71. 
177 Ibid, 7lf. 
178 Ibid, 72. 
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context, e.g. measures regarding the "sharing of persons" (resettlement, temporary 
protection), sharing of the financial burden [or] sharing of the material burden. ' 179 
Finally, in 2010 academics Frank Biermann and Ingrid Boas180 suggested that 
burden-sharing should be a crucial component also of a UNFCCC Protocol on 
Recognition, Protection and Resettlement of Climate Refugees. Burden-sharing is 
the key idea behind the fifth and final principle which would underpin the Protocol: 
according to the authors, burden-sharing would again be premised on the idea that 
high-emitting countries have a 'moral responsibility' for such persons that are 
detrimentally affected by climate change. They, too, argue that the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities already underpinning the 
climate regime supports this notion. 181 Specific opportunities to share the 
displacement burden might arise in connection with several of the other principles 
which would guide the Protocol, namely resettlement (including permanent), as well 
as 'international assistance for domestic measures' taken in response to displacement 
or its anticipation. 182 
Such proposals have undeniable ethical merit, being based on notions of justice 
which couple responsibility for risks, costs or burdens arising from climate change 
with the notion of responsibility for sharing its worst detrimental effects. Whether 
explicitly acknowledging it or not, such proposals are thus inherently based on 
distributive justice principles. Sharing based on historical emissions, however, is as 
problematic here as it was in the discussions regarding compensation presented in 
Chapter Five. Equally problematic is the suggestion in the Byravan and Rajan 
179 Ibid. 
180 See Frank Biermmm and Ingrid Boas, 'Preparing for a Warmer World: Towards a Global 
Governance System to Protect Clilnate Refugees ' (2010) 10 Global Environmental Politics 60. 
181 Ibid, 76. 
182 Ibid, 75f. 
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proposal that sharing should occur only around one type of displacement driver - sea 
level rise - and one type of displacee - the permanently displaced. It is not made 
entirely clear why sharing should be subject to such limitations. The same proposal 
also models sharing responsibilities around total displacement figures which have 
been largely discredited as little more than 'hype' .183 Arguing, finally, that the 
resettlement of people to historically high-emitting countries would meet with little 
resistance because it would afford opportunities to top-up labour markets is also not 
borne out by experience: although there is evidence that previous burden-sharing 
regimes which incorporated resettlement permitted the cherry-picking of displacees 
who would also be eligible workers in host nations, 184 this leaves many vulnerable 
persons excluded and hardly represents a just regime. 
Ultimately, burden-sharing proposals in the climate change context are 
undoubtedly ethically supportable, though they are hardly based on existing 
international obligations, or ones that are likely to emerge.- Although Ammer 
seemingly argues that the sharing of persons or financial support in the face of 
displacement is uncontroversial, this is not the case in practice, not even amongst 
countries as closely linked as the member states of the European Union. Biermann 
and Boas certainly allude to the difficulties of any sharing regime by acknowledging -
that the overall scheme they propose would far outweigh any schemes ever 
known, 185 posing significant challenges to its eventual emergence. Both nevertheless 
envision the emergence of burden-sharing as part of a treaty regime, which is 
questionable, however, in light of the many obstacles to a treaty-based approach 
already discussed in Chapter Three. 
183 See ch 2 of this thesis. 
184 See Suhrke, above n 11 , who describes this in relation to both the post-World War II and Indo-
China CPA regimes. 
185 Bie1mann and Boas, above n 180, 82. 
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7. Conclusion 
Burden-sharing has the appearance of a desirable mechanism to (re )distribute fairly 
amongst nations some of the costs or burdens associated with climate change and 
displacement, ensuring that none carries such burdens independently or 
disproportionately. At the very least, burden-sharing could ensure that some of the 
consequences of displacement, especially any increase in protection and assistance 
needs which may arise, are met on a more equitable basis amongst states. 
International principles concerning cooperation, solidarity and assistance seemingly 
support this notion; states regularly make at least principled commitments in their 
support, although opting out is not difficult given the lack of a legally enforceable 
character of such principles (the common difficulty for obligations founded in 
distributive justice, as was argued in Chapter Four). 
In the displacement context, burden-sharing has, at times, been achieved, either 
-
through the actual sharing of persons ( e.g. resettlement in the refugee context) ( e.g. 
post-World War II and 1970s Southeast Asia) or the sharing of costs involved in the 
reception and care of protection seekers ( e.g. the European Refugee Fund). Several 
factors influence the likelihood of sharing: the magnitude and proximity of a 
displacement event, any pre-existing political, economic or other connectivity 
between participants in a sharing or potential sharing regime ( a pre-existing sense of 
solidarity or boundedness which merit sharing), the political or economic priorities at 
the time (leading to cost-benefit analysis) and sometimes humanitarian concern 
(enlightened self-interest). Where such factors have occurred in ways that have 
supported burden-sharing in the past, it is conceivable that they may also emerge to 
play a part in potential burden-sharing in relation to climate change-induced 
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displacement, whether such sharing takes the shape of sharing the fiscal or sheltering 
burden. 
On the other hand, burden-sharing is implicated in a number of less-than-
desirable practices, which support the priorities of those who want to shirk burdens. 
Thus burden-sharing is mixed up with state practices which are exclusionary 
( especially where norm. sharing is concerned) or which do little to address in full the 
distributional issues raised by displacement, especially in relation to its spatial 
distribution. Burden-sharing is thereby used as rnuch to deflect as it is to shelter or 
support, 186 which bodes less well for conceptualising it as viable in the climate 
change displacement context. Much will depend on whether burden-sharing in that 
context is driven by consideration of justice - whether underpinned by a sense of 
feeling bound in sorne way to those too heavily burdened (Aristotle's understanding 
of distributive justice) or operating because of the uncertainty of who will actually be 
burdened in future (Rawls' construct of the 'veil of ignorance') , which rnay lead 
entities to act with enlightened self-interest. 
186 See, eg, Thiele1nann, above n 114. 
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CHAPTER9 
Thesis Conclusion 
The arc of the moral universe is long but it bends towards justice. 1 
(Attributed to Martin Luther King) 
1. Introduction 
This thesis has provided a justice-based analysis of the role of international law in 
relation to climate change and human displacement. This chapter concludes by 
drawing out the broad, cross-cutting themes and findings that have emerged from the 
analysis. Maj or insights gained through the application of a justice framework will be 
identified and situated in the context also of possible limitations of this thesis. The 
Conclusion will proceed with the following overall structure: It will, first, justify 
why a justice framework was chosen and what this framework has been able to add 
to legal consideration of the issue. It will then highlight the major prospects and 
challenges, first, for corrective justice and, secondly, for distributive justice in 
relation to displacement in the climate change context, and in relation to international 
la~,. A penultimate section will consider avenues for possible further analysis. The 
chapter will conclude with a few final words about what has motivated this thesis 
and the overall contribution that it has made. 
1 An aphorism, sometimes attributed to Martin Luther King. 
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2. Climate Change, Displacement and (In)justice 
It is not difficult to support the notion that displacement compelled by climate 
change raises questions of justice in some shape or form; that its occurrence, though 
not always certain and the outcome of multiple, and at times complex and inter-
acting factors, is in some ways an injustice. Through the activities of some, 
detrimental consequences arise for others, including the possibility of human 
displacement. This thesis has analysed more specifically whether this is an injustice 
in light of two particular justice paradigms: corrective and distributive justice. It has 
found that it is possible to conceptualise displacement which may occur in the 
climate change context as both a matter of corrective and/or distributive (in)justice. 
In light of the former, displacement was conceptualised to result from harm or losses 
( of home, livelihoods infrastructure, resources, well-being, etc.), compelled by 
excessive greenhouse gas emissions induced by human activity. In light of the latter, 
displacement was conceptualised as presenting an unacceptable burden, distributed 
unjustly in the spatial and ethical sense, with some individuals, communities or states 
being burdened excessively, both with displacement or the task to respond to it, 
whilst others have benefited unjustly from the processes that contribute to its 
occurrence. 
Although justice dimensions 1nay not be difficult to isolate, the literature 
indicates a hesitation to apply a justice-based framework to thinking about what may 
be owed in relation to displacement. This hesitation has been driven largely by the 
apparent complexities involved in the phenomenon. It is true that climate change and 
its effects will likely not alone ( or inevitably) compel displacement. Many interacting 
factors will play a part, including pre-existing socio-economic, environmental and 
cultural conditions and vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, hu1nan-induced greenhouse gas 
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emissions and their effects can be conceived of as an important factor, and this thesis 
has chosen to focus on this aspect and the consequences that should and could arise 
from it. It has demonstrated that it is not enough to simply agree that displacement in 
the climate change context may involve injustices, but that thinking about what 
action should be taken must also be informed by justice considerations. 
3. From Injustice to Justice 
It is one thing to describe a phenomenon as unjust. This thesis has identified how to 
conceive of human displacement in the climate change context as a matter of 
injustice, particularly in light of corrective and distributive justice constructs. 
However, the main contribution of this thesis has been to analyse how the law (in 
-particular international law) might matter in light of either justice construct, and the 
role it could therefore play in the realisation of justice. Amartya Sen, whose 
'capabilities' approach to justice was introduced in earlier chapters, emphasises the 
importance of this point in his book, The Idea of Justice, where he argues that 
,beyond theory, there must be a 'focus on actual realisations and accomplishments' 
in relation to justice; in other words, on 'realised justice', or a justice which is 
practically relevant.2 This thesis has taken this approach by applying the theoretical 
constructs of corrective and distributive justice to the possibilities they raise in 
relation to displacement in the climate change context through the application of the 
law, and in particular, international law. 
2 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Harvard University Press, 2009) 10. 
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4. Justice, International Law, Climate Change and Displacement 
Justice in International Law - The Gentle Civilizer? 
This thesis has shown how international law scholarship displays a keen interest in 
the identification of the extent to which 'justice' (and other normative concepts), in 
theory and practice, is relevant to the discipline. Some scholars of international law 
(especially those who fall within the New Approaches to International Law (NAIL) 
tradition) have evidenced a disciplinary dialogue which veers, in bipolar fashion, 
between 'apology' and 'utopia', between support for the notion of states' pursuit of 
self-interest and the ability of international law to act also as a 'gentle civilizer' 3 of 
so1is, a moderator in favour of justice, for example. Others doubt that justice 
underpins international law ( and relations) but have proposed various means by 
which the international legal order could be re-oriented towards fostering justice 
better. However, the thesis also noted that 'justice' here often means something 
conceptually vague. Little attention is usually paid to considering or applying 
particularised 'conceptions' of justice4 to international law, or a phenomenon with 
which it is concerned. This thesis chose to pursue such an approach. It has taken the 
particular 'conceptions' of distributive and corrective justice and has applied them to 
analysis of the role of international law in relation to displacement in the climate 
change context. The thesis contends that through the application of this framework a 
novel way of looking at the relevance and possibilities of the law in relation to the 
phenomenon emerges. 
But why corrective and distributive justice? Many would argue that justice 
paradigms are not limited to these two. Chapter Four outlined in some detail the 
3 See Maiiii Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law, 
1870-1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
4 See Tom Campbell, Justice (Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd ed, 2010) 13. The author distinguishes between 
particular ' conceptions ' of justice and the overall ' concept' of justice. 
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Aristotelian origin of the corrective and distributive justice dichotomy and how it has 
permeated thinking about justice for centuries. More importantly, the chapter argued 
that the corrective and distributive justice dichotomy provides a comprehensive, yet 
targeted way of 'ordering external relationships'; according to Ernest Weimib it 
essentialises them to 'mutually irreducible forms ' .5 The Chapter also showed how, 
beyond being theoretical constructs, the two types of justice can be and are reflected 
in the law, perhaps more notably so in the case of corrective justice, given its strong 
affinity with tort law. This thesis has shown how the two constructs may also be 
reflected in international law ( and relations), and the demands this may therefore 
raise in relation to particular phenomena, including displacement in the climate 
change context. The following two sections will crystallise the findings which 
emerged in relations to each justice paradigm. 
Corrective Justice - Possibilities and Challenges 
Two thesis chapters (Five and Six) concerning corrective justice exploited a 
con·ective justice distinction outlined in some detail in the theory chapter (Four), 
namely that co1Tective justice has been conceptualised as both 'pure' and ' rough' . In 
its 'pure' fo1m, as argued by Weimib (who leans on Aristotle), what matters is a 
' [ c ]orrective justice [which] treats the defendant ' s unjust gain as correlative to the 
plaintiffs unjust loss. The disturbance of the equality connects two, and only two, 
[pa1iies]. ' 6 This means that both a loss bearer and a particular perpetrator ( or several, 
as long as they collectively, but specifically caused the harm) of loss, harm or 
damage must be identified. This was the goal of Chapter Five, which attempted, first, 
to isolate loss bearers in the climate change displacement context and, secondly, to 
5 Ernest J Weinrib, 'Corrective Justice ' (1992) 77 Iowa Lavv Review 403, 416. 
6 Ibid, 410 
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isolate a particular perpetrator whose actions compelled the loss bearers ' harm, loss 
or damage. Several challenges were identified in relation to the latter. In particular, 
many entities contribute to climate change through greenhouse gas emissions, and 
therefore its ill effects, but no particular emissions are specifically harmful by 
themselves. Displacement is also rarely ever the result of just one factor or easily 
determined casual chains, etc. 
Chapter Five also considered other important corrective justice-related matters: 
namely, whether the re-instatement of a prior state of affairs, so important in 
corrective justice, is possible in relation to displacement. The chapter argued that if 
compensation is implemented thoughtfully this may indeed be the case. The chapter, 
finally, investigated the extent to which corrective justice is a feature of international 
law. It showed that corrective justice features in international law but in ways that are 
severely curtailed: essentially, corrective justice only applies in instances where an 
-international obligation has been breached by a state, so that obligation would have 
had to be engaged in the first place. In, other words, it may be possible to hold a 
particular entity ( a state) responsible, but only in relation to a limited array of 
wrongs, those that arise in relation to the consequences of an ' illegal act'. The 
chapter sought to present opportunities under international law for obligations (and 
their breaches) which would be relevant to the climate change harm context, and to 
climate change and displace1nent more specifically, concluding that this, too, 
provides challenges. Ultimately, the chapter determined that a 'pure ' co1Tective 
justice-based claim would be difficult to establish under international law. Causal, 
legal and other hurdles may simply be too significant for the present time. Chapter 
Five also concluded that this, however, cannot mean that those affected by climate 
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change's ill effects, including displacement, have no opportunities to seek redress, no 
opportunities to seek corrective justice. 
In Chapter Six, the thesis therefore turned to exploiting an alternative 
conceptualisation of corrective justice, as proposed, for example, by scholar Jules 
Coleman, who has questioned why responsibility for correcting harm, loss or damage 
must be imposed 'on particular injurers' .7 The role of 'rough' corrective justice, 
which does not emphasise particular duty bearers, was · the ref ore explored. The thesis 
argued that 'rough' corrective justice may be able to overcome some of the causal 
hurdles which challenge a possible claim under 'pure' corrective justice. Namely, 
with a focus on a particular duty bearer gone, particularised fault no longer matters 
either, and opportunities to affect loss recovery under no-fault mechanisms arise. The 
chapter explored, specifically, the role of insurance as no-fault compensation, 
including support for such a mechanism under international law and its relevance to 
the climate change displacement context. The chapter concluded that ' rough' 
corrective justice, implemented through insurance, would overcome important causal 
hurdles raised in the climate change context and implement a more efficient and fair 
compensatory system, one that is also highly relevant in the displacement context. 
Distributive Justice - Possibilities and Challenges 
The thesis acknowledged that the notion of compensation, and therefore of corrective 
justice, remains politically sensitive, if not altogether unpalatable, and legally 
challenging in the climate change context. It highlighted the significant resistance, 
certainly, to the potentially emerging loss and damages mechanism within the the 
international climate change negotiations, and the possibility of compensation for 
7 Jules Coleman, 'Tort Law and the De1nands of Corrective Justice ' (1992) 67 Indiana Law Journal 
349, 352 [italics added by thesis author]. 
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loss, harm or damage which it raises (Chapter Six). The thesis therefore also 
explored a different justice construct in relation to climate change, displacement and 
to international law. Later chapters of the thesis took the construct of distributive 
justice and applied it to questions of justice and of responsibilities in the climate 
change and displacement context. 
Chapters Seven and Eight explored two possible distributive injustices raised by 
displacement in the climate change context, and the consequences which should arise 
from this: first , Chapter Seven explored the injustice that those who may face 
displacement are distributed unevenly, with some places, often those who have 
contributed little to greenhouse gas emissions, expected to be impacted more 
significantly. The chapter argued that the international climate change regime accepts 
that distributive injustices arise in relation to climate change and that those most 
burdened should be assisted by those least burdened and most responsible for 
greenhouse gas emissions as a matter of distributive justice. The-chapter also related 
this understanding back to the distributive justice theories of both John Rawls and 
Amartya Sen, which were introduced in detail in Chapter Four. Importantly, Chapter 
Seven argued that the distributive justice foundations of the international climate 
change regime may be of fundamental importance to resolving the distributive 
injustices involved in displacement in the climate change context for those affected, 
as displacement (and other human mobility-related matters) has found some 
expression in the international assistance framework being set up under the climate 
change regime. However, Chapter Seven also concluded that although fundamental 
commitments to relieving the plight of those burdened disproportionately (the least 
well-off, to put it in Rawls ' terms) by the impacts of climate change have been made, 
the realisation of distributive justice via the international climate change regime is 
320 
CHAPTER NINE THESIS CONCLUSION 
hampered by a lack of concrete obligations to contribute (financially and otherwise) 
to that regime. Distributive justice in the context of climate change and displacement 
is therefore doubtful if it is to arise in connection with the international climate 
change regime. 
The problem just mentioned - between theoretical and actual commitments 
made - is one that plagues distributive justice. Chapter Four, in particular, 
highlighted how distributive justice may support weaker obligations or duties, as it is 
not about the re-instatement of a prior right, one that an entity held in the first place. 8 
In practice, this often means that distributive justice is resolved through no more than 
voluntary commitments made by implicated duty bearers, a fact that also plays out in 
the context of climate change, where distributive injustices are widely 
acknowledged, as are responsibilities which should arise from this, but commitments 
to actually resolving such injustices are often lacking. 
Chapter Eight, finally, explored distributive injustices which arise in connection 
with receiving, sheltering or assisting displacees. The chapter argued that this burden 
will likely be distributed inequitably amongst states but sought to investigate whether 
the concept of international burden-sharing might provide a basis by which to think 
about distributive justice in this context. The chapter outlined the connection 
between burden-sharing and distributive justice, arguing that both Rawls ' concept of 
the 'veil of ignorance', which makes actors pursue equity in light of prevailing 
uncertainties, and Aristotle ' s notion of distributive justice amongst deserving, 
bounded actors are important. The chapter also identified burden-sharing, as well as 
related concepts such a solidarity and cooperation, as goals of international law. The 
chapter investigated international legal commitments to burden-sharing and how it 
8 See also Izhak Englard, Corrective and Distributive Justice: From Aristotle to Modern Times 
(Oxford University Press, 2009) 35. 
321 
CHAPTER NINE THESIS CONCLUSION 
has panned out in relation to a number of prominent displacement scenarios. 
Ultimately, the chapter concluded that burden-sharing is both promising and doubtful 
in the climate change and displacement context, not least because it usually is 
practiced ( or contemplated) only in relation to one type of diplacee - refugees - and 
in the context of their mass arrival. International burden-sharing has the potential to 
address distributive injustices related to climate change and displacement - certainly 
those faced by certain states - but whether it will, in practice, emerge as a 
distributive mechanism is not certain. 
Final Words 
This thesis has offered another way of asking questions about, and understanding the 
role of, international law in relation to climate change and displacement. Applying a 
justice framework has meant that questions of responsibilities which arise in 
connection with undeserved burdens or harms have permeated the analysis where 
they have not usually done so before. The justice approach has helped to ensure that 
questions are asked of the law that are not only integral to the positive law's inherent 
principles and opportunities, but which have broader relevance. On the other hand, 
keeping the analysis relatively close to the law has helped this thesis to avoid the 
trappings of an analysis focused 'only' on justice, which could easily have become 
unbound and possibly overly idealistic. The significant contribution of this thesis is 
thus not that it has derived a single, yet-uncovered legal resolution to the 
phenomenon that lies at the heart of its investigation, but that a unique lens has 
provided valuable insights about the relevance of the law. This approach has not so 
much been about being close to the possibilities of the law but the responsibilities 
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towards those affected by a great injustice and the legal consequences which could 
and should arise from this. 
5. Future Research and Analysis 
There are a number of inter-related areas of inquiry which this thesis has not pursued 
but which warrant significant further attention. Three, in particular, deserve some 
mention: First, despite the fact that this thesis is not focused exclusively on theory, it 
has nevertheless been strongly bound by theory ( and in particular Western 
philosophical tradition). What this means is that it has paid relatively little attention 
to what justice might, in practice, mean to those who may be affected by 
displacement. Realising justice, ultimately, will also require the engagement of those 
who experience or fear the claimed injustice, or are likely to be beneficiaries of the 
achievement of justice. What might justice look like to them - in theory and/or 
practice - and in their own words? The scope of this thesis has meant that this 
dimension was not incorporated in the research, but the author recognises that it 
deserves attention. A second issue that has not been resolved through this research, 
and which is related to the first issue, is the relevance of participatory justice in 
realising both corrective and distributive justice through international law in relation 
to climate change and displacement. A lot of emphasis in the thesis has been on 
states being the parties in the rendering and receiving of what is due. But of course, 
receiving what is due at that level may not necessarily translate into justice for 
individuals who are affected. Not all states may be inclined to achieve what would 
amount to a just outcome for impacted persons. Others might be so inclined but 
might struggle to get their views and priorities acknowledged or implemented. 
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Questions concerning participatory justice, including how it relates to international 
law, therefore deserve a much more significant amount of attention than has been 
possible in this thesis. Finally, participatory justice is not the only additional justice 
construct which may deserve attention in relation to the thesis topic. Although this 
thesis has contended that the corrective/distributive justice dichotomy provides an 
essential and comprehensive justice paradigm, and most other justice constructions 
likely fit under , its umbrella, many other justice theories potentially deserve 
contemplation. Given the scope of a doctoral dissertation, it has not been possible to 
consider them all. One final note is that justice theory provides one way of asking 
about responsibilities and the consequences of certain actions and interactions. 
Questions of responsibility, which undoubtedly deserve to be asked in relation to 
anthropogenic climate change, and in particular in relation to its detrimental 
consequences, may also, however, be approached from within frameworks other than 
justice. 
6. Final Words 
Like n1any of those who write about the possibility of displacement in the climate 
change context, the writer of this thesis was motivated to engage with the issue 
because of the grave justice concerns that it undoubtedly raises. With the advent of 
anthropogenic climate change, many may find their livelihoods or sense of well-
being affected negatively by the often detrimental effects of a phenomenon which 
they neither created nor desired. This seems monumentally unfair, in particular when 
considering that the benefits which have accrued from the processes that lead to 
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anthropogenic climate change may be enjoyed elsewhere. Like others who write 
about displacement in the climate change context, or advocate around it, this thesis 
was motivated by a sense of outrage - a sense that 'something must surely be done' 
in response to an issue which is emerging, at least in part, because humanity's ( or at 
least a section of it) appetite for burning fossil fuels is seemingly unbridled and 
difficult to control. Where this thesis has hopefully made a worthwhile contribution 
is by demonstrating that it is important to not only understand and demarcate the 
issue itself as one infused with justice dimensions. Rather, the thesis has argued that 
justice considerations must play a pivotal role concerning its resolution. What justice 
' thinking' can undoubtedly add here is that any attempt at resolution must include 
asking questions concerning responsibility - and the consequences, including legally, 
which should arise when displacement is viewed in such a light. 
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